IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT
in the Time of
LAZARO CARDENAS

by

JAMES WALLACE WILKIE

University of California
1959
Ideological Conflict in the Time of Lázaro Cárdenas

By

James Wallace Wilkie
A.B. (Mexico City College) 1958

THESIS
Submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS
in
History
in the
GRADUATE DIVISION
of the
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Approved:

[Signature]

Deposited in the University Library

[September 1959]

Date Librarian
The Church-State conflict in the Mexico of the 1930's was determined by the course of President Lázaro Cárdenas' Mexican Socialism. The rise of socialism was accompanied by increased State struggle with the Church. Cárdenas' anti-Church policy was one of the forces of his radicalism. He demanded enforcement of the Constitution of 1917 and the triumph of socialism over Catholic Action during his governorship of Michoacán State, 1928-1932. He was vigorous in his persecution of religion. He set definite goals to win the ideological struggle against the Church, an institution which he believed held the people in ignorance and bondage to the detriment of the State. The educational provisions of the socialist Six Year Plan for his presidential term 1934-1940 were embodied in Article 3 of the Constitution to provide this victory.

The basic ideological conflict between Church and State was caught up in the governmental inter-party battle between the socialists and Plutarco Elías Calles, strong man of Mexico from 1924 to 1934. Calles was once a “socialist,” if not ideologically at least to gain position in the times of Revolutionary philosophy. He turned conservative as his wealth
and power increased; he tried to arrange peace within México, and he tried to keep peace between Mexico and the United States. The Socialist wing within the government party resisted Calles' conservative abandonment of the ideals of the Revolution and fought for power and position until in 1933 they forced him to compromise to continue his leadership. Socialism triumphed when Cárdenas came to the presidency, but the victory was dulled when Cárdenas found that he had to compromise to maintain leadership and keep the Six Year Plan and Revolution in motion. Cárdenas came to power by compromise, and he governed by compromise.

Many forces acted upon Cárdenas including the agrarian problem, labor difficulties, oil monopoly, foreign interests, and fascism, as well as the Church reaction and the Calles problem. In 1935 Calles tried to assert his power over President Cárdenas. In the resulting power struggle, Cárdenas began to abandon his quarrel with the Church. Cárdenas is credited with changing the government's anti-Church policy from one of strictness to one of leniency because he was no longer under Calles' domination. This does not seem to be the case. Rather Cárdenas had to change his policy because he broke with Calles and had to gain a broader base of mass support to continue in power. In 1939 Cárdenas was accused of retreating from his principles and
he realized that he was losing the ideological battle of the Revolution. In a last desperate and bitter measure Cárdenas enacted enabling legislation for Article 3 of the Constitution to renew the government education´s battle for the victory of socialism over Catholicism. The provisions were, however, never enforced because in 1940 the current of reaction against socialism was too strong.

The clergy was not united after 1925 as the right wins initiated a battle for Church rights. The moderates eventually won a compromise with the government in 1929, however and the Cárdenas attack of the 1930's lost momentum when the Church refused to fight. As step by step social, political and economic event, pushed upon Cárdenas, he no longer could battle the Church nor even court renewed difficulties. His Church and education programs became less controversial as they became less important in the series of crises acting upon his administration. This thesis examines those forces working on Cárdenas that changed his anticlerical policy. Neither the Church nor the government won the ideological conflict. The Church had the 1940 election advantage of being on the side of the trend against socialism, but the State had taken tremendous strides in the direction of anticlerical legislation.
CONTENTS

PREFACE........................................................................................................................................ ii

CHAPTER .................................................................................................................................................. 1

I. THE CLASH OF CHURCH AND STATE PHILOSOPHIES ........................................ 1
   Liberalism
   Positivism
   Socialism

II. The RENEWED CONFLICT .................................................................................. 18
   Veracruz State Action
   Federal Action
   Cárdenas in Michoacán
   Cardenas´ Presidential Candidacy
   The P.N.R. Querétaro Convention of 1933
   The Campaign
   Condition of Mexico in 1934
   Calles´ Guadalajara Speech
   Cárdenas Takes the Reins of Presidency
   “Coyoacán Affair”

III. SOCIALISTIC EDUCATION ................................................................................. 54
    The Antecedents of the Socialist Six Year Plan for Education
    Sexual Education
    The Socialist Six Year Plan for Education
    Government Education Methods
    Reaction
    Counter-Reaction

IV. AMERIORATION OF CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS ..................................... 82
    Conflict Between Cárdenas and Calles
    The Demands for United States Intervention in Mexico.
    Renewal of the Cárdenas-Calles Conflict
CHAPTER I

THE CLASH OF CHURCH AND STATE PHILOSOPHIES

Mexico's Church-State clash of the 1930s was another cycle in the long number of running battles between liberalism and conservatism following independence from Spain in 1821. During Spanish colonial rule the Roman Catholic Church was equated with the state power, and as such was a political arm inseparable from the crown. With his power, the Church was likewise identified with the wealth and influence of the monarchy. The bloody battles in Mexico for independence from Spain between 1810 and 1821 were not supported by the Church hierarchy until events in Spain required that Mexico be Independent to maintain conservatism.¹ Anticlericalism grew as the Church was viewed as a vested interest anxious to maintain the status quo. The Church acted to oppose reform and also maintain its property which was estimated by a leading Catholic historian to be one-half of the productive land in New Spain at the end of the colonial period.²

Three movements characterize Mexico since independence, thought there were many cross currents of forces. The movement from 1821 to 1876 was of liberal nature. Positivism came to the force between 1876 and 1910, and out of the chaos
of the Revolution of 1910 arose the Nationalistic Socialism that has lasted to the 1950’s. During these movements, the persecution of the Church by the Mexican Government was dependent upon political affairs.

Liberalism

The most distinguishing feature of liberals and conservatives was their position on the role of central and federal governments as well as their position of Church and clergy. Federalism meant laissez-faire in government and business, and end to the ejido or communal land ownership system, and dispersal of the Church’s landed wealth.

In 1823 a wing of the Republicans favored a centralist government against the federalist desire to imitate the United States. Combining with the one-time monarchist to form a party against the liberals, the conservatives generally stood for the traditional social, political, and economic order. Specifically they advocated central government and continuance of class and corporate privileges, especially for the Catholic Church. As the issues came into focus, the landed aristocracy, clergy, and higher army officers joined against the professional men, intellectuals and small business men.
The resulting Constitution of 1824 was federalistic but guaranteed the Church privileges, for at that early date even the more radical liberals still favored the Church’s position. Anticlericalism was always against the temporal power of the Church, rather than the spiritual. The Church was recognized as a corporate body within the state and granted special privileges. Article 3 established Catholicism as the state religion.

From 1821 to 1855 the conservatives and moderates kept rein on the rising liberal opposition and its several abortive attempts against the clerics. The radical liberals did not effectively gain control of the political scene until 1855 when Santa Anna’s dictatorship was overthrown. The nineteenth century liberals fought to form a nation like the United States and against a Church holding onto its old ideals. They failed to achieve their lay state based on economic free enterprise, not because of Church opposition, but due to inherent economic and social conditions different from those creating popular republics in other lands. If the Church owned one-half the wealth of Mexico, the other half was controlled by a small oligarchy quite happy with the status quo: neither moneyed faction wanted change.

Benito Juárez was the symbol of the Reform. In 1855
his liberals leadership gave Mexico the Ley Juárez abolishing the religious and military fuero or right to try their own members, and the 1856 Ley Lerdo requiring the Church to sell its real estate not used directly in Church services. The Constitution of 1857 incorporated these decrees and forbade compulsory fulfillment of religious vows. The Constitution also provided free education, guaranteed freedom of the press, speech, assembly, and the right to bear arms.\textsuperscript{8} It was not a radical document; it attempted to establish a bourgeois federal republic.\textsuperscript{9} It can only be accused of being unrealistic in its idealism, but so can all Mexican constitutions.

Enforcement of the Constitution of 1857 was a difficult matter. The conservatives resisted. The clergy saw in the provision forbidding religious corporations owning or loaning money on property not directly used for religious purposes a drastic threat. The result was the War or Reform.\textsuperscript{10} In the fury of the liberal attack on the conservatives holding the capital, Juárez issued the Reform Laws to counter the Church´s support of conservatism.\textsuperscript{11} The law of 1859 authorized confiscation of all Church properties except buildings of residence and worship, suppression of the religious orders, and establishment of civil registry for birth, marriage, and death. These laws eventually became part of the Constitution.
Though the Constitution of 1857 vested sovereignty in the people, the liberals did not separate Church and State openly until 1859. The confiscated lands were sold, not to the peons who had no money but to the already wealthy who chose to become hacendados in spite of the threat of the punishment of God.\textsuperscript{12} The break up of corporate land holdings to carry out the idea of individual land ownership also contributed to the new hacendado class when the Indian was outwitted of his new property by shrewd lawyers.\textsuperscript{13}

The Maximilian-French intervention in Mexico was partly the result of the Church-State battle of the War of Reform. The idea of monarchy still held on tenaciously and the Church and army clung to it to regain their ancient privileges.\textsuperscript{14} With the execution of Maximilian in 1867 and the eclipse of the Church party, Juárez considered the Reform accomplished.\textsuperscript{15} He resolved to reestablish some harmony in the nation by reenfranchising the clergy and enforcing the Church-State laws with fairness. With the Juárez conciliatory policy, the Church regained some former prestige and influence. The foundation for the Porfirio Díaz relaxation of Church-State conflict and conciliation between Catholics and liberals was laid by 1872, the year Juárez died.\textsuperscript{16}
After years of war and chaos between the extremes of Reform and conservatism, it was not unnatural that influential Mexicans interested in peace and prosperity should seize upon Positivism as a means to end the anarchical liberalism. Rationalizing the August Comte Positivistic fact and phenomena philosophy of order and science with doses of Herbert Spencer’s Social Darwinism, the Mexican bourgeoisie arrived at a “Positivistic” solution. The middle class of Mexico was the rightful ruler; evolution rather than revolution was the way to order and progress. The Juárez Reform was not accepted as the conservatives created opposition which led to turmoil. A strong man’s rule was needed to obviate violence and Porfirio Díaz filled all the qualifications that were needed to establish order.

Positivistic education was instituted in the government controlled secondary schools to insure a strong base for the new order. While the liberals were optimistic about education as a means to perfect the Mexican nation, the Positivists saw less hope for the backward nation. The maintenance of order and protection of the small middle class was more than enough for scientific education to accomplish. This education was not good medicine for the Catholic Church,
for it concentrated on fact and phenomena to exclude speculation on ultimate causes or origins. Since the attack on the Church was indirect, the Church chose to accept the modus vivendi. The anticlerical laws were not all enforced, though they remained unchanged.

Socialism

The Revolution of 1910 against the Díaz group soon looked as if it were no Revolution at all. Francisco I. Madero, the rebel leader who took the presidency in 1911, campaigned on a platform of liberal juridical reform and individual liberty. Once he became president the agrarian problem was forgotten in his heavily conservative cabinet. The middle class provincials had only overthrown the middle class Positivists. Leopoldo Zea believed that a plutocracy of proprietors was succeeded by a plutocracy of former proletarians who emerged as a new privileged class. The Revolution only vindicated the Positivistic axiom that “progress” always generates a privileged class (dogma of the “survival of the fittest”). And Madero, in demonstrating the plausibility of victorious rebellion on the country, could not control its repercussions. He sank in the quagmire of the Ten Tragic Days of 1913 that shook the country.
On Madero’s death, his supporters threw their weight to the avenging Venustiano Carranza who vowed to put down General Victoriano Huerta’s usurpation of power. Against both these opposing sides stood the radical northerners under Pancho Villa and southern guerrillas of Emiliano Zapata who revolted against Madero and continued their fight for the landless. From this malaise of Constitutionalist vs. reactionaries vs. radicals emerged the Social Revolution calling for land, free labor association, and the right to strike.22

But the Revolutionaries were not the only ones demanding social reform. Catholic Social Action following Díaz’s exile was more advanced than that of the liberals or than that emerging in the Constitution of 1917.23 The aim of the Action was to remedy social evils with Catholic principles which would prevent any temptation of society to depart from the Church for socialism. Catholic Action’s land and labor reform failed in the chaos of battle following Madero’s death, and it failed in unrealistic appeals for land divisions by process of law or Christian charity.24 In supporting Huerta’s reactionary government and lending it money, the church stepped to the anti-revolutionary side.25

The Carranza revolution and 1915 victory by the middle class Liberals who were lawyers, teachers, bankers, small
businessmen and ranchers was a continuation of Madero’s work to end central government in favor of the provinces.\textsuperscript{26} Provincial control of education was Carranza’s means to break down the capital’s control of the country. His fear of centralism drove him to the extreme of no national authority at all.

The 1917 Constitutional Convention that Carranza called to rubber-stamp his liberalism of separation of Church and State, toleration of all fights, and fulfillment of the Constitution of 1857 instead wanted more socialism. The provinces sent delegates, many of whom were radical agrarians;\textsuperscript{27} the result was a basically liberal document built on a federal framework with the major articles socialistic.

Whereas in 1875 Article 3 made education free, in 1917 it also made private schools secular and subject to government regulation. Article 27, based on Spanish colonial precedents, brought all land under eminent domain by giving the nation the right to impose limits on private property and regulate national resources to conserve and equitably distribute the wealth. Article 123 proclaimed the rights of labor. And Article 130 carried the separation of Church and State to State domination of Church.\textsuperscript{28} Other major provisions included prohibition of monastic orders and vows as
well as denial of juridical personality to religious institutions. All Church buildings remained government property, state legislatures were empowered to fix the maximum number of clergy, and no jury trial was allowed for violation of Constitutional provisions. Minor anti-religious clauses banned public worship, forbade the Church to hold real property, prohibited foreign clergy, and denied priest the right to engage in politics or criticize the government.29

These provisions of the Constitution clashed with Catholic canon law. If they were not a direct attack on religious freedom, they interfered with dogma.30 According to dogma, the Church and State are to work together.31 The Church is higher in the divine order than the State so the State is not competent to restrict the Church.32 Civil governments must not fall into the error of abolishing laws compelling monastic vows,33 education should be reserved to Church control,34 the Papacy is opposed to free exercise of non-Catholic religion,35 and excommunication is prescribed as punishment for those who despoil the Church´s temporal possessions.36 The State must submit to the Church or there are only two alternatives. First, continuous strife must result as the Church struggles to obtain a situation favorable to its ideology. The Church may bide its time with compromise
with the State while it gains strength for this struggle. The second alternative, which is submission by the State to the Church, is the only real solution to the conflict.\textsuperscript{37} The outmaneuvered Carranza also opposed the document, for it went far beyond his desires, and though he signed it, he did not enforce it. Without enabling legislation there was neither crime nor punishment for violation of the Constitution until 1926 Law of Worship and Penal Code Reforms. The liberal-socialist battle ended with Carranza’s 1920 assassination. The socialist-Church battle was finally free to develop. In 1923 the clergy conducted a ceremony that it believed was within its rights. The monument to Christ the King at Cerro de Cubilete, the geographical center of the Republic near León, Guanajuato, consecrated the Republic to Christ, hence the Church as Christ’s representative as the sovereign power of Mexico. The ceremony took place after Secretary of Interior Plutarco Elías Calles ordered it cancelled. In addition, the clergy usurped the government authority to name localities by changing the name of the hill to Cerro de Cristo Rey. President Álvaro Obregón, engaged in the delicate matter of United States recognition, was not in a position to enforce the anticlerical provisions of the Constitution. He did not wish to discred
his government in the eyes of conservative American property holders. However, he was compelled to answer this clerical threat to the Revolution by expelling the Papal Apostolic Delegate as a foreign clergyman. But until Calles reached the middle of his presidential term in 1926, the Revolutionaries were not ready or did not have the resource and unity to attack the Church.

The Church always misunderstood Mexican socialism and in failing to recognize that it was a Mexican phenomenon attacked the government as “soviet,” and “bolshevik.” Perhaps in answer to the government’s 1925 encouragement of a schismatic church, the right wing of the Catholic hierarchy and lay members began to demand more energetic action to change the religious laws. A group formed as the Liga Nacional de Defensa Religiosa to unite Catholics to defend religion and fatherland by concentrating forces to once and for all tear the injustices of the Constitution out by their roots. The Liga, blessed by Archbishop Francisco Orozco y Jiménez and Bishop José de Jesús Manrique y Zárate, demanded armed rebellion, but moderates led by Bishops Leopoldo Ruiz y Flores and Pascual Díaz argued for peaceful conciliation.
Calles’ own party was not harmonious either. The socialist group was continually demanding that “something be done about the Church” and pressing Calles to enforce the eight year old Constitution. As Calles told United States Ambassador Dwight Morrow on their first meeting, he never wanted to confiscate any property, least of all oil as loss of its revenues would mean political suicide. The retroactive alien oil and land decrees of 1925 were to satisfy the radical wing whose wishes he had to meet to keep the balance of power.42

The times were ripe for Church-State conflict. Strongman Calles could court party harmony and increase his own power by yielding to radical demands for continuance of the Revolution. A genuine persecution of the Church would dissipate any left wing attack on himself and he could control politics well into the 1930’s. One writer believed Calles needed a religious war to divide the Catholic haciendas of Jalisco among his generals.43 The clergy on the other hand believed that their only hope for amelioration of the anticlerical laws was in connecting their cause to the oil problem to gain United States intervention. Another Mexican novelist wrote on the theme that the reactionary landholders used religious liberty as a pretext to stop the government
land distribution program.\textsuperscript{44}

From these varied causes, the struggle began in earnest in 1926 when Calles had enabling legislation enacted to provide penalties for violation of the Constitution.\textsuperscript{45} The clergy conducted an economic boycott instructing Catholics to purchase only the essentials of life. The unrealistic boycott failed.\textsuperscript{46} In a last desperate measure, the priest were withdrawn from the Churches in protest against the government registration of priest. The danger of registration lay in government usurpation of the bishops’ control of appointment. Though withdrawal of priests meant no sacraments, at best it was another unrealistic pressure, for it affected the poor who were least able to protest in favor of the Church. The educated who could effectively protest were indifferent; their wives and daughters were religious but not in public affairs. Priest were not needed by the pagan Indians who were happy praying to the statues of saints and virgins.\textsuperscript{47}

The Cristero revolt by the Liga that followed the failure of the boycott was a lay action in Jalisco, Guerrero, Michoacán, Colima, Guanajuato, Querétaro, Puebla, and Veracruz. The Church has always condemned any revolt against constituted authority. Though the Pope ordered
passive resistance, he gave no orders to stop the rebellion and thus gave his tacit consent.⁴⁸ One government attempt to end the religious war failed in 1928. President-elect Obregón consulted with Calles on July 16 to arrange a possible modus vivendi beginning December, 1928, with the change of presidents. Ironically, the day after this consultation, Obregón was assassinated by a religious fanatic and all efforts to end strife collapsed.⁴⁹

Dwight Morrow had been sent as Ambassador to Mexico by Secretary of State Frank Kellogg in 1927 due to United States fear of the communist menace south of the border. He gained Calles´ confidence and convinced him that the most stable country was a country without internal or external difficulties. Reminded of the Porfirio Díaz maxim-a quiet country is a profitable country easy to rule-, Calles agreed not to expropriate the oil, to stop land distribution, and to repress the communist party. Having ended the United States threat of intervention and pacified Mexico´s foreign investors, he proceeded to establish some internal harmony with a Church-State compromise.⁵⁰ President Emilio Portes Gil and Bishops Ruiz and Díaz arrived at a settlement June 21,1929.⁵¹ Calles could afford to end the conflict because the country was quieter and he no longer needed such unyielding
support from the socialists within his party. He could end the Church-State struggle and devote his time to maintaining his power over those socialist who were continually pressing him to enforce the Constitution. Calles no longer had United States Catholics protesting to Washington, and he lost no face as his president Portes Gil handled the mediation.

The Church won three grants which were not in accordance with the Constitution. Its juridical personality was recognized in the right to appoint bishops; it gained the right to petition for repeal of legislation which was contrary to Article 130; and the federal government set policy with respect to the Church in place of the states.52

Hardly anyone was satisfied with the modus vivendi or “gentlemen’s agreement.” The Vatican realized it was only a working compromise.53 Bishop Leopoldo Lara y Torres, ally of the clerical right wing, wrote Pope Pius XI that as a consequence of the contemptuous and disrespectful attitude of Bishops Ruiz and Díaz towards the rest of the Catholic hierarchy during negotiations, the hierarchy appeared to the public as ignored during the settlement.54 The Liga announced that the agreement was only “a short of an armistice.” But an armistice it was, and its mediators were rewarded by the Pope to the chagrin of the dissatisfied right wing.
Bishop Díaz was given the vacant Archbishopric of Mexico, and Archbishop Ruiz was made Apostolic Delegate to Mexico.

The conflict beginning in 1926 and carrying into the decade of the 1930’s was ideological, not political, as argued by Church and State. The State limited the Church to religion, and the Church demanded the State confine itself to governmental office work. Both sides wanted the middle ground of aim and control of society. The main question was whether Catholic Social Action or Revolutionary socialism would guide Mexican history.

In 1929 Calles used the federal power to end the Church-State conflict for his own ends. The conflict was beyond such manipulation, for the socialists in the state governments had deeper motives than Calles for argument with the Church. They saw the real battle in philosophy and fought on against Catholicism for the Revolution and enforcement of the Constitution of 1917.
CHAPTER II

THE RENEWED CONFLICT

The Church’s political power had been curbed by the 1930’s, but Church-State ideological battle continued. The local priest was then, as even today, the center of village authority and loyalty. In 1959 the government had not won the ideological battle. The ultimate threats to the Church in the twentieth century are industrialization and its corollaries of modernization and communication which are intangibly breaking clerical strength.¹

Pro-clerical José Vasconcelos² came very close to the truth when he said in 1956 that the Pope was happy to have the Mexican Catholics persecuted, for, he added, it is healthy to be persecuted because it produces martyrs and a cause when all has been complacency and sloth.³ Persecution is a tangible enemy. To many Mexican of the 1930’s whose live were earthy and exciting, Catholicism was void of any fire. The Churchless intelligentsia looking for faith had not turned to the even more colorless and monotonous Protestantism, for it was suspected as a vanguard of
United States imperialism. Protestantism was drab in comparison to the services and buildings of Catholicism. Instead, native nationalism or return to Indianism became the fire, and the new crusading faith of the intellectuals was social remedy for the people. The people of Mexico were to be redeemed from ignorance, not sin. The rural school teacher carried the knowledge of something to live for in this life without superstition and Catholic rituals. This man-made plan could be fought by the Church, and persecution in the 1920’s and 1930’s meant added religious appeal to the masses of population and strength to the Church.

If Mexico was and is 99 per cent Catholic, how could persecution take place? Gruening, citing the 1910 census, pointed out the answer. “Of the fifteen million nominal Catholics who inhabit Mexico, at most two million are Catholics in the sense accepted in the United States, and equal number are agnostic or indifferent, and the remainder while observing in their worship some of the outward form of Roman Catholicism are in reality pagans.” Luis Cabrera explained how many intellectuals came to think when he said, “I am a Catholic because I was born and educated in that religion, although with the indifference of the Positivist epoch and of the Preparatory School.”
The government party was divided on whether to attack the Church or leave it in peace. *El jefe máximo* Calles allowed a truce. The socialists refused to abide by it, for the states were constitutionally delegated the matter of regulation of religion. Just as the government was, and is, usually considered as “one” instead of factions, the Church was misconstrued as united. However, the clerical conservatives were agitating for strife to obtain rights through the continued existence of the *Liga Nacional de Defensa Religiosa* while the Church moderates backed the compromise of 1929. Apostolic Delegate Ruiz had to say in September, 1930, that the religious *modus vivendi* of 1929 was no longer a debatable issues as the Pope’s approval was the last word: The scandalous and discordant efforts to renew trouble had to end. But with socialist Governor Adalberto Tejeda in Veracruz, Tomás Garrido Canabal in Tabasco, and Lázaro Cárdenas in Michoacán pressing for enforcement of the principles of the Revolution, and the Liga pressing the government not to enforce the Constitution of 1917, it was no wonder the *modus vivendi* failed; it had solved nothing.

**Veracruz State Action**

The beginnings of upheaval culminating in the socialist
victory over the conservatism of Calles began June 18, 1931, when Veracruz State limited the number of priests to one for each 100,000 inhabitants.\textsuperscript{10} This act came through the instigation of the man Carleton Beals called the most responsible for the 1926-27 difficulties, Governor Adalberto Tejeda, the Calles Minister of the Interior 1924-1928.\textsuperscript{11} Tejeda had sent a telegram to Portes Gil denouncing him as a “coward and traitor” for making peace with the Church in 1929.\textsuperscript{12} In 1931 he announced, “I declare emphatically and before the entire world that my government will continue to comply with the revolutionary program.”\textsuperscript{13} He then deprived priests of the right of citizenship on the grounds theirs prime loyalties were to the Vatican, a foreign power. Catholic priests were instructed by the hierarchy not to accept the laws, but not to arm in resistance either. The clergy hoped the gubernatorial election of 1932 would bring a charge of policy; however, the new Governor Vela was unrelenting so in 1933 Bishop Valencia of Veracruz agreed to comply with the laws\textsuperscript{14} which were strictly enforced until the “Orizaba Affair” in the summer of 1937.\textsuperscript{15}

The states of Yucatán and Tamaulipas followed Veracruz action by limiting the number of priests in their states to nine and twelve, respectively. Apostolic Delegate Ruiz
almost seemed to realize the federal government of Mexico was not responsible for the actions of the state, for he said, “We have decided to show our patriotism in not multiplying the government’s problem by presenting our petition. [on Veracruz] at the present moment when the new monetary and labor laws are so justly preoccupying the nation… however… if the religious problem were solved… the government would recover the confidence indispensable for the solution of its other problems.” Unfortunately for Ruiz, he ended his statement by saying, “If the anticlericals group themselves together to persecute us we must do likewise to defend ourselves.”16 This last was open to misinterpretation and ultimately was partly responsible for his expulsion from Mexico.

Federal Action

Chihuahua had added its name to the list of five states limiting priests by December 12, 1931, when the hierarchy chose to force its demands in the face of this rabid state legislation. The outdoor celebration of the four hundredth anniversary of the Virgin of Guadalupe was so grandiose that even the government of Calles’s “puppet” President Ortiz Rubio, which was relatively friendly to the Church, was
forced to action. The illegal open-air ceremony in the Federal District was a direct challenge to the laws and enabling legislation of Article 24 of the Constitution of 1917. In the resulting socialist uproar over the most elaborate celebration that Mexico had ever witnessed, the federal government was pushed to action. One writer claimed that Calles had favored the ceremony at Guadalupe but was forced to implement the law to avoid the socialist charge of yielding to Church influence. It is doubtful that Calles favored the celebration, for his man, President Ortiz Rubio, called on the physical education classes of Mexico City’s schools to meet in a demonstration attracting the crowds away from Guadalupe. Strife between the two groups was narrowly averted. Ortiz Rubio called a cabinet meeting December 21, 1931, to ask the resignation of members attending the Guadalupe services. The Secretaries of Foreign Affairs, Treasury, and Public Health left the cabinet. The government imposed a December 30, 1931, limit of one priest for each 50,000 population in the Federal District and Lower California. The new United States Ambassador to Mexico Josephus Daniels remarked in 1933, however, that fifty priests were officiating at one church whereas only twenty-five were allowed in the whole district. The upshot of the “Guadalupe Affair” found the Church persecuted
by the federal as well as the state governments.

The federal government was controlled to different degrees from 1924 to 1934 by Plutarco Elías Calles who began to exert his influence as Secretary of the Interior to President Álvaro Obregón between 1920 and 1924. Calles was born in the seaport town of Guaymas, Sonora in 1877. The legend is that his mother was part Yaqui Indian and his father an improvident itinerant Armenian or Jew. Calles however was mostly Spanish, but his near-eastern features and his shrewd bargaining power did earn him the nickname “El Turco.” His struggle against poverty and lack of education took him from elementary school teacher to frontier chief of police at Agua Prieta, Sonora. From there he graduated into the Revolution as a lieutenant of Obregón.

As president in 1924 Calles was a zealous reformer. He ended the traditional army waste of money on expensive uniforms, built 4,000 schools, balanced the budget, discharged 20,000 surplus bureaucrats and blessed the labor movement under the C.R.O.M. union (Confederación Regional de Obreros Mexicanos). Calles was an anticlerical product of the Revolution.²⁴

Following Calles’ presidential term of office from 1924 to 1928, he was credited with imposing three presidents on
the nation: Emilio Portes Gil, 1928-1930, Pascual Ortiz Rubio the following two years and Abelardo Rodríguez, 1932-1934. However, Calles never held the absolute power he has been credited with.²⁵ He yielded to the left wing in regard to the Alien Oil and Land Decrees of 1925. He fired his labor force commander Luis Morones in 1928 when this supporter was linked to the murder of President-elect Álvaro Obregón, and he dismissed his Foreign Secretary Montes de Oca, Trojan horse of the reaction and able banker involved in the “Guadalupe Affair.” Portes Gil thought Calles changed during the Ortiz Rubio term²⁶ and began to think himself indispensable.²⁷

By the late 1920’s Calles had run the gamut from left to right. He was typical veterano Frank Tannenbaum described so well²⁸ as making his start wearing a cotton shirt, large straw hat and sandals. In a charge to European clothes, a felt hat, and added weight from ease and comfort, he lost his lean keenness. Only a few years separated his peonage and his position in the government. New people replaced the Indians who used to crowd around him wanting lands. Now lawyers whose clients had land bowed and ran to open the door for him. The new friends were as good hearted as the Indians. The newspapers praised him and his family
acquired social position. He did not really change his mind about land distribution, he just did not think about reform any more. The city had swallowed him.

Cárdenas in Michoacán

Along with Tejeda of Veracruz, Lázaro Cárdenas was the other outstanding socialist governor of the early 1930’s. He was born in 1895 in the agricultural valley of Jiquilpan, Michoacán to lower middle class parents. His father ran a small grocery shop and sold medicinal herbs. When the orphaned Lázaro completed primary school, he took work as a typesetter and soon found himself working on La Popular, a weekly progressive newspaper, as well as serving as town jailer. At the time Huerta’s reaction was victorious, Lázaro came under suspicion as a progressive and fled with his only prisoner to join the Constitutionalists.

When Cárdenas’ superiors supported Pancho Villa against Obregón and Carranza in the 1915 break between the three avengers of Madero, Cárdenas was sent north to Agua Prieta, Sonora, to finish off one of Carranza’s units led by Plutarco Elías Calles. Cárdenas searched his soul and found he was going into battle against the wing of the Revolution he most believed in. Promptly defecting, Cárdenas deserted Villa to
join the reformer Calles who had proclaimed the Plan of Agua Prieta and declared himself against saloons and vice.\textsuperscript{33}

“El Chamaco” or “the kid” as Cárdenas was nicknamed by Calles, proved an apt protégé. He was soon noted for instantaneous measures against alcohol, prostitution and gambling. Calles liked Cárdenas´ doglike obedience, lack of personal ambition, ability to carry out and order, and the young officers other nickname, the “Sphinx.”\textsuperscript{34} After peace was restored Cárdenas saw duty against the Yaqui Indians, General Pershing and Pancho Villa, and then spent 1922 and 1923 on the northern Veracruz Huasteca oil zone patrol. The story is told that after Cárdenas joined Obregón´s fight against President Carranza and the Obregón-Calles clique swept into office, Cárdenas returned 20,000 pesos of an unused forced loan to the village that “donated” the money.\textsuperscript{35}

As early as 1920 Secretary of the Interior Calles should have suspected Cárdenas was not doglike. Cárdenas was sent as provisional governor to Michoacán to supervise the elections. The reform candidate, General Francisco J. Múgica, was victorious over the administration candidate Pascual Ortiz Rubio. Cárdenas resigned his post when Calles refused to allow him to publish the state legislature decree announcing Múgica´s election.\textsuperscript{36}
Cárdenas was once lukewarm Catholic and even went to church occasionally. Wounded in battle in 1923, he offered a vow to the Virgin of the shrine of Nuestra Señora de los Lagos in Jalisco. When he recovered from the wound, he fulfilled his promise by entering the church on his knees, candle in hand. His second wife was a Catholic whom he married in both civil and religious ceremonies.\textsuperscript{37}

As zone commander of the Huasteca oil region in 1926 and 1927, Cárdenas was joined in Villa Cuauhtémoc by General Francisco J. Múgica. The radical Múgica, author of Article 3 of the Constitution of 1917, went to the Huasteca on business and decided to rest there far out of politics after being deprived of his Michoacán gubernatorial election victory of 1924. Perhaps Múgica did not influence Cárdenas, for he claimed, “I have never been mentor of the soldier Cárdenas, nor of General Cárdenas, nor of President of the Partido Nacional Revolucionario Cárdenas, nor of President Cárdenas… we lived together from 1926 until the beginning of 1928… [and] he already had very well defined his ideas with respect to socialism as an adequate doctrine to solve the conflicts of Mexico.”\textsuperscript{38} Perhaps the events in Michoacán influenced Cárdenas’ plans for a political career. The governor of Michoacán, a Calles man, shocked Cárdenas and Múgica
by discharging two hundred school teachers to balance the state budget. Cristero Catholics were in rebellion in the north of Michoacán. Revenues had fallen off; social reform was at a standstill; and bankruptcy was imminent. To Cárdenas who had founded a school for children of the army, the social affairs of his home state of Michoacán were in a desperate condition. Reminded of his friend Múgica’s failure to attain office without Calles-Obregón support, Cárdenas was loath to enter politics. But when the main political organization of Michoacán agreed to support him, Cárdenas went to Mexico City to obtain the support that would decide the election. Calles and Obregón chose to support him and he repaid them with a proclamation:

I am a partisan of the agrarian policies because they are fundamental to the Revolution and because solving the land problem is a national need and will be an impetus to agricultural development…

I have been, and am, a fervent admirer of men such as President Calles and General Obregón, who have attacked the social problems of our people courageously.

Nothing was said about the Church or education, and this statement casts little light on what Cárdenas was to do.

Cárdenas soon showed he was no puppet governor dominated by the federal government as were so many other when the
difficulties arose over division of land. Calles had expressed his dissatisfaction with communal land holding as far back as 1925. In 1927 United States Ambassador Dwight Morrow won Calles to Wall Street view of limiting land expropriations to prevent a Mexican economic crisis in the decline of food production. Morrow maintained that the country needed economic security to stabilize the economy and attract foreign capital for industrialization. Calles’ final retreat on land distribution came as he returned to Mexico in June, 1930, from a vacation in France. He admitted, “If we wish to be sincere… we must confess as sons of the Mexican Revolution that agrarianism, as we have understood it and practiced it hitherto, has been a failure… [resulting in] a terrific financial burden.” He “suggested” that each state fix a relatively brief period preceding enactment of laws ending distribution of lands for communal living. Calles planned to turn the ejidos into small private land holdings such as he saw in France. The cessation of land expropriation would mean some alleviation of the government expropriation debts. Calles’ internal strength after the Escobar Rebellion was crushed in 1929 enabled him to change his policy even if the socialists objected. It is noteworthy that Calles also chose to change his Church policy at the same time.
Three governors absolutely refused to enact legislation ending land distribution after the other governors either acted promptly or under duress to follow the Calles “suggestion.” The three, all socialists, were Cárdenas, Tejeda, and Arroyo Ch. of Guanajuato. They continued land distribution while national figures of land distribution fell two-thirds between 1929 and 1932.  

Another left wing show of independence occurred in 1932. Three governors, Cárdenas, Tejeda, and Lugo of Hidalgo, adopted expropriation laws. The state governments were empowered to take over factories that violated labor laws and turn them into worker’s cooperatives. The P.N.R. or government party labeled this action “pure communism.”

Speaking to the Michoacán legislature about education in his farewell address of 1932 Cárdenas stated:

Secularism which leaves the family with liberty to inculcate in their children the spiritual… in practice produces negative effects in the school, because it negates the possibility of unifying the public conscience to obtain the goals for which the Revolution fights.

This was no political verbiage of campaign, but a measured statement at the end of his term of office.

Cárdenas´ education program was more properly education for social responsibility rather than socialism. He acted to
created a social conscience toward alcohol, health, and even reforestation, for example.\textsuperscript{49} He believed that it was the duty of the government to orientate, to define, and to make uniform public education in consonance with collective need.\textsuperscript{50} In the 1930’s this was socialistic; today it would be democratic.

In spite of only spending one and one-half years in Michoacán during his four year governorship term due to calls to serve the federal government,\textsuperscript{51} Cárdenas achieved the opening of 100 schools and required 300 new schools to be supported by the plantations for their workers. He made normal schools coeducational, industrial institutes practical and the state university more democratic. He reorganized teaching staffs if he found the instructors neutral towards religion in the classroom.\textsuperscript{52}

When religion was attacked then, Cárdenas was not a puppet of Calles, but continued to formulate more policy which appeared in the Six Year Plan of 1933 imposed on Calles. Cárdenas as a Grand Master of the Masons, instituted masonry to combat the clergy and their “obscurantist work.” He required all bureaucrats to join the Masons.\textsuperscript{53} This requirement had its roots in Obregón’s becoming a Mason while president, carried into the Calles presidential
administration, and has come down to the present day. Any army officer above the rank of lieutenant colonel must also be a Mason.\textsuperscript{54}

In accordance with the Constitution of 1917, Cárdenas and his state legislature limited the number of priests to thirty-three allowed to conduct religious ceremonies in Michoacán. All priests except members of the hierarchy were required to register. A license was then given the registrant which either forbade him to conduct religious ceremonies or noted that as one of the thirty-three priests permitted by law to conduct Church services, he could legally carry out his functions as a priest providing he did so only within his district which was determined by the state. Violation of the license law meant government closure of the Church where the illegal ceremonies were conducted. The members of the hierarchy were not permitted to register or receive a license, therefore, they had no chance of becoming one of the thirty-three priests permitted by law.\textsuperscript{55} Bishop Leopoldo Lara y Torres, first bishop of Tacámbaro, a diocese partly in southeast Michoacán, wrote from Rome on August 10, 1932, to Miguel Palomar y Vizcarra of the Liga that the Pope held the Liga in bad standing as he feared it would revolt against the state limitations on priests.\textsuperscript{56} Pope Pius XI issued an encyclical, Acerba Animi, on September 29, 1932, to explain
to the disgruntled right wing of the Church why he accepted the *modus vivendi* of 1929. The Pope feared that the continued absence of the priests and bishops contributed to a weakening of ecclesiastical discipline. He ordered the Mexican Church to resist the laws and to demand change but by peaceful and legal means only. The Liga had never wanted the armistice and the Pope issued the encyclical to justify his acceptance of such a weak truce. From March to the September encyclical, the Federal-Church battle was comparatively quiet with only nine churches nationalized in the Federal District while state governments continued conflict by seizing twenty-three churches. Two more states imposed limitations on the number of priests in relation to the population. The Rodríguez government felt that the Vatican was pushing again and labeled the encyclical “a criminal interference by Rome.” Apostolic Delegate Ruiz, on record as supporting the encyclical was summarily “thirty-threed” or deported without legal recourse by the president as an undesirable alien under Article 33 of the Constitution. Though Ruiz was Mexican born, he was accused of owing his allegiance to the Vatican, and independent state since 1929.

In January of 1929 Cárdenas formed the labor and peasant elements of the state into the *Confederación Revolucionaria*
Michoacana del Trabajo (C.R.M.T.). This organization was antireligious and began the task of ending religious fanaticism. Churches were seized and turned into libraries, schools, or granaries. Thirty persons were reported killed in a C.R.M.T. clash with faithful at Cherán. Cárdenas, as Secretary of War for Rodíguez also supported the anticlerical “Red Shirts” of Tabasco and was so taken with their “color of labor” dress that he adopted their red shirts and black pants for his C.R.M.T.

To punish the errant Cárdenas for his left wing action on land and expropriation laws, Calles did not allow him to name his own successor to the governorship of Michoacán. Instead, pro-clerical General Benigno Serrato took the helm of an anti-agrarian government that immediately set out to crush Cárdenas’ C.R.M.T. Cárdenas became a bitter enemy of General Serrato. However, the candidate of the P.N.R., Serrato, was accorded all cooperation by Cárdenas for the appearance of party harmony in his campaign. The Cárdenas-Serrato duel meant difficulties in the path of Cárdenas to the presidency as well as control of the Michoacán delegation to the Querétaro convention of 1933. The Cárdenas-Serrato battle did not end until 1934 when Serrato was killed in an airplane crash.
Cárdenas’ Presidential Candidacy

As Calles saw the left wing of this P.N.R. government party gain in power he realized his leadership was threatened. His problem was to hold his power by satisfying socialist demands. With the presidential election of 1934 approaching, Calles was in a quandary over a candidate. His choice was the President of the P.N.R., Manuel Pérez Treviño or Aáron Sáenz, Protestant governor of Nuevo León. The socialist wing was pressing for one of their men and somehow the name of Lázaro Cárdenas came more and more to the fore.

It is difficult to say how Cárdenas was first mentioned. Perhaps General Gildardo Magaña made the suggestion, for the army definitely supported General Cárdenas and it had always played an important role in Mexican elections. A variation of this theory credited General Saturnino Cedillo, strong man of San Luis Potosí state, with decisive influence as the army wanted an end to the Calles regime in the hopes that Calles’ power could be broken to favor a new hierarchy of army leaders. A group of politicians in Guadalajara may have first mentioned Cárdenas as next president.

Emilio Portes Gil claimed he first thought of the idea while in Europe on a diplomatic mission. A son of Calles, Rodolfo,
visited Governor Olachea of Baja California Norte and indicated the three candidates of the party where Pérez Treviño, Carlos Riva Palacio and Cárdenas. He considered it wise to bring together a few governors to launch the support of Cárdenas. When another of Calles’ sons, Plutarco Jr., brought up the question in the House of Representatives, the deputies thought Cárdenas had Calles’ backing and undertook the presidential candidacy of Cárdenas. Cárdenas was forced to accept the situation and his personality found wide response from labor, peasant groups, army and socialists.

At the time it was claimed that Calles’ sons were acting without their father’s consent, however Calles was using a shrewd maneuver to allow a left wing leader without losing his support of the old-line conservatives. Cárdenas was imposed on Calles but el jefe máximo allowed the Partido Nacional Revolucionario to function as he set it up in 1929, this being the only way he could keep control and prevent civil war. The party was established to unify the diverse forces of the Revolution into one group by providing institutional government in place of rule by individuals. The party provided the platform for political struggles between rivals without resort to weapons. The P.N.R. ("Plutarco
Necesita Robar”) made it possible for the “outs” to attain power without rebellion by entering politics inside the party with hope of success. In 1933 Pérez Treviño ran against Cárdenas for the P.N.R. nomination. Cárdenas won the nomination and Pérez Treviño accepted the presidency of the P.N.R. as a consolation prize after he withdrew his candidacy for presidential nomination under left wing charges of conservatism. Calles realized he would have to assume some kind of leadership of the Revolution if he were to maintain himself as the jefe máximo. The steps he took were recognition of a leftist to take the presidency, a renewed revolutionary platform which is discussed next, and the award of a position of power to Pérez Treviño to keep the old-line element satisfied with less than the presidency.

The party system and party loyalty meant appeasement by bargain instead of rebellion by the loser. Cabinet position was a means to bargain and to balance the diverse party elements; it did not necessarily imply trust. Cárdenas’ appointment January 1, 1933, to the powerful post of Secretary of War while he held the position of Governor of Michoacán meant that he was a trusted party member not apt to revolt. This appointment has been interpreted as a sign that Calles favored Cárdenas as his successor to the presidency.
Apparently the appointment was, however, only a means to quiet the left wing with some position, for one keen observer saw 1933 as the year Calles’ grip on control was noticeably weakening. The cabinet met only once while Cárdenas held the office of War Secretary and as administrative officers reported individually to the President. Furthermore, Calles also had Pérez Treviño in the strategically important presidency of the P.N.R., so both men seeking the nomination were in position leading to the highest office. Calles could stand pat and ride the P.N.R. political winds either way. When Pérez Treviño dropped out of the race, Calles was on the winning side. Cárdenas accepted the nomination December 7, 1933, at the P.N.R. Convention in Querétaro, Guanajuato.

The P.N.R. Querétaro Convention of 1933

The Six Year Plan first suggested by Calles capitalized on the idea of planned economy then so successful in Russia against the background of world depression and was contemporary with the New Deal in the United States. Calles appeared as the leader of a return to Revolutionary ideals by seeming to lead the leftist movement that threatened to displace him. On May 30, 1933, he admitted the failure of the Revolution’s social and economic aims, and suggested a
Six Year Plan as a remedy to guide the next president 1934-1940. The convention that met in Querétaro, however, was a triumph of socialism in more ways than the nomination of Cárdenas. The delegates emulated the delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1917 when they bypassed the presidential plan and formulated more radical goals.\textsuperscript{83}

The Six Year Plan called for detailed industrial and agrarian laws, federal government action to meet the labor needs, the promotion of labor organizations, and arbitration of industrial conflicts.\textsuperscript{84} The land policy demanded distribution until every Mexican village was satisfied, and called for elimination of red-tape in land division.\textsuperscript{85} These ends were to be achieved by positive regulation and channeling of the economy by the government,\textsuperscript{86} prohibition of religious education in primary schools, enforcement of the public worship ordinances, and amendment of Article 3 for a socialist base of education.\textsuperscript{87} The philosophy that emerged in the Six Year Plan was the culmination of Mexican Revolutionary Socialist thinking. It was a unique philosophy compounded of nationalism, Indianism, xenophobia, irreligion, anti-capitalism, and authoritarianism.\textsuperscript{88} But Mexican Socialism was also built on the structure of world socialism which was “essentially no more and no less a criticism of the idea of
property in the light of the public good... The ordinary socialist... a collectivist; he would allow a considerable amount of private property but put such affairs as education, transport, mines, landowning, most mass production of staple articles and the like, into the hands of a highly organized state.”

The Six Year Plan had several weaknesses. It was not realistic. It was typically idealistic, and like the Constitution of 1917, more a set of goals than a workable plan. The Plan’s goals were formulated without an economic blue-print to find and assess sources of revenue. Weyl pointed out the best example of muddled thinking by noting the plan called for commodity prices to go down while the producers would enjoy a discreet price rise. Calles allowed the Six Year Plan to pass the convention because he felt that, like Carranza, he would not need to follow the convention mandates. He allowed Cárdenas, the presidency and Cárdenas acknowledged the bargain by pledging himself to seek the counsel of all those who made the party.

With the advent of the Six Year Plan, the ideological conflict with the Church renewed by the provincial socialists in 1931 reached culmination. The Church-State battle depended on the relations between leftist Cárdenas and the conservative
dictator Calles. The struggle for power between these two men ultimately decided how far Cárdenas could push the policies of the Six Year Plan.

The Campaign

After Calles’ resistance to the socialist movement, he felt that friendship with Cárdenas was necessary to gain a position to exert influence. Cárdenas, however, kept Calles at a distance. Cabrera wrote that Cárdenas’ famous campaign journeys over Mexico had several reasons. Cárdenas desired to stay away from the capital and its “place intrigue;” he wanted to make the election look real; he was searching for the support of the people; and he wanted to find out the true situation of the country. 92

Addressing Governor Tómas Garrido Canabal’s citizens in Tabasco as “comrades,” Cárdenas was glad to see the people were no longer troubled by the clerical opiate. 93 Garrido’s state was termed a paradise of socialism in spite of swamps and malaria. This governor had decreed prohibition, ended crime, and destroyed all churches after 1925 to concentrate on physical education and schools. Cárdenas was so taken with Garrido that he wrote in his name for president of Mexico in 1934. 94
The P.N.R. discipline pulled conservatives and socialist together for an appearance of complete party harmony along the same lines as the Michoacán gubernatorial election of 1932, which has already been pointed out as an example of battle within the P.N.R. instead of open rebellion. On election day, Cárdenas was easily victorious over the four opposition candidates, two of whom were conservative and two of whom were radical. One of the latter was Adalberto Tejeda, ex-governor of Veracruz and close friend of General Cárdenas, who renewed the religious controversy in 1931.

Condition of Mexico in 1934

Mexico may have been a semi-fascist government with control by wealthy politicians and generals from 1928 to 1934, but Calles certainly paid dividends to a business man´s government. The country that President-elect Cárdenas was to take over basked in a rare position. Finances were solid with all federal employees and local accounts paid in full. Twelve million pesos of international debts were paid off, including one million pesos borrowed from foreign oil companies as advances on their production taxes. And Mexico´s biggest difficulties with the United States, those of claims
by both side for Mexican Revolution damages and the Pershing punitive expedition, were settled.\textsuperscript{98} Calles had won a big battle with the Church when he proved that clerical rebellion not only could not succeed but was disastrous to religion. He defeated the privileged economic position of landlords and employers who were defended by the strong feeling of many Catholics.\textsuperscript{99} The Six Year Plan Agrarian Code had been made law and was already in operation when Cárdenas became president.\textsuperscript{100} The struggle for educational reform within the P.N.R. was ended by Constitutional Amendment to Article 3 a month before Cárdenas took office.

Even the traditionally dangerous army was under some control.\textsuperscript{101} The generals no longer commanded private armies, and commanders were shifted from post to post to prevent development of rebellion. Calles encouraged officers to go into business.\textsuperscript{102} Troops were disciplined and trained under General Joaquín Amaro who created a genuinely loyal federal army with officers educated in the national military academy without a history of rebellion or accidental promotion. Amaro provided a consistent army program by serving as commander of the military college for every president from Calles to, and including, Cárdenas.\textsuperscript{103} A new supply system eliminated much need for soldaderas or women who
foraged for their men. Finally, a psychological factor tended to prevent revolts, for the last successful army movement was in 1920 and the 1929 failures were well in mind.

Calles’ Guadalajara Speech

Against this background of Mexican stability, Calles grew more restive as the Cárdenas campaign gathered steam. Cárdenas’ first campaign act was to send a telegram to the owner of the big Nueva Italia and Lombardía haciendas where guards killed three peasants. Cárdenas’ telegram worried Calles as it suggested that if the peasants weren’t given a livelihood, the haciendas would be turned over to cooperative ownership. The jefe máximo could recall how the recalcitrant Michoacán Governor Cárdenas defied his orders from 1930 to 1932. He grew more nervous as he remembered the left wing Six Year Plan of the 1933 Querétaro Convention and saw Cárdenas stump ing the country propounding its philosophy. Mexico faced no major problems and the changeover of presidents would be accomplished with ease. But twenty days after Cárdenas’ July election victory Calles had the answer to keep the socialist leader under control. If there were no problems, one would have to be manufactured.

Calles had not wanted Cárdenas to be president, yet he
yielded to socialist pressure within the P.N.R. to prevent civil war in the country. To hamstring Cárdenas with a difficulty, Calles spoke to the people of Guadalajara July 20, 1934:107

But the Revolution has not yet ended. The eternal enemies lie in ambush and are laying plans to nullify the triumphs of the Revolution. It is necessary that we enter a new period of the Revolution. I would call this new period the psychological period of the Revolution. We must now enter and take possession of the consciences of the young, because they do belong and should belong to the Revolution.

It is absolutely necessary that we dislodge the enemy from this trench where the clergy are now, where the conservatives are, -- I refer to education, I refer to the school.

It would be a very grave stupidity, it would be a crime for the men of the Revolution to fail to rescue the young from the claws of the clericals, from the claws of the conservatives; and, unfortunately, in many states of the Republic and even in the capital of the Republic itself the school is under the direction of clerical and reactionary elements.

We cannot entrust to the hands of our enemies the future of the country and the future of the Revolution. With every artfulness the reactionaries are saying and the clericals are saying that the children belong to the home and the youth to the family. This is selfish doctrine, because the children and youth belong to the community; they belong to the collectivity, and it is the Revolution that has the inescapable duty to take possession of consciences to drive out prejudices and to form the new soul of the nation.

Therefore, I call upon all Governors throughout the Republic, on all public authorities and on all Revolutionary elements that we proceed at once to the field of battle which we must take because children and the young must belong to the Revolution.
This “grito de Guadalajara” in the stronghold and center of Catholic resistance during the Cristero revolt of the 1920’s meant direct federal persecution. Calles threw the weight of the conservative P.N.R. with the socialist against the Church.

Calles’ Guadalajara Speech had other reasons than burdening Cárdenas with an unsolvable problem to occupy his time. The jefe máximo speech rode the rising wave of socialist action. Calles knew he had to lead to keep control of Cárdeans. The anti-Church attack not only served to forestall the proletarian Revolution, but to unify the party and gain control of the alienated P.N.R. factions by utilizing the only deep convictions common to all Revolutionary elements. Calles was unquestionably against the Church, especially when his policy changed and he no longer wanted order in the country. He often asked, “Where are the elementary schools it founded?” Where are the hospitals, outside of a few charity foundations?” He answered his questions by saying, “I know of none,” adding that the Catholic Church did not provide schools to teach the disinherited, but to exploit the few rich. Lizzie Barbour, in her thesis agreed with Calles’ rhetorical questions.

In fastening the Church problems upon the socialist,
Calles knew he was giving them a problem they welcomed and probably would have attacked anyway. Cárdenas said during his campaign:111

I will not permit the clergy to intervene in popular education in any way, for this is exclusively a sphere of the State. The Revolution cannot tolerate the clergy’s continuing to utilize the youth of the country as instruments of division in Mexican family… Why does the clergy today ask the liberty of conscience that it condemned yesterday; yesterday, when it exercised a dictatorship over the spirit of the Mexican people?

President –elect Cárdenas represented the anti-clerical groups when he went to President Rodríguez for General Calles to request that Archbishop Díaz be deported for conspiring with the apostolic delegate against the government. Rodríguez quietly prevented the expulsion of Díaz by assigning a study of the legality of such action to his Attorney General Portes Gil. Portes Gil compiled a lengthy document showing Bishop José de Jesús Manrique y Zárate of Huejutla and Apostolic Delegate Ruiz y Flores guilty of conspiracy against the government.112 Portes Gil persuaded Calles to distribute this document to discredit the clergy. Since the two accused bishop were out of the country, orders were issued to prevent their entry. Archbishop Díaz was not bothered and a Church-State break was avoided as the moderate Díaz continued in control of the Church.113
Cárdenas Take the Reins of Presidency

A New York Times dispatch viewed the Cárdenas-Calles animosities of the P.N.R. nomination as patched-up by November 30, 1934, when Cárdenas took the red, green, and white sash of office from Rodríguez to become President of Mexico. But a Constitutional Amendment ratified by state legislatures under P.N.R. discipline abolished life tenure for judges to permit the new president to begin with a clean slate. Cárdenas’ cabinet choices also were mostly his own. His socialist friend Francisco J. Múgica, the shaping force of the education, agrarian, and labor provisions of the Constitution of 1917 was named Secretary of the Economy. The Agriculture Department post went to Tomas Garrido Canabal, red-shirted radical of Tabasco. The position of Agrarian Chief enforcing the Agrarian Code was given to Gabino Vázquez, who so often took over for Cárdenas as governor of Michoacán at the turn of the decade. Narciso Bassols became Secretary of the Treasury. Three trusted former private secretaries of Cárdenas, Silvano Barba González, Silvestre Guerrero, and Ignacio García Téllez were appointed Secretary of Labor,
Attorney General, and Secretary of Education, respectively. An old Cárdenas confidant, Portes Gil, was persuaded to become Secretary of Foreign Relations. Leftist Juan de Dios Bojórquez was appointed Secretary of the Interior to the surprises of Calles, and a relatively anonymous lawyer, Pablo Quiroga, headed the War department. Cárdenas’ deference to Calles was noted by the appointment of Calles’ son Rodolfo to the critical S.C.O.P. (Secretary of Communications and Public Works) cabinet post and appointment of Áaron Sáenz to the governorship of the Federal District. These appointments were reassuring to neither Calles nor the pro-clericals and conservatives.

“Coyoacán Affair”

One of the first big crises Cárdenas faced was the result of dramatic agitation against religion by Garrido Canabal’s Red Shirts. Garrido was not content to hold his interests to agriculture, for there was much anti-God work to do for the socialists. He set about creating a weekly program of Red Saturday Nights in the Palace of Fine Arts. He had named his sons Lucifer and Lenin, a daughter “Zoyla Libertad” (Soy la Libertad or I am Liberty), a favorite thoroughbred bull “Bishop,” and a prize ass “Pope.”
Garrido ruled Tabasco from 1920 to 1935. The organization of Tabasco’s banana industry into cooperatives by his Red Shirts was famous in Mexico. Cárdenas was so impressed by Garrido’s efficiency that he named him to his cabinet agriculture post. The anti-clerical Cárdenas may have wanted him as Secretary of Education, but after the sex education furor, he had to be careful of that cabinet member’s reputation to prevent public demonstration in the face of the reformed Article 3 of the Constitution. Cárdenas knew, nevertheless, that Garrido’s anti-clerical talents need not be limited to agriculture. The competent Gabino Vázquez, a Cárdenas favorite, was handling land distribution as head of the independence Agrarian Department. The socialist opportunity to win the ideological battle with the Church was newly gained, and Garrido’s appointment to the cabinet was considered a commendation of his Tabasco governmental methods which he naturally carried into federal spheres.

Cárdenas was not able to prevent the Bassols type furor he tried to avoid when Garrido’s Red Shirts showed up in front of the Church in Mexico City’s Coyoacán suburb on Sunday morning, December 29, 1934. Apparently the Red Shirt had permission to hold anti-religious meeting in front of Churches. Ever since Garrido’s troop arrived from Tabasco they headed
a vigorous anti-Church campaign by holding meetings to denounce God, the Church, and fanaticism. This Sunday morning their rantings and yells of “death to the priests!” were answered by boss from the faithful. The official government version of the story said that when the Catholics booed and began to advance threateningly on the sixty-five Red Shirts, the Red Shirts fired their pistols. Five Catholics fell dead, including one woman, and thirty more were wounded as the Red Shirts retreated to the handy municipal palace for refuge. The delegate in charge of the building, Homero Maragalli, who was a friend and paisano of Garrido, managed to spirit the weapons of the Red Shirts away before the police arrived to arrest the surrounded anti-clericals. This official was suspected of supplying the arms in the first instance. A Red Shirt arriving late was seized by the angry Coyoacán revenge mob as he got off the bus near where his fellows were cornered. His skull was crushed with clubs and stones.¹²³

The pro-clerical uproar reached alarming proportions and Cárdenas took immediate steps to quiet the anguish by announcing a thorough investigation and apologizing for the incident. Sixty-two Red Shirts were arrested, of which forty were later held for trial. Three defenders of the faith were arraigned for the murder of the Red Shirt.¹²⁴
The tumult of shouting and anger in the days following the “Coyoacán Affair”\textsuperscript{125} did much to discredit Garrido with Cárdenas as the man from Tabasco became a liability to the cabinet. On January 8 a protest meeting of Catholic against the Red Shirts terminated in a riot. Five hundred rushed to the National Palace to visit the absent Cárdenas, then hurried on to the Red Shirt headquarters to stone it. Police and firemen dispersed the protesting mob.\textsuperscript{126}

In the face of this public clamor and Catholic demand for Garrido’s resignation that Cárdenas might prove his sincerity in ending the Church-State difficulties, Cárdenas allowed the Red Shirts to continue scandalizing worshippers,\textsuperscript{127} and announced in his New Year’s Message that the government would require a strict observance of the religious laws and would base education on collectivism and socialism.\textsuperscript{128}
CHAPTER III

SOCIALISTIC EDUCATION

The Antecedents of the Socialists Six-Year Plan for Education

From the Revolutionary philosophy culminating in the radical change after 1910, education arose as the tool to archive and hold victory. Carranza’s concept of education was only to use it as a means to break down Mexico City’s control of the country in favor of the provincial middle class.\(^1\) José Vasconcelos contributed the idea of federal education as the only way to finance a unified, well directed, adequate system of schools.\(^2\) the socialist seized upon the latter organization as the method to lower the 1910 illiteracy rate which was calculated at 70 per cent.\(^3\) Article 3 of the socialist Constitution of 1917 provided for free, secular education with all schools subject to government supervision. It read:\(^4\)

> Education is free, but that which is given in the official establishments, as well as the primary, elemental and superior education given in private schools, must be lay education.

> No religious corporation nor minister of any cult can establish or direct primary education schools.
Private primary schools can only be established by adhering strictly to official vigilance. In all official establishments primary education will be given free.

Article 123 went so far as specifically to require that the owners of landed estates, industries, mines and other classes of work establish and maintain schools for the worker’s children.  

Vasconcelos, as the first Secretary of Education from 1921 to 1924, formulated the goals which carried into the 1930’s. He laid the basis for a school of social action with practical participation by the student; the three “R’s” were subordinated to socialization and the standard of living; and the Indian was emphasized as an integral part of national life with need for assimilation into the mestizo culture. The rural schools for the peasants and Indians followed Revolutionary ideology for the social, economic, and cultural redemption of the masses. As center of the community, the rural school teacher served as family counselor, country farm agent, health and hygiene officer, and physical education organizer. The need for rural educational paralleled the land distribution, for knowledge of agricultural techniques was necessary for the success of other than subsistence farming. The philosopher Vasconcelos, however, was not well grounded in the social sciences and did not see the
need for technical knowledge. He unrealistically spent much time and budget on publishing classical books for the newly taught countrymen to read. Thought he provided the general orientation and initial impetus of education, he left no basis organization to the system. The chaos in education that he bequeathed to the decade of the 1930’s was a moral and material separation between the teachers and the government, an indiscipline of system due to teacher insecurity and administrative uncertainty, and a neglect of education’s debt to the Revolution.

Sexual Education

Narciso Bassols, stalwart socialist and another power of the anti-Calles movement within the P.N.R., took over the Ministry of Public Education in 1932 for President Rodríguez. He set about reforming the educational system in his two and a half years in office and emphasized the economic aspect of rural education. He met resistance on several sides. The education bureaucracy fought reorganization. The Catholics fought his sexual education program. The Cristero Revolt of 1926 had hinged in part on Calles’ secularization of primary education. Bassols realized that the Constitution did not specify the type of secondary
education to prevail and that it was openly in the hands of the Church. In December, 1932 Rodríguez remedied this situation by a presidential decree for lay secondary schools. The clerical reaction was immediate. Archbishop of Mexico Pascual Díaz ordered all parents to refuse to send their children to the lay secondary schools and threatened excommunication of teachers. He imposed an obligation on them to choose Catholic schools for their children, and if that were impossible, to lay their case before the hierarchy. The weapon which the Catholic finally used to force Bassol’s resignation was the much publicized sexual education which they falsely attributed to him.

Bassols had followed the suggestion of the 1930 Sixth Pan-American Child Welfare Congress held in Lima, Perú which noted that all governments of the Americas should provide physiology and hygiene courses in the school curriculum. In 1933 the Mexican Eugenic Society presented to the Bassols´ ministry a list of suggestions by leading physicians of Mexico. Bassols published this list in May to solicit opinions on its recommendations. The suggestions pointed out that some kind of sexual education was necessary since year after year adolescent girls died as a result of criminal abortions or else were burdened for life with unwanted
children and venereal disease. And those girls were not only from poor families, but often products of “good” middle class homes whose parents had kept them in ignorance. The course adopted for the schools was a direct translation of a standard physiology text in the United States, but Bassols was bitterly attacked. Public demonstration calling for Bassol’s resignation was the result of wild gossip against “sex in schools.” Tales were told of men teachers seducing theirs students, practical classroom experiments in sex, and nude models in front of the class. The names of teachers were added to the stories to afford the hysteria some authenticity. Typical of the fervor against sex education was the following article by one Josefina Santos Coy de Gómez which appeared in the Catholic paper La Palabra:

I turn to you – mothers of Mexico—and first of all to the wife of the first ruler of our Nation… You, Señora, whom the public voice has acclaimed a model of mothers… will you watch, without indignation, your little sons being initiated into the mysteries and vulgarities of sex? Well, then, if you are good, raise your protest, together with ours, against those who want to pervert our children’s souls.

It fills me with panic even to imagine the grade of perversion to which future humanity will sink after it has been prepared, shamelessly, by such an education; it is terrifying to think that a child then years old will be made to understand the sexual instinct.
In the name of human dignity, we must oppose this abominable project of education... When my little daughter María Teresa turns upon me her limpid eyes which reflect the whiteness of her soul, I feel the desire to adore her as one adores an angel... and render homage to her innocence... and when I think of the monstrosities that sexual education will create in children, I think of my ten-year-old daughter and say to myself, it would cause me less pain to see her laying dead than see her innocence brutally shattered!

Our grandfathers were educated in blessed ignorance of all sexual problems... The highly immoral science which our government is trying to impose upon the country will only create perverts and candidates for the insane asylum.

Bassols tried to appease the Catholic populace by changing the name of his educational program from “sexual” to “social”\textsuperscript{16} which might indicate that he was either imprudent or deliberately trying to cause trouble by labeling his program sexual education in the first place, but he was forced to resign in May of 1934. As he withdrew, Bassols pointed out that sex education was only the whipping boy. The real issue was socialism in education and clerical agitation for nullification of the newly proposed reform of Article 3 of the Constitution.\textsuperscript{17}

The Socialist Six Year Plan for Education

While the sexual education debate raged, the P.N.R. convention met at Querétaro to formulate the Six Year Plan. In the radical swing away from Calles’ wishes, the convention
Proposed that Article 3 be amended to read as follows:\textsuperscript{18}

The education imparted by the State shall be a socialistic one and, in addition to excluding all religious doctrine, shall combat fanaticism and prejudices by organizing its instruction and activities in a way that shall permit the creation in youth of an exact and rational concept of the Universe and of social life.

Only federal, state, or municipal schools were granted the right to give primary, secondary, or normal school education. Private schools were placed under government supervision to meet standards for curricula and teachers preparation. Religious groups or priests were forbidden to interfere in education. Primary education was made obligatory and provided gratuitously by the State. This proposed amendment was accepted by the National Congress and ratified by the states in November, 1934.\textsuperscript{19}

Calles was definitely against socialist education and reform of Article III. His opposition within the P.N.R. resulted in the exemption of universities from socialist instructions, and the move to substitute the world “Marxian” for “socialistic” education was defeated.\textsuperscript{20} Senator Ezequiel Padilla, speaking for Calles, tried to stem the tide of anti-religious education by summarizing Mexican Socialism as dedicated to direction of the economy, control of national
resources through elimination of the Capitalist, creation of labor laws, establishment of cooperatives, and fight against religious fanaticism. This last manifestation of the Revolution could only succeed, he thought, by persuasion, not violence, for Catholicism was more than just “idols” and “churches,” but a faith buried in the heart of man. Padilla made his point by quoting Victor Hugo holding up a book, gesturing towards a church, and saying, “This will kill that.” Violence and persecution on the other hand would only mean a great resurgence of Catholicism like that in France following the martyrdom after the French Revolution.  

Padilla was ignored and the Congress accepted the Amendment. The P.N.R. recapitulated Church-State conflict as having four periods. The Church domination over State, 1821-1857; the separation of the two into equal spheres in the orthodox liberal reform of Article 3 in the Constitution of 1857; the State’s domination over Church in 1917; and the death of clerical power and complete integration of Mexican sovereignty under civil power with the reform of Article 3 in 1934.  

This final Amendment to Article 3 was vague and interpreted as ranging from “scientific socialism” to “communism” but Carleton Beals told an anecdote about a Oaxaca Indian
village to show the difference between scientific education and religious education:  

When the first airplane flew overhead, the village priest rushed out to tell the terrified Indians that it was a miracle sent from heaven, that they had best get on their knees to pray. The school-teacher rushed out, too, and he told the Indians it was a miracle, but a miracle wrought by modern science, enabling man, through knowledge, to pierce the skies and break his earthbound chains.

The Socialist Six Year Plan for education guided state and federal education officials for the first time. The Six Year Plan called for state and federal authorities to negotiate agreements giving the federal government direction of all primary schools. The P.N.R. added that it did not want federal control, but a vigorous, logical program of coordination of education.

Government Education Methods

The Six Year Plan goals were to be achieved by secondary school curricula aimed toward vocational guidance and training at the expense of cultural studies. Even the conservative National University was forced to open schools of physical education, agriculture, veterinary medicine, science, commerce, and business administration. This emphasis on technical training
was an attempt to limit the number of students preparing for the overcrowded professions of medicine and law by channeling the professionally aspiring young men into other fields such as engineering." Tannenbaum saw the rural school replacing the Church in the affections of many communities, for integrated into the village, it provided hope for the children and a program to meet the particular needs of the village. The government methods aimed to teach the peasants how to use the land. By bringing the benefits of modern civilization to the Indian, social disorder, ignorance and superstition, and bad living conditions would be obviated. But education was to work both ways. The white culture would reciprocally adopt some of the Indian culture.

One of the first acts of the new Cárdenas Ministry of Education was to revise the text books to socialistic standards and break the text book monopoly. The cost of all publishing was cut 93 percent. Zone commands of education were instituted to divide Mexico’s states and territories into eight zones and the federal district. Each zone had an Inspector General with one Director of Federal Education for each state or territory under his command. School inspectors were assigned according to each zone’s needs to supervise and coordinate teachers, chiefs of ejidos, work inspectors,
and municipal presidents. It was this inspection system that Archbishop Díaz complained was formed to investigate schools suspected of religious instruction. Inspectors searched classrooms, dormitories, and sometimes even teachers and pupils to find some small medals or image of a saint.

Cultural missions began in 1935 to create in each state capital a regional center of socialistic orientations and present a model socialist school. Their purpose was to give teachers in-service training in the “new education” and to promote the social and economic improvement of the rural communities. The chief of each mission taught a course of the history of the Mexican proletarian movement and the international workers’ movement along with a discussion of the unequal distribution of Mexico’s wealth, the religious problem, education policies, and socialistic orientation. A nurse, an educator, an agricultural worker, a music teacher, a manual arts teacher, a recreation director, and a welfare worker sought to link the school to the important problems, of the community. For the teacher who served as the government’s representative to influence and organize the community for cleanliness, highway repair, reforestation, sanitation, construction of kitchen chimneys, construction of outhouses, use the beds, and development of cooperatives as well as work
in the defense of the worker’s interests and salary, there was little time for attacking religion or ranting about socialism. Urban missions placed more emphasis on academic curses than social improvement, however, and probably had more chance to teach socialistic ideology.

The percentage of the national budget devoted to education jumped from roughly 12 percent when Cárdenas took over in 1934 to 18 percent in 1937. This compares favorably to the last year of the Porfirio Díaz reign when about 7 percent of the budget was allocated to education. Madero appropriated nearly the same proportion, but Carranza’s last year of office in 1920 saw less than 1 percent for education as this field was left to provincial governments. By 1925 the Calles government had again reached the old 7 percent allocation to education. The Cárdenas program increased the importance of rural schools in the education budget in an attempt to reduce the illiteracy and number of Indians speaking exclusively Indian languages. The total number of schools grew from 10,633 in 1934 to 14,487 in 1940.

Though the book monopoly was broken, the changeover to new text caused a shortage of reading material. When S. L. A. Marshall, an often unreliable reporter, visited thirty-three schools in seven states for the New York Times in the
fall of 1934, he found thirty-three different interpretations of education. Texts had such readings as: “there is no being superior to man. God exists only in the human mind.” Sex education was provided in kindergarten children and pictures were shown of nude men and women saying. “This is nature.”39 True or not, the United States public was fed on this kind of news and heard “communism” charged against everything that the Mexican government sponsored. A review of the Ministry of Education summary of its curricula from 1934 to 1940 reveals that the kindergarten stressed only activities for social living.40 The socialist primary school taught organization of the workers for protection from capitalistic exploitation by collectivizing production and distribution.41 The rural primary school began this instruction in the ninth year of schooling when studies on “work” included organization of work teams for experimental farming. The instruction in classrooms emphasized the teaching of history from the viewpoint of social movement for reform.42 By grade twelve, this program was intensified to teach the socialist’s theory of the origin of private property.43 The urban primary school course work was based on a detailed study of the history of Mexico.44

The secondary school beginning at the fifteenth year of
age introduced a socialist bibliography with Marx and Engels standing out on the list. The organization of labor was taught as the means to achieve cooperative life. The rural normal school was much more Marxist oriented and the radical bibliography include many of Lenin’s works. The National Teachers School was also organized for teaching economics and history on the basis of class struggle. There was little mention of the Church in proportion to other problems, let alone derogatory propaganda.

The Mexican education was, for the most part, as much a training in social responsibility or citizenship as in socialist ideology. John Dewey’s educational philosophy guided the Mexican educators. Physical education became vitally important. The official education plan did not call for direct attack on the Church since anti-religious “defanitization” could be handled by the more subtle method of inculcating socialism which would lead to a continued freedom from religion in later life. The wild stories circulates about “anti-God in the classroom” such as “Good morning teacher, there is not God,” and the teacher answering, “Good morning children, there never was a God” may be discounted to a large extent as the same kind of hysterical propaganda hurled so successfully at the Narciso Bassols
sexual education program. A distinguished committee from the Council for Pan American Democracy found in 1939 that the charge of propaganda in the schools could not be substantiated, although there were many instances of teaching showing high enthusiasm and using strong phrases in support of socialism. In one school the students showed a strong reaction against “fascism” but did not know what it would mean, like the word “communism” in the United States. Ambassador Daniels set the propaganda in perspective when he wrote:

You hear so much gossip here in the antagonism over socialist education that you do not know what to believe… [Mrs. Daniels asked the head of the Public health Department] why the government did not correct the statements… such as the socialistic education sends young children to the hospitals to witness to birth of a baby. He said that one false story followed so close on the heels of another that it was impossible to keep up with the yarns that were invented and circulated. “Only today,” he said, “a story was broadcast and sent to the United States that girls in the public schools were stripped and made to dance before the boys as a lesson in sexual education.” He seemed to think it impossible for truth, even with seven-league boots, to be able to overtake such lies.

On the other hand, you hear stories equally fantastic telling that priests are doing. And on both sides real evils exists… readers are inclined to accept such incidents as typical, just as the German atrocities were regarded in World War I. Of course they were and are exceptional. And such outbreaks are rare and are generally personal rather than inspired either by the Church or by the State.
A 1936 writer in *School and Society* said:\(^51\)

From our own modest observation in several schools, whose nearness to the Federal District would permit the teacher to preach radical doctrine in perfect safety, the much bruited revolutionary ideology turned out to be harmless stuff! The teacher came out against pulque and germs. Beyond the fancy revolutionary names painted over the school entrance and the doughy rhetoric which Mexican educators beat out like tortillas and the occasional quotations from Marx and Lenin to be found in the text books, most of the teaching wouldn’t give an Iowan superintendent pause. At its most radical it resembles the New Deal’s talk about the Forgotten Man.

However, critics of socialistic education did note some valid shortcomings. The immediate effect of the Amendment to Article 3 was disastrous as many teachers resigned or were dismissed. The Mexican government school inspection system has resulted to this day in mediocrity of instruction and administrative red-tape; the minute rules of bureaucracy have weakened the creative energy of the school teacher who has become part of an assembly line education. In addition to low pay, distant locations, and an ever-present lack of teachers, the reaction against socialism made the teacher’s job a dangerous occupation. Portes Gil saw the education ministry sending out teams unprepared to teach Revolutionary concepts as many only adopted a leftist position without understanding it so that they might keep their jobs.\(^52\) The criticism of inadequate facilities and poorly
trained teachers was countered by the argument that a social philosophy teaching acculturation was more important than academic achievement. Books were not needed, except for reference, as the keynote of teaching was on practical experience.\textsuperscript{53} This Mexican approach to education was developed in Sixteenth Century New Spain to meet the need of educating the mestizo in the light of the social and economic factors peculiar to the area that became Mexico. The Spanish colonial children, in contrast, received the traditional Spanish education in separate schools. The revolution relegates reading and writing to a secondary position in favor of social welfare. The lack of financial and technical resources proved a blessing in disguise. Inspired villagers built their own schoolhouses and resorted to native ingenuity using things within their reach and understanding. Mexico’s rural schools represented a great contribution to world education theory and practice.\textsuperscript{54}

The Watson Committee refuted the charge that the Mexican government only built new schools along the main highways as show pieces.\textsuperscript{55} Undoubtedly there was much communism in the Department of Education.\textsuperscript{56} MacFarland quotes school readers he reviewed as overtly anti-religious and reprints ideological declarations sponsored by some federal education
inspectors in the provinces. To what extent this radicalism prevailed or to what extent it emanated from the Federal District is questionable.

Reaction

It is understandable that a negative reaction to Cárdenas’ Six Year Plan developed. With the P.N.R. usual demonstration of solidarity, Cárdenas looked like just another Calles man who would rob the Church and the people for personal ends. There were many observers of all shades of political opinion beside the pro-clericals who were disgruntled with the Revolution. Carleton Beals summed up this criticism when he wrote:

Aside from a few hundred Indians growing corn upon what were once good sugar-cane lands, a few thousand rural school-teachers earning 30 cents a day to teach Spanish to illiterate Indians in thatched roof, dirt floor huts out in the hills, the net result has been a charge of yokes concealed by incessant hurrahing about nationalism…

José Vasconcellos returned to the Church in reaction to the millionaire Revolutionaries’ manipulation of elections and subservience to the United States in the 1920’s. Another writer even interpreted the Six Year Plan as putting an impediment in the way of the Revolution so as to keep the
power and money of the government even more in the hands of conservative Revolutionaries.\textsuperscript{60} Luis Cabrera believed that the Revolution ended in 1917 and that Mexico was only witnessing another Revolution as part of world adjustment to economic disequilibrium.\textsuperscript{61} He believed that a change was necessary in education to make a strong basis for socialism, providing socialism knew where it was headed. Was there to be a classless society? Was the aim pure proletarianism without land or pure proletarianism with ejidos? Was there to be all workers and no bosses? What kind of a society did Mexico specifically want to educate its children to replace capitalism?\textsuperscript{62} Cabrera opposed the limitations imposed upon the clergy by the state legislatures in the early 1930’s. He had expropriated Church property as Secretary of the Treasury under Carranza, but believed the Church should be allowed to operate seminaries to create a national clergy and prevent the education of Mexican priests in foreign lands.\textsuperscript{63}

The pro-clerical opposition against the “rags to riches revolution” was nothing new and saw not hope for improvement with the coming of Cárdenas. “Few countries in recent years have had government which made greater protestations as to solicitude for workers and farmers,” yet done so little.\textsuperscript{64}
The Clergy had good arguments against the troublesome Constitution of 1917. Since the delegates were chosen by weeding out pro-clericals and conservatives, the document was not representative of the people. Next, the Constitution was not referred to the people or states for approval, but proclaimed. There were also the contradictions within the Constitution and between the Constitution and law. Articles 6 and 7 prescribed free speech, but Article 130 forbade clerical criticism of the government. The restrictions of the Constitution of 1917, however, were minor threats to the Church compared to the amendment for socialistic education in 1934. Lay education limited the Church in the sphere where new generations were brought up faithful to Catholicism. The Churches’ reaction was one of self-protection.

Ramón Beteta, Cárdenas’ Secretary of Statistics, told the United States that no law prohibited parents from teaching children anything they pleased, provide they didn’t teach it in the schools. Yet Cárdenas’ new Supreme Court handed down a decision that all privately owned buildings in which Catholic ceremonies of any kind were conducted automatically became the property of the nation in accordance with the Constitutional provision nationalizing churches. Catholic parents could instruct their children in religion neither
in the school nor in the home. Whatever the claims and counter claims and the thousands of words, they were all to no avail. In Mexico the Supreme Court and legislators follow the executive’s current demands.

The Catholics contended that Catholic Social Action was the answer to social reform and if it had been allowed to succeed, the evils of socialism would have been avoided. The Church did not abandon its Action. It called for a reavowal of its principles and continued lay Action in order that Catholicism might yet triumph. This message was the basis of many of the pastoral letters of the hierarchy to the faithful in the early 1930’s.69 Quirk interpreted the Social Action as attempting to reconstitute the successful medieval policy of unity and orthodoxy. Guilds would replace labor unions. Catholic education would end socialism, and the hierarchy would stop political maneuvering by interpreting God’s will to the people and revamping society to obtain classes knowing their place and duty.70 The pro-clerical representatives maintained in 1935 that this program stood for land distribution, social insurance, co-operatives, collective bargaining assisted by the government, and a living wage, but also peace, compensation for expropriation, and slow, steady growth in land distribution.71 This social
Action, as explained in a joint pastoral by the entire Mexican hierarchy, was thus based on a normal, gradual, moral charge without the brusque transition of the Revolution.\textsuperscript{72}

Archbishop Díaz, caught in the middle between the infuriated right wing Cristero Catholics and the Cárdenas government, had feared another rebellion since the outbreak of the new crisis in 1931, but kept the Liga partially appeased by threats against the government and finally invoking non-attendance in the socialist school.\textsuperscript{73} The Apostolic Delegate Ruiz, in exile, issued a pastoral letter in support of Díaz’s verbal attack on the government which declared:\textsuperscript{74}

The Church recognizes no human power to prevent it from doing what it considers necessary to save souls... ideals situation would be the Church unified with State... where this is denied, the Church will tolerate separation of power only so long as the civil power does not interfere in what does not concern it.

United States Ambassador to Mexico Josephus Daniels noted that the pastorals made little impression on either the government or the people. The government did not take steps to prevent their circulation and ignored them. The people as a whole were seeking the secure better wages and living conditions instead of worrying about Church-State
Most of the workers and peons may have accepted socialistic education, but there were many who did not. Three hundred school teachers were reported killed between 1935 and 1939, and many had their ears cut off. Not all of these murders could be attributed to a religious distaste for socialistic education, however. There also existed the powerful economic motive, for the hacienda owners saw in the teachers arrival the same threat to profits as an open shop employer might see in the arrival of a C.I.O. organizer. The teacher, once he became integrated into community life, would excite the peons to demand better working conditions and higher wages. The children might be taken off the labor market, sent to school, and the wage scale upset. What if the villagers began to demand their own ejidos? That would be bad enough, but they would also want their children as helpers which would surely disrupt the wage scale. Sabotage was the answer and it was an easy matter. First the community would keep the children home on a saint’s day; then the children would be encouraged to stay away from school for no reason at all. If some parents persisted in cooperating with the school, the local hacendado would organize a band of religious fanatic to raid the school, burn it, and perhaps kill the teachers if he refused to leave the community.
The foreign visitor suggesting this economic approach was inclined to minimize the government’s accent on Revolutionary education as the important reason for persecution of Mexican teachers, for the baiting of federal officials did not begin with the Cárdenas term. It was an old malady rising with every attempt a reform administration made to heal the ignorance of its people. Many poems were deeply conservative, and, caught in an economic trap, were not so willing to listen to the blandishments of improvements for their children when they themselves were blinded by poverty and disease. Why should they trouble themselves with feeding and clothing their children for school when they could utilize their labor for something more productive? They saw only mischief afoot to alienate their children and increase their despair.\textsuperscript{77}

Counter-Reaction

In keeping the Liga-Cristero wing of the Church from revolution with his verbal attack on the government, Archbishop Díaz came to be misunderstood by the government as stirring up the people, for the inter-clerical battles were conducted with the same secretiveness as the inter-P.N.R. struggles.\textsuperscript{78} Ambassador Daniels heard Díaz present the
argument that more priests were needed to fulfill the holy functions of the Church, but never did he ask for United States intervention.\textsuperscript{79} Díaz was a full blooded Jalisco Indian. He was one of the rarest examples of Churchmen in the Catholic world as he was a Jesuit appointed to a Church office of Bishop by the Pope over the rules of the Jesuit Order.\textsuperscript{80} With wholesale violation of anti-religious laws by the Church, the Department of Interior agents of Secretary Juan de Dios Bojorquez singled out Díaz as the leader of Catholics in Mexico for a crackdown. Díaz was arrested by federal agents in the State of Mexico on March 7, 1935 for violating the law prohibiting a minister from officiating outside his diocese. The authorities claimed that papal and Mexican flags were raised at the ceremony, ornaments and ecclesiastical robes were worn outside the Church, and that gifts should have been reported to the Department of the Interior. Díaz was held incommunicado for twenty-one hours with the Department denying knowledge of his whereabouts. He was finally released on payment of a 100 peso fine.\textsuperscript{81} Díaz admitted the charge of officiating in a religious ceremony outside his diocese but denied all other charges in an unanswered open letter to Cárdenas. His condemnation of the Department of Interior made damaging
claims against the legality of his arrest as he cited the Constitution to show only state authorities should have arrested him and that gifts of money could be accepted by the Church without notifying the government. He was held in an auto for five hours along with his innocent chauffeur before they were transferred to a jail cell where no food, a chair, and a broken iron bench were provided. Díaz declared the agents arrested him on the suspicion of carrying a Thompson sub machine-gun in his car.82

Cárdenas also clamped down on religious literature and propaganda by barring it from the mails after February 15, 1935.83 This stopped the use of the mails for religious correspondence and caught a highly publicized shipment of Bibles in Veracruz,84 to the consternation of the faithful in both Mexico and the United States. The law read:85

... Whereas. One of the ideological aims of the present government is to combat, through all legitimate means, fanaticisms and religious prejudices in order to obtain spiritual freedom for the people;

Whereas. In order to accomplish this, legal steps must be taken to facilitate free government action...

Whereas. For these reasons it is necessary to reform... the mails... one of the most powerful aids to the diffusion of culture, that... must not be used to spread ideas contrary to cultural betterment.

For these reasons, and because much of this correspondence contains unjustified and besmirching attacks on the Government and the revolutionary institutions, I have hereby resolved to issue the following decree...
Another crushing blow against reaction was delivered when Cárdenas struck at the National University of Mexico. Founded in 1551 as a Royal and Pontifical University, it was closed as a Conservative stronghold in 1865 by Benito Juárez.\textsuperscript{86} In 1910 the University was reconstituted by Justo Sierra on the precepts of Positivism.\textsuperscript{87} The 35 years interruption of existence and the fact that it was reopened on an entirely different basis of modern investigation in contrast to the select colonial University of the same name charged with imposing “God and King” on the country have done little to dull its image as the oldest University in the Americas, 400 years in 1951.\textsuperscript{88} It received partial autonomy from the government in 1929 to quiet a student strike against the new written exams, and complete autonomy with continued government subsidy in 1933 as a result of a student riot which took place when an effort was made to have the institution adopt the socialistic education.\textsuperscript{89} During the late 1920’s the University was criticized as having become estranged from the people and converted into an aristocratic and conservative institution.\textsuperscript{90} In the 1930’s Dr. Antonio Caso carried on a public attack against Marxian and socialistic education from his philosophy chair.\textsuperscript{91} Cárdenas had noted that the University students from the
countryside had become bourgeoisie when they finished school and that they were lost as leaders and teachers to return to their peasant background. He said, “The Revolution has granted the University its autonomy in order that it can maintain itself outside of political contingencies. The left wing students locked up the school with a strike and Cárdenas announced an end to the government 75 percent subsidy of the school if the University did not change from the liberal professions to emphasize technical and scientific curricula the country so desperately needed. The University fired Caso and agreed to social service provisions requiring students to spend a certain amount of their time among the peasants, placing their newly acquired knowledge at the service of the masses. The government also founded a Worker’s University to provide practical courses under the direction of C.T.M.’s Vicente Lombardo Toledano.

During these latter controversies between Cárdenas and reactionary elements, Calles was undergoing an operation on his gall bladder in, ironically, a Catholic hospital in Los Angeles. From January through March Calles was incapacitated and resting without visitors on his ranch in Sinaloa state. When he recovered, he began a political power struggle with Cárdenas by actively appearing again on the national scene.
CHAPTER IV

AMELIORATION OF CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS

Conflict Between Cárdenas and Calles

Cárdenas came to the presidency as the champion of labor, just as Calles and many other Latin American politicians had come to power. Cárdenas inherited a weak labor party, but he attempted to improve the position of the workers by initiating a new phase of the Revolution. In return for labor’s support, he assumed the role of protector of the worker by encouraging strikes. The Government, as arbiter to the strikes, attempted to end the abuse of the workers by management. The number of strikes in 1935 was 642, compared to 7 in Calles’ last year in the presidency, 1928, and 202 in Rodríguez’s last year of office, 1934. In 1936 there were 674 strikes, 545 of which were settled by management concessions to labor. This great increase of strikes seriously hampered industry and disrupted services throughout the nation. These strikes were largely against foreign owned companies that had flourished under the “businessman’s government” of Calles.
Calles, who had recovered from his gall bladder operation in the spring of 1935, took the occasion of labor-management strife to return to the national political scene. He answered the call of Catholics dissatisfied with socialistic education as well as conservatives who were anxious for a leader to counteract the “communistic” policies of General Cárdenas. The jefe máximo was interviewed in Cuernavaca by his favorite senator, Ezequiel Padilla, on June 12, 1935. In the interview Calles stated that he deplored the attempts of certain political groups to divide the Chamber of Deputies into Cardenistas and Callistas. He recalled that the result of a similar development of factions during the term of Ortiz Rubio had been the forced retirement of that president. Calles noted that the division in the Chamber of Deputies came at a time – after six months of strikes – when the country most needed unity and calm. Terming the strikes unjustified and the strikers “treasonous” for holding back the economy of a country which was protecting the workers, he asserted that Cárdenas was a friend of labor but the strikers’ ceaseless demands were obstructing the government’s economic program. The jefe máximo conclude by announcing that his 21 years of friendship with Cárdenas could not be broken by those senators attempting to divide the P.N.R.
for personal gain. Padilla’s interview with Calles was a bombshell in Mexican politics. The simmering struggle between Calles and Cárdenas for control of the P.N.R. was no longer a party secret. If Calles were really a friend of Cárdenas, there would have been no need for a statement about a division of the party. The New York Times, predicting the fall of Cárdenas’ government, viewed Cárdenas as resembling Madero – whose Revolutionary government collapsed in 1913 due to weak leadership – in all respects but appearance. A cavalcade of generals, politicians, and bureaucrats filled the road from Mexico City to Cuernavaca to congratulate and pledge allegiance to Calles for his “patriotic” declarations.

Cárdenas’ rebuttal to the Calles declarations was to justify the strikes as necessary to consolidate the economy. To reinforce his position, Cárdenas turned the command of the P.N.R. over his friend Portes Gil, and he asked his cabinet to resign so that he might be at liberty to reorganize his government. This cabinet reorganization has been interpreted by many writers as a move by Cárdenas to throw off the yoke of conservative advisors imposed upon him by Calles in 1934. This was not the case, for the cabinet was composed mostly of men loyal to Cárdenas. Cárdenas, in
search of mass support to continue in power, reorganized his advisors in favor of a more moderate group. Such publicly unpopular radicals as Garrido Canabal and Narciso Bassols were no longer liabilities to Cárdenas after they left the cabinet. General Saturnino Cedillo, the Catholic strongman of San Luis Potosí, replaced Garrido in the agriculture post. Cárdenas would certainly never have called on this famous conservative, who resisted Calles’ anticlericalism and was one of the two governors who had refused to enforce Cárdenas’ socialistic education amendment, unless he wanted Catholic support of his administration. Cedillo was also welcomed by generals and politicians who had been denied office or position by Calles. Cárdenas was no longer troubled by Rodolfo Calles when he changed the cabinet. The important communications post that the young Calles had occupied was given to Múgica, who had just resigned as Secretary of Labor, bitterly criticized by Calles for allowing strikes, was transferred to the powerful Secretary of the Interior post. Portes Gil noted that upon the resignation of Cárdenas’ cabinet, retiring Secretary of the Interior Juan de Dios Bojórquez suggested to Cárdenas that the retiring secretaries visit Calles in Cuernavaca with the object of showing the country
a solid P.N.R. front. Cárdenas did not object, but Portes Gil and Múgica felt such a visit so soon after Calles’ declarations would be dishonorable. They postponed a visit to Calles for several days, thought the rest of the resigning secretaries made the trip immediately.15

Cárdenas obtained support in many places. The newly appointed acting-Secretary of War, Manuel Ávila Camacho, stated the army had nothing to do with the crisis.16 Cárdenas was generous to those who pledged him loyalty and he won many of Calles’ followers who were anxious for a position in the government.17 He repealed the law prohibiting the circulation of religious literature through the mails and won more friends. Ex-Governor Tejeda of Veracruz demanded that Cárdenas expel Calles. The Mexican Congress voted to support Cárdenas.18

Calles’ policy was to keep the workers divided into various labor unions which were easier to control. He defeated his own work when he attacked Cárdenas for allowing the strikes of 1935. Labor was forced to unite behind Cárdenas for self-protection. In defense of labor’s gains, a united front of 70 per cent of the labor organizations of Mexico formed to support the government. Within a few short
months one big union, the C.T.M. (Confederación the Trabajadores de México) under Vicente Lombardo Toledano, was to emerge after years of oratory in favor of one organization had failed. In the face of such overwhelming opposition, Calles retired from public life in June 16, 1935, and departed for his ranch in Sinaloa. On July 20 he left for the United States for some “dental work” and a “vacation in Hawaii.”

The fall of Calles and the appointment of Cedillo to the cabinet seemed to Catholics signs of an end to persecution of the Church. Cárdenas was hailed as finally free from the domination of Calles and his demands of an anti-Church policy. Catholics joyously welcomed Cárdenas to Guadalajara by ringing Church bells. Following close upon these events, the “Brito Foucher Affair” in Tabasco offered Cárdenas a chance to further please Catholics. After leaving the cabinet, Garrido and his Red Shirts had returned to Tabasco. With the July gubernatorial elections imminent, one Brito Foucher led a group of students from the National University of Mexico to Villahermosa, Tabasco, to insure free elections. Several of Brito Foucher’s entourage were killed on July 15 by Garrido’s Red Shirts and a national furor developed over the incident. Whether
the students, who reportedly shot down a Red Shirt leader while he was carrying flowers home to his wife, were killed by a Red Shirt vengeance mob, or whether the outgoing state governor fired, without provocation, on the students with a machine gun will probably never be clear. National demonstration against the newly-elected Governor Garrido forced Cárdenas to end Garrido’s anti-Catholic dictatorship of Tabasco.23 Stating that order had disintegrated in Tabasco, Cárdenas had Congress declare that the Constitutional powers of the State of Tabasco had disappeared and appoint a provisional governor in accordance with Article 76, section 5, of the Constitution of 1917.24 Cárdenas appointed Garrido to an agricultural commission leaving immediately to visit Guatemala, the Caribbean, and Puerto Rico. Garrido, well guarded, left by airplane in some haste to avoid the public on August 11, 1935.25 On arrival in Guatemala he found a telegram from Cárdenas announcing that the agricultural commission’s tour had been cancelled and that it would be prudent not to return to Mexico.26 The exile of Garrido seemed another sign of the triumph of the Church, and an early change of the anticlerical laws did not appear out of the question.

On September 1, 1935, however, Cárdenas indicated he had consolidated his power and was again ready to renew his
Revolutionary program. Speaking to Congress he referred to... unexpected political developments which produced a problem of general intranquility, threatening... to destroy the principle of our legal institution. However, my declaration that I was the only one responsible for the political and social march of the nation caused that menace to disappear. All workers and public opinion endorsed the acts of the Federal Executive, thus demonstrating that the revolution this time did not need violent measures to accomplish the housecleaning that was necessary for the accomplishment of [the Revolution’s] historic mission.

Perhaps to answer the critics of his administration who charged that he had failed to attack the Church or to enforce the religious laws, Cárdenas stated on August 13 that he would not permit grateful peasants to kiss his hand since priests had taught them such a ceremony to enslave them. Cárdenas, occupied with strikes and the impending return of Calles to the political scene in early 1935, had relaxed his persecution of the Church in April and May. But in late August he was again ready to attack the Church.

On August 26, 1935, Cárdenas decree the Law of Nationalization of Property which clearly defined what property of the Church belonged to the nation. The president, as representative of the federal government, assumed the sole authority to nationalize and administer the Church’s property. Under this law 300 properties belonging to the
Church were transferred to the Ministry of Education for conversion into schools.\textsuperscript{31} The clerical attitude towards the Law of Nationalization was given in a joint pastoral letter issued October 7, 1935, on the “Civic Duties of Catholics.” This document was regarded as a renewal of Catholic attack on the Constitution of 1917.\textsuperscript{32} Shortly thereafter the hierarchy petitioned Cárdenas to relax the anti-Church Constitutional Articles 3, 24, 27, and 130 which provided for socialist education, exclusion of religious instruction, nationalization of the Church’s property, and limitation on the number of priests. Cárdenas refused to consider the petition. He answered the hierarchy with stinging words:\textsuperscript{33}

You claim that liberty of conscience is recognized by all nations living under a regime of social and democratic morality, but the Catholic Church has always denied any liberty of conscience … Under such conditions, Catholic authorities cannot be included within the sphere of culture to which you now apply… In Mexico, the Roman clergy has been instigator and sustainer of most of our bloody internal warfare and is still guilty of treachery to the fatherland…

The exchange of argument continued. The Mexican Congress requested Cárdenas to expel the entire Catholic hierarchy. The Church kept busy sending out pastoral letters, though neither side gained much in this battle of words. Cárdenas
ignored the Congressional resolution for expulsion of the hierarchy and the pastorals were running out of new messages. The Church-State battle continued, but it did not rage with the fire of the early Cárdenas presidency.

The Demands for United States Intervention in Mexico

One of the many factors working to soften Cárdenas´ anti-Church policy was unofficial pressure from the United States. North American Catholics always watched the Mexican Church-State struggle closely. When the conflict was renewed in the 1930´s they protested to Washington in favor of United States intervention in Mexico to stop intolerance. The appointment of Josephus Daniels, a Protestant instead of a Catholic, as Ambassador to Mexico in March, 1933, brought forth new condemnations of Franklin D. Roosevelt´s “good neighbor policy” which ignored “moral suasion.” However, charges that the Protestant Daniel would not protect Catholics in Mexico were unjustified. Daniels fought the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920´s and campaigned for Catholic Al Smith in 1928 when he knew that his newspaper´s politics would be unpopular in Protestant North Carolina. Daniels remained the American Catholic´s scapegoat as they opened a concerted campaign for intervention in
Mexico. Daniels, at a diplomatic affair, praised Mexican education and paid tribute to Calles. Many American Catholics demanded Daniels’s recall and began to apply pressure against him in the press and through public protest meetings.\(^{35}\)

The storm of Catholic protest in the United States following the “Coyoacán Affair” in Mexico\(^ {36}\) reached such proportions that in January, 1935, Congressman Higgins, a Democrat from Massachusetts, introduced a resolution to request Roosevelt to recall Daniels and withdraw recognition of Mexico. Senator Borah in Idaho, a Protestant, surprised the United States by introducing a resolution in February to investigate the charges that the Mexican government was persecuting United States citizens and seizing American property in Mexico.\(^ {37}\) A Mexican newspaper, the Catholic El Hombre Libre, saw deep implications in Borah’s action. The presidential campaign of 1936 which would see Roosevelt against Alfred Landon was a year away and the unsettled Mexican Church-State conflict was one of the many political means that the Republicans used to embarrass Roosevelt. El Hombre Libre noted that Cárdenas feared Borah and any investigation by him as he was opposed to the “good neighbor policy” and rumored as
London’s choice for the powerful Secretary of State post. The Liga wing of the Catholic wanted intervention since no Mexican government in recent history has been able to maintain itself in power without the blessing of the United States government. Perhaps one of the reasons Cárdenas relaxed his attack on religion was to relieve pressure on “good neighbor” Roosevelt who was seeking hemispheric solidarity. Roosevelt certainly succeeded in keeping the Borah Resolution in Senate committee.

The American Catholics differed, as did the Mexican Catholics, in their view of the Mexican Church-State situation. Many Americans calmly accepted the Revolutionary laws of Mexico. They condemned such organizations as the Knights of Columbus of interfering in the affairs of a foreign country and protesting to Washington in the name of all Catholics in the United States. Other American Catholics wrote books such as Blood-Drenched Altars and No God Next Door to goad Catholics and Roosevelt into action against the Mexican government. The Catholic viewpoints generally centered upon three main conflicts. First, there was the struggle within the Mexican hierarchy and lay groups over policy on how to fight the government’s Revolutionary program. Second, there was the struggle between those Catholics
in the United States demanding action by Roosevelt and those urging noninterference in Mexico. Finally there was friction between Mexican and American Catholics over the matter of intervention or nonintervention by the United States. Many writers noticed differences between Catholicism in Mexico and the United States that led to misunderstanding and friction between the faithful of the two countries. The Latin American clerical outlook was seen by Kirk as almost wholly European in attempting to maintain power and privilege. United states Catholics and a small minority of the Latin American clergy were, in contrast, not oriented toward guidance from the old world and believed in the principle of liberation of the common man. While the latter group has remained close to the flock, the former has followed the European ideal of remaining dignified and autocratic. One Latin American priest was quoted as saying, “American priests are regarded as not quite Catholic or as representing a form of Catholicism not wanted here…” An editorial in the Mexican newspaper Omega, which was entitled “The Danger of Protestantism,” said that American Catholicism was contrary to the customs and traditions of Hispanic America. The activities of American Protestantism and Catholicism were defined as “Yankeeization” of Hispanic Catholicism through the inculcation of the North American
concept of catholic Welfare, so contrary to the “fighting, suffering, poor, apostolic, sacrificing” Hispanic Catholicism.\textsuperscript{40}

Protestants were happy to encourage any dissension within Catholic ranks which would mean more strength to Protestantism. The Episcopal Church, which had complied with all Mexican laws, argued with American Catholics over whether or not there was any persecution in Mexico. The distinguished American Committee on Religious Rights and Minorities conclude that the Mexican government was persecuting religion in order to abolish it, but that Protestant didn´t suffer from the laws limiting the number of ministers as each faith was allowed a number of ministers in proportion to the population of an area. The Protestants had much room to grow before reaching their legal quota of ministers while the number of Catholic priests was reduced. Many Catholics believed that the strength of Protestantism was balanced with Catholicism, since the Catholics had previously enjoyed a ratio of then priests to one Protestant minister. Protestant religion suffered to some extent from the education restrictions and nationalization of property.\textsuperscript{41}

Roosevelt did not directly answer the hue and cry for
intervention until November, 1935, when he said that no American in Mexico had complained of interference with religious freedom and the United States intended to pursue a course of nonintervention regardless of the intemperate language of the Knights of Columbus. The American Catholics’ protest also lost momentum when Americans learned that the United States was not intervening in favor of the Mexican government by maintaining an embargo upon arms and ammunition to Mexican Catholics, but that the Mexican government was responsible for the prevention of arms shipments to Mexico. Ambassador Daniels claimed he made only “one religious intervention.” When Archbishop of Mexico Pascual Díaz died on May 19, 1936, Daniels asked Cárdenas to waive the law prohibiting a priest appearing in the street in the robes of office; he asked that a religious funeral procession be allowed in the street in order that Díaz might be taken from his residence to the Cathedral attended by priests. Daniels was never given credit by American Catholics for this intervention, but “El Hombre Libre announced, “Mexicans do not have a government which listens to them. The government listens to Mr. Daniels, and the Mexicans, as a result are protected by Mr. Daniels.”
Renewal of the Cárdenas-Calles Conflict

Against the foregoing background of Mexican Church reaction and protest of American Catholics to Washington over Cárdenas’ nationalization of Church property, Cárdenas developed a case of malaria which he probably picked up on one of his tours of the country. The rumor circulated that the President had little chance to recovery. Moderate socialists, radical socialists tinged with communism, and the group of men not so concerned with political theory as with a chance to rule vied for political ascendancy. On December 14, one month after Roosevelt had announced a policy of nonintervention in Mexico and two weeks after Cárdenas was on the way to recovery from malaria, Calles flew into Mexico City from exile in the United States where he and José Vasconcelos had been plotting a revolution against Cárdenas. Perhaps Calles felt that Cárdenas’ position was as delicate in politics as in health. At any rate Calles saw an opportunity to lead opposition against Cárdenas and he returned to Mexico. He told a crowd of his supporters at the airport after he arrived that he returned to defend his presidential administration of 1924-1928. He asserted that while he was president he sought the counsel of political enemies because
he considered them “Mexicans and patriots” while Cárdenas, in contrast, ignored his critics. Calles reiterated his stand on labor and appealed to the conservative elements of the population instead of the masses for support. He admitted that he was responsible for the religious persecution from 1924 to 1928. But no one had forgotten that he brought about *modus vivendi* of 1929, opposed amendment to Article 3 in 1934, and fought Cárdenas´ socialism. Calles was certainly not the favorite of pro-clericals, but compared to the radical Cárdenas who attacked parochial education, clerical persecution by Calles was a minor threat to the Church. This clerical outlook on Cárdenas and Calles was especially true after it became evident that Cárdenas had not been a puppet of Calles as the clericals had believed up until the nationalization of Church property in September, 1935.

Cárdenas had not previously taken any drastic steps to outs the Callistas from the government. Now he answered the challenge of Calles by calling upon the Senate to outs five of Calles´ senators in order that the government might more effectively meet what organized labor Calles the “Fascist threat created by the arrival in Mexico of a representative of clericalism and reaction.” Two top ranking generals were
fired. Four Calles’ governors were removed from office on charges of sedition. And Calles was put under guard “for his own protection.”

Labor, with the beginnings of one big union stemming from the eight month old open conflict between Calles and Cárdenas, emerged as the C.T.M. union to back up Cárdenas in this new struggle with Calles. Cárdenas prefaced the founding of this organization by defending labor with his “Fourteen Points” to solve the labor question. He said in points nine and eleven:

Current labor agitation is not due to the existence of communistic groups since they are so small they have no real influence in the affairs of the nation...

The fanatical religious factions who assassinate school teachers and oppose the carrying out of the laws and of the Program of the Revolution make more trouble for the nation than do the communists, and yet we are obligated to tolerate them.

One month later, on March 4, 1936, Cárdenas spoke in Guadalajara, the Catholic stronghold where Calles began federal persecution of the Church in 1934. Faced with crisis after crisis in his Revolutionary program, and still worried about Calles in Mexico City, Cárdenas sought to pacify the Catholics and end the opposition to his educational program. In promising to issue arms and ammunition to teachers for protection against those fighting socialistic education,
he said,\textsuperscript{50}

To break down the resistance of fanatics egged on by the enemies of the Revolution, the people in the communities must be organized. In those states where this has been done, the efforts of the reactionaries are null and void.

But this government has no intention of falling into the error of previous administrations. The duty of a revolutionary administration like the present consists in doing all that may be necessary to carry out the program of the Revolution, the fundamental aspects of which are social and economic in character… It is no concern of the Government to undertake anti-religious campaigns since all that is obtained thereby is a fruitless waste of the efforts of public servants, provocation of resistance and postponement, for an indefinite time, of economic and social principles basically essential to the well-being of the people. Action by organized masses in the fight against fanaticism and in support of the socialists school is the best safeguard for the lives of their children, and for the social, economic and spiritual emancipation of the people.

In the month following Cárdenas´ speech, the Governors of Colima, Campeche, Oaxaca, Nuevo León, Sonora, Sinaloa, and Guerrero opened many churches.\textsuperscript{51} Cárdenas told Ambassador Daniels, “You have observed that in every state as Governors is sympathy with my administration have been elected, more and more churches have been opened and a policy of moderation is growing all the time.”\textsuperscript{52}

Cárdenas´ Guadalajara speech has been interpreted by many writers as the turning point in Church-State relations.
It was, however, only one of many events leading to amelioration of Church-State relations. Archbishop Díaz interpreted Cárdenas’ Guadalajara speech optimistically, but *El Hombre Libre* pointed out that Veracruz still suffered the major anti-religious persecution and too much optimism was unwarranted.\textsuperscript{53} Carreño noted that priests were less bothered personally only because Cárdenas found it “more productive to nationalize private properties under any suspicion” that their owners were helping the Church. Carreño also contrasted the number of priests officiating in Mexico in 1929, 4493 to 1936 when 322 priests were legally officiating.\textsuperscript{54}

The relief of Church-State conflict after the Guadalajara speech at the beginning of March was almost undone at the end of the month. A government cultural mission of teachers, social workers and agriculturalists arrived in Ciudad González, Guanajuato, on March 29 to conduct a Sunday program in the central square. To combat “socialistic education,” the parish priest held a special service in the Church at the opposite end of the square. The agrarian militiamen, who had received lands and arms with which to protect themselves, were in attendance, and in the explosive situation clashed with the Church faithful.\textsuperscript{55} The details of the battle are very confused, but several person were killed.
Cárdenas happened to be in nearby Querétaro and sent his aid, Arroyo Ch., ex-Governor of Guanajuato, to investigate the clash the next morning. Cárdenas arrived in the afternoon to make his own investigation. Asking the agrarians to leave their arms at the Church door, he also invited the townsmen to enter and hear him speak. Talking from the altar, he placed the burden of the responsibility of the clash on the four parish priests who circulated handbills inciting the faithful to attack the cultural mission as “anti-religious.” Cárdenas gave three priests, who were unregistered and not licensed by the government to officiate, twenty-four hours to leave town. The priest most responsible for the clash, who was licensed by the government legally to conduct religious ceremonies, lost his license and was consigned to the authorities for trial.56

Meanwhile Calles, in Mexico City, was finding out that an appeal to the Catholics and conservatives was no longer enough to begin a revolt. The balance of power now lay with the awakened masses organized into the labor unions and agricultural brigades, and they were vociferously demanding his expulsion from Mexico. The guard that Cárdenas placed on Calles “to protect” him was so effective that Calles complained that he was “hounded as a common criminal” and
that his telephone line was tapped. Calles had been in Mexico four months
and had avoided all governmental attempts to force him to leave
voluntarily when Cárdenas lost his patience and arrested Calles shortly
before midnight on April 10, 1936, as he lay at home, ill with influenza,
reading Mein Kampf. The “jefe máximo” was deported to the United
States within hours.57

The ouster of Calles did not leave Cárdenas in a happy
position of untroubled power as might be supposed. Foreign
investors viewed the expulsion of Calles as a triumph of radicalism
foretelling even more labor difficulties. Foreign investment slowed
and the revenue lost to the government in taxes as well as the
wages lost to strikers hinted a bigger economic crisis.58 Cárdenas
was also hard pressed in agrarian reform as there was a heavy
demand upon him to find founds to pay for land expropriation.59 In
October, 1936, Cárdenas expropriated the Laguna cotton-growing areas in
Coahuila and Durango and turned it over to the workers. Since the
individual farmer could not economically grow cotton, collective or
cooperative ejidos were formed; Cárdenas was beset with charges of being
a communist.60 In October he also told Ambassador Daniels that his three
major problems were, in order of importance, educational, economic,
and religious. With so many problems, it seemed inexpedient for Cárdenas to renew difficulties with the Church.

But religious problems seemed unending. On February 8, 1937, the “Orizaba Affair” shook Mexico, and six months of prolonged trouble followed before Veracruz was quiet again. Veracruz, was the focal point of the socialistic attack on religion, was the scene of a police raid on an illegal mass held in a private home. Seventy-seven Catholics were caught in attendance, though over a hundred escaped. A fourteen years old girl fleeing the scene was shot in the back by one of the policemen and public protest of this act reached huge proportions. Thousands of Catholics forcibly opened churches in Orizaba and rang the bells which had long been silent. Cárdenas responded to the Catholic protest by ordering an investigation of the affair. The Federal Department of the Interior announced the repeal of the Veracruz anti-religious laws. The government propaganda office said, “Things are now being done in accordance with the president´s whishes on religious matters.” But Governor Miguel Alemán of Veracruz, who at first apparently agreed to Cárdenas´ demands to relax the anticlerical laws, changed his mind when threatened with the loss of the socialistic vote, and, influenced by the murder of the previous governor-
elect, declared the anti-religious laws still in force. He ordered all Orizaba churches closed.\textsuperscript{63} Catholics refused to give up the churches so Alemán allowed the buildings open for prayer but not for mass. Cárdenas called Alemán to Mexico City to work out strategy for meeting the problem. Evidently they decide on a simple course of action: delay the problem in bureaucratic processes. Alemán advised Catholics to petition the Federal Department of Finance for the return of nationalized churches to Catholic control; the Department of Finance maintained that only Alemán had authority to receive the petitions and the problem settled down to a battle of legal responsibility.\textsuperscript{64} Authorities arrested the policemen who killed the girl in the raid and held them for trial on charges of murder and acting without orders. Veracruz labor threatened anti-Catholic demonstration if the Catholic won their demands for control and opening of churches.\textsuperscript{65} On February 24, 1937, the Catholics of Orizaba were appeased when they were “unofficially” given the keys to the churches. The “official” course of action was delayed until August 2, 1937, when the “Orizaba Affair” and Veracruz religious problem was virtually settled with the relaxation of the state’s six year old anticlerical laws. Fourteen priests were allowed in the state and Catholics were
allowed to resume religious services.66

The role of Cárdenas in the “Orizaba Affair” was one of moderation. Trying to keep peace in the country, he granted a political amnesty at the time of the Orizaba troubles to permit civilian, military and religious leaders charged with rebellion to return to Mexico.67 Cárdenas probably believed that time was necessary to quiet the anger of Veracruz Catholics and socialists, and six months were gained in determining who had the legal responsibility to answer the Catholic petitions. In the meantime, Cárdenas refused to see Catholic delegations from Veracruz. The anticlerical laws of the various states illustrated Cárdenas’ lack of control over the stronger governors. In San Luis Potosí and Sonora the religious laws were very tolerant while in Tabasco and Campeche no priest could officiate unless married. Cárdenas’ Church policy was inconsistent. In Quintana Roo, a federal territory, there were no churches open, and in the Federal District, also under Cárdenas’ control, many churches were open. Political expediency was Cárdenas’ watchword: In Quintana Roo there was no one effectively to object to anticlerical laws. Cárdenas had not changed his anticlerical policy as so many writers have claimed, but he wished to subordinate the Church-State conflict to more pressing
problems. Frank Kluckholn noted that “Government circles” assumed that Cárdenas could not allow an increase in the number of priests officially permitted by law as pressure against Cárdenas’ socialistic education program would increase proportionally, and enough bishops were already issuing pastoral letters against government educational.68

The moderate Catholics’ control of the hierarchy was upset on May 19, 1937, when Archbishop Díaz died. His private secretary, Alberto Mario Carreño, wrote that Díaz died of disgust, shame, and bitterness over the Liga’s calumnious attacks against him “in forms that seemed incredible and that even tried to hinder his Episcopal action.”69 With the passing of Díaz, a power struggle erupted within the Catholic hierarchy for the vacant archbishopric and control of policy to meet the threat of socialism. The struggle within the hierarchy, complicated by the powerful lay groups such as the Liga, remained unresolved for eight months before the Church moderates won the appointment of Luis Martínez and Archbishop of Mexico. Pending the outcome of this struggle the Church in Mexico lacked meaningful and effective leadership.70 Martínez was raised by Pope Pius XI from his position as Bishop of Morelia, Michoacán, to be Catholic primate of Mexico. He was moderate
in his approach to the Church-State question. While Bishop of Morelia, he met personally with Cárdenas for the first and only time. Speaking on the 1932 antireligious laws of Governor Cárdenas, Martínez counseled, “Tolerate the law, protest, and strive for change little by little.” In contrast, a conservative Catholic, Bishop of Tacámbaro Leopoldo Lara y Torres had said: “The protests… that … Sr. Martínez proposes… have no hope … I am not in favor of giving in to compromise but rather in favor of insisting that the government suspend… all the antireligious laws… If we must suffer persecution for Christ anyway, let us suffer with valor… as the faithful have shown as in our country [Cristero Rebellion] and in all the history of the Catholic Church.”

The appointment of Martínez signified the victory of the Church moderates and the Church’s intention of following a clear cut policy of a cooperative attitude toward the government. Cárdenas had also gradually moved to a position of favoring a truce in Church-State conflict as his radicalism was tempered by his three years in the presidency. An encyclical of March 28, 1937, by Pope Pius XI was notable not for what it said, but for what it did not say. For the first time in many years, there was no strong condemnation
of the Mexican government. The Pope announced three principles. First, the laity rather than the hierarchy were to assume responsibility for achieving a change of the Mexican government’s anticlerical position; second, the laity should work for a “practical change” of the government’s position instead of a “legal change” in the Constitution; and third, the Church must answer its critics’ charges of failing to formulate social objectives.
CHAPTER V

CHURCH-STATE CONCILIATION

Influence of Social, Political and Economic events

The Church’s refusal to fight the State, the appointment of Martínez as archbishop of Mexico and the social, political and economic events during Cárdenas’ presidency paved the way for amelioration of Church-State relations by early 1937. Events of even greater magnitude where to provide impetus for Church-State conciliation. Stirrings of labor-management unrest in the foreign owned oil industries in March, 1937, foretold big difficulties for Cárdenas. During the same month, he gave encouragement to Catholics by ordering the Mexican Supreme Court to declare unconstitutional the Chihuahua law allowing Catholics only one priest in the state. The Court ruled that the state had the right to fix the number of priests, but not arbitrarily as one to a state. The limitations were required to be on the basis of population. This Supreme Court decision did not mean, however, a general rule of law for all of Mexico, as the Supreme Court is confined by Article 107,
Section 1 of the Constitution to the case at hand and no generalizations of principle can result from a particular case.¹

The Spanish Civil War had definite repercussions in Mexico. The Latin American activities of General Francisco Franco’s Spanish Fascism beginning in 1936 revolved on a program of Hispanidad. This program aimed at restoring and preserving in Hispanic America what Franco considered to be the Hispanic traditions and ideals. Franco wished to unite the Hispanic people into a political, cultural, and economic unit under the “spiritual” leadership of Spain.² Since Franco was allied with the Spanish Catholic Church, he aimed to protect Catholicism from the rise of liberalism, democracy and Marxism. Catholicism and Hispanidad became synonymous terms. Propaganda was directed toward Latin Americans and many came to favor Franco’s victorious rebellion against the republican government, not because of a preference for Hispanidad, but because Franco was seen as preventing social anarchy. In Mexico, the Hispanidad movement and the success of the Axis powers stimulated the foundation of the “non-political” Unión Nacional Sinarquista in León, Guanajuato, on May 23, 1937.³ Sinarquismo, the antithesis of anarchism, condemned the Constitution of 1917
and the “corruptive doctrines of... “revolutionaries” totalitarians, and communists attempting to divide Mexico into “leftists” and “rightists” or “revolutionaries” and “reactionaries.” Sinarquismo endeavored to establish the Christian social order destroyed by anarchy.4

Two by-products of Sinarquismo were the formation of the political party Acción Nacional (the initials P.A.N spell “bread” in Spanish) in September, 1939, and an outburst of religious fanaticism.5 The rapid growth of Sinarquismo to 800,000 Catholic members again demonstrated the division of the Mexican hierarchy. Senator José María Dávila declared that the clergy was “divided into two groups, one orthodox and conservative, the other unfortunately small and mildly Revolutionary, which accepts conditions as they are and works with the government. The Archbishop belongs to this latter group and we Revolutionaries sympathize with him. Because of his position, part of the high clergy condemns the Archbishop as a liberal and as a friend of President Cárdenas.”6 Archbishop Martínez proved, if belatedly, that he was sincerely attempting to work with the government when he said.7 “There is no doubt that some priests have personal sympathies for Sinarquismo, all the more so in that the Sinarquist organizations were formed by Catholics, but these
personal sympathies are not the expression of Mexico’s Church nor the expression of its norms regarding the issue.” This statement was made in 1942 after Church-State conciliation. During the late 1930’s Martínez may have tacitly favored Sinarquismo as a pressure upon Cárdenas, for Cárdenas was prone to adopt a policy conciliatory towards the Church to prevent the entire Catholic world from consolidating behind the fascist movement, especially after he gave Leon Trotsky asylum in Mexico in December, 1937.

Conditions continued to improve for the Church as Cárdenas was caught up more and more in expropriation proceedings—this time expropriation of the foreign owned railroads and the Yucatán henequen estates. The Church showed its gratitude for what appeared to be the end of the “affairs” that had plagued Church-State relations. Papal Delegate to Mexico Ruiz y Flores, in exile in San Antonio since 1932, resigned his position on September 3, 1937. One month later he was allowed to return, under the amnesty law, again to head the diocese of Morelia. Archbishop Martínez, as the new Apostolic Delegate to Mexico, now had full authority to speak for the Church. In his first pastoral letter, issued February 3, 1938, Martínez appealed for spiritual peace. The message was
interpreted as an indication the Church’s leadership was convinced a peaceful attitude to the anticlerical laws would be more fruitful than resistance.9

The expropriation of the foreign owned oil industries by Cárdenas on March 18, 1938, was the big event that swept the Church-State problem out of sight, at least for one year; in the United States, Mexican Church-State affairs became a dead issue. The oil problem began in 1937, a year of economic recession when business and gold left Mexico and the government was forced to deficit financing. The problems of the oil industry complicated Cárdenas’ general governmental problems so much that Frank Kluckholn of the New York Times wrote expropriation was virtually impossible. Cárdenas was more interested in the agrarian problem, Mexico depended upon the oil taxes, the country would have neither technicians nor a market for oil as the oil combinations enjoyed a world monopoly, and Cárdenas would receive no foreign support.10 This analysis overlooked Cárdenas’ background of expropriation and the fact that the oil companies had cut oil production to one-fifth of 1921 production as investors allowed equipment to become obsolete, apparently in fear of enforcement of the expropriation provisions of the Constitution.11 With the expropriation, all
Cárdenas´ energies were turned to meet the crisis of administering the oil production, selling the oil, and fighting the economic sanctions imposed by American and English oil companies and manufacturers, and the government of Great Britain. The United States temporarily assumed a half-threatening pose with diplomatic notes and talk of suspension of silver purchases, but Roosevelt did not want Cárdenas overthrown, and did not interfere in Mexico.12

Mexico rallied behind Cárdenas to support his action. There were no strikes for seven weeks,13 a record for the Cárdenas term. All presidential candidates of 1940 backed the government´s oil expropriation to avoid being labeled “unpatriotic.” Even the Mexican Church backed Cárdenas. Martínez issued a circular on May 2 that the government printed in El Nacional, the official P.N.R. organ, which never mentioned the clergy. Martínez said:14

“…the Mexican episcopate…declares that not only can Catholics contribute for the end expressed [payment of the nationalization of petroleum debt]
…but that this contribution will be an eloquent testimonial that the Catholic doctrine is a stimulus to carrying out citizenship duties and give solid base to true patriotism.”

One important man in Mexico, General Saturnino Cedillo, did not support Cárdenas´ expropriation of the oil. Cedillo
had been appointed Secretary of Agriculture to placate the Catholics in June, 1935, during the Cáderness-Calles conflict. Cáderness also wanted to keep Cedillo away from San Luis Potosí while federal agents worked to destroy Cedillo’s power in the state. Cedillo and Cáderness differed on their agrarian platforms and Cedillo attempted to hinder the distribution of ejidos by demanding that the government support small independent land holders. Many, including Cedillo, believed that Cáderness could not survive politically without Cedillo’s backing. Cedillo thought that he could offer to resign as a bluff to gain Cáderness’ support against a student strike at the Chapingo Agricultural School. Cáderness called the bluff and Cedillo angrily returned to San Luis Potosí to prepare to fight Cáderness and stop federal subversion of his empire. Novelist Graham Greene traveling in Chiapas noted the existence of many half-formed plots against Cáderness, one of which planned wildly a rising of Chiapas, Tabasco, Yucatán, and Quitana Roo to separate from Mexico and join Catholic Guatemala. All these plots were confused with the vague dream of a victory over Cáderness by Cedillo. Finally Cedillo was forced into open opposition to Cáderness. He had his state legislature withdraw recognition of the federal government
on May 15, 1938, and name him commander of the state’s forces. Cedillo, in effect, proclaimed a crusade to defend religion, land, and the rights of property “from the atheistic government dominated by bolshevism.” Three days later Cárdenas declared that Cedillo was in rebellion. This rebellion was put down within two weeks, but the chase of Cedillo in the mountains lasted eight months.

The rebellion came at an opportune time for Cárdenas because the burst of enthusiasm over oil expropriation had subsided in favor of a realistic look at the economy; several politicians and generals who were wondering about revolt saw the inadvisability of such action. The quick defeat of Cedillo bolstered Cárdenas´ position. Cedillo failed because he could find no support. The Catholics did not join Cedillo, who proffered protection of the Church and a reform of antireligious laws, for the Church-State situation was relatively quiet. Archbishop Martínez was not about to gamble the gains in the Church´s position on the revolution of a local caudillo. The appeals of Cedillo to the peasants on his reputation as a famous agrarian failed as Cárdenas was already distributing land to them. The only support Cedillo could muster was reported to come from the vengeful foreign oil companies who gave “tacit”
encouragement to the rebellion. Cedillo was also accused of being supported by fascism as his army was headed by an ex-German officer; Cádiz was portrayed outside Mexico as a man forced to expropriate national resources but who was defending “democracy” against “fascism.”

The last “affair” seriously to mar Church-State relations occurred while Cedillo was still being hunted by federal troops in San Luis Potosí. This “affair” occurred, strangely enough, in the state of Tabasco where a Cádiz’s governor had taken control of the state after the “Brito Foucher Affair” in July, 1935, when Garrido was forced to flee Mexico. On May 31, 1938, Governor Victor Fernández Manero reported four Catholics killed and two fatally wounded when police dispersed a street demonstration by a Catholic crowd in Villa Hermosa. The fracas was over the right of Catholics to build a church and culminated a month of Catholic requests for permission to resume Church services suspended since 1925.

If Cádiz had changed his anticlerical policy and was deliberately working to bring about Church-State conciliation, he was certainly going about it oddly. Cádiz could not change the laws of Tabasco overnight since Tabasco had been the most antireligious state in Mexico for eighteen
years. Tabasco even ignored the *modus vivendi* of 1929. But, after three years of control in Tabasco, Cárdenas could at least have allowed the opening of one church. He had not done so before this “affair” in May and he did not do so for many more months. If, however, Cárdenas was conciliatory towards the Church only where the Catholics applied enough pressure so that Cárdenas felt obliged to prevent a national scandal, the government’s policy in Tabasco makes more sense. Graham Greene noted that the Catholics of Tabasco, living in heat and swamp, were too lethargic to apply much pressure, and, after ten years of Garrido’s rule that stamped out almost all Catholic organization, no one really cared even to hold secret masses. By 1939, however, the Church realized pressure would have to be applied in order to make any religious gains in Tabasco. The faithful began to create disturbances of the type that were so successful in the “Orizaba Affair” in neighboring Veracruz state the year before.

**Presidential Nomination of 1939**

Almost a year before the presidential campaign of 1940 was slated to get under way, the politicians of the P.N.R.
were openly worrying about the presidential succession. The Radical General Múgica was definitely mentioned as a leading candidate and a rumor circulated that his campaign director would be Garrido Canabal. Other leading candidates of late 1938 for official party nomination were General Sánchez Tapia, a P.N.R. conservative and commander of the first military zone, and General Manuel Ávila Camacho, a P.N.R. moderate and Secretary of Defense. These three candidates met with Cárdenas on January 16, 1939, to talk over the election and maintenance of P.N.R. solidarity. Cárdenas had promised that he would not impose his successor on the country as he had no favorite. He did, nevertheless, indicate he preferred the “unknown soldier,” Ávila Camacho, when he kept this moderate at the luncheon one hour longer than the other candidates.

The early election talk was understandable after four years of Cárdenas’ direction of Mexico. Cárdenas, despite or perhaps because of the use of compromise, had alienated many factions in Mexico while pushing his Revolutionary program forward. Opposition to Cárdenas was gaining day by day. Hernán Laborde, leader of the communist party, summarized the threat facing the Revolution when he pointed out the forces of reaction ranged from Calles, Catholic
dissatisfaction with the Constitution, Gold Shirts and Spanish Fascists, the Axis powers, Sinarquismo and Standard Oil to Wall Street. He noted that there was grave danger that these forces would unite behind the leading conservative candidate, General Almazán, and capitalize on economic problems, to win control of the government and stop the Revolution unless a moderate succeeded to the presidency. The P.N.R.’s position was weakened by the fact that Múgica did not see any need for moderation when the Revolution had so far to go. He believed, as the leading socialist supporter of Cárdenas and the protector of the communist party, that he was entitled to govern Mexico, especially after his big part in writing the Constitution of 1917. A split in the P.N.R. seemed imminent.

On February 22, 1939, nine months before the party convention, the P.N.R. candidate was chosen at the C.T.M. convention. Lombardo Toledano, the radical often accused of communism, threw labor’s support to Ávila Camacho, and strangely enough, moderation. The peasants’ union also met on February 22, 1939, and selected Ávila Camacho as its candidate the next day. Múgica bitterly charged that such a lukewarm candidate would not continue the work of the Revolution; he refused to offer his support of Ávila Camacho
for a solid P.N.R. front. Múgica claimed, as he withdrew from public life, that Lombardo allied with professional politicians so he could continue in power. He urged the workers to maintain their firm stand behind Cárdenas’ policies, asserting that the communist party doublecrossed even those who fought hardest against conservatism. Another crack in the P.N.R. came when Sánchez Tapia broke with the government party over the nomination of Ávila Camacho. The 1940 election was off to a shaky start for the P.N.R., but there was lots of time to bolster support. Ávila Camacho announced in February that he would continue Cárdenas’ programs, but that he would not make new ones. He repeatedly started that he was not the candidate of those who opposed the freedom of conscience. In November, after Cárdenas’ reform of the Revolution, the leader of Múgica’s campaign joined Ávila Camacho to present a solid P.N.R. front.

Cárdenas’ Reform of the Revolution

The early P.N.R. nomination victory by Ávila Camacho was but another compromise by Cárdenas. Ávila Camacho may have been imposed upon Cárdenas, for Lombardo Toledano was the powerful figure that Múgica claimed cheated him out of the presidency. The achieve party unity, the Partido Nacional
Revolucionario was reformed on March 30, 1939. The result was the P.R.M (Partido Revolucionario Mexicano) based upon four sectors of the public. Separate conventions of organized labor, peasants, army and popular groups including government employees would select candidates; the P.N.R. party primaries were eliminated so Ávila Camacho was officially nominated on the basis of these conventions which were held in February.

Cárdenas’ many retreats from his Revolutionary program brought much criticism from socialists. Realizing that he was losing the ideological battle for socialism, Cárdenas made a last attempt to quell the growing aggressiveness of conservative Catholics uniting behind Hispanidad, Sinarquismo, and Almazán. In December, 1939, Cárdenas proposed the enactment of enabling legislation for enforcement of Article 3 of the Constitution which he had been enforcing extralegally early in his term. Such legislation would promote party harmony and satisfy the alienated socialist such as Múgica. It would also offer protection of the teachers against antisocialistic education attacks and insure a continuation of socialistic education after Cárdenas left office. This enabling legislation was passed by Congress on December 30, 1939. It provided that any building in which religious education
was imparted would be confiscated, the director would be liable to two years in prison, and the teachers liable to six months in prison. Any person promoting religious instruction was liable to two months to two years in prison. Private Schools could legally exist only by obtaining special approval from the government and excluding all intervention or economic aid by religious organizations. Violation of this latter provision meant revocation of license and a 1000 peso fine.\(^{36}\)

In another reform of the Revolutionary movement, Cárdenas attacked labor. Though Lombardo Toledano was responsible for Ávila Camacho’s nomination, Ávila Camacho was trying to avoid the “association” that he was “a pawn of labor.” A spokesman for groups backing Almazán had stated that their support of conservatism was not due so much to the popularity of Almazán, but to prevent any aggrandizement of power by Lombardo if Ávila Camacho were elected.\(^{37}\) On February 20, 1940, Cárdenas appealed to Mexicans disenchanted with the actions of Lombardo Toledano. Speaking at Chilpancingo, capital of Guerrero, he criticized labor and denied that his administration had any connection with communism.\(^{38}\) In March and April he reorganized the corrupt unions which controlled the nationalized oil industry and railroads of Mexico. Whether the P.R.M. lost any votes from labor on election day
four months later is questionable since Lombardo had no chance of maintaining his power with any candidate except Ávila Camacho. Whether the P.R.M. gained any anti-Lombardo Toledano votes after Cárdenas criticized labor in his “Chilpancingo Speech” is also questionable. After Ávila Camacho´s disputed election victory on July 7, 1940, Cárdenas could be even more harsh with labor´s lack of restraint in the number of strikes when the nation´s economic problems were so pressing. Making an about face in an important part of his Revolutionary program, he told the C.T.M. that “the state” had replaced “the worker” and it was now the national welfare that he urged as the basis for unity. Cárdenas identified himself with labor, but warned, “The moment has arrived when it must be understood that the weakening of solidarity between the Mexican proletariat and the Revolutionary regime will provoke a grave crisis for our institutions and the downfall of labor.”

This reversal of Revolutionary policy, to meet the changing political, economic, and social scene as World War II came on, was also voiced by Ávila Camacho when he sought Catholic support for his new government. On September 21, 1940, almost two months before he was to take office, he announced, “I am a believer.” Archbishop Martínez followed
this statement with an announcement in December that the Church hierarchy firmly supported Ávila Camacho.\textsuperscript{41} It may be noted that Martínez said nothing about support of the P.R.M. until after Ávila Camacho was elected and Martínez was obligated to seek continued friendship with the government. But the foundation of Church and State conciliation was well laid. The Mexican religious problem was solved with a tacit truce that, to date, has lasted two decades.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

It was politically expedient for Cárdenas, Ávila Camacho, and the P.R.M. to court a conciliation between Church and State as the Mexican presidential election of 1940 came near. The basis of a Church-State truce was well laid as Cárdenas left office, and a trend of administrative acts in favor of the clergy by the new President Ávila Camacho contributed strength to the conciliation. Ávila Camacho did not enforce Cárdenas’ socialistic education legislation of 1939. He ended federal inspection of schools so that, with no one to look for violation of the law, the clergy began again to appear in the classroom. Ávila Camacho removed the liberals in the Department of Education in favor of a new Secretary of Education, Octavio Vejar Vásquez, who said, “There can be no education in Mexico without the sign of the cross behind it.” Co-education was abolished above the fifth grade when the enabling legislation for Article 3 was partially modified in 1942. Buildings were returned to the clergy, and the 1942 General Law of Nationalization of Property relieved the federal government of the necessity of
seizing Church property previously nationalized; the right of seizure was maintained, but only through the courts. Thus the Church regained some of the position it held in the early 1920’s before Calles came to the presidency. The long years of persecution, however, had contributed to a scarcity of priests that could not be made up immediately, even under a friendly government. In 1910 there was one priest to 3,000 Catholics. In 1945 the ratio was 1-5,000. This compared to a ratio of one priest to 620 Catholics in the United States, and 1-734 in the world. The Catholic faith in Mexico gained only 16 per cent in the decade of the 1930’s, and the Protestants rose 35 per cent, but the number professing no religion jumped a spectacular 181 per cent.

The change of presidential administrations in 1940 brought a relaxation of the enforcement of the anticlerical laws, but the laws have never been repealed. Some Catholics see a grave danger in the unrepealed anticlerical laws, but others realize that the attitude of the men in the government towards the Church is more important than laws which can be enacted at a whim. That Martínez assumed this latter position is clear, for he stated in November, 1943:

The Catholic Church in Mexico has accepted the present legal situation, not because it doesn’t
earnestly desire that the certain legal restrictions, actually limiting the Catholic activities disappear, but because it respects the reality in which it lives and knows that all the vital processes, in societies as well as in individuals, are realized by means of a slow and methodical evolution.

The Catholic Church in Mexico is ready, as it has already practically manifested on many occasions, to collaborate sincerely and effectively with the civil government for the good of the fatherland…

In these moments in which Mexico takes part in a serious war… I judge it inopportune and unpatriotic to stir up [religious] arguments that divide the Mexicans…

This statement by Martínez also pointed up the fact that the right wing Catholics, despite the gains, or perhaps because of the gains of the Church, still were not satisfied and agitated for more rights. Brito Foucher had shown that pressure on the government, correctly timed with other governmental crisis could bring results. Not only did Brito Foucher fell Garrido in Tabasco in 1935 with such pressure, but he lost no status and became rector of the National University of Mexico in the 1940’s. However, the right wing voice of the Church has not been loud since 1940, and the moderate Churchmen have quietly gained rights for the Church until, in the late 1950’s some religious holidays have been declared school holidays by the Department of Education, which still regulates instruction under Article 3 of the Constitution.
This resurgence of the Church serves to point up the fact that the State persecuted it in the early 1930’s. Cárdenas’ philosophy of Church and State called for the victory of socialism over Catholic Action. In Michoacán and in his presidential speeches, decrees, and legislation, Cárdenas proved himself anti-religious. Cárdenas was less anti-Church than Múgica, true, but a man such as Luis Cabrera was the Typical example of an anticlerical Revolutionary who believed in the Church as a worthwhile institution. Cabrera, the idealist of the Revolution, was also the conscience of the Revolutionaries with his criticisms of the government’s policies. He said:

“I am an enemy of foolish radicalism… I believe [in the law] that the Church should not have property… but I have always opposed [this law] as a pretext of taking private property… I have opposed nationalization in the spirit of rape and vengeance … because of the corruption and greed which is fostered in the womb of public administration.”

The government’s limitation of the Church in the 1930’s was more than “a political struggle between the Revolutionary group and the interests of the Catholic Church.” The limitation was one of “defanaticization.” In place of religion, Cárdenas wished to substitute national patriotism. He wanted to transfer the allegiance of the people from the
traditional emblems of Church powers to a faith in the masses. Education became the tool to achieve this ideological victory. But the State’s policy toward the Church was based as much upon political contingencies as upon Mexican socialistic philosophy. Cárdenas was obliged by the economic situation to announce in June, 1938, “The era of Church persecution” has passed. In Mexico City and large centers, churches were open, but in rural districts the restrictions continued. The government said one thing and practiced another by showing no disposition to lift the restrictions without effective Catholic pressure. Cárdenas publicly urged an end to the anticlerical laws while allowing an undercover attack on the Church to continue. He foresaw the trend of Ávila Camacho away from socialistic education, and in 1939 he attempted to prevent such action by enacting the enabling legislation for Article 3 of the Constitution. Such legislation also served notice on the Church that the government could still punish it for encroaching in political affairs.

Cárdenas’s Church policy, as well as all his Revolutionary policy, was based upon compromise. Cárdenas governed a country where regional strong men gave allegiance to the federal government only in return for benefit to themselves—Cedillo supported the government for years, and the government
did not press for the enforcement of socialistic education in his state. Cárdenas was personally honest but he estimated that 90 per cent of his administrators were corrupt. He could not easily reform the governmental bureaucracy, for in his battles against reaction, he often needed bureaucratic loyalty even if the price was nullification of federal action in local areas. Knowing that reaction would triumph unless a moderate succeeded to the presidency, Cárdenas’ ultimate compromise was to allow changes in the character of the Revolutionary programs. The Church-State conflict, which corresponded to the amount of pressure the government faced in social, economic and political affairs, could not continue in times of reaction.
ENDNOTES, PREFACE

1. The word “Church” in Mexico refers to the Roman Catholic Church.
2. “Revolution” and “Revolutionary” do not carry the literal meaning of rebellion. These words refer to the change in philosophy from “Social Darwinism” to “Socialism” after the Revolution of 1910.
1. Mariano Cuevas, Historia de la Nación Mexicana (México D.F.: Buena Prensa, 1952), II, p. 147, refutes this traditional historical treatment but fails to give any satisfactory explanation for the Church’s sudden change of loyalty. According to H. C. Lea, The Inquisition in the Spanish Dependencies (New York: MacMillan Co., 1922), pp. 276-288, Fathers Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla and José María Morelos were early leaders in the independence movement, but they only represented the lower clergy Creole priest nationalism and were condemned by the Inquisition and the hierarchy. However, Lucas Alamán, Historia de México desde los Primeros Movimientos que prepararon su Independencia en el año de 1808 hasta la Época presente (México D.F.: J. M. Lara, 1849), I, p. 148, notes that the Inquisition was only a tool of the Spanish crown in the 1800’s and that the condemnations of Hidalgo and Morelos represented acts of political vengeance rather than any religious ideals.

2. Alamán, I, p. 67. However Alamán cites no source for this information and Mariano Cuevas, Historia de la Iglesia en México (El Paso, Texas: Editorial “Revista Católica,” 1928, V, pp. 284-308, asserts that from the time of Alamán´s estimates, the wealth of the Church has been greatly exaggerated.


Endnotes, Chapter I


7. James, p. 117.


Endnotes, Chapter I


18. Perhaps this world-wide philosophy of bettering society scientifically contributed to the growing religious indifference among the people, see Schmitt, pp. 117-119. Justo Sierra, a proud Catholic, believed in “conscient Catholicism” based on knowledge and faith rather than superstition; civil education and instruction in science would actually strengthen religion. See *Evolución Política del Pueblo Mexicano*, pp. 311, 337, 458. Lucas Alaman, V, 863, believed the Church was the foundation of Mexico’s moral unity and religious instruction by the Jesuits was necessary to create proper habits of work and morals.


24. The clergy’s appeals to the hacendados voluntarily to give their land away fell on deaf ears. See *Ibid.*, pp. 52-53.
Endnotes, Chapter I


26. Novelist Felix F. Palavicini, as one of the original Madero supporters, expressed the Madero philosophy and Carranza’s goals as Revolution for political privileges only. José Vasconcelos agreed and noted in his novel La Tormenta that Carranza was forced by the masses into economic concessions. See ibid., pp. 118-119.


33. Dogmatic Canons and Decrees, error 53, p. 201.

34. Ibid., error 47, p. 199.

35. Ibid., errors 77 and 78, p. 208.
Endnotes, Chapter I


43. Fernando Robles, La Virgen de los Cristeros (Buenos Aires: Editorial Claridad, 1932), pp. 105-110.

44. Aurelio Robles Castillo, Ay Jalisco… No te Rajes! (México; D.F.: Ediciones Botas, 1938), passim.

45. The clerical act that reputedly sparked Calles to action was a protest against the new Constitution issued by the Mexican Episcopate in 1917. In January of 1926 an enterprising reporter looking for a sensational story headlined the fact that the Church and Archbishop Mora y del Río still did not recognize Article 3, 5, 27, and 130 of the Constitution. Joaquín Cabañas Ramírez (J. Pérez Lugo, pseud.), La Cuestión Religiosa en México (México D.F: Centro Cultural “Cuauhtemoc,” 1927), pp. 369-371.
46. The boycott proposed to paralyze the social and economic life of the nation by calling on the people not to buy newspapers opposing the Church. Silence of papers was considered lack of support. Other recommendations included purchase only of necessities, abstention from the use of vehicles, electric current, lottery tickets, theater attendance, and lay school attendance. The poor constituted the majority of the faithful and were already purchasing only the necessities to keep body and soul together. See Ernest Gruening, *Mexico and its Heritage* (New York: Century Co., 1928), p. 277 and picture facing p. 264. See also Aquiles P. Moctezuma, pp. 321-324.

47. Gruening, pp. 229 and 239.


52. See C. L. Jones, “Roots of the Mexican Church Conflict,” *Foreign Affairs*, October 1935, p. 143, and J. L. Mechem, *Church and State in Latin America* (Chapel Hill: University of
Endnotes, Chapter I


THE RENEWED CONFLICT

1. This author was part of a sociology team from Mexico City College answering the village priest of Cuajimalpa’s request for help in the spring of 1957 to examine the failure of his traditional authority. Part of the answer to his problem was ascribed to the proximity of Mexico City’s big industrial plants drawing off the male population. Another factor was the ease of communication from village to city by hourly bus. The sophistication of the city’s permissiveness and wealth has done much to change the rural viewpoint.

2. Vasconcelos was a Catholic who became a Tolstoyan Christian Scientist and anticlerical when the Church supported Huerta. In 1925 he went into exile in protest against the Calles government execution of the army officers who demanded free election after President Obregón term. Returning to Mexico for defeat in the 1929 presidential election, Vasconcelos blamed the United States and became anti-North American. He returned the Catholicism after disenchantment with the Revolution. By 1937 he was a defender of Franco policy in Spain. See Rodman, p. 157, Verna Carleton Millan, Mexico Reborn (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1939), pp. 42 ff., and Benjamín Carrión, Los Creadores de la Nueva América (Madrid: Sociedad General Española de Librería, 1928), pp. 23-76.

3. Rodman, pp. 146-147.


5. See Chapter III, pp. 62-63 of this thesis.

Endnotes, Chapter II

15. Chapter IV, pp. 104-106 of this thesis.
17. Goodspeed, p. 226, however, believed that Ortiz Rubio’s removal of the Governor of Durango, who failed to uphold his State’s anticlerical limitations, gave encouragement to other states to attack the Church.
Endnotes, Chapter II

24. This background of Calles is from Juan de Dios Bojórquez, Calles (Guatemala City: Sánchez and De Guise, 1923), passim, and Hudson Strode, Timeless Mexico (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1944), pp. 275-279. See also Amado Chaverri Matamoros, El Verdadero Calles (México D.F.: Editorial Patria, S. A., 1933), passim.
27. Portes Gil, Quince, p. 200.
Endnotes, Chapter II

30. Townsend, p. 11, describes the father as later running La Reunión de Amigos, a tavern-billiard hall where drinking, gambling, smoking, loafing, and smutty talk turned young Lázaro against such doings. Strode, p. 302, had father once operating a one-table poolroom to supplement his meager budget. Weyl, p. 20, called La Reunión de Amigos the name of the grocery store, not the name of a poolhall and like Foix, p. 37, also failed to mention a poolhall.

31. Legend has Cárdenas and Calles both complimented by their omniscient school masters: “Lázaro, I will not beat you because someday you will become state governor of Michoacán,” Weyl, p. 20. “Plutarco, someday you will be governor of this state of Sonora,” J. A. Magner, Men of México (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1942), p. 520.

32. Michoacán historian Jesús Romero Flores, Anales Históricos de la Revolución Mexicana, IV, p. 30. Weyl, p. 22, said his father was alive and placed his son in the collector’s office. Townsend, pp. 15-17, said Cárdenas might have gone to seminary on a scholarship from his mother’s side of the family, but father didn’t want a priest as a son. Foix, pp. 39-40, said the family didn’t have enough money to send son to Guadalajara so he took a job on La Popular. He also became town jailer when his father died in 1910. Compare Goodspeed, pp. 259-260.


34. Magner, p. 552 and Millan, p. 76. A rabid Schlarman, p. 533, describes Cárdenas as a simple, pleasant yokel who bordered on stupidity which in turn led to the dull-witted stubbornness characteristic of an inferiority complex. “This obstinate simple-mindedness made him an easy mark for the extreme elements that surrounded him and… wrecked the economy of the country.”

35. Weyl, p. 63.

36. Armando de María y Campos, Múgica; Crónica Biográfica (México D. F.: Compañía de Ediciones Populares, 1939), pp. 146-151; Weyl, pp. 64-66.
Endnotes, Chapter II

37. Magner, pp. 553-554, discusses Cárdenas and Catholicism and Plenn, p. 137, notes his two marriages.
38. María y Campos, p. 268-311. Tannenbaum, Peace, p. 150, quotes Múgica as saying, “If Huerta had not destroyed the Madero government we, the Revolutionists would have had to do so. We, who were really concerned with the social movement, found the Madero government less satisfactory each day, and it was better for the Revolution that the destruction of Madero came from a reactionary rather than a revolutionary source.”
40. Weyl, p. 75.
41. Diario Oficial, December 31, 1925 and April 5, 1926. See also Weyl, p. 81. For an excellent definition of the ejido see Plenn, p. 243, who gives three senses: (1) As “the way out,” the ejido served as community property giving access to independent towns surrounded by feudal estates; (2) In Mexico the ejido is a tract of land granted in common to a group of families. Each family receives a parcel and farms it as it chooses. The land may not be sold or mortgaged; (3) Cooperative ejidos eligible for government loans are under the direction of the government which decrees either individual farming or collective work to collectively make the products.
42. Vasconcelos, Breve Historia de México, p. 492; Weyl, p. 81.
44. Eyler N. Simpson, pp. 440-443.
45. Gibson, p. 140.
46. Weyl, p. 82.
47. Ibid., p. 82. Diario Oficial, June 8, 1932.
Endnotes, Chapter II


51. A governor in Mexico was able to hold dual positions. Romero Flores gives the following chronology of Cárdenas’ governorship. September 16, 1928, Cárdenas governor; January 19, 1929, Cárdenas fought Cristeros while brother Dámasor an government in interim; September 25, 1929, Cárdenas again governor; November 7, 1930, Cárdenas left state in hands of Gabino Vázquez to become P.N.R. President; May 12, 1931, Cárdenas governor; August 15, 1931, Gabino Vázquez again took over while Cárdenas served as Secretary of the Interior; February 15, 1932, Cárdenas returned to finish his term. Historia de Michoacán (México D.F.: Imprenta “Claridad,” 1946), II, p. 785.


Endnotes, Chapter II

57. Cruchaga Tocornal, pp. 252 ff.
58. Montavon, p. 15.
60. Montavon, p. 15.
63. Anguiano Equihua, pp. 48 ff., gives the official P:N.R. Cárdenas viewpoint as against violence in the anti-religious conflict.
65. Anguiano Equihua, pp. 64-66 and 75-124.
67. Schlarman, p. 533.
68. Correa, Balance, pp. 11 ff.
69. Plenn, pp. 84 and 303. Vasconcelos, Breve Historia de México, p. 514, however, says that Cárdenas never had popular prestige with the army.
70. Weyl, p. 107.
71. Portes Gil, Quince, p. 460.
72. Gaxiola, pp. 177-178 and Anguiano Equihua, p. 94.
Endnotes, Chapter II


74. María y Campos, pp. 49-50.

75. Prewitt, p. 82. Vasconcelos, *Breve Historia de México*, p. 514, believed, in contrast, that Cárdenas was very close to Calles as his faithfulness had given no motives of suspicion during many years service.


77. Pérez Treviño had resigned the presidency of the P.N.R. to campaign for the presidency of México.

78. Weyl, p. 111.


81. Weyl, p. 106.

82. Weyl, p. 112. See Millan, pp. 64-71, for a detailed discussion of Calles’ announcement of the plan through Senator Ezequiel Padilla. Padilla compares Calles to Stalin and Mussolini as dictators for the masses.

83. According to Millan, p. 71, the Callistas tried to forestall such a movement by turning Querétaro into a giant fiesta that played on the weaknesses of the majority of politicians and kept them from sessions. See Carlos Velasco Gil, *Sinarquismo, su Origen, su Esencia, su Misión* (México D.F.: C.D.R., 1944), pp. 13-16, for one of the best discussions of the Querétaro political power struggle.

84. Planks were adopted to establish and agrarian code, found an agrarian department to distribute land under presidential responsibility, and abolish the various Agrarian Commissions.
Endnotes, Chapter II

85. Bosques, p. 23.
86. Ibid., p. 131.
87. Ibid., pp. 200 and 185. See also Chapter III, pp. 59-62. of this thesis.
90. Weyl, p. 117.
92. Cabrera, Veinte, p. 205. These campaigns are now a ritual in Mexican politics.
95. See p. 35 of this chapter.
96. For a discussion of the election see the New York Times, July 6, 1934, IX, p. 8; Excelsior, July 3, 1934, pp. 1 and 3; Braderman, p. 228; Weyl, p. 123.
Endnotes, Chapter II


103. Naranjo, p. 23.

104. Weyl, p. 323.

105. Plenn, 138-139.


111. Partido Nacional Revolucionario, *Jira*, pp. 93-94. See also Bremauntz, pp. 331-333, for socialistic education excerpts from Cárdenas’ speeches.
Endnotes, Chapter II


113. Gaxiola, pp. 427-432; Portes Gil, Quince, pp. 488-493.


118. See Portes Gil, Quince, pp. 500-506, for example of Cárdenas’ trust and confidence in Portes Gil.


121. In connection with Garrido’s extreme actions see reproductions of his newspapers in Carreño, Páginas, pp. 208 a 240 a.

122. See Plenn, pp. 96-105. Schlarman, pp. 534-548, presents a biased but lengthy picture of Garrido.


125. Ibid., January 1, 1935, p. 1; January 2, p. 2; and January 5, p. 1.

126. Ibid., January 8, 1935, pp. 1 and 3.
Endnotes, Chapter II

127. Townsend, p. 105. However, L. O. Prendergast, “Behind the Overthrow of Calles,” Nation, July 17, 1935, p. 68, believed Garrido was a tool of Calles who was turned loose on Mexico City to embarrass Cárdenas before conservative opinion in Mexico and the United States.

Endnotes, Chapter III

SOCIALISTIC EDUCATION

5. Ibid., p. 86. García Téllez, pp. 185-186.
Endnotes, Chapter III

19. See Bremauntz, pp. 287-317, for Congressional debates on the Amendment.
20. Charles W. Hackett, “Mexico’s War on the Church,” Current History, December 1934, p. 491. Bremauntz, p. 211, notes that Calles was opposed to socialistic education, however Townsend, p. 80, quotes a politician who believed that Calles wanted reform of Article III as he knew that it would be trouble for Cárdenas to enforce. Carreño, Páginas, pp. 135-143, wrote that Calles’ Guadalajara speech may have hinged on the outcome of the Bassols’ sex education failure. This would suggest that perhaps Calles saw how strong religion could be against Cárdenas. Carreño, however, interpreted the speech as due to Calles’ anger at Bassols’ failure to establish Calles’ sexual education.
Endnotes, Chapter III

23. Bremauntz, Chapter 16, pp. 337-376. El Hombre Libre charged that communists ran the Department of Education. See April 17, 1936, p. 1, for example.
26. Ibid., p. 189.
32. Barbour, p. 82.
34. Julian Aronson, “The Murder of Mexican Teachers,” School and Society, December 5, 1936, p. 741, gives an example of a school in Tepoztlán where “The people have their land” and “any revolutionary talk would be superfluous.”
Endnotes, Chapter III

41. Ibid., pp. 49-50.
42. Ibid., pp. 78-81.
43. Ibid., pp. 85-90.
44. Ibid., pp. 159-176.
45. Ibid., pp. 269-278.
Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1937), pp. 489-507, for a discussion of
the Institute for Socialist Orientation which aimed at effective
placement of workers on the basis of aptitude and interest.
50. Daniels, pp. 135-136. Green p. 200, reported another extreme. A
priest turned down a baptism as an Indian was fifty centavos short of
the required two pesos. The priest was under no control as the Bishop
had been banished by the government. “Who could blame him” taking
what money he could while hunted by the government?
51. Aronson, p. 741. See also Tucker, p. 357.
52. Portes Gil, Quince, p. 517.
53. José de la Luz Mena, Escuela Racionalista; Doctrina y Método
54. George Sanchez, “Education,” Annals of the American Academy of
Political Science, Vol. 268, March 1940, pp. 144-149.
55. Watson, p. 39.
57. “I. I declare that I am willing to obey and to cause to be obeyed
Article 3 of the Constitution.
“II. I declare that I am willing to support the ends of socialist
education...
“III. I declare that I am ready to spread without reservation the
postulate and principles of Socialism which the National Government
stands for.
“IV. I declare CATEGORICALLY that I do not profess the Catholic
religion or any other.
“V. I declare CATEGORICALLY that I will combat with every
means the schemes of the Catholic clergy and other religions.
“VI. I declare CATEGORICALLY that I will not practice any
religious observance… Of the Roman Catholic or any other religion.
Endnotes, Chapter III

60. Cuesta, passim.
61. Luis Cabrera, Veinte, pp. 307-328, writes his beliefs and his biography as a Revolutionary. See p. 325 for his view on the Revolution.
64. W. W. Cumberland quoted in Beteta, p. 50.
66. Cabrera, Problemas, pp. 81-82. Pattee, Catholic Revival In Mexico, p. 44.
71. R. A. McGowen quoted in Beteta, p. 120.
Endnotes, Chapter III

74. Literary Digest, February 9, 1935, p. 119.
75. Daniels, p. 155.
77. Aronson, p. 741.
80. Ibid., pp. 147-148.
Endnotes, Chapter III

86. Larroyo, p. 178.
87. Ibid., p. 268.
88. Ibid., pp. 268-271.
90. Larroyo, p. 322.
91. Ibid., p. 334.
92. Townsend, p. 124.
95. Plenn, p. 188.
96. Townsend, pp. 125-126.
Endnotes, Chapter IV

AMELIORATION OF CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS


13. Correa, *Balance*, p. 404, Plenn, pp. 88-93, and Townsend, p. 163. Some writers suggest that Cárdenas was paying his political debt to Cedillo in return for Cedillo’s threatened use of troops in favor of Cárdenas at the 1934 P. N. R. presidential nomination in Querétaro. See Velasco Gil, p. 15.
Endnotes, Chapter IV

Endnotes, Chapter IV


34. For an example see the pastoral letter of January 20, 1936 against socialistic education which said, “There is nothing new to tel you… everything has been explained in previous letters… but we wanted to repeat it once again in more concrete language.” *El hombre Libre*, January 20, 1936, p. 1.


37. *New York Times*, February 3, 1935, p. 1. Since Idaho had few Catholics and Borah had never paid any attention to the Mexican religious situation, there was some speculation that he was paying off Catholic support of his movement to block Senate approval of American participation in the world court, Cronon, “American Catholics and Mexican Anticlericalism, 1933-1936,” p. 216.

38. *El Hombre Libre*, June 12, 1936, p. 1. *America*, April 11, 1936, p. 3, said that reports of a Cárdenas change of religious policy were nothing but campaign year propaganda for Roosevelt.


Endnotes, Chapter IV


42. Excelsior, November 18, 1935, p. 1 and Daniels, p. 190.

43. Daniels, p. 148 and Cronon, “American Catholics and Mexican Anticlericalism,” p. 225. For and interesting discussion of Daniels’ more subtle interventions see Vasconcelos, Breve Historia de México, pp. 519-521. Daniels, p. 188, comments on arms shipments to Mexican Catholics.

44. Townsend, pp. 123-124 and New York Times, December 1, 1935, p. 29. Excelsior and El Nacional were very quiet about Cárdenas’ illness. El Hombre Libre, May 8, 1936, p. 1, noted the president was still sick.

45. Calles said to Vasconcelos, “I have the force and you have the ideas. Let’s get together,” Hilton, pp. 407-408. The plot failed when the Mexican Army refused to follow officers loyal to Calles and when the majority of Catholics preferred to back Cedillo. See Martin, “Mexican Prospects,” pp. 407-408 and Vasconcelos, Breve Historia de México, pp. 518-519.


47. Apostolic Delegate Ruiz y Flores blamed Calles for Cárdenas’ anti-Church policy, New York Times, March 31, 1935, VI, p. 10. He changed his mind in July 1935 when he said: “I think that President Cárdenas has lost his chance to be peacemaker of Mexico, since, though he has apparently broken with General Calles, he has not with the National Revolutionary Party, and because of this the people of Mexico is bound to be victim of socialistic dreamers who work in behalf of the proletariat and look for justice without charity outside


52. Daniels, p. 69. Kluckholn, p. 275, discusses the opening of churches. See also Fernández Naranjo, p. 215b.


55. A discussion of the cultural mission’s organization and purpose may be found in Foix, pp. 173-174. The government side of the clash is told in García Maroto, pp. 117-117 and Townsend, pp. 13-134; the Catholic version is in El Hombre Libre, April 8, 1936, p. 1 and Correa, Balance, p. 295.

56. García Maroto, p. 118. Cárdenas’ speech is in Partido Revolucionario Mexicano, Cárdenas Habla, pp. 66-68.

Endnotes, Chapter IV

59. Between 1934-40 Cárdenas distributed 18,352,275 hectares of land to 1,020,594 peasants in comparison to all other Revolutionary presidents who distributed 6,972,283 hectares to 422,301 peasants. Bravo Ugarte, p. 279.
60. See Cabrera, Un Ensayo Comunista.
61. Daniels, p. 69 and Prewett, Reportage on Mexico, pp. 103-105.
62. La Prensa, February 8, 1937, pp. 1 and 3.
67. A discussion and the text of the amnesty are in La Prensa, February 10, 1937, p. 33.
70. Daniels, p. 70. The magnitude of inner-Church conflict 1925-1940 did not come out until 1943, six years after the death of Díaz. Jorge Núñez and Miguel Palomar y Vizcarra, ex-officials of the Liga, wrote two articles in Excelsior,
May 25, 1943, p. 4 and June 7, p. 4, which attacked Carreño and Changed that Díaz was responsible for the confusion and defeat of the Mexican Catholic Church in the 1930’s. Martínez tried to keep the battle from breaking into the open by having Carreño remain quiet. After another article on June 28, Carreño was allowed to reply to the Liga’s charges by publishing a new edition of his biography of Díaz. See Díaz, 1943, pp. 8-9, 527-528, 544, 563-604, 605-624. See also Correa, Díaz, 1945, p. 215.

71. La Prensa, December 5, 1940, p. 20.
Endnotes, Chapter V

CHURCH-STATE CONCILIATION

1. Catholic World, June 1937, p. 364. Excelsior, May 5, p. 1, believed that this decision would gradually allow more priests to officiate in the several states.

2. In Latin America “Hispanidad” oftentimes had a more favorable meaning based on a sympathy for Spanish art, literature, and historical tradition. The Hispanidad movement existed before 1936 as hispanoamericanismo with one of its aims to wipe out the “Black Legend” of Spanish conquest and colonization. See William Baker Bristol, “Hispanidad in South America” (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1947), p. 243, Manuel Garcia Morente, Idea de la Hispanidad (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1947), and Bailey W. Diffie, “The Ideology of Hispanidad,” Hispanic American Historical Review, August 3, 1943, pp. 458-482. Diffie, p. 463, quotes Vasconcelos as saying, “No descendant of a Spaniard who is not a bastard can fail to feel glad that the Mediterranean is on the point of again becoming a Latin sea... the Romance languages will dominate the world... our America will again be Spanish.” Ramiro de Maeztu, Defensa de la Hispanidad (Madrid: Gráfica Universal, 1941), p. 359, presents a map of the areas of the world encompassed by Hispanidad.


Endnotes, Chapter V

9. New York Times, February 3, 1938, p. 4. El Nacional, La prensa and Excelsior did not mention this letter. Plenn, quoted Martínez as saying on January 24, 1938, “It is charity for man to wait to realize the will of his fellow man as if it were his won, and it is a greater good to achieve concord and harmony among our brothers than to achieve realization of the highest ideals and holiest aims.” This statement followed the Pople’s request for more Christian charity in Mexico in his encyclical of 1937.
12. Daniels, pp. 229-245. Vasconcelos, Breve Historia de México, pp. 524-525, speculates that with the United States preparing for war in Europe, Roosevelt had to keep peace in the new world and accept the expropriation.
13. New York Times, May 18, 1938, p. 5. Cárdenas urged a slowdown of strikes in 1937 and 1938 as the economy could not withstand them, especially after the nationalization of oil. In 1937 there were 576 strikes compared with 319 in 1938, still too high a figure for Cardenas. Anuario, 1942, p. 622.
Endnotes, Chapter V


15. See Chapter IV, pp. 84-85 of this thesis.


18. The decree by the legislature withdrawing recognition of the federal government and Cedillo’s proclamation are found in Fernández Boyoli, pp. 313-320 and 320-325.


20. See Chapter IV, pp. 87-88 of this thesis.


22. Daniels, p. 164.


Endnotes, Chapter V


30. Lombardo Toledano’s speech July 6, 1943 in a church in El Paso hypocritically tried to gain support of religion. See *Cristianos y Socialistas Unidos Contra la Regresión* (México, D. F.: México Universidad Obrera, 1943). Four months later he revealed his true feelings about the Church in a speech to the C.T.M. See *El Estado y la Iglesia; La Revolución y la Religión; Progreso y Retroceso* (México, D. F.: México Universidad Obrera, 1943), Strode, pp. 258-359, believes that Lombardo chose Ávila Camacho because the peasants organization had already done so and a solid front was necessary for the P. R. M.

31. *La Prensa*, February 27, 1939, p. 3.


34. Ávila Camacho entered the Defense Ministry in 1933 and soon became under-secretary. In October, 1936, he held the same position but took charge of the Ministry. He was not appointed Secretary of National Defense until January, 1938. This unspectacular record does not imply any great faith by Cárdenas in Ávila Camacho.

35. This plan first appeared in *El Nacional*, December 18, 1937.

Endnotes, Chapter V


37. La Prensa, August 1, 1939, p. 3. Diego Rivera’s support of Almazán illustrated the communist split between Stalin and Trotsky. Diego Rivera and Múgica were responsible for Trotsky’s asylum in Mexico and claimed that Ávila Camacho and Lombardo Toledano were Stalinists. See El Popular, May 28, 1940, p. 1.


40. Hoy, September 21, 1940, p. 9. Ávila Camacho’s brother, as Governor of Puebla, was very friendly to the Church and was instrumental in gaining support for Ávila Camacho’s nomination, Plenn, p. 155.

41. New York Times, December 5, 1940, p. 14 and La Prensa, December 5, p. 3. El Nacional did not carry any mention of this statement.
Endnotes, Chapter VI


4. Calculated from the religious census given in Bravo Ugarte, p. 289.

5. Aldunate, pp. 455-462.


8. See Chapter IV, pp. 87-88 of this thesis.


13. Beteta, p. 188.


APPENDIX

A Chronology of Selected Events in Mexico, 1924-1940.

1924  Dec. 1; Plutarco Elías Calles become President of Mexico.
       Feb. 18; Schismatic Church is founded.
1925  Mar. 14; The Liga is founded.
1926  Jan. 26; Mexican hierarchy reasserts refusal to assent to Articles 3,  
       31, 5, 27, and 130 of the Constitution.
       Feb.; Primary education is secularized.
       June 19; Ley de Cultos is published.
       July 3; The Penal Code is Revised.
       July 21; Catholics began economic boycott against the government.
       July 31; Sacraments are withdrawn as public worship is suspended  
       with the presence of a priest.
       Aug. 21; A near truce is reached between Church moderates and  
       Calles.
1927  Jan. 12; Bishop Díaz is expelled from Mexico.
       Apr. 21; Archbishop of Mexico Mora y del Rio is expelled from  
       Mexico.
       Oct.; Generals Gómez and Serrano rebel against Calles.
       Nov. 27; Supreme Court declares the Alien Oil and Land Decrees  
       unconstitutional.
1928  July 17; President-elect Obregón is assassinated.
Sept.; Lázaro Cárdenas becomes Governor of Michoacán state until 1932.

Dec. 1; Emilio Portes Gil becomes President of Mexico.

1929 Mar.; Escobar Rebels against Calles.

June 21; Church-State modus vivendi ends religious conflict.

June 25; Bishop Díaz is raised to vacant Archbishopric of Mexico.

Oct. 10; Leopoldo Ruiz y Flores, Archbishop of Morelia, is named Apostolic Delegate to Mexico.

1930 Feb. 5; Pascual Ortiz Rubio becomes President of Mexico.

June 23; Calles changes his land policy.

Oct. 15; Cárdenas becomes President of the P.N.R.

1931 June 18; Veracruz state limits religions to one priest per 100,000 inhabitants.

Aug. 7; Federal Congress removes the acting-Governor of Durango on charge of violating religious laws.

Aug. 10; Catholic teachers in Veracruz are dismissed.

Aug.; Cárdeans resigns presidency of P.N.R. after fight with Senate; he becomes Secretary of Interior.

Sept. 9; Yucatán limits priest to nine.

Sept. 28; Tamaulipas limits priests to twelve.

Oct.; Cárdenas resigns his cabinet post.

Oct. 23; Bishop Guizar y Valencia issues pastoral in Veracruz with message not to arm against religious laws nor accept them.

Nov. 31; Chihuahua limits religions to one priest per 9,000 inhabitants.
Dec. 12; The “Guadalupe Affair” shakes Federal District.

Dec. 22; The Federal District limits religions to one priest per 50,000 inhabitants.

1932 Vicente Lombardo Toledano breaks with CROM.

Jan. 25; Archbishop Orozco y Jiménez is deported from Mexico.

Feb. 17; Archbishop Ruiz y Flores advises acceptance of anticlerical laws.

May 6; Cardenas limits clergy in Michoacán to 33.

June 1; All churches in Mexico state are closed as Bishop fails to comply with laws.

Aug. 1; Michoacán request the arrest of Bishop Lara y Torres for sedition.

Sept.; Rodríguez becomes President of Mexico.

mid-Sept.; Cárdenas completes his term as Governor.

Sept. 29; Papal Encyclical Acerbi Animi is issued.

Oct. 4; Apostolic Delegate Ruiz is expelled from Mexico.

Oct. 7; Archbishop Díaz is arrested.

Oct. 30; Jalisco closes all churches.

Dec.; Secular education is extended to secondary schools.

Dec. 4; Guanajuato restricts religions to one priest per 25,000 inhabitants.

Dec. 15; Durango limits priests.

1933 Jan. 1; Cárdenas becomes Secretary of War.

Mar.; Cárdenas is reputed to be the most likely next President of Mexico.
Mar. 3; Chiapas limits religions to one priest per 500,000 inhabitants.

Mar. 14; Cárdenas resigns as Secretary of War to campaign for President of Mexico.

Mar. 17; Josephus Daniels becomes United States Ambassador to Mexico.

June; Church accepts Veracruz anticlerical laws.

Nov. 18; Querétaro State limits religions to one priest per 30,000 inhabitants.

Dec. 6; The P.N.R. convention begins in Querétaro.

Roosevelt pledges non-intervention in Americas at Montevideo Convention.

1934

Mar.; Cárdenas campaigns in anticlerical Tabasco.

Mar. 21; Ley de Cultos is ruled still in force.

Mar. 28; Chihuahua limits priests to five for each religion.

May 9; Narciso Bassols resigns as Secretary of Education in Sexual Education furor.

May 20; Sonora closes all churches.

July 1; Cárdenas wins presidential election victory.

July 20; Calles makes his Guadalajara Speech.

Oct. 20; Article 3 is amended.

Oct.; Congressional resolution requests President to expel all bishops and archbishops from Mexico.

Oct. 22; Colima closes all churches.

Dec. 1; Cárdenas is inaugurated.

Dec. 17; Cárdenas decrees Mexico for the Mexicanas.
Dec. 29; The “Coyoacán Affair” takes place on a Sunday morning.
Dec. 29; Congress resolves to nationalize churches.

1935
Jan. 15; Calles has an operation in San Diego.

Between January and May fourteen resolutions are introduced in United States House of Representatives calling for action on the Mexican Church-State situation.

Feb. 2; Borah Resolution is the United States Senate calls for investigation of Mexico.

Feb.; The Episcopal Church announces that it has lost no property in Mexico.

Feb. 15; Cárdenas prohibits the circulation of religious literature by mail.

Mar.; Episcopal National Council argues with American Catholics over whether there is “persecution” in Mexico.

Mar. 7; Archbishop Díaz is arrested for twenty-one hours.

Mar. 21; Cárdenas warns the Autonomous National University of Mexico to Stay out of politics.

Mar. 22; Guadalajara conflict is reported to be somewhat abated by Commonweal.

June 12; Calles-Cárdenas power struggle begins.

June 25; Cárdenas reopens mails to religious literature.

July 15; “Brito Foucher Affair” in Tabasco causes national scandal.

July 20; Calles leaves for “dental treatment” in San Diego.

Aug. 26; Cárdenas decrees the Law of Nationalization.

Sept. 11; University of Mexico is reorganized.
Oct. 7; Mexican hierarchy issues joint pastoral letter, “Civic Duties of Catholics.”

Oct. 18; Church petitions the State for a change of the Constitution.

Oct.; Mexican Congressional Resolution request Cárdenas to expel the entire Mexican hierarchy.

Nov. 18; Roosevelt announces a non-intervention policy for the United States.

Dec. 11; Cardinal Mundelein of Chicago rebukes some American Catholics for attempting to speak for all Catholic about Mexico.

Dec. 1; Cárdenas is reported to be recovering from Malaria.

Dec. 14; Calles returns to Mexico.

Jan. 19; Pastoral letter defies socialistic education.

Feb.; The C.T.M. is organized.

Feb. 7; Cárdenas states his “Fourteen Points” on the labor issues.

Mar. 4; Cárdenas makes his conciliatory speech towards the Church at Guadalajara.

Mar.; The Governors of Colima, Campeche, Oaxaca, Nuevo León, Sonora, Sinaloa and Guerrero open churches.

Mar. 29; “Ciudad González Affair” mars Church-State relations.

Apr. 10; Calles is deported from Mexico.

Apr. 24; Chihuahua limits state to one priest.

May 19; Archbishop of Mexico Díaz dies.

Oct.; Cárdenas expropriates La Laguna.

Oct. 7; Cárdenas’ three most important problems are education, the economy, and religión.
Nov. 18; Law of Expropriation is enacted.

1937 Feb. 8; The “Orizaba Affair” begins in Veracruz.
Feb. 10; Cárdenas decrees a Political Amnesty.
Feb. 25; Bishop of Michoacán Martínez is raised to Archbishop of Mexico.
Mar. 28; Pope Pius XI issues moderate encyclical.
Mar.; Labor is reactive in the oil industry.
Mar. 4; The Mexican Supreme Court declares Chihuahua’s law limiting the state to one priest is unconstitutional.
May 23; Sinarquismo is founded in Guanajuato.
Aug. 2; The “Orizaba Affair” is settled.
Aug.; Cárdenas expropriates the Yucatán henquen estates.
Aug. 16; Cedillo resigns from cabinet.
Sept. 3; Ruiz resigns as Apostolic Delegate to Mexico.
Dec.; Trotsky receives asylum in Mexico.

1938 Feb. 3; Apostolic Delegate Martínez appeals for spiritual peace.
Mar. 18; Cárdenas expropriates the oil industry.
April.; PNR became PRM
May 2; The Church supports confiscation of oil.
May 15; Cedillo rebels against Cárdenas.
May 31; “Tabasco Affair” creates a national scandal.
July; Cárdenas supplies arms and ammunition to teachers for protection.
Aug.; Some churches are open in every state but Tabasco.
1939  Feb.; Ávila Camacho is assured of P.N.R. nomination for President of Mexico.
     Feb. 10; Pope Pius XI dies.
     Sept. 4; P.A.N. is founded.
     Dec. 30; Enabling legislation for Article 3 of the Constitution is enacted.
1940  Feb. 20; Cárdenas makes his Chilpancingo Speech.
     July 7; Ávila Camacho wins presidency on election day.
     Aug. 20; Trotsky is assassinated.
     Sept. 21; Ávila Camacho says, “Soy creyente.”
     Nov. 30; Ávila Camacho becomes President of Mexico.
Biography

I. Primary Sources

American Committee on Religious Rights and Minorities. Religious Liberty in Mexico. New York: 1935, 15 pp. The distinguished committee sent a Jew, a Protestant, and a Catholic—all notables—to Mexico to find truth. The Report was not intended to embarrass the Mexican Government. It admits not taking the government’s social program into account but only examining religious liberty.

Balderrama claims objectivity in presenting documents. Details of the Liga are included. This is one of the most valuable works for the study of Church-State conflict.

This book in English and Spanish presents a debate held July, 1935 at the University of Virginia between Beteta, representing Cárdenas, and American critics of Mexico.


“Persecutions against belief don’t exist, only the laws are applied.” The 5 points covered are religious, social, educational, administrative and agricultural. Cárdenas outlines his policies in answer to a series of questions about the problems facing the nation.

This is a warning for the university to mend its reactionary ways.
Cárdenas gives his “State of the Nation” speech on inauguration day.


Pastorales, Edictos, y otros Documentos del Excmo. Y Rvmo. Sr. Dr.. D. Pascual Díaz, Arzobispo de México. México D. F.: Ediciones Victoria, 1938, 373 pp. This is a valuable collection of documents for insight into the moderate churchmen’s viewpoint on the religious struggle.

Carrillo, Alejandro. *Defensa de la Revolución en el Parlamento*. México D. F.: n. p., 1943, 221 pp. These speeches by Carrillo show a change in political philosophy from the “left” to “moderation” after 1940.


Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos.
Villahermosa, Tabasco: Talleres de Imprenta, Encuadernación y Rayado del Gobierno Constitucionalista, 1917.


A valuable study of the Liga’s military actions. Statements of the Liga, and the New Liga 1934-1936 are included.

This is a report on physical education.


This excellent book contains the letters and personal papers of Lara y Torres, first Bishop of Tacámbaro. The struggle of the two factions of bishops over how to combat the government is told from the Liga viewpoint. There are three sections: Before the conflict of 1926; during the conflict; and after the 1929 truce. This is an excellent source of church history for the late 1920’s and early 1930’s.


The Consul-General of Mexico in the United States summarizes the Mexican Government’s arguments against the church.

The work contains texts and documents from the Constitution of Cádiz to 1917.

The government’s case against Cedillo contains documents and events of the Cedillo Rebellion.


Cardenas’ Secretary of Education outlines his program of socialistic education.

The Ministry of Education examines a typical school of a “proletarian area” gathering information on biological characteristic of primary children to make intelligent educational reform.

Informe que rinde el V. Episcopado Mexicano el Obispo de Tabasco Pascual Díaz en relación con las actividades de los Representantes de la Liga Nacional de la Libertad Religiosa en los Estados Unidos de America. New York, 1928, 54 pp.

This is Lombardo Toledano’s speech of November 21, 1943 on the C.T.M.

This is a speech by Lombardo Toledano on July 6, 1943 in a Church in El Paso. It aimed to gain religious support of the government.


The cabinet ministries report on the state of the nation.


The government party presents its oficial educational program.

A work containing a map of Cárdenas´ travels in 1934 campaign and excerpts from his speeches.


A collection of the principle speeches and messages of Cárdenas, 1935-40, that offers excellent material on Cárdenas´ problems.


Portes Gil, Attorney-General for Rodríguez, presents the evidence and charges of Apostolic Delegates Ruiz y Flores´ conspiracy against the government.


The oficial versión of the socialist reform of Article 3 in 1934 is given by an exPresident of Mexico.


The most valuable “inside the government” study written. Portes-Gil, anti-Calles, writes the biopraphy of his life in Mexican politics.

Puig Casauranc, J. M. Una Política Social-Económica de “Preparación Socialista.” México D. F.: Imprenta de la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores. 1933, 15 pp. This is a discussion of the State’s socialistic controls of Mexico.


Opinions for and against Sexual Education are summed up by Narciso Bassols.


This is a summary of the educational program and organization of the ministry of education under Cárdenas.
Socialistic education is assigned the role of providing a conscience and philosophy for Mexico in place of Positivism or religion.

The records of the Ministry of Education show detailed plans of operation. The reading is tedious, but important in many instances.

Article 3 is explained and applied in typical situations.

The P.N.R. shows graphically, pp. 11-15, stages of Church-State conflict.
II. Secondary Sources

Almazán, Lucas, Historia de México desde los Primeros Movimientos que Prepararon su Independencia en el año de 1808 hasta la Época Presente. México D. F.: J. M. Lara, 1849-1852, 5 Vols. Alamán was the conservative historian of the early period. He believed that Catholicism was the foundation of moral unity and that secular education was necessary for a strong Church.


A political opponent of Cárdenas presents the most complete work on Cárdenas as Governor of Michoacán and discusses the basis for the Cárdenas-Calles struggle.

A good chronology of the Cristero Rebellion and events to 1931.

Barbour, Lizzie Messick. “Federal participation in public education in Mexico, 1934-1937.” Master of Education Thesis, University of Texas, 1939, 132 pp. A good examination of the functional makeup, organization and aims of the educational system, but there are not repercussions of the program include. This reads like a sterile government document and is written in the school of education style of consecutively numbering all the points in outline form in every topic.

This book celebrates the twentieth anniversary of the Cristero Rebellion by documenting, day by day, the martyrs for Christ the King. The introduction and conclusions provide excellent material on the Liga’s background.

The author claims his “valuable” biography has been a subject of plagerism, but it is of little value.

A brief biography of Cárdenas’ life up to his candidacy for President – obviously a campaign device by Cárdenas’ first Secretary of the Interior.

An interesting section on Mexican art, music, and dance of the Revolution, redeems much of the book.

A superficial study of little value; it offers no new views of Mexican history.

Branch provides an outlook on the constitutional development of Mexico.

Bravo Ugarte, a Catholic schoolar, blind to any good in the Revolution, nevertheless gives much excellent data.

As a Representative from Michoacán in the House of Deputies, the author was a member of the special commission that presented the plan for socialistic reform of Article 3 in 1934. This work, with its bibliography, is one of the basic works on Mexican Socialist education. It concentrates on defense of the reform of Article 3.

An excellent picture story of Revolution in 1910 including information on photography coverage. The text by Brenner is one of the best concise summaries available on the Revolution of 1910-1942.

A famous Mexican historian cites good reasons why the United States should not have intervened in the Mexican Revolution which it did not understand.

Two excellent discussions by critics of the Revolution offer valuable information.

Cabrera was a supporter of Carranza and a “liberal” rather than a “socialist.”

Cabrera saw 3 types of problems facing Mexico: Political, day to day functions of government, and far reaching social problems. He believed there was a need to solve the latter problem by all people, not just the government.

Cabrera believed there were a series of revolutions after 1910, not one Revolution lasting from 1910-1930.

This is the best work by Cabrera. He gives the balance of the Revolution twenty years after 1910, 1914, and 1917. This work includes his biography on p. 308, and his statements on his political creed. P. 307 ff.

An American journalist travels in Mexico and gives his impressions of the Revolution. The chapter on newspaper history is very good.
This discussion of the conflict leading to the Constitution of 1857 is a penetrating and detailed analysis of the conservative government and the liberal’s attempts to gain control of the presidency.

A sequel to the previous work.

An incisive analysis of the works background of authors, and influence of novels on Mexican history.
This is an invaluable work.

One of the most valuable Works of Mexican history, Carreño’s work has an excellent appendix.

There is nothing controversial here as it is only a posthumous homage to Díaz.

Carrillo traces the history and threat of Sinarquismo.

Carrillo saw no real outspoken challenge to the Revolution between 1913 and 1940 except Sinarquismo.


The sources are too limited.
Since this is propaganda for Calles by testimonials of famous Mexicans, there are many excellent pictures.

Chávez Orozco develops the history of the Mexican school in relation to the masses. He defends social evolution by education.

This work is not as good as his book on Cárdenas. The organization is chronological rather than topical.

Correa attempts to document government crimes and gives one of the best criticisms of Cárdenas.

This biography of Díaz side with Carreño against the Liga. Correa was an old friend of Díaz.


A discussion of Cárdenas´ struggle with Calles.

Corro Viña claims Cárdenas was neither a communist nor a dictator.

An excellent book by one of Mexico´s leading historians.
This work covers the Porfirio Díaz era to 1910.


Cuesta, Jorge. *El Plan Contra Calles.* México D. F.: n. p., 1934, 30 pp. This political writer believed the Six Year Plan was limiting and channeling the Revolution by putting it into the hands of conservatives and administrators anxious only to perpetuate themselves.

Cuevas, Mariano. *Historia de la Iglesia en México.* El Paso: Editorial “Revista Católica,” 1921-28, Vols. 1-5. Cuevas is somewhat intolerant (every liberal sentiment in Mexico is the influence of the Mason, the Protestant and the Jew) but gives a valuable historiography. Forced to flee Mexico under Calles’ regime, Cuevas’ slant came from his own persecution.

Cuevas continues as self-styled defender of the Church.


Dunne, Peter Masten, S. J. *A Padre Views South America.* Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1945, 290 pp. This work is by a Jesuit Latin American history authority at University of San Francisco. The last two chapters on “Politics and Religion” and “Race Psychology and the Good Neighbor” are pertinent to Mexico.

This pro-clerical critical view of Cárdenas has many interesting viewpoints.


This Spaniard is very pro-Cárdenas with his hero worship.


A personal interview approach with records Cárdenas’ mannerisms as he responds to questions.


A scientific study of culture, it pays debt to Cárdenas for progress of Revolutionary agencies to better society.


An excellent summary of the Church’s arguments with the State.


A typical propaganda book sponsored by the P.R.M.


García Morente’s work, representing the official Spanish program of Hispanidad, passed Franco’s censorship and was approved by the Church.


A close study of Indian and education problems, it is rurally oriented.


The private secretary to Rodríguez explains in an excellent book what happened inside the government.
A well balanced treatment of the Calles-Morrow relations.

The author founded the Catholic National Action Party.
This book views its 10 years of existence since 1939.

Gonzalez, a Mormon missionary in Mexico in 1942, say Mexico would be better off without the present form of the Catholic Church. He traces selected events from 1930 to the 1940’s, but ignores, to a great extent, the social, political, and economic forces at work on the government, and the inner division of government and Church. The bibliography is predominantly of works in English.

This thesis presents excellent material, but in its scope, 1910-1940, arrives at many traditional conclusions on Calles-Cárdenas, education, and Church and State. It is one of the best theses on the Revolution.

“Commissioned to write a book on the Religious situation” in 1938, Greene had just become a Catholic convert. He visited Cedillo just before Rebellion.
Greene developed a “pathological hatred” of the country, yet made some shrewd observations as a traveler off the beaten track.
This is a novel of a priest hiding from the government in Tabasco. The priest has human failings, a penchant for women and drink.

The chapter on the Church was accepted by American Catholics at the 1935 University of Virginia Debate with Beteta as a fair Church-State picture.

Many words but few facts: mostly quotes statements made in late 1940’s and 1950’s by Martínez.


Heibel presents a systematic defense of sinarquismo.

Irelan, Elma C. Fifty Years With Our Mexican Neighbors. St. Louis; Bethany Press, 1944, 131 pp.
The Protestant viewpoint on Church-State struggle is included.

American Catholic’s viewpoint by the Bishop of Oklahoma who titles his book Blood-Drenched Altars and then say on p. viii, the “Story should be approached in an unprejudiced spirit.”

Published in the United States under Catholic auspices, this book purports to give details on Mexican religious affairs and problems.

Kirk is excellent on the late 1930’s and 1941-1942.
She is over optimistic about Church-State relations and Cárdenas tends to become too much the hero.

This New York Times correspondent was expelled from Mexico by Cárdenas’ government for his derogatory dispatches that were loaded against socialism and often failed to present truth.

This is the same work as *Sureste Proletario* but the scope is cut to Tabasco and pictures are added.


This is the most comprehensive and up to date work on Mexican education.

A detailed study on the Inquisition in Spanish lands that saw the Church decadence as contributory to the decay of Empire.


A history of socialist school by one of the founders of socialistic education.

The Secretary Emeritus of the Federal Council of Churches for Christ tried to show Cárdenas as unpopular.
The spiritual basis of Hispanidad is presented by the man who coined the Word “Hispanidad.” On p. 359 there is a map of the parts of the world covered by Hispanidad.

A teacher at the Catholic University of America, Magner presents an impartial view of the Calles and Cárdenas administrations that is most valuable.

Cárdenas is presented as a soldier, governor, and National Politician, 1929-1932. The biography is a campaign device.

An excellent book detailing Múgica’s actions “inside the government.”

This work was written with ecclesiastical license to present the history of Church-State relations in Mexico.

Mecham was the Legal Advisor of the National Catholic Welfare Conference in the 1930’s. He provides an excellent background and an annotated bibliography for the Church-State struggle.

The author married a Mexican doctor studying in New York. He once edited a left wing magazine in Veracruz and was a friend of Diego Rivera. When he returned to Mexico he took a job with the Department of Education and Mrs. Millan was able to make keen observations on a controversial department.
Minhard, Herbert L. “The Religious Struggle in Mexico, 1926-1932.” M.A. Thesis, University of Southern California, 1933, 88 pp. The events are examined in the light of polemic works too close in time to the 1920’s to have perspective. Too many anecdotes are reported as fact from Francis McCullagh’s Red Mexico. The author must be a Protestant from his tone as he degenerates into a Protestant vs. Catholic approach in the last two chapters.

Moctezuma, Aquiles P. El Conflicto Religioso de 1926. México, D. F.: n. p., 1929, 454 pp. This work is attributed to a Jesuit priest. His attack on the anti-clerical government presents pertinent details of the Church´s position.


Nathan, Paul. “Mexico Under Cárdenas.” Ph. D. Thesis, University of Chicago, 1952, 460 pp. Nathan presents up to date information on the functions of the branches of government and examines theory and practice of government in Mexico through an analysis of Cárdenas’ actions. The Church-State chapter is excellent as much fine material is presented, but many of the conclusions are not justified.

Palavicini, Félix F. México; Historia de Su Evolución Constructiva. Méjico D. F.: “Libro, S. de R. L.” 1945, 2 vols. This work is edited under the patronage of President Ávila Camacho.


Plenn, J. H. México marches. New York: Bobs-Merrill Company, 1939, 386 pp. This is one of the sharpest insights on Cárdenas’ programs by a foreign writer.


See discussion of this author in Corro Viña Cárdenas Frente a Calles, p. 33ff.

The government of Mexico is given a chance to be heard in the United States.

An invaluable evaluation of ideological conflict between Church and State that points up the Revolution as a religious force fighting Catholicism for the direction of society. The battle is not seen as political; the Church is shown as medieval minded; and federalism is equated with failure in government. *Indianismo*, art, music and the literature of the nationalistic country attempting to develop free of ties with Europe or the United States are well presented as methods to win the battle of ideas.

Many interesting essays on political events of the 1920’s are presented.

A compilation of documents for study of religious problems.

Ramos, Samuel. *Veinte Años de Educación En México*. México D. F.: Imprenta Universitaria, 1941, 85 pp. Ramos postulates the theory that there is no such thing as “socialistic education,” only the socialist politician in education (p. 78).

A history of successes and failures, not just organization and theory of Mexican education. The chapters on “Educating the Intelligentsia,” “Catholics,” and the conclusions are fine, and point up John Dewey’s influence in Mexico.

An excellent pro-Catholic historical novel of the Cristero Rebellion.

A pro-Catholic novel of the Cristero Revolt with an articulate discussion of the Church and land problems.

A pro-government novel of the Cristero Revolt.

A journal of a six months Mexican trip in 1956. Rodman was well guided by people with contacts; he talked with Mexican personages about their present viewpoints in relation to the past. Some of the conclusions are weak but the interviews are very good and the reader can draw his own conclusions.

One of the standard works in English on the Júarez period.

An important history of Mexico with some detail on selected issues.

The Michoacán historian brings the history of the state to 1911. A chronology of state governors to 1946 is presented in Vol. II.
A Secretary of Public Education with modern philosophy writes of the problems and functions of rural education.

Due to the scope of time covered in this work, the 1930’s are not presented in the detail desirable.

A day by day account of labor history.


Sands was a member of the American Committee on Religious Rights and Minorities that found the Mexican government was attempting to abolish religion.

Schlarman is a pro-clerical author who uses charged language and omits facts. Carrido Cánabal is discussed extensively in one of the few treatments in English.

Schmitt explains the relations of Porfirio Díaz and the Church in a critical analysis. He wrote his M.A. Thesis at the Catholic University of America on “The Attitude of the Catholic Church Toward the Reform Movement in Mexico, 1855-1861”

Sierra was a religious person, a proud Catholic and an intelligent thinker. His ideal was “conscient Catholicism” based on knowledge and faith rather than
Myth. He believed, in opposition to Lucas Alamán, that civil education based upon the teachings of science would actually strengthen religion by ending superstition.

An important view of Juárez.

This is the standard work on petroleum expropriation in Mexico.

Silva Herzog ably discusses the threats facing the Revolution.

This fine work is the standard study of the ejido.

Sodi attempts to show that there is communism in Mexico.

Strode has made a valuable interpretation of the Cárdenas administration.

This general work on Mexico includes some pointed talk on the religious settlement by an author who was probably Cárdeans’ closest American friend.

This earlier work deals with the Revolution and has excellent chapters on social progress.
Toro was the government spokesman in 1927, a bad year for impartially discussing Church and State in Mexico.

A book that made Cárdenas a hero. Townsend was a practical missionary who took his nondenominational work to Tetelcingo, Michoacán and here was befriended by an interested Cárdenas. This is one of the most complete studies of Cárdenas available.

The footnotes make an excellent bibliography though limited to works in English.

Vasconcelos’ work in this history of Mexico is valuable because he is not afraid to criticize men still living. The governments of Calles and Cárdenas are brought under close scrutiny.

An excellent criticism of the Revolution.

Sponsored by the Committee for the Defense of the Mexican Revolution, this work attacks Sinarquismo as public enemy number one. Chapters cover most other important threats to the Revolution and provide details not found anywhere else.

This psychological approach favorable to Cárdenas also has valuable propaganda on Cárdenas’ friends and campaigns.
A book favorable to Calles.


Written while Weyl was still a Communist, Cárdenas is a hero. This is one of the most complete works on Cárdenas.

The Hispanidad movement and aims of the Spanish Church during the 1930’s are well presented.

Zavala concentrates on colonial times. The juridical and historical antecedents of institutions transferred to the new world are presented objectively.
III. Periodical and Newspapers


Mexico’s ambassador presents his countries’ case for socialistic education.


The best summary on the 1929 modus vivendi available. The Chilean ambassador presents a fresh, impartial discussion of the inner-Church squabble on method of resistance to the government.


The footnotes provide an excellent bibliography.

A strongly conservative, pro-Catholic, major daily paper. It is the official organ of the Catholic party.


A complete bibliography of Vasconcelos’ work is included.
A vociferous, unofficial, Catholic thrice weekly newspaper utilizing freedom of the press to highest degree.

This is a leading weekly news magazine.

James gives a superb evaluation of the changed objectives and roles of Church and State throughout history.

Jones, C. L. “Roots of the Mexican Church Conflict,” Foreign Affairs, October 1935, pp. 135-145.


Marshall was a soldier and mining man with 20 years experience in Mexico as a student and news correspondent.


Martin deals with the Calles-Cárdenas struggle.


Surprisingly, this article by an expert on earlier Church-State difficulties is not a penetrating study of the 1930’s. He depends too much on unreliable American viewers. His theme revolves on proving that the Church was persecuted.


The 1939 enabling legislation for Article 3 of the Constitution is summarized.


A Catholic sees exaggeration in Mexican Church-State conflict. He witnessed Cristo’s attack on Guadalajara train in 1927.


This paper, published by the government daily since 1929, is the official spokesman for the administration in power.


This is an excerpt from the author’s M. A. Thesis at the University of Texas (1951) on the “Mexican Constitutional Convention of 1916-1917: The Constitutionalizing of a Revolutionary Ideology,” which is the best work in English on the subject.

With the notable exception of Anita Brenner, some other writers such as Charles MacFarland, Frank Kluckholn and S. L. A. Marshall did not always accurately report the news, but often added extreme bias. The Index to the Times also provides a rough index to the Mexican newspapers.


______, “Mas Sobre dos Libros que murieron en Su Cuna,” Excelsior, March 25, 1943 and June 28, 1943, p. 4.


Pattee discusses the difficulties of socialism in 1937.


Pond saw a bleak feature of education in Mexico, even after Ávila Camacho took office.


As the official organ of the C.T.M. it is extremely leftist.


La Prensa, México, D. F.: scattered issues, 1936-1942.

A sensational tabloid that the government often allowed news leaks.

Reinhardt summarizes Leopoldo Zea’s *Apogeo y Decadencia del Positivismo en México* (2 Vols.).

“Statement by the Head of the Church in Mexico,” *Catholic World*, October 1931, pp. 110-111.


A conservative paper, it is the leading Mexican daily publication.