

Stanley F. Shadle

Andrés Molina Enríquez
Mexican Land Reformer
of the Revolutionary Era

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Andrés Molina Enríquez

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Andrés Molina Enríquez

This study analyzes the controversial career of Andrés Molina Enríquez as an *agrarista*, or proponent of land reform, who attempted to address the problem of rural backwardness in Mexico before, during, and after the Mexican Revolution. Molina Enríquez is shown to be the intellectual author of the land-reform provisions contained in Article 27 of the Revolutionary Constitution of 1917, which called for the division of Mexico's haciendas. Molina Enríquez studied agrarian issues and problems for fifteen years prior to publication of his seminal book, *Los grandes problemas nacionales*, in 1909. He then struggled to place land reform on the national agenda in Mexico during the Revolution. After the basic principles of his land-reform program were incorporated into Article 27 of the Constitution, he continued pressing for full implementation of land reform in Mexico throughout the 1920s and 1930s up to his death in 1940. The book draws on his corpus of writings, including pamphlets, articles, books, and letters written to Mexican presidents. It places Molina Enríquez's activities in a historical context through the use of primary and secondary sources on the Porfirian and Revolutionary eras of Mexican history.



Courtesy of Lic. Luis Molina Enríquez.

Andrés Molina Enríquez (ca. 1915)

Stanley F. Shadle

Andrés Molina Enríquez
Mexican Land Reformer
of the Revolutionary Era

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Andrés Molina Enríquez

INTRODUCTION

My purpose in this work is to assess how the land-reform ideology of Andrés Molina Enríquez helped guide the process of land reform in twentieth-century Mexico. Historians have tended to emphasize peasant rebellion and downplay the role that intellectuals such as Molina Enríquez played in establishing the land-reform program of the Revolution. Some revisionist historians have even denied the impact that land reform has had on the development of modern Mexico. Clearly, this study on the land-reform ideology and political involvement of Molina Enríquez during the Revolutionary era addresses major historical questions about the meaning of the Revolution.

The land-reform ideology of Molina Enríquez played a major role in the writing of the land-reform provisions of the 1917 Constitution. The new Constitution mandated the government to divide Mexico's agricultural lands. Contrary to current revisionist interpretations, Mexico went through a massive land-reform program from 1920 to 1982, with more than half of the national territory distributed to the Mexican peasantry. This land reform "from above," albeit in response to peasant pressure, followed the blueprint outlined in Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution.

Molina Enríquez systematized a land-reform ideology in pre-Revolutionary Mexico in his 1909 book, *Los grandes problemas nacionales*, that included theoretical, legal, and historical justifications for the division of the central Mexican hacienda. For Molina Enríquez, the existence of the central Mexican hacienda constituted the great national problem for Mexico. He believed that it held Mexico back from developing into a prosperous, unified country. He envisioned Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution, with its mandate for the division of Mexico's hacienda system, as the legal basis for the national development of Mexico.

Clearly, Molina Enríquez was not the first Mexican *agrarista*, or proponent of land reform. He followed in the tradition of nineteenth-century Mexican Liberals, who had been concerned with the problems inherent in Mexico's *latifundia* system, in which large-scale land holdings often resulted in monopoly, when he formulated his own ideological attack on that system. In his writings, Molina Enríquez made repeated references to nineteenth-century precursors of

the Mexican land-reform movement, including José María Morelos, Lorenzo de Zavala, and Benito Juárez, all of whom favored the creation of small land-holdings in a nation of yeoman farmers.

Though following in the Liberal tradition, Molina Enríquez became the intellectual “parent” behind the land-reform program of Revolutionary Mexico by transcending the Liberal taboo against state interference in the ownership and administration of private property. Molina Enríquez’s importance was that he helped create a climate of opinion pressing for active state intervention.

Indeed, Molina Enríquez’s legacy was that succeeding presidential administrations after the Revolution in Mexico have fluctuated in their objectives for land reform from creating the individual midsize property that Molina Enríquez advocated to establishing the collective *ejido*, or village lands, that became the objective of the massive land-reform program of the Cárdenas administration in the 1930s. Yet all presidents have acted within the framework of the state role set down by Molina Enríquez, some making the state more active than others. For example, Presidents Obregón, Calles, Alemán, Ruiz Cortines, De la Madrid and Salinas de Gortari have utilized the scheme envisioned by Molina Enríquez. Presidents Portes Gil, Cárdenas, Echeverría, and López Portillo did build on Molina Enríquez’s full scheme with their concern for the establishment of some form of collective farming. Once the mandate for land-tenure change was won, and implemented by Cárdenas, the need became clearer for credit and agricultural innovation — needs that Molina Enríquez did not fully foresee.

I call Molina Enríquez a “land reformer” rather than an “agrarian reformer” following the distinctions that social scientists such as James W. Wilkie have made between these two terms as they apply to modern Latin America. In his work *Measuring Land Reform*, Wilkie notes the difference between land reform, which is concerned primarily with land distribution, and agrarian reform, with its goal of integrated, state-directed rural development. The latter includes such items as agricultural reform, credit, inputs, agricultural extension and education, and infrastructural development.¹ The stress that Molina Enríquez put on the redistribution of hacienda lands as the linchpin to all future Mexican economic development clearly makes the title of land reformer more appropriate for him than agrarian reformer.

Mexican intellectuals have been aware of Molina Enríquez’s contribution toward Mexican land reform since the Revolutionary era. On Molina Enríquez’s death, Luis Cabrera, his friend and confidant, wrote that “Molina Enríquez was for the agrarian Revolution, what José María Luis Mora was for the Revolution of the Reforma.”² Other Mexican writers have honored Molina Enríquez with the titles “father of the agrarian reform,”³ “sociologist of the Revolution,” and “the Rousseau of the Mexican Revolution.”⁴

Molina Enríquez’s home state of Mexico has honored him as the precursor of Mexican land reform. In Toluca, a bust of Molina Enríquez stands on the

portal into the state legislative building; the bust is next to that of José María Luis Mora, the celebrated Liberal ideologue of early nineteenth-century Mexico. And the city of Jilotepec, Molina Enríquez's birthplace, honored him in 1986 by officially changing its name to Jilotepec de Molina Enríquez.⁵

Mexicanists in the United States have also been aware of Molina Enríquez as an important intellectual of the Revolutionary era, yet have traditionally downplayed the role of formal ideology in the Mexican Revolution. Frank Tannenbaum, the most influential writer on the Revolution in the pre-World War II era, declared Molina Enríquez's book *Los grandes problemas* "the most important single study of Mexican social problems." However, although Tannenbaum conceded that Article 27 was "in large measure an application of [Molina Enríquez's] ideas to the land problem of Mexico," Tannenbaum denied that formal ideologies played any role in the Revolution.⁶ Henry Schmit, author of *The Roots of Lo Mexicano*, an analysis of Mexican national identity, has questioned the traditional populist view that ideology played no role in the Revolution. Schmit points to Molina Enríquez's ideas as an important intellectual "bridge" between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Schmit writes: "One reads that the Revolution grew without ideas, although in the space of seven years it progressed from bandit reports to the Constitution of 1917." Schmit points out that *Los grandes problemas* is "one of the most complete accounts of Mexico ever written, synthesizing a wealth of data from cooking to character analysis, from irrigation to immigration." Schmit mentions Molina Enríquez and Luis Cabrera, among others, as the intellectuals behind the land-reform program of the Revolution.⁷

While Mexican scholars and Mexicanists from the United States have been aware of Molina Enríquez as an important intellectual of the Revolution, no full biography of his activities as an *agrarista* nor complete analysis of the development and importance of his land-reform ideology in the Mexican Revolution has been written.

Studies of Molina Enríquez published in Mexico have focused on an analysis of *Los grandes problemas* as his seminal work, in which he fully developed his land-reform ideology. Arnaldo Córdova's 1978 re-edition of *Los grandes problemas* includes an excellent introduction to Molina Enríquez's ideas and life, yet concentrates on outlining the main points of his book.⁸ Likewise, James L. Hamon and Stephen R. Niblo, in their joint effort, *Precursores de la revolución agraria en México*, devote their study of Molina Enríquez to an examination of the contents of *Los grandes problemas*.⁹

Among Anglophone Mexicanists, or Mexican experts in the English-speaking world, David Brading has most strongly emphasized the importance of Molina Enríquez's ideology to the formation of the post-Revolutionary Mexican state. After a brief analysis of Molina Enríquez's ideas, Brading sums up Molina Enríquez's impact in the following passage: "In his insistence on the necessity of a dictatorial, interventionist state, endowed with powers to act as

patron of both workers and peasants, essentially middle class in its directorate, ready to act in alliance with small-property holders, on all these heads, Molina Enríquez proved to be the prophet of the Revolution and, yet more, of that party which still governs Mexico today, the PRI."¹⁰

Brading's portrayal of Molina Enríquez as the "prophet" of the Revolution implies that an analysis of Molina Enríquez's vision for land reform, the centerpiece of his entire ideology, would shed light on the importance of ideology in forming the land-reform program of post-Revolutionary Mexico.

While Mexican, British, and U.S. writers have recognized Molina Enríquez as an important intellectual figure of the Revolution, controversy has also surrounded his contribution. The Mexican Chamber of Deputies has voted down motions to have Molina Enríquez's name honored on the wall of Mexican heroes in the federal Chamber of Deputies because of his involvement in the Huerta government (1913–1914).¹¹ To help legitimize a Revolution that truly began with the overthrow of the Huerta regime, the official historiography of the Revolution has traditionally vilified the Huerta government as a despotic, unredeemed dictatorship. However, an objective examination of the Huerta government reveals it to have been initially as reform-minded as the Madero administration.¹² Thus, Molina Enríquez's involvement in the Huerta government can be seen as one of his many attempts to influence the official course of land reform during the Revolution—contrary to the official historiography of the Revolution, which rejects anyone associated with the Huerta regime, regardless of the person's motive.

Even Molina Enríquez's involvement in the drafting of Article 27, usually cited as his most important impact on the Revolution, has been questioned in Mexico. J. N. Macías, a delegate present at the 1917 Constitutional Convention in Querétaro, entered into a polemic with Molina Enríquez in the 1920s over who had written Article 27. Macías claimed Molina Enríquez had nothing to do with the writing of Article 27 and was never present on the committee that drafted Article 27.¹³ Although Pastor Rouaix, chairman of the committee that drafted Article 27, acknowledged that Molina Enríquez wrote the first draft of the article, Rouaix maintained that Molina Enríquez's draft had proven too theoretical to use and that the committee had rewritten a more practical version, although following the ideas contained in Molina Enríquez's draft.¹⁴

Clearly, Molina Enríquez's controversial historical legacy as a Revolutionary agrarista can only be properly assessed through an objective, in-depth, intellectual biography on his role in the Revolution. Unlike other writings on Molina Enríquez's views, this work moves beyond an examination of *Los grandes problemas* to include the origins of his land-reform ideology during the Porfiriato (1876–1910), and to chronicle his political activities on behalf of land reform in the Revolutionary era from 1909 to 1940. To delineate Molina Enríquez's contribution to the ideology of land reform in Revolutionary Mexico, I have utilized previously unconsulted sources.

Most important to this work is Molina Enríquez's entire corpus of writings on land reform before and after *Los grandes problemas*. Using his early writings on social reform, Mexican history, and land reform, I have been able to trace the origins of the land-reform ideology that coalesced in the book. In addition, Molina Enríquez's newspaper articles and interviews during and after the armed phase of the Revolution (1910–1917) have allowed me to chart Molina Enríquez's political activities during the Revolutionary era.

In addition, I consulted newspapers, archival materials, and secondary sources in order to place Molina Enríquez and his land-reform ideology into historical context. For example, statistical surveys from the state of Mexico in the 1890s enabled me to quantify the extent of hacienda monopoly in Molina Enríquez's home region of Jilotepec and in the state as a whole. The municipal archive of Sultepec, state of Mexico, contains materials related to his work as a land notary in the Sultepec region, where he gained a first-hand education on the problems of rural Mexico. Newspaper articles on his failed agrarian revolt, the Plan de Texcoco, and British ambassadorial reports from this period place his attempt at an agrarian revolution in its proper context.

By using previously neglected sources, I have been able to analyze the contribution that Molina Enríquez made to the ideology of land reform in Revolutionary Mexico. The first two chapters outline the origins and development of Molina Enríquez's land-reform ideology through the writing of *Los grandes problemas*. Chapters 3 and 4 are devoted to the political failures he experienced in the early Revolutionary period when attempting to impose land reform on the national agenda. Chapters 5 and 6 chronicle his legislative triumphs on the federal and state levels as his land-reform ideology became codified in the federal constitution and the constitution of the state of Mexico. Finally, chapter 7 explains how Molina Enríquez won the ideological battle for land reform in the 1920s and early 1930s only to lose the war for full implementation of his land-reform program in Mexico.

Ironically, though this work demonstrates that Molina Enríquez provided the legal basis for land reform as the ideologue behind Article 27's vesting of national control over Mexico's land and resources, the course of Mexican land reform did not fulfill Molina Enríquez's original goal of a prosperous, middle class, rural Mexico. Rather, the Mexican land-reform programs of the 1920s and 1930s focused on granting village ejidos. Ejidos had originated in the colonial era from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries. The Spanish Crown had established village lands, the *fundo legal*, in the early colonial period to ensure the survival of indigenous Mexicans. The reforms of the 1920s and 1930s in this sense followed colonial precedence. Ejido were communal holdings but could be worked individually or collectively.¹⁵

Up to the Cárdenas administration's collective ejido program, Molina Enríquez argued that the focus on ejidos had caused the failure of land reform in Mexico. In his view, only the complete division of Mexico's hacienda system

into family farms, as mandated in Article 27, could solve the problem of rural backwardness in Mexico. Despite his major contribution to the ideology of Revolutionary Mexico, Molina Enríquez died in poverty, unable to secure even a government pension normally granted to retired professors in Mexico. The obscurity that he faced at his death has continued despite periodic attempts in Mexico to resurrect his writings.

Scholars of Mexican history have known of Molina Enríquez, yet know little about his contribution to the development of the ideology of land reform in the Mexican Revolution. This work attempts to properly assess his role in Revolutionary Mexico, and more importantly, opens another window on the complicated history of the development of the land-reform program of the Mexican Revolution.

AN AGRARIAN REVOLUTION?

Who made the Revolution happen? Middle-class caudillos, or strong-man leaders? The peasant masses? Agrarista intellectuals? Within this question lies the foundation for the various interpretations of the Mexican Revolution that arose in the 1980s. Contemporary scholars of the Mexican Revolution are divided into two camps, the revisionist and the neo-populist, in regard to the causes and nature of the Revolution. The revisionists maintain that middle-class caudillos mobilized and manipulated the peasantry during the Revolution for ends ultimately antithetical to the peasants' interests. In this revisionist scenario — now the new orthodoxy — Mexico experienced a battle for political power from 1910 to 1920 rather than a social revolution. The neo-populists maintain that the peasantry self-mobilized for “land and liberty” and brought Mexico into a revolution.

Presently historians of the 1910 Revolution are questioning the traditional view of the Revolution as a massive peasant uprising for land and liberty. The issues of the debate were formulated in the 1980s around questions of causality, the impact of U.S. policies on the Revolution, and the definition of the Revolution.

The series of essays in the 1980 book *Caudillo and Peasant in the Mexican Revolution* opened the revisionist era.¹⁶ Overall the contributors to *Caudillo and Peasant* viewed the agrarian revolution as a means to mobilize the peasantry for ends harmful to their long-term interests: the creation of a capitalist economy under the direction of a centralized, authoritarian state. Ramón Ruíz solidified revisionism with his 1980 book, *The Great Rebellion*. As the title suggests, Ruíz rejected labeling the 1910–1917 upheaval in Mexico as a revolution; rather, he viewed the turmoil as “essentially a face-lifting of Mexican capitalism.”¹⁷

In regard to the agrarian nature of the “great rebellion,” Ruíz considered the Zapatista episode in Morelos “unique.”¹⁸ In addition, because of U.S. opposition, Mexican leaders never truly implemented the land-reform provisions of Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution.¹⁹ Ruíz portrayed Mexico’s political upheaval as more akin to the bourgeois-based French Revolution than one of the twentieth-century’s first social revolutions.

In contrast to Ruíz’s *Great Rebellion*, Alan Knight wrote a defense of the old populist interpretation of the Revolution in his two-volume work, *The Mexican Revolution*, published in 1986. In the preface to his first volume, Knight declared himself an “unashamed conservative, or anti-revisionist” regarding the agrarian nature of the Mexican Revolution.²⁰ While conceding that the Revolution did result in the reformation of a neo-Porfirian centralized state dedicated to furthering a capitalist economy in Mexico, Knight argued that a major change in the mentality of the Mexican masses had occurred during the Revolutionary decade. He wrote that this change in perspective laid the foundation for a new mass-based politics, fully developed by 1915, that “facilitated later, radical social policies.”²¹ Knight included in these radical social policies the massive land-reform program of the Cárdenas regime in the 1930s.

John Tutino added evidence in defense of the agrarian revolution with his analysis of the nineteenth-century background to Mexico’s 1910 Revolution in his 1986 book, *From Insurrection to Revolution in Mexico: Social Bases of Agrarian Violence, 1750–1940*. As the title suggests, Tutino analyzed the agrarian insurrections endemic to nineteenth-century Mexico with an eye toward explaining the outbreak of massive peasant rebellions in 1910. Tutino used an anthropologically derived structural analysis to explain why peasants rose in rebellion in 1910. According to Tutino, “Zapatistas and other agrarista guerrilla persistence forced all the contenders in the Revolutionary conflicts to make agrarian reform the primary social question of the day.”²²

In the book *Revolutionary Mexico: The Coming and Process of Revolution* (1987), John Mason Hart viewed the Revolution from the social wreckage of Mexico in the 1980s and found the Revolution wanting. For Hart, the Mexican Revolution represented a failed movement of national liberation. The defeat of the agrarian forces of Villa and Zapata — due to the U.S. government’s massive transfer of arms to the Carranzistas — meant the defeat of the popular forces. Despite his insistence on the defeat of the peasantry, Hart was not ready to dismiss the Revolution as a “great rebellion.” Hart agreed with Ruíz except for evidence of a “transformation of property ownership from foreign to national and from absentee to local control.”²³ Therefore, although a revisionist, Hart conceded that the peasantry won a partial victory in the Revolution.

More than any other source, the authoritative *Cambridge History of Latin America*, Volume Five, summed up the new revisionist orthodoxy regarding the Revolution. In the 1986 book, Friedrich Katz first summarized how the

economic and political changes of the Porfiriato created the conditions for revolution in 1910.²⁴ John Womack then explained how the populist interpretation of the Revolution came under question in the wake of the Mexican government's suppression of student unrest in the 1968 Tlateloco massacre. Interestingly, Womack — the author of *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution*, a work very much in the populist tradition — agreed in the end with the new revisionist consensus. Womack condensed the new revisionist orthodoxy in the following passage: "For all the violence this is the main meaning of the Mexican Revolution: capitalist tenacity in the economy and bourgeois reform of the state, which helps explain the country's stability through the struggles of the 1920s and 1930s and its booming discordant growth after 1940."²⁵

Finally, Jean Meyer completed the *Cambridge History of Latin America's* revisionist thrust by pointing out the basic continuity between the old Porfirian state and the new "revolutionary" state of the twenties. The Sonoran dynasty's basic goals were recentralization of the state and economic growth. Centralization meant the elimination of "Mexico's warring groups . . . by fire and sword."²⁶ Economic growth followed the same lines that the Porfiriato had taken: dependence on foreign capital and export production for the world market.

As the above historiographical introduction makes clear, the revisionists and the neo-populists cannot be neatly separated. Paradoxically, there is unanimity on the Revolution's economic and political results. Both revisionists and neo-populists agree that the Revolution ended in the recentralization of the federal government and the continuation of capitalist economic development. In fact, now the debate on the meaning of the Mexican Revolution has shifted to the effects that the Revolution had on social relations in modern Mexico.

In attempting to assess change in Mexican social relations, the issue of land reform becomes useful. Did the new middle-class leadership of Revolutionary Mexico manipulate the peasantry through the official land-reform program? Can land reform be considered an index of peasant strength? To what ends did agrarista intellectuals such as Molina Enríquez attempt to direct land reform?

The questions raised in the preceding paragraph will be addressed throughout this work and brought to a focus in the last chapter with a discussion of land reform after 1940. From the 1920s until the 1980s, land reform was a major plank in the "permanent Revolution" of the official party. I use the term official party to encompass the three name changes under which the one-party system has reorganized itself to justify its continuation in power: 1929, Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR); 1938, Partido Revolucionario Mexicano (PRM); and 1946, Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). Only by examining how the official party implemented its land-reform program from the 1920s to the 1980s can we assess the full meaning of Molina Enríquez's land-reform ideology in the Revolution.

CHAPTER 1

The Making of a Reformer

1868–1898

Andrés Eligio de la Luz Molina Enríquez was born on November 30, 1868, to Anastasio Molina and Francisca Enríquez in Jilotepec, Mexico. Andrés came of age in rural Mexico in the late nineteenth century during the rule of Porfirio Díaz, an era in Mexican history known as the Porfiriato. An analysis of Andrés's home region, education, and early work in the western half of the state of Mexico provides the setting in which he developed his ideas for land reform in Mexico.

He would come to write that only through rural development could all Mexicans benefit from the progress the few benefited from during the Porfiriato. Seemingly Andrés's move from Mexico's backward countryside to its more modern urban areas as a student, followed by a shift back to an isolated rural region, made him want to see modernization also come to Mexico's rural areas. While working as a young notary in Jilotepec in the 1880s, he wrote: "I observe the process of land concentration with alarm, the growing power of the Spanish and white controlled haciendas, through the systematic despoliation of the ranchos and ejidos owned by the mestizos and Indians."¹ Initially, Molina Enríquez believed a reform of the land title, tax, and credit systems would suffice to bring prosperity to rural Mexico. Later, he came to believe that only violent revolution would be able to break the grip of the hacienda over Mexico's countryside.

FAMILY BACKGROUND IN JILOTEPEC

Andrés Molina Enríquez's mother and father did not do as well financially as their parents. Francisca Enríquez came from a well-known family in the state of Mexico. Her husband, Anastasio Molina, had wandered into Jilotepec while on the way north to a notary job. According to family lore, once Anastasio set eyes on Francisca, he abandoned all thought of moving on.²

Francisca's family, the Enríquezes, owned the hacienda Doxihó outside of Jilotepec. The family acquired Doxihó and other properties during the implementation of the Liberal land law, *Ley Lerdo*, which focused on dividing the lands of the Catholic church in Mexico in the mid-1850s.³ Doxihó was listed as the largest property of the Jilotepec region in 1894.⁴ Thus, the Enríquezes were the elite family of the Jilotepec region during Molina Enríquez's childhood.

Years later during family get-togethers, Molina Enríquez's son, Napoleón, often told a story about the Jewish origins of the Enríquez family. Napoleón claimed that the Enríquezes came to Mexico in the late 1560s with the third viceroy, don Martín Enríquez de Amanza, who was their relative. The third viceroy's nephew, Juan Ignacio Enríquez, sold his trading interests in Spain and accompanied his uncle, the third Viceroy, to Mexico. The story goes that the Enríquezes were Sephardic Jews running from the Spanish Inquisition.⁵

Juan started up a wagon transport company between Veracruz and Jalapa de Enríquez.⁶ Juan looked for a place not too far from Mexico City but far enough away from the Church to avoid detection as a Jew. The Jilotepec region proved ideal for Juan.⁷ Jilotepec quickly grew to be a middle stopping point for the wagon trains moving from the northern silver mines and Mexico City. Thus, if this family story is accurate, the Enríquezes were the founding family of Jilotepec, and continued to be the most important family of the region up to the end of the nineteenth century.

Enríquez family members held positions of leadership in the state of Mexico in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Gumersindo Enríquez, Andrés's uncle, was elected governor of the state in March of 1876 and continued in office until November of the same year. Gumersindo Enríquez fell from power with the triumph of the Plan de Tuxtepec. General Juan N. Mirafuentes then took control of the state in December of 1876.⁸ Another uncle of Andrés, Silvano Enríquez, was the mayor of Toluca and a teacher and director of the Instituto de Toluca.⁹ The elite standing of the Enríquez family in the state of Mexico contrasted with the status of Andrés's father, Anastasio Molina, the unknown newcomer.

Anastasio was originally from Yucatán. His parents reportedly had died in a carriage accident in Veracruz when he was a child. The family owned a mine in Taxco, and upon the death of his parents, Anastasio was taken to Taxco to live with his grandmother. Anastasio's grandmother later sent him to Mexico

City to law school. After two or three years of law school, Anastasio qualified to work as a notary. He was on his way to a notary job when he was delayed permanently in Jilotepec.¹⁰

The Enríquezes tended to look down on Anastasio. His modest, though middle-class, job of notary did not assure Francisca Enríquez of continued elite status. Furthermore, Anastasio tended toward liberal—even radical—politics, a sore point for the conservative Enríquez family.

Undoubtedly this family conflict affected Andrés as a child. The tension between the hacienda-owning Enríquezes and Anastasio might have contributed to Andrés's later denunciation of Mexican hacendados as inherently evil. Interestingly, he claimed to have had an Otomí grandmother on his mother's side, therefore having mestizo status. However, an examination of the Jilotepec Catholic Church archive revealed no such Otomí ancestry. Perhaps he invented an alternate family history to disassociate himself from the elite, Spanish, Enríquez family.

LATE NINETEENTH-CENTURY JILOTEPEC: LAND MONOPOLY, AGRARIAN ECONOMY, AND BACKWARDNESS

As a child and young man, Andrés witnessed the growing monopoly of land in his home region of Jilotepec. Land tenure in Jilotepec went through the classic stages of development found elsewhere in Mexico, leading to concentration of land in the great Mexican estate, the hacienda.

In colonial Jilotepec, the hacienda and the Indian village coexisted. In the early colonial period, Spaniards had first received Crown grants, or *encomiendas*, to extract tribute and labor services from Indians without granting them land ownership. With the demographic disaster in the Indian population (i.e., the native population level dropped by 90 percent) in the first century of the colonial era, the *encomienda* gave way to the hacienda.¹¹ Crown grants of land, *mercedes*, legalized the Spanish occupation of land in central Mexico. However, *mercedes* to Indian pueblos also assured their holding of land through the colonial period.¹²

The application of the 1856 Ley Lerdo against Church and Indian village lands ended the coexistence of the haciendas and the Indian villages in the Jilotepec region. Despite the goal of creating small family farms, the Ley Lerdo tended to result in greater land concentration: with the privatization of former comparably held lands, wealthy Mexicans bought up these lands for haciendas. The Jilotepec region was no exception to this pattern.

By the mid-1890s, haciendas occupied 37 percent of the territory of the Jilotepec district. The district comprised 296,000 hectares, and haciendas occupied 113,000 hectares of that area. Considering that much of the Jilotepec district is made up of mountains, haciendas occupied much of the agricultural

land of the district, and undoubtedly the best. There were twenty-eight haciendas and thirty-five ranchos at this time in the district. In statistics for the state of Mexico from the late nineteenth century, ranchos were roughly defined as properties up to 1,000 hectares in size; haciendas ranged from 1,000 to 50,000 hectares.¹³

In the Jilotepec *municipio*, the region surrounding the town of Jilotepec, there were two haciendas and six ranchos. The Cofradía hacienda encompassed 6,000 hectares of land. Immediately north of Jilotepec, the Boxihicho hacienda held 8,550 hectares of land. The six ranchos, or family-based farms, ranged in size from 86 to 855 hectares.¹⁴

In the late nineteenth century, the six ranchos of the Jilotepec region produced more maize per hectare than the two haciendas. The six ranchos together produced 550 kilograms of maize in 1893 on an area of 2,200 hectares. The two haciendas of the Jilotepec *municipalidad* produced 52,500 kilograms of maize on 14,500 hectares. Thus, the family-based ranchos were more productive than the larger-scale haciendas.¹⁵ Andrés Molina Enríquez would argue as much later during his career as an agrarista.

Like the rest of the state of Mexico, the Jilotepec district's economy rested on an agricultural base of grain production. Seventy percent of the district's population lived in the countryside.¹⁶ The Jilotepec district was first in the state in wheat production in 1900, yet was only average in maize and barley production.¹⁷ District growers also raised beans, peas, and potatoes. Distilled pulque and honey were also part of the district's agricultural production, and pulque breweries and bars dominated the business community of the district.¹⁸ The value of the rural property in the Jilotepec district was six times that of its urban property in 1900. Yet the value of all property in the district of Toluca, the state capital, was four times that of the Jilotepec district for the same year, evidence of the relative backwardness of the Jilotepec region vis-à-vis the state capital.¹⁹

The underdeveloped nature of the Jilotepec region contrasted greatly, like much of the rest of rural central Mexico, with the economic, social, and political progress seen in Toluca and Mexico City in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Young Andrés was likely vividly aware of this contrast when he began his education in Toluca in the early 1880s at the age of thirteen. He would become a social critic seeking to uncover the roots of his country's rural backwardness, and he would eventually see the root of this problem in the Mexican hacienda's monopoly of land.

A RADICAL/POSITIVIST EDUCATION AT THE INSTITUTO LITERARIO DE TOLUCA

In 1881 Andrés was a boarding student at the *Instituto Literario de Toluca*.²⁰ In 1882 he obtained a certificate from the jefe político (district prefect) of the

Jilotepec district “certifying that the child Andrés Molina belonged to a poor family of this area that did not have the ability to pay the costs of his college.”²¹ The government of the state of Mexico paid the young man’s costs to attend the Instituto. Perhaps the fact that Andrés’s uncle, Silvano Enríquez, was on the staff of the Instituto as a chemistry professor helped Andrés obtain his scholarship.²²

According to Andrés’s grandson, Luis Molina Enríquez, Andrés lived with his uncle Silvano as a student at the Instituto. Silvano was said to have been strict with Andrés, impressing on him the need to study seriously.²³ Judging by the positivist-influenced curriculum of the Instituto in 1881, the boy had his work cut out for him as a student.

He also was to be exposed to the Instituto’s liberal/radical tradition. The Liberal governor Lorenzo de Zavala first established the Instituto in Tlalpán 1827, the same year in which the state of Mexico was founded, to teach the doctrines of the French Enlightenment. Zavala said the Enlightenment philosophy would work “against superstition and the rote education of the Conquerors.”²⁴ In 1830 the state capital was moved to Toluca, so in 1833, Zavala, reelected as governor, moved the Instituto in Toluca. Zavala’s establishment of the Instituto laid the foundation for the Instituto’s famous “great liberal tradition.”²⁵

Concurrent with the anti-clerical legislation of the Liberal president, Valentín Gómez Farfás, which included confiscating and selling California mission lands, Zavala confiscated the property of Church missions in the state of Mexico in 1833. Zavala’s goal was to divide Church lands in the state into family farms. Zavala also proposed paying off the public debt through the confiscation of Church property.²⁶

Many years later, Andrés Molina Enríquez was to consider Zavala’s decree for the confiscation of Church property “the monumental peak of national agrarian legislation.”²⁷ According to Molina Enríquez, Zavala’s decree completely covered all of the basic questions of the agrarian problem in Mexico. Moreover, Molina Enríquez claimed that Zavala’s reform plans directed José Luis Mora’s land-reform ideas. Molina Enríquez considered Mora the most important Liberal ideologue of Mexico in the first half of the nineteenth century, the “mentor of creole reforms,”²⁸ while Zavala represented the goals of Mexico’s mestizos. Because of this, Molina Enríquez believed, creole historians had deliberately defamed Zavala’s reputation.²⁹ In 1835, with the return of the centralist Conservatives to power in Mexico, the Instituto shut down. It reopened in 1846 when the federalist Liberals regained power in Mexico. From 1851 to 1882, the Instituto was a Christian academy where a priest taught Christian ethics. However, with the final triumph of the Liberals in 1867, the Instituto began to shift to a positivist curriculum along with the rest of Mexico’s educational system.³⁰

In 1870, Governor Mariano Riva Palacio called for a new plan of study for the Instituto following the new positivist curriculum of Gabino Barreda, the

chief promoter of positivism in nineteenth-century Mexico, at the Escuela Preparatoria de México. Barreda's program called for a shift from the old rote learning to a new learning based on "observation and experiment."³¹

Andrés entered the Instituto in 1881 at the time that the new "Plan of Studies and Regulation of the Instituto" was introduced. The plan favored the natural sciences over philosophical studies. It declared science education more important for the state's agricultural and mining economy, and the Instituto replaced the school of law with agricultural and engineering schools.³² Andrés flourished in the new academic environment at the Instituto. His transcript certified he was "approved with unanimity" as an exceptional graduate of the Instituto.³³

"ORDER AND PROGRESS" IN LATE NINETEENTH-CENTURY TOLUCA

As a boarding student at the Instituto, Molina Enríquez witnessed the building of modern Toluca in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. With the opening of the railroad from Mexico City on May 5, 1882 (seen by a crowd of 10,000), the paving of streets, the digging of sewers, and successful public-health measures against a typhoid epidemic from 1893 to 1895, Toluca was representative of the growth and modernization that urban Mexico experienced during the Porfiriato.³⁴ Toluca's growth contrasted strongly with the stagnation of Molina Enríquez's home region of Jilotepec.

Toluca was the commercial center of the western half of the state of Mexico in the nineteenth century. Toluca's exports were primarily agricultural products, which increased with the rail link to Mexico City. The city boasted also two important industries, cloth and beer. Santiago Graf, a German, established *Compañía Cervecera, Toluca, México, S.A.*, in 1885. By 1900 only the famous *Compañía Cervecera de Chihuahua* brewed more beer in Mexico.³⁵

Like the rest of nineteenth-century Mexico, Toluca was a city divided by race and class, with segregated neighborhoods and public institutions. The elite families of Toluca tended to live along the *Avenida José Vicente Villada*, and were the region's important hacendados and professionals.³⁶ The Hospital de Toluca had two classes of patients, "distinguished" patients and patients whose costs were paid by public charity. A school for secretaries divided its pupils into "ladies of reason" (whites/mestizos) and Indian girls.³⁷ The state population censuses of the late nineteenth century even listed population by racial category: white, mixed, and Indian.³⁸ Given the segregation of Mexican society, it can be understood why Molina Enríquez would come to conceive of Mexican history as a struggle between the three principal racial groups of Mexico.

The experience of living in Toluca during its modernization and growth must have created quite an impression on young Andrés after having grown up in a stagnant rural area. The segregated nature of Tolucan society likely

reinforced many of his emerging ideas on the racial conflict inherent in Mexico. Perhaps he made the inference that if government intervention could work to speed the modernization of urban Mexico, then logically it could also work to hasten the development of rural Mexico.

The next phase of Andrés's life took him to Mexico City and the Escuela Normal de Jurisprudencia in the middle of the 1880s. Once again, exposed to the modernizing works of President Díaz in Mexico City, the young man must have been struck by the contrast of the city with rural Mexico. However, he did not obtain his law degree from the Escuela Normal de Jurisprudencia. His father became ill, so he returned home to Jilotepec to help support the family as a notary.

Andrés finally obtained his law degree from the Instituto de Toluca in 1895 and then began a decade of legal work for the state of Mexico in various rural locations. His legal work allowed him to develop a first-hand understanding of rural Mexico. Such an understanding, combined with the positivist methodology he learned at the Instituto, would allow him to develop the first systematic work on what he considered Mexico's great national problem.

A NOTARY IN SULTEPEC (1894–98)

Andrés Molina Enríquez's work as a notary in Sultepec and other rural locations in the state of Mexico gave him firsthand knowledge of rural isolation and backwardness, the symptoms of what he came to see as the great national problem. For four years Molina Enríquez notarized the buying and selling of mid-sized plots of land in the Sultepec region. He drew directly on his experience gained in those four years when citing specific examples of backwardness in rural Mexico in *Los grandes problemas*.

Sultepec lies in a forested mountainous region to the southwest of Toluca, the state capital. Travel from Toluca to Sultepec requires climbing over the west flank of the large volcano, Nevado de Toluca. Molina Enríquez's comments on Sultepec some thirty-five years after his stay there illustrate its remoteness in the pre-Revolutionary era. He described the journey from Toluca to Sultepec as "dangerous and disheartening" in the 1890s.³⁹ He wrote that before the Revolution, travelers to Sultepec took the train to San Juan de las Huertas, then went on over the west flank of the Nevada de Toluca by foot, burro, mule, or horse. Because of dangerous highwaymen, travelers could only safely go in a caravan with police escort. Saturdays a guarded caravan went from Toluca to Sultepec, and Wednesdays it came back to Toluca.⁴⁰

On the trail over the Nevado de Toluca, Molina Enríquez found rural stagnation caused by hacienda land monopoly: "The mountain [Volcano of Toluca] belonged in its entirety to only one hacienda of more than 100,000 hectares,

El Gavia, and it was absolutely a desert.”⁴¹ The pueblos near the hacienda El Gavia, El Pedregal and Texcaltitlán, were “stunted and miserable,” and the inhabitants, mostly Indians, were “poor, depressed, and dirty.” Molina Enríquez contrasted Sultepec’s somewhat “animated” mining economy with the stagnation of the region’s countryside.⁴²

Molina Enríquez complained about the lack of modern communications for the southwest region of the state of Mexico in the newspaper, *La Hormiga*, that he started in 1898 during his stay in Sultepec. *La Hormiga* translates as the ant, and at fifteen centavos a copy, Molina Enríquez claimed it to be the cheapest newspaper in the Mexican Republic. However, the difficulty of bringing products from Toluca to Sultepec made the price of paper so high that *La Hormiga* often had to operate at a loss. Molina Enríquez charged that “the lack of communications” with Toluca combined with the expensive price of the paper made it hard to continue its operation.⁴³ He decided that he would have to leave “the work of true civilization [bringing the first paper to the municipal level] . . . to those with more patience.”⁴⁴

Molina Enríquez’s patience appears to have worn thin soon after because he left Sultepec in 1898—but he left with an in-depth knowledge of the agrarian structure of the region. In *Los grandes problemas*, Molina Enríquez related that the Sultepec region, with some 10,000 inhabitants, lacked a good road over the Nevado de Toluca volcano. According to Molina Enríquez, if the hacienda La Gavia had not monopolized the land along the route, a “small chain of small villages” would have united Sultepec with San Juan de las Huertas, the terminus of a railway to Toluca. In his view, population development along the Sultepec/San Juan de las Huertas road would have made travel “easy and safe,” thus ending the isolation of the Sultepec region.⁴⁵

Molina Enríquez also used the example of the Sultepec region to illustrate in *Los grandes problemas* the low capacity of isolated mestizo rancheros to consume industrial goods. He wrote that the population of the Sultepec district could not even afford to use iron tools. He witnessed instead the use of wooden picks and bars to build local roads in the Sultepec district, and he reported that use of wooden machetes was very common in the Sultepec region.⁴⁶

Ironically, because of its isolation and geography, the Sultepec district did not have as much hacienda-monopolized land (Molina Enríquez’s chief concern) as other more settled districts in the state of Mexico at the end of the Porfiriato. The four haciendas of the Sultepec district held less than 5 percent of the district’s territory in the 1890s.⁴⁷

For the state of Mexico as a whole, the Sultepec district was at the bottom of the list in rural and urban property value, even though it was second in terms of size.⁴⁸ However, the district ranked second in the state in corn production in the late nineteenth century, lending credence to Molina Enríquez’s notion that the *ranchero*, the owner of a midsized family farm, was the true producer of maize in Porfirian Mexico.⁴⁹

Molina Enríquez notarized the buying and selling of *terrenos de repartimiento*, or village lands, in a 16- to 23-kilometer radius from Sultepec. The average-sized plot that Molina Enríquez dealt with was 20 hectares.⁵⁰ In some cases the notarial document contains the plot's maize capacity stated in terms of the amount of harvest to be expected.⁵¹ The price fetched by different plots varied, and was likely dependent on the quality of the land for maize growing. Land boundaries, following colonial custom, were marked by natural boundaries and by relation to other farmers' lands.

Molina Enríquez followed the liberal Ley Lerdo land law when notarizing land sales. The 1856 Ley Lerdo focused on dividing Church lands but also applied to all corporately held lands. Villages were included in the Ley Lerdo's definition of corporations. Thus, citizens of pueblos in the Sultepec region could sell the land held by their families, land formally owned by the entire village. Molina Enríquez came to denounce the application of the Ley Lerdo, noting how in many instances it resulted in greater land concentration rather than in its stated goal: creation of midsized family farms.

This was not the case in Sultepec, however. Due to the Sultepec region's geography and isolation, there was little incentive to build up haciendas by buying up pueblo lands. Isolation from markets caused by the La Gavia hacienda's monopoly of the transport link between Sultepec and Toluca meant that family farms of the Sultepec region could not benefit from the economic growth of the late Porfiriato.⁵²

Molina Enríquez's notarial work in Sultepec gave him firsthand experience with the problems of isolated "Indian" peoples regarding written land titles. In one case, he recorded a case of an Indian selling land to a priest. Because the Indian did not speak Spanish, he needed an interpreter to explain the transaction to him.⁵³ It is likely that due to the problems of communication, the Indian did not understand he was permanently giving up his land.

Even more than in Molina Enríquez's home region of Jilotepec, the modernization of the Porfiriato bypassed the Sultepec region. Aside from the mining activity in the immediate Sultepec area, the district depended on maize-based farming. Because the Sultepec region lacked the problem of hacienda land monopoly, Molina Enríquez ascribed the area's backwardness to lack of a road linking the region with the state capital of Toluca. However, in *Los grandes problemas*, he linked the transport problem to the hacendados' refusal to grant rights of way across their lands, and he cited Sultepec as a specific example.

A RURAL NOTARY'S ACCOUNT OF THE "GREAT NATIONAL PROBLEM"

Molina Enríquez employed the intimate knowledge he gained as a notary of the legal and financial state of central Mexico's countryside during the late

Porfiriato to give a detailed exposé of how the Porfirian system worked for the hacienda's continued survival. To understand his land-reform proposals during the Revolution, it is necessary to examine his exposé of the Porfirian regime's bias in *Los grandes problemas*. He considered the agrarian laws and policies of the Porfiriato as key to the hacienda's survival and growth in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Molina Enríquez's land-reform proposals were largely designed to undo this bias. In his opinion, the Porfirian regime created unfair advantage for the hacienda, allowing it to thrive despite its inherent lack of agricultural productivity.

Molina Enríquez based his critique of the Porfirian system on his notarial and judicial work in rural Mexico. He credited the importance of this legal experience in rural Mexico when explaining the complexities of the land title system: "In this particular issue our opinions are the result of personal observations made over nine years while working as a notary in various rural districts."⁵⁴

Molina Enríquez saw systematic bias in favor of the hacienda in the Porfiriato's property-tax system, title system, and credit institutions. He also condemned the Díaz regime's land-legislation policies as biased towards speculators and hacendados. He considered the Porfirian property tax system utterly unfair. In Molina Enríquez's experience, hacendados employed all the influence and intrigue they could muster to reduce tax assessments on their haciendas, while small-property holders, lacking political influence or business sophistication, ended up paying taxes on all or even more than the true value of their property.

Molina Enríquez drew on knowledge of tax records from the state of Mexico to point out how haciendas were vastly underassessed, citing three extreme cases of underassessment. The La Gavia hacienda, at 64,500 hectares the largest hacienda in the state, had a true value of no less than six million pesos, yet was assessed for taxes at only 362,695 pesos.⁵⁵ Likewise, the haciendas San Nicolás Peralta and Arroyozarco each paid taxes on only 21 and 26 percent, respectively, of their true value.⁵⁶

Molina Enríquez maintained that underassessment of hacienda land taxes was not unique to the state of Mexico but applied to the entire country. He cited two Mexican business journals, *La Semana Mercantil* and *El Economista Mexicana*, to add authority to his contention that underassessment of haciendas was the norm throughout Mexico. Both journals held tax underassessment of haciendas to be general throughout the Republic.⁵⁷

To illustrate the Porfirian tax system's unfair treatment of small properties in relation to the underassessment of haciendas, Molina Enríquez drew on an example of an unfairly applied pulque tax from the state of Mexico. According to Molina Enríquez, the fruit-growing Tenancingo district paid more pulque tax than the pulque-based Otumba district during the administration of Governor Villada (1897–1904). Molina Enríquez explained this paradox in political terms. Large pulque haciendas made up the Otumba district, and the owners

of these haciendas used their political influence to greatly reduce the amount of pulque tax they paid. The Tenancingo district "had almost no magueys," yet paid a larger amount of pulque tax, because the district's small-scale fruit growers had no political leverage.⁵⁸

Molina Enríquez also explained how required fees and costs for the transfer of land titles weighed unfairly on small-property owners. The requirement for obtaining a stamp for 100 pesos to validate a land sale was of no consequence to a wealthy landowner, but for the small landholder, the 100-peso stamp constituted a "double quota."⁵⁹ Likewise, the local tax on land transfers, being based on a percentage of the property's value, penalized the small-property holder. Molina Enríquez noted how required notarization of all land transfers in the state of Mexico, regardless of the land's value, forced the holder of a small plot valued at ten pesos to pay up to 3,750 times more on a percentage basis for notary costs than an owner of an estate valued at one million pesos.⁶⁰

Additionally, Molina Enríquez outlined how the land-title system worked to secure the lands of hacendados to the detriment of small landholders and Indian villagers, whom Molina Enríquez considered to be the true farmers of Mexico. In his experience, land titles rarely corresponded to actual land boundaries; instead boundaries were defined through the "resistance and energy of neighboring owners."⁶¹ On one hand, hacendados tended to hide their titles because the boundaries marked out on the titles were often much less than the amount of land their haciendas were occupying. On the other hand, small landholders and Indian villagers, whose lands were being occupied by the aforementioned haciendas, had no way to prove their rights to land as they generally lacked valid titles.⁶²

Molina Enríquez believed that the disarray he found in Mexico's land-title system held back agricultural growth because it provided no security for land-owners and banks. He held that without secure titles, agricultural credit would never be forthcoming for Mexican farmers. He noted how even hacendados had trouble obtaining mortgage credit from the banks, which were inevitably located in the federal district. Banks favored making loans to commercial enterprises within the federal district, where bankers could make a valid assessment of the risks involved, rather than to far-flung, risky agricultural enterprises.⁶³ It is doubtless that Molina Enríquez described the problems hacendados had in obtaining loans on their large properties to accentuate the impossibility of rancheros securing loans on their much smaller properties.

From personal experience, Molina Enríquez knew of the dearth of loan possibilities for midsized and small farms in Porfirian Mexico. He related how he had attempted in 1906 to obtain a 2,000-peso loan from the Banco Central in Mexico City for a relative of his in Jilotepec with a rancho valued at 8,000 pesos. The bank director wrote to Molina Enríquez, explaining that the bank could not loan such a small amount due to the costs of appraising the farm for the loan.⁶⁴ Molina Enríquez contended that the lack of loan possibilities for

rancheros and small holders kept Mexico's countryside in "a true state of misery," especially in relation to the "opulence of certain levels of industry."⁶⁵

Molina Enríquez named disparities in property taxes, land-titling procedures, and credit as part of the political and economic "system" of the Porfiriato that needed to be overcome for national prosperity. He blamed the Díaz regime's public policies regarding "colonization" land laws for favoring speculators and hacendados over owners of rancheros, small landholders, and Indian villages.

Molina Enríquez also condemned the Díaz regime's insistence on valid land titles, instituted to secure land from the infamous *terrenos baldíos* (empty land) laws of 1883 and 1894.⁶⁶ His condemnation centered on his belief that this had resulted in the loss of ranchero and villager lands. He maintained that only the haciendas had come through the chaos of the nineteenth century with perfectly maintained land titles, because only hacienda owners had the literacy and money to go through the complicated procedures required to obtain written titles. Thus, when the Díaz administration began requiring all property holders to demonstrate legal title to land or risk having it confiscated under the *terrenos baldíos* laws, only the hacendados could demonstrate such legal status.⁶⁷

As an example of the loss of village lands, Molina Enríquez cited the case of the Tixmadeje and Dongú pueblos in the state of Mexico. Both pueblos dated their origins to the pre-Conquest period, yet their lands were seized under the *terrenos baldíos* laws. Because the pueblo dwellers could not demonstrate legal title, their lands were declared empty and taken away.⁶⁸

In order to point out the absurdity of this law's insistence on legal titles, Molina Enríquez related how some of his own land had been seized under the *terrenos baldíos* laws. He described how he had bought a piece of land from a village that had been divided in 1860. Molina Enríquez noted that he received title to the land, and believed he had a secure property. However, some years after he bought his land, a person "denounced" under the *terrenos baldíos* law the entire region where Molina Enríquez's land lay. The "denouncer" ended up being awarded all the lands, because none of the owners could prove firm ownership with legal titles to the Secretary of Development. Molina Enríquez assured the reader that such denunciations occurred "thousands of times a week," and would continue if the "denouncers did not back down before uprisings of landholders, defending their lands at the costs of their lives."⁶⁹

Molina Enríquez's condemnation of the Porfirian system's bias toward the hacienda formed the basis for specific land-reform proposals he would make on the eve of the Revolution.

CHAPTER 2

Formulating the Basis for Land Reform in Pre-Revolutionary Mexico 1895–1909

From 1895 to 1909, Andrés Molina Enríquez traced the roots of Mexico's political turmoil and economic backwardness in the nineteenth century to Mexico's land-tenure system, thus defining what he considered Mexico's "great national problem." In a 1902 speech before the Mexican Society of Geography and Statistics, Molina Enríquez announced his intention to develop a systematic study of Mexico's agrarian problem. By 1909, he had incorporated a series of studies that provided theoretical, legal, and historical justifications for land reform in Mexico into the book, *Los grandes problemas*. On the eve of Mexico's 1910 Revolution, Molina Enríquez came to consider land reform as the prerequisite for any advancement in early twentieth-century Mexico:

It is difficult to imagine at this time how large our agricultural production will be when in all of the fundamental zone of cereals (i.e., central Mexico), widening into the north, the medium-sized property exists; how big our population will be when the production of the medium-sized property becomes large; how large our industrial production will be when our population is large; how great our commerce will be when our agricultural and industrial production is very powerful; how great our national wealth will be when our production and commerce have reached their full prosperity; how large our credit will be when we have a rich country; and how our culture will flourish when our art has bloomed and has been raised to a high level, upon the ample base of stability, to the height of genius.¹

Clearly, Molina Enríquez linked all future advancement in Mexico to land reform; he based this premise on the importance of agriculture to social development, an association that warrants further examination.

THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN AGRICULTURE AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

To understand why Molina Enríquez focused on the central Mexican hacienda as the root of Mexico's major national problems, we must examine one of his basic assumptions: "Agricultural production is the fundamental base of existence of all developed human societies."²

Because Molina Enríquez believed that the evolution of human civilization depended on advancement in agricultural production,³ he considered the "unproductive" central Mexican hacienda a drag on Mexico's evolution, or advancement. He also believed in the primacy of cereal production to human development, so he focused his analysis on central Mexico, which he called the "fundamental zone of cereals." As is evident in his name for it, the "zone's importance lay in its agricultural production of maize for the entire country. Due to its climate and geography, central Mexico produced the surpluses of food, goods, and labor that the rest of the country depended on."⁴

Molina Enríquez restricted his case against the hacienda to the zone of cereals because of the importance of maize production for Mexico. He believed that the central Mexican hacienda owners did not utilize the potential of their lands to maximize maize production, but speculated instead on bad harvest years to reap huge profits at the expense of the poor masses.⁵ He linked maize prices with wage levels because maize constituted "the indispensable necessity a man needs to live" in Mexico.⁶

To maximize maize production in the zone of cereals, Molina Enríquez called for division of the central hacienda into mid-sized farms run by mestizo farmers, whom he considered the true producers of maize in Mexico. However, in regions outside the zone, he saw the hacienda system as a natural adaptation to climate and geography: "In the fundamental zone of cereals, the large property is artificial and obstructs the growth of the population; in the rest of the country, as a general supposition, it is natural, and will disappear with the development of the population in the fundamental zone of cereals."⁷

Because Molina Enríquez considered agriculture so vital to a civilization's development, he theorized that a country's land-tenure systems determined its peoples' state of development. In fact, he provides a table in *Los grandes problemas* correlating land tenure to the states of evolutionary development of human groups.⁸ The table listed groups ranging from nomadic hunters with no notion of property ownership—hence a primitive state of development—to advanced societies with private land ownership based on a free-trade economy.

Later in the book Molina Enríquez characterized the United States and England as the world's most advanced countries,⁹ due to their yeoman-based farming, and Poland as backward due to its latifundia system, a lower stage of land-tenure development. Mexico's problem lay in the fact that it "presents all the states of development mankind has crossed in the course of time."¹⁰ Because of this, Molina Enríquez held that national integration was an imposing task and that only state-sponsored land reform would be able to bring all of Mexico's social groups up to the highest level of development.

Molina Enríquez equated Mexico's different land-tenure systems, and hence social development, with Mexico's three basic racial groups: the creole, the mestizo, and the Indian. The creole owned the hacienda. The Indian farmed the communal village lands, or was a nomadic hunter. And the mestizo farmed the midsized rancho, providing Mexico with most of its food. Hence, the key to Molina Enríquez's land-reform vision lay in the breakup of creole-controlled, unproductive haciendas into mestizo-controlled, productive, midsized family farms. To help justify this reform, Molina Enríquez turned to the theories of the eighteenth-century Spanish economic reformer, Jasper de Jovellanos.

BUILDING ON JASPAR DE JOVELLANOS'S LEY AGRARIA (1793)

Jaspar de Jovellanos's *Ley Agraria* reflected the concern of Spanish politicians and economists about agricultural production and land concentration in eighteenth-century Spain. Jovellanos wrote the *Ley Agraria* in 1793 for the Spanish economic society, Amigos del País de Madrid, which was a society dedicated to seeing the doctrines of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment implemented in Spain.¹¹ The Spanish Crown had requested that the society write a proposal for agrarian reform.

Molina Enríquez inserted into *Los grandes problemas* a long passage from the *Ley Agraria* in which Jovellanos explained how the entailment of noble land had severely damaged Spain's agriculture. Jovellanos maintained that the entailment of latifundia in Spain created scandalously high prices for land, which held back agricultural production because investors looked for more profitable enterprises. Those who did buy land expended all their capital on the land itself and had no capital left for farming. In addition, those who bought such high-priced land would never willingly sell it because they could not be sure they would have the means to buy land again. Jovellanos held that Spanish owners of large estates sought a long-term secure rent, not a profit, from their investment. The result of all this was unproductive, titled land controlled by a small number of families — all to the detriment of Spanish agriculture.¹²

Molina Enríquez applied Jovellanos's argument against the central Mexican hacienda, illustrating the "feudal" nature of the central Mexican hacienda and

appealing to the Liberal sentiments of early twentieth-century Mexico's intelligentsia. Molina Enríquez wrote, "It cannot be doubted, owing to facts seen by the entire world, that the preceding reflections of Jovellanos, have, in Mexico, given the present state of the large creole-owned property, the most complete application."¹³

Jovellanos's views had an "immense influence . . . in nineteenth-century agrarian thinking throughout the Hispanic world," including Mexican Liberalism.¹⁴ Before Molina Enríquez, José María Luis Mora and Ponciano Arriaga had also used Jovellanos's writings to defend their ideas for land reform in nineteenth-century Mexico.¹⁵

Molina Enríquez claimed that the Liberal prohibition against titled estates after Mexico's independence had failed. He assured the reader that any lawyer in Mexico knew that families would do anything to prevent the division of their haciendas at the death of the patrons. For him, *de facto* entailment explained how the central hacienda survived unchanged from the colonial era into the early twentieth century.¹⁶

Molina Enríquez applied Jovellanos's argument against entailment also to explain how entailment caused the central Mexican hacienda to be non-productive. According to Molina Enríquez, "no where in the world is the investment of capital in large extensions of land profitable."¹⁷ The hacienda was too big to cultivate well, but it had a monopoly on land and resources. In Molina Enríquez's words, "A good hacienda should have waters, agricultural land, pastures, mountains, magueyes, rock and lime quarries, etc., everything at once."¹⁸ Monopoly of such resources allowed the hacendado to pay off laborers and obtain a secure rent through selling natural products without having to bother with cultivating his land well.¹⁹

According to Molina Enríquez, all one needed to do to see the unproductiveness of the central hacienda was to take a railroad trip through central Mexico. In the mountains, where the small centers of population were found, one would see intense cultivation of cereals, while on the plains, where the haciendas dominated, one would see Mexico's best farm lands "abandoned and deserted."²⁰

Molina Enríquez even recommended to readers a specific railroad trip from Mexico City to Toluca in order to observe how intensively villagers cultivated their small plots of land in contrast to the unproductive haciendas: "Whoever wants to can take the railroad to Toluca, and see near the tunnel of Dos Ríos in the small pueblo called Huixquilucan, the enormous quantity of cultivated parcels, perfectly cared for, rising to the peaks of the Las Cruces, where this pueblo is located. Has it not occurred to all who have seen this pueblo and others like it, that if the great plains of the haciendas were cultivated in this way, our national destiny would be different?"²¹ Clearly Molina Enríquez knew this railway route well, and likely traveled many times back and forth from

Mexico City to Toluca, observing the contrast of productive villages and unproductive haciendas.

Molina Enríquez gave special emphasis to hacienda cultivation of maguey for the making of pulque to illustrate the hacienda's nonproductivity. Molina Enríquez held that the maguey was the ideal security crop for the hacendado. Able to withstand drought and plagues injurious to cereal crops, the maguey assured the hacendado of a fixed income with a minimum of effort or expense. Molina Enríquez lambasted the fact that hacendados used good agricultural land to grow maguey rather than cereal crops.²² Production of maguey rather than maize on the best lands of central Mexico hurt Mexico's ability to be self-sufficient in maize production.

Molina Enríquez's legal work in rural Mexico also allowed him an inside look into the violence he considered inherent in running the "feudal" hacienda. He related how he had taken part in an investigation of "a hacienda near this capital" where the administrator had held a "poor man" in a dirty cell, hanging by his thumbs, for stealing some steers.²³ Molina Enríquez cited other examples of hacienda violence, such as a hacienda administrator who had raped all of the local women with impunity over a period of thirty years, and another hacienda administrator who had ordered a neighboring villager's crops burned because he believed they extended onto hacienda land.²⁴

By labeling the Mexican hacienda a feudal institution, Molina Enríquez was able to ascribe the backwardness of the Mexican countryside to the hacienda's dominance over land, resources, and people. He declared that the central Mexican hacienda was not a business enterprise but an institution to uphold the "vanity and pride" of its owners.²⁵ Having made the case that Mexico's rural problems were rooted in the hacienda, he then needed to formulate legal principles to enable the Mexican government to intervene to break the hacienda's dominance in the Mexican countryside.

PRINCIPLES OF ARTICLE 27: A RETURN TO COLONIAL LEGAL PRECEDENT

Molina Enríquez's 1902 speech before the Mexican Society of Geography and Statistics, on "the question of the day," contains an outline of his proposed study of Mexico's agrarian problem. He divided the "agrarian question" into three aspects: environment, race, and the historical 'moment.'²⁶ In his speech, he took up the environmental aspect of the agrarian question, and divided this into the problems of water and communications.

Molina Enríquez's proposals for water legislation in the early phase of his study of national problems contain the germs of the most important provisions of Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution. His 1905 proposed federal water law²⁷

reveals how he returned to colonial legal tradition when seeking legislation to benefit all Mexicans. His proposal also reflects a strong commitment to conservation and to the fair allocation of water.

The 1905 proposed water law vested in the Mexican federal government control of all permanent sources of water. The government would only grant concessions to individuals or towns for water use if advised to do so by experts from the Secretary of Development office. The goal of all concessions in which water was lost in use would be to maintain "a consistent level of rivers."²⁸ In the colonial era, the Spanish Crown had been the ultimate owner of all land and water in Mexico, and had regulated resource use. Molina Enríquez argued that this right of ownership had passed from the Crown to the Mexican national government at Independence.

Molina Enríquez's assertion of the federal government's right to control Mexico's waters harked back to colonial legal tradition. In the *Siete Partidas* of 1265, King Alfonso X's famous codification of Spanish law, water was considered a temporary property right "subject to the intervention of the state," for the common good.²⁹ The *Siete Partidas* became the basis for New Spain's legal system.

Molina Enríquez's 1905 water law proposal concurred with the *Siete Partidas* when it regulated the use of water for the common good. The proposed law required no permission from the federal government for drinking, bathing, or washing clothes.³⁰ The *Siete Partidas* allowed for the common use of water for basic needs such as drinking, fishing, and transport; applied to Mexico, it included the free use of water for domestic needs.³¹ However, the *Siete Partidas* did require the Crown's concession for irrigation and the use of water for energy. Likewise, Molina Enríquez's 1905 law required concessions from the federal government for irrigation and the use of water for motor power. Both the *Siete Partidas* and Molina Enríquez's proposed law allowed for private ownership of water if its source originated on someone's property. Like the *Siete Partidas*, however, Molina Enríquez's proposal qualified the private use and ownership of water by giving the federal government the right to intervene in order to conserve or allocate water on the basis of "public utility."³²

In *Los grandes problemas*, Molina Enríquez formulated the legal basis for Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution by extending the concept of federal ownership of water to all of Mexico's land and resources. He argued that the Spanish Crown's ultimate right over Mexico's lands and resources passed to the national government at independence, thus providing the legal means to limit the rights of private property for the interest of society. Molina Enríquez maintained that the Mexican government, like the Spanish Crown before it, had the right to revoke the rights of private property ownership.³³ Molina Enríquez would write such a principle into the preface of Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution after the dust of the Revolution had settled.

One of the noted and controversial provisions of Article 27 was the right of the Mexican federal government to subject foreigners to Mexican law in regard to property rights. Molina Enríquez included such a provision in his 1905 water law proposal and forbade the transfer of a water concession to a foreign government or state: "The enterprise of every development will always be Mexican, even when all or some of its members are foreigners, it will be subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts of the Republic in all activity taking place within the national territory."³⁴

Molina Enríquez realized that to legalize his land-reform proposals, the Mexican Constitution would have to be amended to promote the social interest over the rights of private property. However, the absolute right of private property took precedence over social interest in the minds of most of Mexico's legal professionals. Molina Enríquez believed this ingrained precedence had to be reversed for the good of the country: "In our country, every restriction of private property that aids in the formation, the constitution, and consolidation of our nationality, inasmuch as it does not eliminate private property, should be constitutional and legitimate. The Constitution could not have been made to obstruct, or even less to stop, the organic development of the nation's life."³⁵

Having established the legal basis for land reform in Mexico, Molina Enríquez went on to develop a historical justification for land reform. In "La cuestión del día," his speech to the geographers and statisticians, Molina Enríquez first referred to "the great national problems" of Mexico's "course of evolution" from independence to the beginning of the twentieth century.

"LA REFORMA Y JUÁREZ"

In 1906, Molina Enríquez entered the literary contest of the National Juárez centennial. However, his entry, *La Reforma y Juárez, Estudio Histórico-Sociológico*, dealt more with the context of the Reforma rather than with Juárez, the Liberal leader.³⁶ The outline of nineteenth-century Mexican history that he had given in his 1902 speech was amplified in his prize-winning defense of President Benito Juárez' role in the Reforma.

La Reforma y Juárez followed the analytical division that Molina Enríquez proposed in "La Cuestión del día." In the first section of *La Reforma y Juárez*, Molina Enríquez explained how three factors, (1) geography, (2) the racial structure of Mexico, and (3) the land-tenure system inherited from the colonial era, had created nineteenth-century Mexico's land-tenure problem. He saw the entire Reforma period from 1857 to 1872, including the Guerra de Tres Años (the civil war between Liberals and conservatives over the direction of the reform) and the French intervention, as a struggle of the creole clergy and Indians against the Liberal mestizos and their battle to disentail Church lands.

In the second section of the book, Molina Enríquez analyzed the Reforma itself, and portrayed it as an agrarian struggle of Mexico's mestizos to gain a place for themselves in Mexico's antiquated, colonial-derived land-tenure system. Like all other Liberal writers dealing with the Juárez theme for the centennial, Molina Enríquez portrayed the Reforma as a period of transition.³⁷ Molina Enríquez considered the Plan de Ayutla, the 1855 overthrow of the dictator Santa Anna, as the watershed of Mexican history.³⁸ However, unlike most Liberal writers who saw the Reforma in purely political terms (i.e., the triumph of the Liberals), Molina Enríquez considered it as the coming to power of the mestizo race, who would go on to create the true Mexican nation in the age of integration.³⁹

Molina Enríquez cited the works of well-known Mexican historians to support his conception of the Reforma as a period of transition to a mestizo nation in Mexico. He drew throughout his work on the Liberal history by Riva Palacio, *México á través de los Siglos*. Riva Palacio's ideas regarding the sources of nationality, and the lack of these sources in the colonial era due to the Spanish-Indian racial division, confirmed Molina Enríquez's view that the mestizo embodied the resolution of the racial dichotomy problem in Mexico.⁴⁰ More explicitly, Molina Enríquez cited the following passage in Justo Sierra's *Historia General*: "The mestizo, casual product of the dominant and dominated races, is considered only fit for evil, only fit for robbery and murder; the mestizo or casta is, nevertheless, the future ruler of the country, the future revolutionary, the future author of the nation."⁴¹

Molina Enríquez built on the idea of mestizo nationalism and linked it directly to his portrayal of modern Mexican history as a battle over control of land. In his opinion, Juárez's July 12, 1859, law for the nationalization of all Church property turned the tide in the Guerra de Tres Años. This rallied the weakened mestizo soldiers, who fought with new zeal in the hope of gaining the nationalized Church lands for themselves.⁴² Molina Enríquez believed that the Catholic church brought the separation of church and state upon itself when it opposed the extension of the *Patronato*, the law giving the Spanish Crown power to approve high clerical appointments, to the newly established Mexican federal government in the first half-century of independence. The fact that nationalization affected only Church lands, not Indian village lands, left the clergy alone in their battle.

Juárez understood the need to protect Indian lands, unlike Comonfort and other creole originators of the Reforma's land legislation.⁴³ Although lauding the nationalization of Church lands as a "transcendental" law, Molina Enríquez condemned the Liberal moves to individualize Indian communal lands in the early Reforma period. He maintained that this attempt simply recruited Indians to fight on the conservative side of the Reforma.⁴⁴

In Molina Enríquez's opinion, Crown defense of Indian communal property in the colonial era enabled the survival of the Indian race. According to Molina

Enríquez: "If the land (in the colonial era) had been divided, fairly or unfairly, among the Spanish and the Indians on an individual basis . . . it is absolutely certain there would not exist one square centimeter of land in Indian ownership, or any Indians in the Republic."⁴⁵

Molina Enríquez differed from most Liberal positivists in the pre-Revolutionary era, including Juárez, by discounting the effectiveness of education in integrating the Indian into national life. Education was seen as the best solution to the problem of Indian poverty and ignorance in rural Mexico during the Restored Republic and Porfirian eras.⁴⁶ However, Molina Enríquez objected to such an easy "fix all" to the Indian/peasant problem on social evolutionist grounds: "The dogma now reigning, unfortunately, that education . . . could correct in a period of ten or fifteen years, two or three thousand years of backward evolution, has caused, precisely in the Hispanic-American countries, immense disasters impossible to repair."⁴⁷

Molina Enríquez praised Spanish Crown policy toward the Indian communities as being fit to their "evolutionary age"; the solution to the Indian problem would come with the Indian's absorption into national life through miscegenation.⁴⁸

For Molina Enríquez the problem of Indian integration into national life was simply one aspect of national weakness, reflected in the 1848 U.S. annexation of half of Mexico's territory. From a geopolitical standpoint, Molina Enríquez considered the U.S. annexation to have been inevitable. Mexico's inability to defend itself lay in the land-tenure system of the central mesa. Land monopoly caused general poverty, resulting in the lack of population and economic growth, thereby hindering the creation of a strong military and a system of communications to defend the country.⁴⁹ Thus, Molina Enríquez's argument led the reader to the conclusion that only land reform would ensure Mexico's future prosperity.

THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL DARWINISM

Molina Enríquez wrote in the 1930s on how he became caught up in the radicalism of the 1890s in Mexico, when it was believed that defects in the social order could be corrected by following a social theory such as Social Darwinism. Social Darwinism suffused the intellectual world of late nineteenth-century Mexico. Justo Sierra's history textbooks of the late 1870s with "Darwinian themes" were used in preparatory schools, and Molina Enríquez refers repeatedly to Sierra's history text in his writings. Sierra proposed applying the theory of evolution to sociology and to Mexico's struggle for national survival against the United States — themes that Molina Enríquez would come to apply in *Los grandes problemas*.⁵⁰

Molina Enríquez learned of the Social Darwinist theories of the German

social critic Max Nordau while a law student in Mexico City in the early 1890s. Nordau (1849–1923) was one of the most widely read social critics of the late nineteenth century.⁵¹ Nordau's books appeared in most of the world's major languages, and ran through many editions.⁵² Molina Enríquez explained the influence of Nordau on his thought: "We decided to follow the path indicated by the German philosopher Max Nordau and we wrote a pamphlet with the title of *El Evangelio de una nueva reforma*, trying to demonstrate that in the capitalist system, the evil is not in the creation and accumulation of capital that a man makes for his own exclusive use, and which constitutes private property, but the prolongation of this custom making this property continue after the life of the owner by means of inheritance."⁵³

Social Darwinism is generally considered a conservative doctrine that justified nineteenth-century capitalism as carrying out the dictates of evolution in human society. However, part of the lure of Darwinism in the late nineteenth century was the fact it could be used to justify virtually any point of view. Nordau used Darwinism to defend his ideas for social reform, seeing evolution leading to a civilization of love and solidarity, rather than continual "tooth and claw" competition.⁵⁴ Evolution means perpetual change. Thus, reformers used the theory of evolution to advocate change in social structures. Reformers such as Nordau pointed out that it was human social organization, a human construct, not the natural struggle for existence, that kept elites on top.⁵⁵ Nordau advocated setting evolution to work in society by abolishing inheritance, thus equalizing the struggle for existence for all classes.⁵⁶

In *El evangelio de una nueva reforma*, Molina Enríquez took up Nordau's call for the end of inheritance to propose a new reform for Mexico. Nordau believed that "a nation which consists of free tillers of the soil is never poor," and explained how "absolute" poverty only occurs with urbanization, when lower classes are driven to the cities because the land is monopolized through inheritance.⁵⁷ Molina Enríquez put an additional Social Darwinist twist into Nordau's call for the end to inheritance in *El evangelio* by noting how inheritance perpetuates the class system to the detriment of human evolution by allowing unfit individuals to survive through inherited wealth.⁵⁸

Following standard Social Darwinism, Porfirian elites were convinced that European immigrants, not land reform for the mestizos or Indians, would insure Mexico's progress. In instructions given to private companies promoting Mexican colonization in Europe, the Díaz regime called for the admission of northern European immigrants and the refusal of Slavic and Mediterranean Europeans.⁵⁹ And of course, the Porfirian regime's *terrenos baldíos* law's original intent was to attract foreign colonists to Mexico.⁶⁰ The Porfirian elite premised their racist belief in the benefits of northern European immigration for Mexico's progress on their assumptions that Mexico's mineral and agricultural economy had enormous potential and that the native population would be unable to develop these riches.⁶¹

As a professional anthropologist at the Museum of Anthropology from 1907 on, Molina Enríquez was, in a sense, a captive of the racist thinking of his times. Anthropology at the turn of the twentieth century analyzed the world in terms of the struggle of racial groups, and inevitably found the white race to be the most “fit” in this struggle.⁶² And of all social sciences in late nineteenth-century Mexico, anthropology showed “the greatest traces of the impact of Darwinism.”⁶³

INVERTING SOCIAL DARWINISM AS A THEORETICAL BASIS FOR LAND REFORM

Molina Enríquez found it necessary to take early twentieth-century anthropology’s theoretical framework, Social Darwinism, and turn it on its head in order to legitimize his call for land reform in favor of the mestizo race. In *Los grandes problemas*, he attempted to undermine the ideological bedrock of the creole-controlled central Mexican hacienda by inverting the Porfirian elites’ belief in the inherent superiority of the white “races” into a defense of the Mexican mestizo. As Frank Tannenbaum noted, “The movement for the destruction of the communal holdings, for the alienation of government land, for stimulus to foreign immigration, for the special favoring of foreign investors, found support and justification in the belief that Mexico must become a white man’s country.”⁶⁴

D. A. Brading notes the dilemma that Molina Enríquez faced in arguing for the racial superiority of the mestizo half-breed along Social Darwinist lines. Herbert Spencer, the most prominent promoter of Social Darwinist racism at the turn of the twentieth century, had discounted half-breeds as inferior. Spencer even cited Mexico’s and Latin America’s political turmoil during the nineteenth century as proof of the inability of “hybrid societies” to organize themselves.⁶⁵

Yet, as Brading explains, Molina Enríquez found the “scientific” theory he needed to justify his characterization of the mestizo in Ernst Haeckel’s assessment of hybrid races in *The History of Creation*. Although Haeckel put the white races on the top of his racial hierarchy, Haeckel also conceded that hybrid races were the source of new species and possessed an “inner force” allowing them to adapt and thrive in a favorable environment.⁶⁶

Molina Enríquez seized upon Haeckel’s theory of hybrid races, converting the Social Darwinist claim for the innate superiority of the white races into a defense for the making of a mestizo Mexico. Using Haeckel’s favorable assessment of the potentials of hybrid races, Molina Enríquez argued that the mestizo race’s superior adaptation to the Mexican environment due to its Indian “blood” destined it to rule not just Mexico, but North America as a whole.⁶⁷

Molina Enríquez divided evolutionary advancement into two distinct types of adaptation to create a theoretical basis for inverting racial Social Darwinism.

He distinguished between two types of energy in mankind, action and resistance. He “conceded” that the white race excelled in action, or organizing and building up society, due to their advanced social evolution. However, he argued that the Indian races had a greater capacity to resist the hardships of the Mexican environment than the white race. In the long run, he theorized, the quality of resistance would win out over the quality of action in the battle for survival. Thus, the Indian races would triumph over the white races over time.⁶⁸ Because Molina Enríquez defined the mestizo as “the Indian race . . . modified by Spanish blood,” he could apply arguments on the superior adaptability of Indians to the mestizos.⁶⁹

Molina Enríquez portrayed survival in poverty as a sign of strength for mestizos. He estimated that the mestizo race grew by half despite its impoverished condition in the nineteenth century.⁷⁰ He explained that the terrible living conditions, including lack of adequate housing and clothing, that most mestizos were able to endure provided “proof” of the race’s superior resistance to environmental hardships. He maintained that the mestizo soldier fought the wars of the nineteenth century on a minimal diet of corn and salt.⁷¹

If mestizos could register impressive growth in the nineteenth century despite terrible living conditions, as Molina Enríquez contended, then how would improved economic conditions affect Mexico’s conversion into a mestizo nation? Molina Enríquez confidently predicted a population increase from fifteen million to fifty million in fifty years if the goal of land reform were realized.⁷² In his vision, land reform would turn the dispossessed mestizos into a thriving agrarian middle class eager and able to consume the products of a home-based Mexican industry, and ready to defend their gains.

PROSPERITY OR OBLIVION: AN APOCALYPTIC CALL FOR LAND REFORM

Molina Enríquez rested his case for land reform in *Los grandes problemas* on an apocalyptic vision of Mexico’s future. Mexico had to choose its future: either Mexico would achieve prosperity and national unity by restructuring its social system through land reform, or Mexico faced national oblivion at the hands of the more powerful United States. In basing his case for land reform on this either-or scenario, he attempted to play on the fears of the Porfirian elite, who generally agreed that without economic modernization, Mexico faced annexation by the United States.⁷³

Molina Enríquez explained how the Porfirian economic structure inhibited the development of a rural middle class and the formation of a home-based industrial economy in Mexico. First, only a few elites controlled business in Mexico—one could count on one’s fingers the number of big businessmen in each city’s commercial plaza.⁷⁴ Second, the hacienda did not provide agricultural workers with a living wage, let alone enough to buy manufactured prod-

ucts. Third, the hacienda had an unfair competitive edge over the small farmer due to minimum wages for workers and the Porfirian regime's agricultural policies; this hurt agricultural production, raising the price of food and decreasing the purchase of consumer goods. Fourth, Mexican industry geared itself toward the export market, not the development of a home market.⁷⁵

For Molina Enríquez, economic underdevelopment meant that Mexico lacked the means to become a unified nation. He devoted the last chapter of *Los grandes problemas* to the question of national unity and Mexico's ability to survive a takeover by the United States. In Molina Enríquez's opinion, neither the Indians, with sole allegiance to their villages, nor the Creoles, with their European biases, could unify Mexico racially. After attempting to define national unity, he concluded that only through land reform to benefit the mestizo would Mexico become a truly unified nation.

Molina Enríquez contended that national unity would come through land reform raising the mestizo majority into a strong middle class: "Middle classes . . . will not exist until the division of the haciendas puts a large group of mestizo midsized landowners between the foreign and creole capitalists, and the rancheros and Indians of the lower classes."⁷⁶

Earlier in *Los grandes problemas* Molina Enríquez had compared Mexico's situation to late eighteenth-century Revolutionary France in order to make the point that Mexico faced land reform or revolution: "We gather that the revolution in France did not only free the property of the clergy, but also of the nobility. We desire such a revolution to take place in our zone of cereals, and it is necessary to do this and it will be done, either by the peaceful means we have indicated or by a revolution that sooner or later will come; this work will contribute much to the salvation of the nation."⁷⁷

Molina Enríquez envisioned Mexico with a middle-class mestizo population unified through racial origin, Catholic religion, physical type, customs, language, evolutionary state, and desires and aspirations. As he saw it, the notion of patriotism thus developed would then assure the success of land reform. When Mexico became one unified family (Molina Enríquez defined patriotism as an extension of the family), the equitable distribution of the common inheritance — land — would be assured.⁷⁸

Molina Enríquez prophetically explained the internal and external political dilemmas Mexico would face when attempting social reform. On the one hand, he contended that Mexico faced revolution if no reforms were implemented. He desired "that the national wealth be better distributed, because we foresee in the present circumstances, the coming of the inferior groups; the day of revenge and punishment."⁷⁹ On the other hand, he could not be sure that the United States would not intervene at the behest of creole land owners and U.S. nationals if reform or revolution came.

Regarding the dangers of U.S. opposition if Mexico carried out reforms, Molina Enríquez contended that Mexico had to make a stand: "It is necessary to prevent that the conservation of our national political existence owes itself

to the wishes of others. Are we, or are we not: that is the question . . . If we are to disappear, better sooner than later.”⁸⁰

Clearly, Molina Enríquez held an apocalyptic vision of Mexico’s future regarding his land-reform program. Either Mexico achieved prosperity through land reform or it faced oblivion as a nation. This vision explains why he worked so tenaciously during and after the Revolution, up to the time of his death, to see land reform realized in Mexico. By setting the land-reform issue in terms of national survival, Molina Enríquez likely felt he would gain more attention to his land-reform program.

CHAPTER 3

Molina Enríquez as Reyista and Independent Governor Candidate 1909–1911

Andrés Molina Enríquez, armed with a systematic agrarian reform program, participated in the transition in Mexican politics that began on the eve of the Mexican Revolution. In early 1908 Porfirio Díaz opened up Mexican politics with the famous Creelman interview, in which he welcomed the formation of opposition parties and hinted at his own retirement.¹ After the Creelman interview, Mexican politics took on a new animation unseen in the previous thirty years.

Molina Enríquez attempted to use this new political atmosphere in order to promote his land-reform program. In addition to building a strong case against the central Mexican hacienda in *Los grandes problemas*, he also proposed a land-reform program to undo the artificial political and legal supports that he maintained allowed the central hacienda to survive. He brought this reformist program into the “new” Mexican political arena from 1909 to 1911.

This chapter chronicles Molina Enríquez’s attempts to define land reform as *the* crucial political issue during the transition in Mexican politics from the eve of the Revolution through the fall of Porfirio Díaz. He became first a partisan of General Bernardo Reyes, a potential vice-presidential candidate on the Díaz ticket in 1909.² After the failure of the Reyista movement, Molina Enríquez rejected the leadership of the other opponent, Francisco Madero, and decided to run for the governorship of the state of Mexico. As will be seen, neither the political opening created by the Creelman interview nor the electoral politics instituted with the fall of Díaz created a mass constituency for Molina Enríquez’s populist agrarian politics.

THE REYISTA MOVEMENT: A PERSONAL AND IDEOLOGICAL AFFINITY

General Bernardo Reyes emerged in 1909 as the first major opposition figure to the Díaz dictatorship. Reyes came from a fairly well-to-do Nicaraguan family that had emigrated to Mexico and settled in Guadalajara, Jalisco. Reyes entered the Mexican army as a teenager and earned himself a stirring reputation as a courageous and effective leader in efforts to rid northern Mexico of endemic banditry and hostile Indian tribes.³

By the turn of the century — and after a brief and controversial stint as minister of war in Díaz's cabinet — Reyes settled into a more sedate existence as governor of the state of Nuevo León. In that role, he gained recognition and popularity as a progressive, "reform-minded administrator."⁴ Reyes's reforms in Nuevo León included a uniform tax collection code, public-health measures, primary education for the masses, and labor reform.⁵ The impressive economic growth of the Monterrey region during Reyes's tenure as governor also gained him national attention.⁶ With his widespread support among the leadership of the Mexican army, Reyes presented a potentially formidable challenge to the aging Porfirian oligarchy.

A diverse group of politicians organized the first Reyista party, the Centro Organizador del Partido Democrático, in January of 1909 to promote Reyes's candidacy for vice-president. The Partido Democrático trumpeted a basic Liberal political platform, yet included a call for the establishment of a Ministry of Agriculture to improve agrarian conditions in Mexico.⁷ The Reyistas represented the first strong opposition movement to the Díaz regime in a quarter century. Reyes himself remained tactically noncommittal over the issue of his vice-presidential candidacy, leaving the job of pushing his candidacy to the numerous Reyista political clubs that had arisen in the aftermath of the Creelman interview.⁸

Molina Enríquez's law partners in Mexico city were Rodolfo Reyes, son of Bernardo Reyes, and Luis Cabrera. Both men were active Reyistas. Molina Enríquez's friendship with Rodolfo Reyes provided Molina Enríquez with an insider connection to the Reyista movement. Rodolfo Reyes, like Molina Enríquez, was reform-minded, and influenced his father's political outlook.⁹ Molina Enríquez had a close relationship with Rodolfo Reyes as early as 1903; in correspondence between them from that year, Molina Enríquez's congratulated Rodolfo on the birth of his son, and Rodolfo sent Molina Enríquez a legal document on property that Rodolfo believed would interest him.¹⁰

Rodolfo Reyes appeared to have been instrumental in fomenting the Reyista movement; as early as 1902 he had organized a press campaign in favor of his father during a showdown with the minister of finance, José Limantour.¹¹ And

Rodolfo likely facilitated a meeting between his father and Molina Enríquez to discuss publication of *Los grandes problemas*.

Bernardo Reyes opened his home to Molina Enríquez for a series of interviews about Mexico's national problems.¹² Apparently convinced of the soundness of Molina Enríquez's ideas, Reyes became his patron by paying the costs of publishing the 1909 edition of *Los grandes problemas*. Twenty-three years later Molina Enríquez noted the importance of Reyes's sponsorship: "To his spontaneous offering we owe the publication of our book *Los grandes problemas*, that marked out the directions the Revolution would take."¹³

However, Reyes' financing of the book left Molina Enríquez, as a social scientist, open to the charge of political partisanship. Carlos Basave was one contemporary who faulted Molina Enríquez in 1939 for mixing science with "inappropriate and impure politics" in the book.¹⁴ Basave maintained that Molina Enríquez's solution to Mexico's political problems was to replace Díaz with Reyes, and he noted that Molina Enríquez deleted all reference to Reyes in the second edition of *Los grandes problemas*.¹⁵ However, Basave himself was treasurer of the Central Reyista Committee in 1909, a fact that makes it hard to understand Basave's later criticism of Molina Enríquez's Reyista partisanship.

In the 1909 edition of the book, Molina Enríquez disclaimed the presence of any political partisanship in the work. He wrote that he did not want to enter into the details of the debate over the presidential question, nor would he endorse in the book any of the parties then being formed. Above all he wanted his book to be judged as "a work of high, serene, and impartial criticism."¹⁶

ANTHROPOLOGY AND NATIONAL POLITICS: MOLINA ENRÍQUEZ AS REYISTA IDEOLOGIST

Nevertheless, Molina Enríquez had no qualms about writing pro-Reyes articles in the Reyista press. In 1909 Molina Enríquez wrote articles for the Reyista paper, *México Nueva*, in open support of Reyes, putting claims of political neutrality to rest. Juan Sánchez Azcona was a founder of the Partido Democrático, the first Reyista party, and editor of *México Nueva*. Sánchez Azcona's desire to change Mexico through peaceful evolution coincided with Molina Enríquez's land-reform ideas.¹⁷ In the fall of 1909, *México Nueva* printed two companion pieces by Molina Enríquez dealing with Reyismo and land reform.

In the first, "What Reyismo Means," Molina Enríquez employed his racial analysis of Mexican society in discussing the politics of the presidential succession. He linked Reyismo to the desire of the indigenous and mestizo races—85 percent of the Mexican people—for improved living conditions. Molina Enríquez maintained that only the creoles went along with the continued vice-

presidency of Ramón Corral, and he called Corral a mere puppet of the Científicos,¹⁸ the intelligentsia of the Díaz regime. Only through strong personal power had Díaz averted class war over the vice-presidency issue, in Molina Enríquez's analysis. However, he warned that repression of the Reyista movement would only delay the question of change in Mexico and declared that conflict over presidential succession had raised "the fundamental question" for Mexico: whether Científico oligarchic rule would continue or whether the New Reforma would be achieved.¹⁹

Molina Enríquez included the fundamentals of his New Reforma in a companion political program, "Outline of the Necessities and Aspirations of the Country, and the Method to Satisfy Them," in the same issue of *México Nueva*. In this companion piece to his pro-Reyista article, Molina Enríquez outlined the reform program he had developed in *Los grandes problemas*. He called for laws and regulations on the state and federal level to implement a New Reforma for division of Mexico's haciendas, for economic growth and justice, and for national unity.²⁰

Molina Enríquez's political program also contained several xenophobically tinged proposals. These included proposals to outlaw foreign study by Mexican students, to prohibit teaching of English and French in primary and preparatory schools, and to end all governmental encouragement of foreign immigration.²¹ Additionally, Molina Enríquez called for the prohibition of all foreign imports that competed with Mexican manufactured goods, along with a check on foreign labor in Mexican industry.²²

These seemingly xenophobic proposals, coupled with his call in the political program for laws to encourage racial mixing to promote national unity, left Molina Enríquez — and by association, the Reyistas — open to charges of racism.

REYISMO VERSUS CORRALISMO: THE IDEOLOGICAL BATTLEGROUND

With the heating up of the national presidential elections, the Porfirian elite felt challenged enough by the Reyista opposition to fund publication of a paper, *La Reelección*, to support the reelection of Ramón Corral on the Díaz ticket. The Porfirian elite used *La Reelección* and the equally savage *El Debate* to criticize and defame the principle leaders and ideologues of the Reyista opposition, including Molina Enríquez, "as subversives bent on the destruction of public order."²³

Porfirista R. A. Esteva Ruíz wrote an article in *La Reelección* strongly criticizing Molina Enríquez's racial analysis of Mexican history.²⁴ After attacking Molina Enríquez's professional qualifications, Esteva launched an assault on Molina Enríquez's political program and the Reyistas. Esteva claimed that

Molina Enríquez founded his “flamboyant political program” on two false premises: (1) that race is a social factor, and (2) that common racial origins constitute the base of a population’s progress and movement toward democratic organization. To demonstrate the falseness of Molina Enríquez’s insistence on the importance of a mestizo-based Mexico, Esteva claimed that numerous racially diverse countries were well unified. Esteva finished his tirade against Molina Enríquez’s racial sociology by labeling his ideas and the politics of the “neo-Reyistas,” or Anti-Reeleccionistas, as backward.

Molina Enríquez responded to Esteva’s Corralista attack on his reform proposals with a November 1909 article in *México Nueva*. “The Formula for a Momentary Solution to the Present Political Conflict.” In the article he declared that “Reyismo has not died,” insisting the movement was based on principles and not the personality of Reyes, who by that time had been exiled on a military “mission” in Europe. Molina Enríquez also cited the “three great national problems” that the Corralista creoles refused to see: (1) differences of race, (2) the need for transformation of the land tenure system, and (3) Mexican nationalism.

In “The Formula for a Momentary Solution,” Molina Enríquez equated conservatism and personalism with the creole elite, and progressivism and principles with the indigenous and mestizo masses. Despite the oligarchy’s criticism against him for reducing “all historical and sociological national questions to simple questions of race,” he insisted it was a fact that the creoles were an oligarchy that desired “continuation of the present system” in Mexico through the “concession system of exemptions and favors” that benefited their business interests.²⁵

To create true national unity in Mexico, Molina Enríquez held that the conservative creoles needed to fall to the level of the indigenous and mestizo masses. Equalization of social levels would then end the rule of privileged classes over the working classes in Mexico, a system that was equal, in Molina Enríquez’s eyes, to the worst aspects of the serfdom system in Russia.²⁶ He argued that what the masses wanted was the application of the Constitution to end the personalist system of rewards and favors for the creole elite and foreign entrepreneur.

CALL FOR A TWO-PARTY POLITICAL SYSTEM AND FAILURE OF THE REYISTAS

Molina Enríquez’s “momentary solution” to the 1909 political conflict consisted of calling on the Díaz administration to authorize the formation of a two-party system to end the political fanaticism that personalist politics had been causing. He contended that rather than suppressing progressive opposition parties such as the Reyistas, Anti-Reeleccionistas, and Democrats, the

Díaz administration should have encouraged opposition parties as a check on the conservative Científicos, thus assuring Mexico's political equilibrium after Díaz was gone.

Molina Enríquez believed that the Díaz administration could encourage formation of a two-party system by allowing complete press freedom for all political parties and by mandating free elections of federal deputies. Perhaps influenced by the political system of the United States, Molina Enríquez believed the institution of a two-party system in Mexico would prevent future revolutions for political change,²⁷ though any political solution without a thorough land reform would only be a "temporary solution."

Needless to say, the Díaz administration did not take up Molina Enríquez's call for a two-party system, opting instead for the repression of the political opposition. The repression of the Reyista movement began at the state level with the jailing of Reyista supporters. After Reyes publicly supported Corral's vice-presidency campaign, and left on a military "mission" for Díaz in Europe, the Díaz government began a purge of Reyistas in Mexico City.²⁸ Reyes then made a public statement in support of Corral's vice-presidency and was sent on a military "mission" for Díaz in Europe.²⁹

The Reyistas initially had adopted a political strategy of not directly attacking Díaz and instead had focused their attack on his vice-president candidate, Ramón Corral, to prevent a crackdown on their movement. However, neither Luis Cabrera nor Molina Enríquez could hold back from attacking Díaz once the political struggle heated up in the summer and fall of 1909. Cabrera, one of the most important Reyista intellectuals, wrote that the "Reyistas, [as] political enemies of the Científicos, are therefore enemies of General Díaz."³⁰ And in "The Formula for a Momentary Solution," Molina Enríquez called Díaz "an immense patriot" but said he only represented the interests of creoles.

While the Reyistas had attempted to stay on Díaz's "good side" by lauding the benefits he had brought to Mexico and centering their fight on the vice-presidency question, his repression of the Reyistas, and later the Maderistas, led Mexico down the road to revolution, as Molina Enríquez had predicted.

REJECTION OF MADERISMO

The Maderistas "inherited the organization and brains" of the dead Reyista movement in the fall of 1909.³¹ The Reyista strategy of appeasing Díaz failed and left the Maderistas to take up the fight against the Díaz regime. However, Molina Enríquez did not take up the Maderista cause as did so many Reyistas after their reluctant leader was exiled. While Luis Cabrera entered into the Maderista movement, Molina Enríquez held back, as is evident from the "Formula for a Momentary Solution" article in which he declared that Reyismo had not died. Molina Enríquez's political ideology and personal antipathy

regarding Francisco Madero explains why he did not make the jump from Reyismo to Maderismo in the fall of 1910.

Molina Enríquez believed that Mexico required an authoritarian government to see land reform achieved due to the population's diversity and lack of development.³² From his private meetings with Reyes, Molina Enríquez saw in him the strong, military leader that he believed Mexico needed. Molina Enríquez was aware of Reyes's career as the pacifier of Mexico's northern territory, and of the progress Monterrey had experienced under Reyes's direction. In addition, Molina Enríquez believed Reyes understood the need for agrarian reform well and the need for industrial reform even better.³³ Because Molina Enríquez considered Reyes a mestizo, the general fit into Molina Enríquez's division of Mexican politics by racial categories. Molina Enríquez wrote in *La revolución agraria* that Mexico had never had more "a true statesman" for governor than General Reyes.³⁴

Molina Enríquez's praise for Reyes was in marked contrast to his characterization of Francisco Madero. Molina Enríquez had rejected Madero's political solution to Mexico's problems as early as 1903. Molina Enríquez related later how he had met with Madero in his home for political discussions, but they could not reach any "accord." He explained that this disagreement stemmed from his insistence "on the necessity for profound reforms" and Madero's answer that if the peaceful succession of presidents were secured in Mexico, "all the problems would resolve themselves."³⁵

According to Molina Enríquez's son Napoleón, Molina Enríquez also met repeatedly with Madero in 1909, and failed to reach any accord on the importance of land reform for central Mexico. Napoleón wrote of how he and his father regularly met Madero when walking to a streetcar stop from their home in the Colonia Juárez of Mexico City. Molina Enríquez and Madero "passionately discussed various aspects of the agrarian problem," but Madero would only concede about the abuses of the terrenos baldíos laws and the need to restore the alienated lands of the Indians.³⁶

Napoleón maintained that Madero's preference for large-scale agricultural enterprises and lukewarmness for land reform led Molina Enríquez to reject him and his Anti-Reeleccionista Party as nonrevolutionary. Napoleón reported that Madero appeared vague and confused when discussing the agrarian problem with his father. Although Madero appeared to agree with the importance of promoting ownership of small properties in central Mexico, he also seemed to lean towards large agro-industrial complexes as a solution to agricultural modernization in Mexico.³⁷

Besides the profound ideological differences between Madero and Molina Enríquez, Madero also did not fit Molina Enríquez's vision of the strong political leader needed for the mestizo majority of Mexico. He saw Madero as a weak man, controlled by his father, grandfather, and uncle Ernesto, who represented the aspirations of the creole hacendado class to resurrect themselves

politically using their old subterfuge — calling for free elections that they would control.³⁸ Molina Enríquez attributed Madero's adherence to nineteenth-century Liberal ideology as due to his faulty education.³⁹ In fact, Molina Enríquez characterized Madero's overthrow of the Díaz regime as a creole-controlled counter-revolution.⁴⁰

RACE FOR THE GOVERNORSHIP: THE FAILURE OF REFORMISM POLITICS

Molina Enríquez entered politics in the state of Mexico in 1910 by being elected state deputy for the district of Otumba, which had a population of 36,000 in 1902.⁴¹ The elections for state deputies were made under a new electoral law designed to demonstrate the "progressive and open" nature of the Porfirista governor of the state of Mexico, General Fernando González. The elections were indirect and excluded the majority of the people of the state due to a literacy requirement. The result was "business as usual," with the election to the state legislature of the old Porfirista elite: the owners of the haciendas, mines, and industries of the state. In fact, Molina Enríquez's election as a reformer appeared to be an exception to this pattern.⁴²

Despite the fact that Molina Enríquez rejected Madero's political revolution for democracy, Madero's triumph against Díaz created a political opening in the spring of 1911 — an opening Molina Enríquez seized on to run for governor of the state of Mexico. On May 25, 1911, the interim governor of the state of Mexico decreed that elections would be held for the governorship. Molina Enríquez stepped into the heated politics of the state, running for governor against the Maderista candidate and a popular Liberal candidate.⁴³

Molina Enríquez's land-reform platform marked him as the most radical candidate in the race. He ran on an anti-hacienda, populist ticket based on the reform proposals contained in *Los grandes problemas*. In his political platform, the "Definite Program of Señor Lic. Don Andrés Molina Enríquez for Governor of the Free and Sovereign State of Mexico," Molina proposed a comprehensive reform program for the state. He included political, judicial, labor, tax, transport, and agrarian reforms in favor of the poor masses.⁴⁴ The agrarian-reform proposals reflected the concerns he had developed while working in rural Mexico in a legal capacity and had written about in the book.

Division of unproductive hacienda lands took a prominent place in the platform proposals. Molina Enríquez proposed that owners of large properties with unused lands be legally obligated to divide and sell the lands in lots valued at less than five thousand pesos. To enable poor farmers to acquire these lots, Molina Enríquez proposed selling the lands through state contracts or bonds. This approach to hacienda land division was a toned-down version of his call for division of all haciendas at inheritance. It was probably an attempt

to appear less radical in the still conservative political climate of post-Díaz Toluca.

Molina Enríquez's platform singled out the huge hacienda of La Gavia for land division. He had already singled it out in *Los grandes problemas* as one of the worst examples of hacienda tax evasion in the state of Mexico. La Gavia's huge size — some 648 square kilometers — also marked it out on Molina Enríquez's list as the most conspicuous symbol of "rural feudalism" present in the state; La Gavia occupied 44 percent of the Toluca district's territory. Although in absolute terms it ranked among the most productive haciendas in the state, La Gavia produced less maize per hectare than haciendas less than 3 percent of its size.⁴⁵ To undo La Gavia's monopoly of land, Molina Enríquez proposed establishing a new center of population to be the principal town of a new district created from La Gavia's divided territory.

La Gavia's huge size was legendary and represented for Molina Enríquez all that he fought against in rural Mexico. His grandson, Luis Molina Enríquez, notes how legend had it that a man on horseback would take twelve days to ride through La Gavia's territory, beginning in Sultepec and ending on the Pacific coast. According to family lore, Molina Enríquez vowed to hold off dying until the British Empire fell and the La Gavia hacienda was divided. It is said that the owner of La Gavia periodically inquired of the Enríquez clan over the state of Molina Enríquez's health.⁴⁶ His concern was warranted because Molina Enríquez did indeed live to see both La Gavia divided and the beginning of the fall of the British Empire in the post-Revolutionary era.

In *Los grandes problemas*, Molina Enríquez cited hacendado tax evasion as one of the numerous artificial supports to which the hacienda owed its existence to.⁴⁷ In keeping with this concern about tax evasion as well as the exploitation of hacienda workers, Molina Enríquez produced a populist broadsheet in June of 1911 calling for "two laws of the people" to end both these practices. He declared that he would implement these laws if elected governor.⁴⁸ His first proposed law would have instituted a statewide tax reevaluation of all real estate, both urban and rural; it represented an attempt to end what he considered widespread tax evasion.

The second proposed law called for an end to labor contracts over a week in duration and signaled an attempt to appeal to the workers of the state of Mexico. (Labor contracts had been used to bind indebted agricultural workers to haciendas.) His proposed labor contract law also prohibited "company stores" and payment in scrip. He considered debt peonage, founded upon the labor-contract system, among the worst features of the rural feudal system of the Mexican hacienda. Clearly, in calling for an end to the debt-peonage system, Molina Enríquez hoped to obtain peasant support for his gubernatorial race.

Defense of indigenous communities' rights to legal status was another important plank in Molina Enríquez's platform and foreshadowed controversies over this issue in the immediate post-Revolutionary land-reform program. His

platform proposed to recognize all indigenous groups, regardless of the name given them (*rancherías, pueblos*) as legal entities with the right to live by their traditions and customs. By calling for legal status for all indigenous communities, Molina Enríquez hoped to end the alienation of indigenous lands under Ley Lerdo, the law of the mid-nineteenth century, and terrenos baldíos, the law of the Porfirian era. As will be seen later, the question of the legal political status of communities petitioning for ejido lands would loom large in the official land-reform program instituted after the end of the armed phase of the Revolution.

The conservative elite of the state capital of Toluca rejected Molina Enríquez's agrarian-based political platform as too extreme—even crazy.⁴⁹ The Toluca elite, made up of employers and large landowners, had the most to lose from implementation of the program. The Toluca elite's rejection of Molina Enríquez's agrarian politics gives an indication of the obstacles he faced in trying to convince the Porfirian elite of the need for land reform in Mexico. Without the political mobilization of the masses, his populist political platform could not constitute a basis upon which to win the race for governor.

At the end of August of 1911, the Democratic Club of Jilotepec had announced the withdrawal of its candidate, Andrés Molina Enríquez, from the governor's race. The organization attributed the withdrawal to "reasons until today ignored." The Democratic Club shifted its allegiance to the candidacy of Alberto García and circulated a manifesto to all Molinista clubs in the state regarding the shift.⁵⁰ In fact, as will be related in detail in the following chapter, the day before the Democratic Club's announcement, Molina Enríquez—with his proclamation of the Plan de Texcoco—had led an abortive agrarian uprising against the central government and was on the run from federal authorities.

The withdrawal of Molina Enríquez was of little importance to the governor's race. The political revolution Madero had unleashed in the spring of 1911 did not change the basis of power in Toluca. The Maderistas, the faction that led the successful battle against Díaz, predictably won. Already sitting in federal prison due to his leadership in the failed Plan de Texcoco agrarian revolution, Molina Enríquez garnered a mere 285 votes of 136,737 total votes in the gubernatorial election.⁵¹ He would have to wait until the dust of a social revolution settled to reenter state politics and implement his land-reform program.

If Molina Enríquez had experienced a degree of ridicule from the Toluca elite over his reform platform for the governorship of the state of Mexico, it paled in comparison to the belittlement the governing elite in Mexico City would heap on him for attempting to instigate an agrarian revolution.

CHAPTER 4

The Plan de Texcoco and its Aftermath 1911–1912

Having tried the path of populist politics in his race for governor of the state of Mexico, and having found the Porfirian elitist system intact after Madero's revolution, Molina Enríquez turned to mass-based, grassroots revolution as the means to see land reform implemented in Mexico. Coming on the heels of his conventional political failures, Molina Enríquez's effort to foment an agrarian revolution appears to be an act of desperation. However, by examining the political context of the summer of 1911, Molina Enríquez's plan for a grassroots agrarian revolution can be seen as a calculated political risk rather than as an impulsive, reckless act. After the Toluca elite's rejection, and having experienced the failure of the reformist's path, Molina Enríquez took up the banner of revolution in an attempt to rally Mexico's masses behind his land-reform program. It would take a seven-year, bloody revolution to introduce mass politics into Mexican society.

Francisco León de la Barra, Díaz's secretary of foreign relations, came in as interim president until national elections could be held under the provisions of the Treaty of Ciudad Juárez, which ended the Revolution against Díaz. Many revolutionaries considered that Francisco Madero had capitulated to the Porfiristas with the negotiated peace treaty, even though Díaz and his vice-president had been forced to resign as part of the treaty. Among the Revolutionary groups that were displeased with Madero's actions were the Maderistas in Puebla who were battling the federal army; the Zapatistas, peasant revolutionaries in Morelos, who were angered at Madero's insistence that they disarm;

and the Vazquistas, or followers of Emilio Vázquez Gómez, who believed Madero had "sold out" the Revolution at Ciudad Juárez. Molina Enríquez attempted to direct this discontent with the first formal declaration of agrarian revolt of the Mexican Revolution in August 1911.

THE PLAN DE TEXCOCO'S PROGRAM: MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND LAND REFORM

Molina Enríquez proclaimed himself the Revolutionary leader of Mexico in the Plan de Texcoco on August 23, 1911.¹ In the Plan, he distilled his twenty years of research into the agrarian problem in Mexico into a straightforward formula in order to recruit grassroots support for the Texcoco revolt. The Plan promised to end onerous labor contracts, rid rural pueblos of the hated *jefes políticos*, and declare all *rancherías* as legal entities. All these provisions represented an attempt to appeal to Mexico's rural masses. With the Plan, Molina Enríquez lashed out at Francisco Madero's lack of action on land reform—a promise of Madero's Plan de San Luis Potosí, which had initiated the revolt against Díaz and had promised the return of lands unjustly seized from the Mexican peasantry.

The Plan de Texcoco's first clause repudiated the regime of interim President Francisco León de la Barra, as well as all state and territorial governments, including the Federal District. The first clause went on to suspend the Constitution and to invest all executive, legislative, and judicial powers in Molina Enríquez, as leader of the movement, until a Revolutionary tribunal could be formed to effect the reforms contained in the plan.

In the third clause of the Plan, Molina Enríquez declared that he would surrender power when a Revolutionary tribunal was formed to rule Mexico until the reforms could be implemented. The proposed Revolutionary tribunal included Emilio Vázquez Gómez, León de la Barra's dismissed secretary of the interior; Manuel Bonilla, secretary of communications in the León de la Barra cabinet; Pascal Orozco, the rebel leader of northern Mexico who had pulled a gun on Madero in a conflict over the taking of Ciudad Juárez;² Emiliano Zapata, the peasant leader of the Morelos agraristas; General Camerino Mendoza, a rebel leader in control of the region of the Puebla/Veracruz border; Rafael Tapia, a saddler and Revolutionary leader in the Orizaba region; and Paulino Martínez, a journalist from the State of Mexico. Molina Enríquez's selection of these men for the Revolutionary tribunal represented an attempt to appeal to disgruntled revolutionaries who had supported and fought for Madero's revolution, yet felt Madero had compromised too much with the Porfirian forces in the Treaty of Ciudad Juárez.

The five reforms Molina Enríquez called for in the Plan de Texcoco were a distillation of the reform proposals he had developed in *Los grandes problemas*,

and they were geared toward awakening popular support for the Texcoco revolt. The first reform in the Plan called for the "partial expropriation" of all haciendas larger than 2,000 hectares in size, with the right of the public to "denounce" haciendas in this category. The "denouncer" would be given the right to choose the parcel of land he desired. The second reform of the Plan called for the free import and export of corn or wheat to or from Mexico. The third reform accorded legal status to all *rancherías*, *pueblos*, and tribes of the country until their division into individually controlled land parcels. The plan's fourth reform prohibited all outside political bosses, the notorious *jefes políticos*, from exercising power over local communities. The fifth and final reform mandated the suppression of debt peonage through loans and long-term labor contracts.³ Most of these reforms represented an attempt to appeal to central Mexico's rural masses.

Molina Enríquez was careful to avoid antagonizing foreign opinion over the reforms proposed in the Plan de Texcoco. He took responsibility for "all the acts of the nation" in relation to foreign policy. The Plan mandated the "safeguarding of lives and interests of foreigners within" Mexico. Violators of this clause would be punished with "military justice."

The seriousness with which Molina Enríquez took the Plan de Texcoco and the agrarian revolution it proclaimed is revealed in clause four of the Plan that stipulated how the leadership of the movement would be passed on in the event of the death of Molina Enríquez or succeeding leaders. He called for strict military control of the movement at the state level, with dictatorial controls to be extended to the Revolutionary tribunal. The Plan de Texcoco was a call for the military takeover of the Mexican government.

THE PLAN'S MILITARY STRATEGY

Reports from the Mexico City newspaper, *El Imparcial*, provide an overview of the military strategy planned by the rebels backing the Plan de Texcoco. On August 25, *El Imparcial* reported that the rebels had planned to blow up the military barracks of the town of Texcoco's cavalry corps and then open the town jail. The rebels then planned to head to nearby haciendas to gather up armed bands to provoke the agrarian revolt. On the following day, *El Imparcial* reported that the Plan likely included the bombing of the Texcoco Municipal Palace, the sacking of the town treasury, and the taking of forced loans from local businessmen. The prisoners freed from the Texcoco jail were to be armed with weapons taken from the military barracks to increase the army of "the future dictator," Andrés Molina Enríquez.⁴

According to *El Imparcial*, Molina Enríquez had recruited important state of Mexico and Texcoco town officials into his Revolutionary movement and had supporters moving toward Texcoco to join in the revolt. *El Imparcial*

implicated the jefe político of Texcoco, a "Señor Galicia," and his brother, the second-in-command of the town jail, in the Plan. People in Texcoco affirmed that nightly clandestine meetings were held in the house of the jefe político Galicia and reported the arrival of many strangers in Texcoco "without very defined intentions." (Most of these strangers left town by August 26 once the Plan failed.) In addition to the Galicia brothers, *El Imparcial* implicated the general secretary of the government (the second-in-command of the state of Mexico), Munguía Santoye, and the "well-known" journalist, Paulino Martínez, in the Plan de Texcoco plot. *El Imparcial* also reported the arrest of twenty-eight men who had tried to reach Texcoco by train to join in the rebel movement.⁵

In spite of the planning and support behind the Plan de Texcoco, the Plan failed before it started, most likely due to an informer, and Molina Enríquez fled Texcoco for Puebla. *El Imparcial* reported that Molina Enríquez was arrested in Puebla on August 25, where he was lodged in the Hotel México, engaged in producing "active rebel propaganda." *El Imparcial* reported that others associated with the Plan de Texcoco had also been arrested on August 25.⁶ The Plan de Texcoco had been nipped in the bud before it ever had a chance of flowering into revolution.

THE PLAN'S CONTEXT: LOCAL AND NATIONAL UNREST THROUGHOUT THE SUMMER OF 1911

Molina Enríquez's flight from Texcoco to Puebla made good sense in the context of the conflict in Puebla between the revolutionaries and the federal army. On July 12, 1911, federal troops had opened up with machine guns on a Maderista rally in support of an arrested Revolutionary leader. More than 200 Maderistas were reported killed.⁷ The Maderistas were reportedly in Puebla to welcome Madero, who was due into town on July 13. When Madero arrived after the massacre, he publicly praised Col. Aureliano Blanquet, who had ordered the firing on the Maderistas. Madero then condemned the revolutionaries.⁸ He believed that all of the Revolutionary bands that had arisen in his name should have disarmed and participated peacefully in the democratic political process that he was attempting to create in Mexico. However, in a private telegram to interim President León de la Barra, Madero called for the "retirement" of Colonel Blanquet, whom he described as "severely hated."⁹

After the failure of the Texcoco revolt, Molina Enríquez apparently hoped to rally the discontented rebels of Puebla behind the Plan when he fled there. However, Puebla was not the only region in Mexico experiencing Revolutionary unrest in the summer of 1911. According to the British ambassador to Mexico at the time, Thomas Beaumont Hohler, the country was in a state of confusion and near anarchy. Strikes were occurring in Veracruz and Orizaba,

and "bandits" who called themselves Maderistas were seizing power in Oaxaca, Michoacán, and Uruapan. The British ambassador reported that Madero was losing influence and was facing a potential challenger in General Reyes, recently returned from his military mission in France. However, the ambassador concluded that Madero still had the support of the lower classes and would win the popular vote for the presidency unless "other incidents like that of Puebla occur to shake still further public confidence in him."¹⁰

In addition to attempting to foment revolt in the Puebla region, Molina Enríquez also attempted to rally to his Plan Mexico City revolutionaries who were upset at the Porfirista control of the federal government. The Plan directly repudiated the interim presidency of León de la Barra, yet the true target of the Plan was Madero and his apparent compromise with the old Porfirian elite. Madero, after all, had compromised with the Díaz government in the peace treaty of Ciudad Juárez and had allowed the presidency to be passed to León de la Barra, Díaz's secretary of foreign relations, for an interim period prior to national elections. When León de la Barra began packing his cabinet with Porfiristas, many revolutionaries became very unsettled. However, Madero was satisfied with León de la Barra's selections.¹¹ Molina Enríquez considered the León de la Barra interim presidency as a counter-Revolutionary government; its existence after a triumphant revolution against its principles legitimized the cause of rebels who fought to defeat it.¹²

The issue of Madero's disbanding the rebel army aroused great discontent among many revolutionaries. Molina Enríquez included. *El Imparcial* reported that Molina Enríquez had accused Madero of being a new Ignacio Comonfort, the president whose vacillations helped bring on the War of the Reforma in 1857. Madero considered the demobilizing of the rebel army as essential for the pacification of Mexico.¹³ In Molina Enríquez's opinion, Madero's action "destroyed the necessary instrument for imposing the reforms" he had promised.¹⁴ Molina Enríquez saw Madero's call for demobilization of the rebel army as a means to return Mexico to pre-Revolutionary conditions.

In an article published in *El Imparcial*, Molina Enríquez accused Madero of being a "rich creole" from a "truly feudal family," who worked to destroy the "forces of the people." He wrote that Madero sought to restore the old regime in Mexico, including a consolidation of the "rural feudalism" of the Mexican hacienda, through his plan of demobilization. Molina Enríquez wrote that if Madero had been a mestizo, and hence a true Revolutionary, he would have maintained the Revolutionary army throughout the Republic; put Revolutionary generals in charge of the states; created a regular Revolutionary army; and begun a program of popular reforms to undo the Porfirian system.¹⁵

In early August of 1911, President León de la Barra dismissed Emilio Vázquez Gómez as secretary of the interior; Vázquez Gómez had called publicly for León de la Barra to step down immediately in favor of Madero after

the administration had attempted to disarm the Zapatistas.¹⁶ Madero's support for the dismissal of Vázquez Gómez became the "final straw" for many dissident revolutionaries. For Molina Enríquez, it affirmed his belief that Madero, as a symbol of the creole forces, represented the forces of the counter-Revolution in Mexico.¹⁷

THE VAZQUISTA THREAT: A SPLIT IN THE REVOLUTIONARY RANKS IN JULY

After Vázquez Gómez's dismissal from the Ministry of Interior post, Molina Enríquez attempted to use Vázquez Gómez's reputation as a true Revolutionary to rally disgruntled Maderistas around the Plan de Texcoco. Emilio Vázquez Gómez's brother, Francisco, had been Madero's vice-presidential running mate for the aborted 1910 elections. Molina Enríquez credited Emilio with salvaging some modicum of honor for the revolutionaries at the Treaty of Ciudad Juárez by insisting on the immediate retirement of Díaz and the exclusion of Treasury Secretary Limantour from the presidency; according to Molina Enríquez, Madero did not press for any of these demands.¹⁸ Molina Enríquez maintained that Vázquez Gómez's dismissal resulted from his valiant attempt to preserve the Revolutionary army in order to preserve Madero's revolution.¹⁹ Upon his dismissal, Vázquez Gómez was quoted in Mexico City papers as saying he had simply tried to support the views of the revolution against "the reactionary policy of the old regime" present in León de la Barra's cabinet.²⁰

President León de la Barra's dismissal of Vázquez Gómez with Madero's approval intensified discontent among dissident revolutionaries. As the British ambassador reported, León de la Barra's changes in his cabinet had been "arousing strong opposition among the extremists of the Revolutionary party," though the "really serious question was presented in the removal of Señor Vázquez Gómez from the post of minister of the interior." The ambassador reported that after the dismissal, armed revolutionaries went to Chapultepec Castle to support Vázquez Gómez before the president. Furthermore the ambassador reported to London that on August 3, 1911, Mexico City's morning papers quoted Madero in support of the actions of President León de la Barra and refuting charges that León de la Barra was a reactionary.²¹

Supporters of Vázquez Gómez, Vazquistas, visited Madero at his summer residence at Tehuacán, protesting the dismissal of Emilio Vázquez Gómez with a petition signed by 102 angry revolutionaries. Madero reportedly dismissed the Vazquistas as last-minute revolutionaries who "profaned the sacred cause by their disrespect for the legal president and established authority."²² The British ambassador reported the potential for a Vazquista insurrection against the León de la Barra government in mid-August of 1911.

The León de la Barra government reacted to the Vazquista threat with repression. The principal leader in charge of marching some 200 soldiers to

Chapultepec Castle in protest over the dismissal of Vázquez Gómez was arrested for sedition.²³ And the signatories of the petition presented to Madero were either arrested or denied signing or having knowledge of the petition. The León de la Barra government also posted a cavalry patrol at the Ministry of the Interior and had troops ready to move from their barracks to deal with any problems.²⁴

Molina Enríquez's personal relationship with Emilio Vázquez Gómez helps explain why Molina Enríquez seized on the controversy surrounding his friend's dismissal, attempting to gain support for the Plan de Texcoco revolution by placing Vázquez Gómez first on the list of the Plan's proposed Revolutionary tribunal. Molina Enríquez's son, Napoleón, asserts that his father met regularly with Vázquez Gómez during July 1911 for morning walks to discuss the agrarian question. Napoleón believes these meetings led directly to the proclamation of the Plan de Texcoco in the following month.²⁵ In fact, the families of Molina Enríquez and Vázquez Gómez became very close, as the two daughters of Vázquez Gómez married Molina Enríquez's two sons.²⁶ Emilio's later denial of involvement after the failure of the Plan de Texcoco plot did not appear to harm the relationship between the two families.

Molina Enríquez later explained how Vázquez Gómez got "cold feet" when Molina Enríquez attempted to convince him to take a "new Revolutionary action" to enforce social reforms on the Maderista revolution. Molina Enríquez reported that he originally wrote the Plan de Texcoco for Vázquez Gómez after his dismissal from the cabinet post and that Vázquez Gómez became "the center of attraction for all discontented revolutionaries." However, Molina Enríquez found that Vázquez Gómez feared taking the Revolutionary path, and therefore Molina Enríquez resolved to take up provisional leadership of the Texcoco revolt himself.²⁷

MADERO'S RESPONSE TO THE VAZQUISTA CHALLENGE

Madero did not need news of another revolution such as the Texcoco revolt to make him aware of the serious challenges he faced from the left. In telegrams to President León de la Barra in July, Madero urged the replacement of Vázquez Gómez as minister of the interior with Luis Cabrera, a partisan of Molina Enríquez's land-reform proposals. He also suggested that León de la Barra first appoint a trustworthy man as inspector general of the Rural Police before dismissing Vázquez Gómez as a precaution against potential revolts.²⁸ The next day Madero sent a telegram to Vázquez Gómez instructing him to retire as soon as Sub-Secretary Cabrera was ready to take over and advising him to leave Mexico or renounce his ministry to prevent turmoil over his dismissal.²⁹

Madero saw in Cabrera a man who would appeal to all Revolutionary factions. Thus, he envisioned that Cabrera's appointment as minister of the interior would heal the divisions in the Revolutionary ranks caused by the dismissal of

Vázquez Gómez. In another telegram to León de la Barra near the end of July, Madero noted Cabrera's great prestige throughout Mexico among the revolutionaries and explained the importance of "justly and rationally" satisfying public opinion in the new open political atmosphere of post-Díaz Mexico.³⁰

Madero's attempt to convince León de la Barra to appoint Cabrera as minister of the interior appears to have fallen on deaf ears, as León de la Barra appointed Alberto García Granados in his place. In Molina Enríquez's opinion, García Granados embodied the worst traits of the creole hacendado class.³¹ León de la Barra's appointment of García Granados only confirmed for Molina Enríquez the reactionary nature of the León de la Barra regime. According to Molina Enríquez, Madero's compliance with León de la Barra's reactionary appointments and policies were repaid with plots against his life by Granados and León de la Barra himself.³²

Had Madero succeeded in obtaining the appointment of Cabrera to the cabinet post, it might have affected the course of the Mexican Revolution by preventing a further falling out among the Revolutionary ranks. Molina Enríquez maintained that if Cabrera had obtained the post of minister of the interior, the León de la Barra government might not have attempted to exterminate the Zapatistas as it did with García Granados at the helm.³³ And, as Madero reasoned, Cabrera's appointment would have probably gone a long way toward quelling the discontent among the left wing of the Maderista movement over Vázquez Gómez's dismissal.

Cabrera became an outspoken advocate for land reform in the 1911 presidential campaign, thus keeping Molina Enríquez's land-reform ideology alive in the political arena, while Molina Enríquez languished in federal prison after the failure of the Plan de Texcoco. At the end of August during the Progressive Constitutional Party's convention (Madero's new title for his party), Cabrera participated in a debate over the Maderista movement's agrarian plank in its 1911 presidential platform. Cabrera demanded that the Maderista party eliminate a contradiction in the platform, with one article favoring small farmers and another saying large farming interests would be favored. A delegate to the convention, Enrique Bordes Manguel, rose to explain the lack of any contradiction in the agrarian plank of the platform because large farms aided the development of small farms through creation of irrigation works and "other things" small farms could use. Later Cabrera proposed eliminating all taxes on properties worth less than five hundred pesos as an amendment to the convention's proposal to equalize all tax rates on property. The measure to equalize taxes was passed without Cabrera's amendment.³⁴

Cabrera caused an uproar at the Maderista convention when he spoke in favor of the vice-presidential candidate, Francisco Vázquez Gómez. Cabrera insisted that the chairman of the Progressive Constitutional Party had sent out telegrams to delegates instructing them to vote for Pino Suarez for vice-president. One of the convention's delegates, a Mr. Maldonado, accused Cabrera

of bad faith, purporting that Cabrera was only at the convention to cause disorder. Maldonado's accusations against Cabrera met with cries of yes and no, adding to the uproar that Cabrera's proposals caused at the convention.³⁵

Newspaper articles written by Cabrera in the summer of 1911 reflect the closeness in thought of Cabrera and Molina Enríquez. In the articles, Cabrera insisted that the León de la Barra government needed to be purged of all its Porfirian functionaries, and he called for ending the discharging of the Revolutionary armies.³⁶ In one of the most famous articles, "The Revolution is the Revolution," written to launch a new political party, the Popular Evolutionist Party, in which Molina Enríquez participated, Cabrera justified the imposition of a military government to force social reforms in Mexico.³⁷

As seen above, Molina Enríquez had attempted the imposition of a military government in the Plan de Texcoco revolt. Like Molina Enríquez, Cabrera saw in the León de la Barra government the continuation of the old regime in Mexico; both were convinced that only an interim, Revolutionary military government could impose the social reforms Mexico required.³⁸

If Madero had succeeded in his attempt to replace Vázquez Gómez with Cabrera as minister of the interior, Molina Enríquez would not have attempted to instigate an agrarian revolution with the Plan de Texcoco. Cabrera embraced Molina Enríquez's land-reform ideas and strove to see them realized during the armed phase of the Revolution. Molina Enríquez—and likely other disgruntled revolutionaries also—would have been satisfied with a Cabrera appointment to the León de la Barra cabinet. It does seem remarkable in retrospect that Madero attempted to impose Cabrera on León de la Barra, given the intensity with which Cabrera had attacked the León de la Barra government as the continuation of the old regime in Mexico.

REACTION TO THE PLAN DE TEXCOCO

While the León de la Barra cabinet reportedly had a good chuckle over Molina Enríquez's Texcoco revolt, the new minister of the interior, Alberto García Granados, did send out officers to arrest him. Molina Enríquez took the blame for the Plan de Texcoco revolt, and despite the León de la Barra administration's amusement, it sentenced him in the fall of 1911 to a year in prison for the attempt.³⁹ Thus, the administration's public pronouncements did not correspond with the actions it took against Molina Enríquez and other supporters of the failed revolt.

Both León de la Barra officials and Mexico City papers treated Molina Enríquez with ridicule and sarcasm after the aborted Texcoco revolt.⁴⁰ Most striking was the effort of Vázquez Gómez and others named as members of the Revolutionary tribunal in the Plan de Texcoco to distance themselves from any association with the failed revolt.⁴¹ Vázquez Gómez denied any knowledge of

Molina Enríquez's call for agrarian revolution and dismissed it as "laughable." Vázquez Gómez was quoted as saying Molina Enríquez should beg for a pardon from the government for the attempt at revolution. Vázquez Gómez also expressed his disdain for the press for giving space to the failed Plan de Texcoco revolt because it might be given credibility in foreign countries when it really had "no importance of any kind."⁴² Vázquez Gómez reportedly feared that news of the abortive revolution could bring down Mexican credit in foreign countries.⁴³

Vázquez Gómez's public reaction to the failed Plan de Texcoco was mirrored by other erstwhile supporters of Molina Enríquez's agrarian revolution within León de la Barra's cabinet, who laughed off Molina Enríquez's attempt at revolution in Mexico City's papers. Minister of Communications Manuel Bonilla, whom Molina Enríquez had also named as a member of the Revolutionary tribunal, was quoted as saying he considered the Texcoco revolt a "source of amusement" and understood that brain specialists would be examining Molina Enríquez because it was thought his mind must be badly affected.⁴⁴ Minister of Public Instruction Dr. Francisco Vázquez Gómez, brother of Emilio, was reported as stating that the rumor of a "counter-Revolution" was injurious but laughable. Dr. Francisco Vázquez Gómez claimed that León de la Barra cabinet members had joked about the Plan de Texcoco during a meeting and had concluded that neither Zapata nor Orozco were involved in the plot, despite having been named as leaders.⁴⁵

After arresting Molina Enríquez, the new minister of the interior, García Granados, believed it would be easy to get the names of others in the conspiracy. The implication seems to be that he believed Molina Enríquez would inform on his followers, and the matter could be "nipped in the bud." Secret police reportedly worked on the Texcoco case,⁴⁶ and *El Imparcial* reported that the Interior Ministry sent various agents by car to arrest the main leaders of the revolt.⁴⁷ The actions of the León de la Barra government against the Texcoco conspiracy belie the ministers' public pronouncements of amusement. Although the administration declared the Texcoco revolt unimportant, the secretary of the interior considered it serious enough to warrant sending out officers to track down and arrest the principal leaders; the paper *El Tiempo* noted this inconsistency.⁴⁸ The questioning of Molina Enríquez's sanity appears to have been an attempt to discredit "a well-known figure in intellectual and political circles"⁴⁹ in Mexico City, to prevent public speculation over why Molina Enríquez would choose revolt as the only means left to achieve land reform in Mexico.

Additional evidence for the seriousness with which Mexican governmental officials took the Texcoco revolt can be seen in the coded telegrams sent from the new jefe político of Texcoco, H. O. Carrasco, to the general secretary of the government of the state of Mexico on August 23, 1911. Underneath a coded telegram of 96 units, the Texcoco jefe político reported that police investiga-

tions since eleven o'clock that morning had not produced any results. It appeared that calm had been restored to Texcoco already on August 24.⁵⁰

Molina Enríquez later claimed to have launched the Plan de Texcoco as *propaganda for land reform, realizing at the time that the Texcoco revolt would likely fail*. He took the fact that he captured the attention of high governmental officials as an indication of some success. He explained how newspaper and magazine articles were quickly forgotten in Mexico and books were hardly read. Therefore, in lieu of influencing public opinion with his numerous newspaper articles or *Los grandes problemas*, he had proclaimed a Revolutionary plan, as such plans are "read by the entire world."⁵¹

In fact, as a propaganda tool, the Plan de Texcoco appears to have succeeded, judging by the headlines it made. On August 25 and 26, Mexico City papers gave front-page coverage to the Texcoco revolt and explained Molina Enríquez's agrarian program detailed in the Plan. *El Imparcial* reported that Molina Enríquez and his Plan had "fixed the attention of the public."⁵² and both *El Imparcial* and *The Mexican Herald* explained the program for land reform encapsulated in the Plan de Texcoco.

Despite this coverage, however, the stories also contained a good deal of sarcasm and harsh criticism for Molina Enríquez and his plan. Editorials in the two papers flatly rejected revolution as a path to change in Mexico.⁵³ *El Tiempo*, which had published a serial of Molina Enríquez's *Los grandes problemas*, questioned Molina Enríquez's sanity in an editorial and decried the sensationalist reporting of the Texcoco revolt in *El Imparcial* and other Mexico City papers.⁵⁴ *El Tiempo* singled out *El Imparcial* as especially guilty of exaggerating the importance of the Texcoco revolt with its bold title for the Texcoco story, "Another Revolution." *El Tiempo* maintained that *El Imparcial* always had alarmist stories, trying to break the confidence of the social classes and convince its readers and foreigners that Mexicans were living in anarchy. *El Tiempo* chided *El Imparcial* for misusing the freedom of expression ushered in with the Maderista revolution.⁵⁵

El Imparcial responded to *El Tiempo*'s attack on its supposed sensationalism of the Texcoco story with a editorial disclaiming any support for Molina Enríquez's revolt and portraying the Texcoco revolt as the direct heir of Madero's revolution to power in Mexico.⁵⁶ *El Imparcial* attempted to show Madero as a hypocrite by quoting passages in Madero's book, *Sucesión Presidencial*, in which Madero railed against men who came to power through revolutions. The newspaper labeled the Texcoco revolt as the "logical" outcome of Madero's Revolutionary rise to power. It claimed that Madero had used agrarian promises to foment mass support for his revolution and that the Plan de Texcoco simply took Madero's promise of the return of lands unjustly seized during the Porfirian era a step further by decreeing the expropriation of all haciendas larger than 2,000 hectares. *El Imparcial* asserted that the Revolutionary process Madero had unleashed would have its final outcome in the complete

communist takeover of Mexico, with “watches, wives, and children” subject to expropriation according to the logic of the revolutionaries. The paper characterized the Plan de Texcoco as simply representing the next step toward this final tragedy for Mexico.⁵⁷

Though Molina Enríquez found no support in Mexico City’s papers, the coverage the Plan de Texcoco received aided in disseminating his land-reform proposals to the Mexican public. In this sense the Texcoco revolt was a success. However, Molina Enríquez’s later assertion that the Plan de Texcoco’s principal task was to create propaganda for land reform can be questioned because the planning for the revolt makes it appear as a serious attempt at revolution.

Evidencing the Plan’s impact on public opinion, Molina Enríquez explained how a good friend of his, Señorita Dolores Jiménez y Muro, sent numerous copies of the Plan de Texcoco “to various military chiefs residing in remote parts of the country” to aid Molina Enríquez’s agrarian cause. However, Molina Enríquez found the coverage that *El Imparcial* gave to his ideas to be the most important publicity that the Plan de Texcoco received.⁵⁸

Molina Enríquez compared his position after the failure of the Plan de Texcoco to that of the Liberal hero of the War of the Reforma, Santos Degollado. Molina Enríquez maintained that Degollado’s tenacious guerrilla campaign in central Mexico had prevented the consolidation of a strong conservative government; thus, Degollado’s defeats paved the way for Juárez’s final victory. Likewise, Molina Enríquez felt that his failures in instigating land reform in Mexico had succeeded as propaganda devices, helping to pave the way for a successful land reform in Mexico.⁵⁹

AFTERMATH OF THE TEXCOCO REVOLT: A YEAR IN PRISON

If the Plan de Texcoco succeeded as a propaganda device, as Molina Enríquez asserted, he personally paid a price — a prison term — for obtaining public attention for his land-reform ideology. Newspaper accounts from August of 1911 reported Molina Enríquez’s arrest at Puebla immediately after the failure of the Plan de Texcoco, but later accounts give differing dates. For example, Gabriel Ferrer Mendiola, writing in 1953, asserted that Molina Enríquez was arrested on September 12, 1911, in Coyotepec, México, about ten kilometers immediately south of Texcoco.⁶⁰ Regardless of the exact date of his capture, Molina Enríquez served more than a year in the penitentiary of the Federal District from September of 1911 until his release in the fall of 1912.⁶¹

While in prison, Molina Enríquez remained convinced of the necessity for land reform to solve Mexico’s major national problems. Within the federal penitentiary in Mexico City, he continued to disseminate his land-reform ideas through newspaper articles and through discussions with leaders of the principal factions of the next phase of Revolutionary struggle in Mexico. He claims

to have discussed his land-reform ideology with Revolutionary leaders, including representatives of the Zapatista movement and Pancho Villa himself.⁶² He also carried on a public polemic with his former mentor, Wistano Luis Orozco, from prison, debating the need for a revolution to instigate land reform in Mexico; Molina Enríquez answered Orozco's reformist stand on land reform with a call for agrarian revolution.⁶³

Molina Enríquez claimed to have met with hundreds of revolutionaries in prison, who all reacted favorably to his land-reform program. Among the imprisoned revolutionaries he talked with were Generals Carrera Torres, Andreu Almazán, Banderas, Barrios, Navarro, and Villa,⁶⁴ and Colonels Castillo Tapia, Berthani, and Zamora. Molina Enríquez reported that all these revolutionaries understood his land-reform program and promised to begin working for land reform immediately after their release from prison. Carlos Basave corroborated Molina Enríquez's claim to have met with many of the principal future Revolutionary leaders in prison. Basave wrote that Molina Enríquez introduced him to Juan Banderas and many other people while Basave was in prison in 1912.⁶⁵

Molina Enríquez also asserted he had corresponded with Emiliano Zapata while in prison. Molina Enríquez claimed that the Zapatista general, Gonzalo Vázquez Ortiz, was his prison comrade until his death. Vázquez Ortiz had been one of the Zapatistas "leading agents" in Mexico City and was arrested in June of 1912,⁶⁶ and Molina Enríquez asserted that his correspondence with Zapata had been through Vázquez Ortiz.⁶⁷

Molina Enríquez later claimed that his correspondence with the Zapatistas, his Plan de Texcoco, and his newspaper articles in the summer of 1911 helped influence the writing of the Plan de Ayala, the Zapatista call for agrarian revolution in late November of 1911.⁶⁸

Molina Enríquez also continued writing political articles from prison. He outraged Madero's personal secretary near the end of 1911 by writing an open letter to the U.S. ambassador decrying the United States government's intervention to prevent a Reyista revolution from being organized within the United States. Madero's secretary wrote a report for the administration about how newspapers in Mexico City had printed Molina Enríquez's letter to the U.S. ambassador. The secretary found it "inconceivable there were papers that could publish such notices, as their directors . . . should have known no nation can allow within its territory the organization of armed expeditions against their neighboring friends."⁶⁹

Madero's secretary contested Molina Enríquez's "untrue" thesis that Madero had won the revolution against Díaz due to the support of the U.S. government. Rather, the secretary insisted, the U.S. government had seized arms from the Maderistas and had tried to stop them from crossing the border. The secretary maintained that the "perfidy" of Molina Enríquez and the "sensationalism" of the press allowed such lies to circulate, and he regretted Molina

Enríquez's "open letter" that attempted to alter the good relations between the two countries.⁷⁰

Molina Enríquez's defense of Bernardo Reyes's right to mount a revolution against the Madero administration from U.S. soil did little to endear him to the Madero administration. Nevertheless, the idealistic Madero reportedly granted Molina Enríquez a pardon from prison as he did for so many of his political enemies.

In October of 1911 Molina Enríquez wrote a rebuttal to criticism his former mentor, Wistano Luis Orozco, had expressed over his own proposals to achieve land reform in Mexico in August of 1911. Molina Enríquez had cited Orozco's 1895 book, *Legislación y jurisprudencia sobre terrenos baldíos*, in *Los grandes problemas* and had applied many of Orozco's ideas on reforming Mexico's property system to his own land-reform program. However, by the fall of 1911, Molina Enríquez had abandoned the reformist path, convinced that revolution was the only route to destroying Mexico's hacienda system.

Orozco had taken exception to Molina Enríquez's land-reform proposals in a pamphlet entitled "The Agrarian Question," published in early August of 1911 in Guadalajara. Orozco rejected Molina Enríquez's proposal to limit the size of properties to 500 hectares. Orozco maintained that 500 hectares did not constitute a large property, even in the Valley of Mexico, and such a small amount of land would never suffice in other regions of the country. Orozco also declared that a later proposal by Molina Enríquez to expropriate every hacienda over 2,000 hectares, leaving only 300 hectares for the owner, would be a disaster for Mexican agriculture, "destroying in one blow the agricultural wealth of the Republic."⁷¹

Orozco's main objection to Molina Enríquez's land-reform program lay in the latter's proposal for government intervention to regulate private property. As a classic Liberal, Orozco could not make the jump Molina Enríquez had made regarding the means to divide up Mexico's haciendas. Orozco declared "the intervention of the Government in the dividing of inheritances and the selling of parcels to be contrary to all the most rudimentary principles of political economy and of good public administration." Orozco believed the benefits of state interventionism had been condemned by science to the dustbins of history.⁷²

Molina Enríquez answered Orozco's criticisms of his land-reform proposals in an article entitled "Philosophy of My Ideas on Agrarian Reform," written in prison and published in Guadalajara in November of 1911.⁷³ In a letter to Dr. D. Emilio Pérez Vargas, the publisher of the article, Molina Enríquez accused Orozco of an unwarranted attack on his ideas. And in the first part of his article, he maintained Orozco had not read *Los grandes problemas* and therefore could not judge his land-reform program properly. Molina Enríquez asserted that any discussion of reform proposals he had made in June of 1911 was useless, as the agrarian revolution against the hacienda system had already

begun. He maintained that the agrarian uprisings in Morelos and Chiapas were only the start of a nationwide agrarian revolution. Comparing Mexico's situation in the early winter of 1911 to late eighteenth-century Revolutionary France, Molina Enríquez wrote that Mexico's hacendados faced popular seizures of their lands because of their inability to accept state-mandated division of rural properties with indemnities. He asserted that though many had accused him of fomenting popular unrest by publicizing his land-reform program against the hacienda system, the situation was now out of anyone's hands: Mexico faced violent agrarian revolution.⁷⁴

The León de la Barra administration's jailing of Molina Enríquez appears to have backfired; during his year in prison Molina Enríquez only became more radically committed to an agrarian revolution in Mexico and had the opportunity to propagandize for land reform among many of the principal leaders of the next phase of the Revolution. As Molina Enríquez correctly prophesied, the popular phase of the Revolution had already begun in Mexico in the fall of 1911, leaving the León de la Barra administration and succeeding Madero administration little room for maneuver in the coming wave of mass political uprisings.

CHAPTER 5

Revolutionary Factionalism and the Vindication of Article 27 1912–1917

As related in the preceding chapter, the imprisonment of Molina Enríquez for his leadership in the Plan de Texcoco revolt simply increased his commitment to land reform in Mexico. After a coup against the Madero administration, the Decena Trágica, Molina Enríquez departed from the tactic of attempting to rally popular support behind his program of land reform and shifted to attempting to influence the leading chiefs of the major Revolutionary factions instead. After using his newly established paper, *El Reformador*, to defend the Madero administration during the February 1913 coup, Molina Enríquez would subsequently participate in the three succeeding Revolutionary governments that controlled Mexico from 1913 to 1916: the Huerta administration, the Villistas, and the Carranzistas. Though Molina Enríquez's ability to shift political camps during the Revolution could be seen as opportunistic, in fact, he used this ability to continue pressing his land-reform program onto the political agenda of the Revolution.

DEFENSE OF THE MADERO ADMINISTRATION DURING THE DECENA TRÁGICA

The second epoch of *El Reformador*, published in the 1930s, mentions that in its first epoch, the newspaper was the only one operating during the entire Decena Trágica in February 1913. Not only did Molina Enríquez con-

tinue publishing the new paper amidst chaos in Mexico City, he also rallied to the side of the Madero administration with articles and editorials in the paper.

In the month of January, Molina Enríquez had foreseen the possibility of a coup against the Madero regime.¹ He began using *El Reformador* to pressure the Madero administration to implement the land-reform program he considered essential to the nation's—and the Madero administration's—survival.² Only if the Madero administration completely embraced the Revolutionary transformation the country required would it be able to reunify the Revolutionary factions that had arisen in the aftermath of the Treaty of Ciudad Juárez.³ And only this reunification of the revolutionaries would ensure the Madero regime's survival in the face of the rising reactionary threat.⁴

In the midst of the battle on the streets of Mexico City from February 9 to 19, Molina Enríquez decisively sided with the government: “We are writing these lines in the same moments of the battle. The cannon shots shake our nerves and prevent us from having the serenity indispensable for clear thinking. In our opinion, which has been influenced by the tumultuous events that have taken place and that have hastened our judgment, everything tilts in favor of the Government.”⁵ Indeed, he considered the rebel forces fighting the government to be “the last force of the Porfiristas, the Científicos, and the hacendados to return things to the past.”⁶

Molina Enríquez considered the coup the moment of truth for the Madero administration. As the fighting raged, he pleaded with Madero to act as Benito Juárez had done during the War of the Reforma and institute an immediate land-reform program. Only immediate agrarian reform would reunite the Revolutionary factions and ensure the final defeat of the reaction. Madero could no longer vacillate; it was “now or never.”⁷

Molina Enríquez's defense of the Madero regime during the Decena Trágica contrasted with his rejection of Madero for president in 1909. Indeed, in 1909 Molina Enríquez had supported Bernardo Reyes for president, yet in 1913, Molina Enríquez implicitly denounced Reyes as one of the principal leaders of the coup (along with Felix Díaz, the nephew of the recently deposed president). In *El Reformador* Molina Enríquez asserted that the Porfiristas had misled Madero into believing that the revolution against Díaz had only occurred because of “discontent over the lack of political rights” rather than due to the need for a social transformation in Mexico.⁸ Perhaps the fact that Madero had pardoned Molina Enríquez from prison helped in his reassessment of Madero's Revolutionary potential. In any case, Molina Enríquez believed that Madero would understand what he had to do to rally the “popular forces” in support of his government.⁹ However, with the help of the U.S. ambassador to Mexico, Henry Lane Wilson, the coup against Madero succeeded, and General Huerta took power in Mexico.

THE HUERTA ADMINISTRATION: FAILURE OF THE STRONG MAN/SOCIAL REFORM FORMULA

Although Molina Enríquez's turnabout regarding Madero can be explained, his subsequent joining of the Huerta regime after the fall of Madero is more perplexing. Having denounced the coup against Madero as a counter-Revolutionary and anti-land-reform movement, how could Molina Enríquez have joined forces with Huerta, the general who had betrayed Madero and likely ordered his murder? To understand Molina Enríquez's motives, it is necessary to examine the social reformism that Huerta paid lip service to in the initial months of his regime and to review the revisionist interpretation of the Huerta regime.

Molina Enríquez initially saw in the Huerta regime the political formula that he believed Mexico required: a strong military leader capable of imposing the social reforms Mexico needed for the benefit of the masses. Molina Enríquez accepted the Huerta government's offer to head the Department of Labor, but he resigned the post after less than six months, disgusted with what he considered the manipulation of Huerta by members of the creole hacendado class eager to return to the era of the Paz Porfiriato.¹⁰

Molina Enríquez's brief participation in the Huerta regime has tainted his reputation in twentieth-century Mexico. Attempts in the Mexican Congress to post Molina Enríquez's name on the wall of Revolutionary heroes in the Congress building have failed over the issue of his participation in the Huerta regime.¹¹ Official Revolutionary historiography has portrayed the Huerta regime as a counter-Revolutionary tyranny that the Revolution swept away. Thus, those connected in any way with the Huerta government have been perceived as supporters of a counter-Revolution attempting to reinstate a Díaz-like political system in Mexico.

However, revisionist historical analysis has brought into question the black legend of the Huerta regime. In the book, *Huerta: A Political Biography*, Michael Meyer questioned the validity of labeling the Huerta regime as a counter-Revolution. By analyzing the proposed social programs of the Huerta regime's ministries, Meyer found that the Huerta regime was as aware of the need for basic social reforms in Mexico as the Madero administration had been. Meyer asserted that in no way did "the Huerta regime represent an attempted reincarnation of the Age of Díaz."¹²

Meyer's focus on the proposed social reforms — including land-reform proposals — of Huerta's cabinet members to refute the traditional view of the Huerta regime as counter-Revolutionary aids in understanding why Molina Enríquez initially joined the Huerta regime. Meyer explained that the Huerta regime took an interest in the agrarian problem of Mexico. The Huerta government's agrarian action included restoring ejido lands to the Yaquis and Mayos of Sonora and advancing proposals for distribution of government lands to

small-scale farmers.¹³ Huerta also established an independent Ministry of Agriculture. Interestingly, Eduardo Tamariz, Huerta's minister of agriculture, proposed raising taxes on haciendas and lowering taxes on small properties to induce hacendados to sell off unproductive lands.¹⁴ Molina Enríquez, like many others in pre-Revolutionary Mexico, had called for tax reforms as one means of encouraging divisions of haciendas in central Mexico.

The mild social reformist thinking present in the Huerta regime, combined with the strong-man approach Huerta took toward governing Mexico, undoubtedly enticed Molina Enríquez into the Huerta administration with the hope of pressing the regime further toward land reform. However, as early as June of 1913, Molina Enríquez became disenchanted and rejected the Huerta regime due to its repressive policies.

By that time Molina Enríquez was publishing a series of articles in *El Imparcial* castigating the Huerta regime's lack of action on social reforms and repression of revolutionaries. He argued that the creole reactionary ministers Huerta allowed into his cabinet were in control of the regime's policies, preventing Huerta from implementing the reforms — especially land reform — that would have won him the support of the mestizo revolutionaries, the majority in Mexico, as well as of the Wilson administration in the United States. In his first article in *El Imparcial* in June of 1913, Molina Enríquez disavowed having any personal relationship with Huerta, thus attempting to disassociate himself from the repressive regime.¹⁵

Although by the fall Molina Enríquez had given up attempting to steer the Huerta regime toward the social reformist path, he continued trying in newspaper articles to convince Mexicans of the need for land reform. In September of 1913, he wrote another series of articles in *El Independiente* dealing with his land-reform program. *El Independiente* accused Molina Enríquez of having utopian ideas in an editorial rejecting Molina Enríquez's proposal to return Mexico to the legal framework of the colonial era in order to legitimize his land-reform program.¹⁶ As will be remembered from preceding chapters, Molina Enríquez argued that the right of the Spanish Crown as the ultimate owner of Mexico's resources passed to the federal government at independence. *El Independiente* argued that giving the federal government the Spanish Crown's right to "reversion," or taking back of granted lands, would result in the "bribery and favoritism" present in the era of absolute monarchy. The newspaper maintained it was far better to look for new legal forms, even socialism, than try to revive "a past well dead and better buried."¹⁷

Although *El Independiente* labeled Molina Enríquez's land-reform proposals as utopian, he found enough support for his ideas to be named the vice-presidential candidate for the Grand Liberal Republican Party in the October 1913 presidential election ordered by Huerta. The Grand Liberal Republican Party sponsored David de la Fuente, who had recently retired as Huerta's minister of communications and public works, as its presidential candidate.

Thus, the party represented the reformist-minded officials of the Huerta regime who were upset with Huerta's lack of social reform. The Grand Liberal Republican Party was one of many opposition parties that mushroomed with Huerta's call for presidential elections.¹⁸

By October, the Grand Liberal Republican Party had conceded the problematic nature of the election in its political manifesto to the nation.¹⁹ The party explained that, owing to the Revolutionary movements pervading many regions of Mexico, the elections could not be considered representative of the "true national mandate." Likewise, in the opinion of the party, the other political parties involved had not had enough time to organize properly for an election. The manifesto explained that the Grand Liberal Republican Party was running to oppose the reactionary Catholic Party rather than with hope of winning the elections.²⁰

The party offered a reformist program based, for the most part, on Molina Enríquez's ideas, which the party claimed would quell the revolutionary disorder in Mexico. The party proposed a resolution of the agrarian problem through a restoration of usurped lands, the division of large properties, and the free import and export of grains necessary to feed the nation. In addition, the party called for legal status for Mexico's rural villages and a suppression of "rural slavery." The party's manifesto also included calls for judicial, educational, tax, and military reforms.²¹ To achieve its reforms, the Grand Liberal Republican Party called for the convening of a constitutional convention.

If it had won the presidential elections, the party would have made itself a dictatorial government by suspending the Constitution.²² The party then would have convened a Grand Reformist Commission made up of the three Revolutionary factions, the Constitutionals (formed by Venustiano Carranza, governor of Coahuila, to overthrow the Huerta regime); the Vazquistas; and the Zapatistas, as well as from existing state and federal governments. After the commission worked out the reform agenda for Mexico, then the party planned to decree new legislative and presidential elections.²³

Unfortunately, the Grand Liberal Republican Party did not have a remote chance of accomplishing a reconciliation of Mexico's warring factions. Huerta "won" the presidential race of 1913 in a farcical election.²⁴

Molina Enríquez commented later that the presidential election proceeded "in our habitual mode."²⁵ The Huerta regime lasted another eight months until the Villista victory at Zacatecas over the federal forces. (The Villistas were the northern forces of General Francisco "Pancho" Villa and were allied with the Constitutionals.) As a result, Huerta was forced to resign and go into an exile from which he would never return.

Molina Enríquez's whereabouts after the fall of Huerta are unclear. However, a 1915 article written by him in the Villista paper, *La Convención*, indicates that apparently he had been attempting to join the Villista movement in an advisory role.

MOLINA ENRÍQUEZ AND THE VILLISTA MOVEMENT

General Pancho Villa received a telegram in Zacatecas in late October of 1914 from Silvestre Terrazas, a journalist and early opponent of the Porfirian system in the state of Chihuahua. The telegram warned Villa against professional politicians from Mexico City, headed by Molina Enríquez, who would be arriving in Zacatecas to jump on the Villista bandwagon.²⁶ Terrazas told Villa that Molina Enríquez would try to establish an agrarian commission with Villa's help. Terrazas warned Villa against consenting to Molina Enríquez's request and described his checkered Revolutionary career.²⁷ Terrazas portrayed Molina Enríquez as a counter-Revolutionary and threat to Villa. He ended by cautioning Villa that political affairs could be more potentially harmful to Villa than the battlefield, as the dangers of politics were less evident than the immediate dangers of the battlefield.²⁸

Terrazas may have had a proprietary interest in warning Villa against "professional" agraristas from Mexico City because Terrazas administered the confiscation of haciendas in Chihuahua from the middle of 1914 on. Terrazas's creation of the Administración General de Confiscaciones del Estado de Chihuahua undoubtedly enriched the power of "Chihuahua's highest civilian official, Silvestre Terrazas."²⁹ Without disputing Terrazas's Revolutionary credentials, it may be conjectured that he feared competition from Mexico City agraristas such as Molina Enríquez, who might endanger Terrazas's own political power in northern Mexico. According to Molina Enríquez's personal testimony, Villa did not heed Terrazas's warning. Molina Enríquez claimed to have helped in Villa's division of haciendas after the Convention at Aguascalientes in the late fall and early winter of 1914-15.³⁰

In April of 1915, Molina Enríquez wrote an article published in *La Convención*, the paper that represented the ideas of Villista intellectuals.³¹ This and other contributions to the publication provide evidence of Molina Enríquez's collaboration with the Villista camp from 1914 to 1915.

La Convención appeared sporadically from 1914 to 1915, and many articles revealed a strong concern among Villista intellectuals with the agrarian problem in Mexico. For example, in December of 1914 a spate of articles dealing with the Villista land-reform program were published. According to the newspaper, Villa was implementing an agrarian law designed to create family-sized parcels in the state of Chihuahua.³² Two articles within *La Convención* demonstrated a concern among Villista intellectuals with the backwardness of Mexican agriculture, especially in comparison to the United States. Apparently Villista intellectuals considered the development of family farms to be essential for the social and economic progress of Mexico.³³

The "Program of the Convention," published at the end of 1914, concurred with most of the key reform proposals Molina Enríquez had been publicizing

since the Plan de Texcoco. The first reform of the convention's Manifiesto a la Nación (manifesto to the nation) called for the destruction of latifundia through the end of titled large property and its division among family farmers. Molina Enríquez, of course, had premised a major part of his argument against the central Mexican hacienda in *Los grandes problemas* on the notion that the hacienda represented a titled, feudal property in Mexico in a de facto sense. Other reforms of the convention's program that accorded with Molina Enríquez's earlier reform program included the restitution of ejidos despoiled during past dictatorships; municipal independence (i.e., the end of the *jefes políticos*); reorganization of the judicial branch of the government; and placement of the social good over the rights of the individual.³⁴

While congruence between the convention's program and Molina Enríquez's reform program does not prove he helped write the convention's program, it does make clear that Molina Enríquez's concerns were becoming the general concern among Revolutionary intellectuals by the end of 1914. In 1911, Molina Enríquez had been considered little short of crazy while running for governor of the state of Mexico for proposing reforms very similar to the 1914 Program of the Convention. By late 1914, something was afoot in Mexico.

A month before the Villista debacle at the battle of Celaya (i.e., Villa's cavalry met its match before the trench-warfare tactics of General Alvaro Obregón), Molina Enríquez published an article in *La Convención*, "If the Revolution is the Revolution, then Peace is Peace," proposing that the Revolutionary factions lay down their arms to work out a peaceful resolution in a newly reunified Convention.³⁵ Rather than fighting each other, Molina Enríquez urged that the Revolutionary factions see themselves as part of the same Revolution with a common enemy, the reactionaries. Molina Enríquez maintained that the Revolutionary factions were fighting for the same end—reforming Mexico—and differed only in the details of how to reach that end.³⁶

Molina Enríquez was expanding in the article on a 1911 article by his friend, Luis Cabrera, entitled "The Revolution is the Revolution." Cabrera had warned of the continuation of revolution in Mexico without fundamental social reforms and had advocated establishment of a military government to implement social reforms. In his 1915 article, Molina Enríquez defined peace as society organized for the masses and revolution as society organized for the minority. He saw revolution as the forceful side of social evolution, occurring only when peaceful evolution was impossible.³⁷

Following his concepts of the process of revolution, Molina Enríquez believed the time to implement reforms had come in Mexico. He divided revolutions into three periods: (1) the period of preparation, when intellectuals defined the general reforms needed in society; (2) the period of imposition, when Revolutionary forces crushed the opposition to social reforms; and (3) the period of implementation, when politicians implemented laws for the practical applica-

tion of the social reforms proposed in the first period of revolution. Molina Enríquez believed that in the spring of 1915 the Mexican Revolution had entered the last phase of the Revolutionary process, the phase of implementation.

Molina Enríquez defined the six "essential reforms" a new convention would have to deal with: division of the haciendas; a revision of the property tax code; the legal recognition of all rural population centers; the suppression of the *jefes políticos* to promote local autonomy; the expulsion of Spanish Catholic clergy (with the exception of those priests who ran charitable organizations); and the nationalization of the lands of Spaniards. Molina Enríquez believed that other reforms could come after these essential reforms were implemented.³⁸

Molina Enríquez credited Villa's actions in dividing haciendas with forcing other Revolutionary factions to seriously consider land reform in order to gain mass support. As noted earlier, Molina Enríquez claimed he helped Villa begin the process of dividing haciendas in northern Mexico after the Aguascalientes Convention. However, Villa's actions regarding land reform are murky historical questions. Friedrich Katz found that land reform remained an unfulfilled objective in Villista-held territory up to the defeat of Villa in the spring of 1915. Katz did concede that some of the haciendas Villista forces confiscated were "rented out directly to poor sharecroppers," especially in the Laguna cotton growing region of Durango. Though Katz found no evidence of a thorough land reform in Villista-held territory from 1913-1915, Katz did allow that Villa appeared ideologically committed to land reform, wishing eventually to award land to his soldiers, and likely held back from implementing land reform due to political and economic concerns.³⁹

THE 6 JANUARY 1915 AGRARIAN DECREE

Regardless of the extent of Villa's action regarding land reform, the fact that the Villistas and the Zapatistas were occupying Mexico City and had the Constitutional forces bottled up in Veracruz in the beginning of 1915 made any move likely to gain support for the Constitutionalists expedient. In fact, the Constitutionalists issued the famous land-reform decree of 6 January 1915 while confined in Veracruz at the low point in the Constitutionalist cause.

Venustiano Carranza, self-proclaimed "First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army," issued two important land-reform decrees from Veracruz at the end of 1914 and the beginning of 1915, at the point when the Constitutionalist cause had reached its darkest hour. Carranza's late 1914 decree mixed accusations against Villa with promises of social reform after the failure of the Aguascalientes Convention. The December 12, 1914, "Program of the Revolution" promised the passing and enforcing of all laws needed "to give satisfaction to the economic, social, and political necessities of the country, effecting reforms

that public opinion demands as indispensable to establish a regime that guarantees the equality of all Mexicans.”⁴⁰

Carranza’s conversion into an agrarista, or proponent of land reform, should be looked at with a great deal of skepticism. The late 1914 “Program of the Revolution” should be seen more as a propaganda ploy to recruit support for the floundering Constitutionalist cause than as an ideological statement. The real importance of the “Program of the Revolution” lies in the indication it gives of the importance Revolutionary leaders put on gaining the support of the rural masses for the final showdown of the Revolution.

Article 2 of Carranza’s “Program of the Revolution” outlined the land-reform agenda that the Constitutionalist cause promised to carry out in Mexico, and demonstrated the general Revolutionary consensus on the need for land reform by the end of 1914. The article proclaimed that laws would be passed to favor the development of small farms, “dissolve” the haciendas, and restore to the pueblos lands that were unjustly taken.⁴¹ Despite the promise to dissolve haciendas, most of the Constitutionalist post-Revolutionary land-reform activities would focus on restoring pueblo lands alienated under the liberal Ley Lerdo and the terrenos baldíos laws of the Porfiriato.⁴²

More specific provisions of Article 2 of Carranza’s “Program of the Revolution” followed the concerns Molina Enríquez had marked out in the years prior to the Revolution. Article 2 called for laws to equalize the property tax system, an early concern of Molina Enríquez and other land-reform advocates of pre-Revolutionary Mexico. Article 2 also promised laws to “improve the condition of rural workers,” promote municipal liberty, reform the judicial system, and revise the laws regulating national resource use to prevent “the monopolies created by the old regime.”⁴³ As was seen in early chapters of this work, Molina Enríquez proposed reforms to deal with all of the problems raised in Article 2 of Carranza’s “Program of the Revolution.”

Many parts of Molina Enríquez’s systematic land-reform program were appropriated by Luis Cabrera to aid the Constitutionalist attempt to capture mass acceptance. Cabrera was the bridge between Molina Enríquez’s land-reform ideas and Carranza’s Constitutionalist land-reform decrees. As a close associate of Molina Enríquez, Cabrera had received a thorough indoctrination into Molina Enríquez’s land-reform ideology. As Carranza’s finance minister, Cabrera was to write the famous Law of 6 January 1915, fixing the direction of Constitutionalist land reform in the post-Revolutionary era based on the ideas Molina Enríquez expressed in *Los grandes problemas*.⁴⁴ For example, in the Law of 6 January 1915, the Constitutionlists called for the immediate return of unjustly seized village lands.

Cabrera readily admitted the debt he owed to Molina Enríquez for the formation of his land-reform ideology. In 1912 Cabrera had given a famous speech before the 26th Congress during Madero’s presidency in which he had

called for the reinstatement of the ejido as a means to solve the most pressing part of Mexico's rural problem. In his speech Cabrera acknowledged how Molina Enríquez's book, *Los grandes problemas*, had made a great contribution to clearing up the confusion surrounding the agrarian question in Mexico. Cabrera recommended the book as mandatory reading for all Congressmen.⁴⁵

The Constitutionalist's 1915 agrarian law mentions in its preamble how the state of confusion reigning in Mexico's land-titling system rendered any strict land-title requirement for the restitution of ejido lands too formalistic to deal with the ejido problem. Instead, the 1915 law decreed that land could be given to pueblos without the necessity of proving original ownership.⁴⁶ Molina Enríquez, of course, had emphasized in *Los grandes problemas* how the chaos of Mexico's land-tenure system baffled even the greatest lawyers of the Republic in early twentieth-century Mexico.⁴⁷

The Law of 6 January 1915 fixed the course land reform would take in the immediate post-Revolutionary period. The law called for the establishment of a National Agrarian Commission to oversee implementation of the provisions of the law. It set up the procedures to be taken in order for villages to take back or receive communal lands. It stipulated that all grants of ejido lands had to be sanctioned by the president of Mexico. This provision gave great power to the executive to decide how land reform would proceed in Mexico during successive post-Revolutionary administrations.

With its sole objective being the re-creation of village lands, the 1915 agrarian law of the Carranza military government fixed a moderate course for immediate post-Revolutionary land reform. Nowhere does the 1915 law mention the need to divide haciendas to establish small farms, as the 1914 decree had promised in general terms a month before. As such, the 1915 law represents a watered-down version of Molina Enríquez's original proposals in *Los grandes problemas*.⁴⁸ Although the agrarian law's role in the subsequent Constitutionalist victory over the Villistas in the spring of 1915 defies objective analysis,⁴⁹ the law did mark an important "point of no return" for land reform in Mexico. The next major step along the road of official land reform would take place at the Constitutional Convention of 1916–1917 when Molina Enríquez's pre-Revolutionary ideas would be implanted in Article 27 of the Constitution.

DRAFTING OF ARTICLE 27 FOR THE 1917 CONSTITUTION

By the end of 1915, the military segment of the Revolution was essentially over. What remained of actual conflict became a Constitutionalist "mopping-up" operation in regions that remained unsettled, with the exception of Morelos, where the Zapatistas continued defying the Constitutionalist government into the 1920s.

In June of 1916 the Constitutionalist controlled Mexico City. At this time, Carranza declared the “armed struggle [was] concluded insofar as it may have assumed any truly political character,” and called for a return to “legal order” in Mexico.⁵⁰ By September of 1916 Carranza called for a constitutional convention to be held in Querétaro to incorporate “indispensable *political* reforms” into a new national constitution. Carranza said he would submit the first draft of the proposed constitution, and the elected delegates would be able to “discuss, approve or modify” it as they saw fit.⁵¹

Carranza’s draft for the new constitution lacked nearly all of the provisions for socioeconomic reform for which the 1917 Constitution became famous. Carranza’s draft contained only minor reforms of the liberal 1857 Constitution. These reforms included secular education, freedom of religion, prohibition on monopolizing “prime necessities,” restrictions on foreign ownership of land, and the provision for communal lands to be worked in common until their division into individual plots. In the words of Charles Cumberland, “the draft was more remarkable for what it did not include than for what it did.”⁵² Carranza’s draft made no mention of land reform.

In 1916, Luis Cabrera secured Molina Enríquez a position as representative of the secretary of finance on the executive committee of the National Agrarian Commission.⁵³ With Cabrera’s help, Molina Enríquez also obtained positions in the Secretary of Development office as director of the forestry section and legal consultant in the water section.⁵⁴

Molina Enríquez learned of Carranza’s draft for the new constitution while working in Mexico City on the National Agrarian Commission; as a member of the executive committee, he was in a position to influence the drafting of the agrarian provisions of the 1917 Constitution. Molina Enríquez wrote later that Pastor Rouaix, head of the National Agrarian Commission and delegate to the Constitutional Convention, showed him a copy of Carranza’s draft just before the formal opening of the convention. Both of them clearly saw that Article 27 of Carranza’s draft, dealing with the lands of the pueblos, “required fundamental corrections.”⁵⁵

After learning that the Constitution possibly would be voted on in sections rather than articles, Molina Enríquez caught the first train he could to Querétaro, believing the Revolution’s promise of land reform to be in jeopardy.⁵⁶ In Querétaro, Molina Enríquez worked to get Rouaix to convince Carranza of the need for an “integral solution” to the agrarian problem in Mexico, moving beyond the ejido solution proposed in Carranza’s draft.⁵⁷ Despite Carranza’s high esteem for Rouaix, his secretary of development, Carranza refused to consider any modifications of his draft of Article 27.⁵⁸

Rouaix himself had been an early proponent of land reform in Revolutionary Mexico. As the Carrancista governor of the state of Durango, Rouaix had issued an agrarian law in October 1913 allowing state citizens to receive land

from haciendas. In November of that year, Rouaix created an ejido from hacienda land that quickly grew to support more than one thousand inhabitants. Rouaix claimed that by 1913, he saw the need to amend the Constitution to give the "nation the right to intervene in the private use of individual property when the interests of the collective demands this."⁵⁹

According to Molina Enríquez, Carranza refused to consider Rouaix's request for a committee to redraft Article 27 to promote land reform in Mexico until confronted by political dangers from the left within and outside of the convention. Molina Enríquez maintained that the appearance of General Alvaro Obregón, Carranza's minister of war and the man responsible for the defeat of Villa, rallied the radical left at the convention. Obregón's appearance, along with rumors of a possible coup led by Obregón against Carranza, put pressure on Carranza to appease the radicals of the convention and to reconsider his refusal to consider modification of Article 27.⁶⁰

Molina Enríquez's personal discussions with Obregón in Mexico City in the months before the Constitutional Convention over the importance of incorporating social reforms in the new constitution may have influenced Obregón to rally the radical left at the convention against Carranza's conservative draft. Emilio Portes Gil, later a president of Mexico, related in an introduction to one edition of Molina Enríquez's book, *La revolución agraria en México*, that Molina Enríquez visited Obregón two or three times weekly in the Palacio Nacional to discuss the early proceedings of the Constitutional Convention. Portes Gil remembered that the conversations between Obregón and Molina Enríquez lasted many times more than two hours.⁶¹ Portes Gil was a legal consultant for the Ministry of War at the time, and Molina Enríquez had to pass through Portes Gil's office to see Obregón; Portes Gil remembered discussions he had with Molina Enríquez over his land-reform ideas.

After the appearance of Obregón put pressure on Carranza within the convention, Villa's retaking of the city of Torreón⁶² added additional pressure to convince Carranza to carry through with the promises of land reform he had made in his decree of December 12, 1914.⁶³ Finally, Carranza approved Rouaix's proposal to convene a special "unauthorized" committee to redraft Article 27.⁶⁴ The committee began meeting on January 14 in "the former residence of the Bishop of Querétaro."⁶⁵

With Carranza's begrudging approval, the Rouaix committee began debating a draft of a revised Article 27 that Molina Enríquez had written at Rouaix's request. Molina Enríquez recalls meeting in the Bishop's Palace in Querétaro with a committee of "Revolutionary deputies" determined to make fundamental changes to Carranza's draft of Article 27.⁶⁶ Time was short: the deadline of the convention was January 31, and the debate on Molina Enríquez's draft began in the middle of January.

The delegates on the Rouaix committee were disenchanted with Molina

Enríquez's preliminary draft of Article 27 — Rouaix later claimed that the draft met with "complete disillusionment." The delegates considered the draft too legalistic and theoretical, lacking the "Revolutionary principles" they felt were needed to practically implement land reform.⁶⁷

Molina Enríquez claimed that the delegates were unable to understand the principles behind his draft, that they could not fathom the advantage to be gained through giving the nation the right to intervene in private property in order to serve the public interest. He recalled that the delegates wished to have precise and direct affirmations rather than general principles.⁶⁸

The Rouaix committee spent the next ten days reworking Molina Enríquez's draft of Article 27. Molina Enríquez characterized the sessions as a "free-for-all debate" without any direction that at "times took on the character of a true tumult."⁶⁹ Rouaix downplayed Molina Enríquez's recollections of the committee debates, claiming that the debates were cordial without the violent emotions that Molina Enríquez recalled.⁷⁰ Regardless of the emotions the debate engendered, the Rouaix committee worked out a draft that all members could support and sent it on to the First Committee of the Convention for a final inspection on January 25. After some adjustments, the First Committee turned the draft of Article 27 over for debate by the entire convention on the evening of January 29, 1917.⁷¹

The Constitutional Convention approved the final version of the Rouaix committee revision of Article 27 on January 30, 1917, at 3:00 A.M. by candlelight (the electricity had gone off in the Iturbide Theater where the convention was held).⁷² Charles Cumberland, in his study of the Constitutionalist movement, believed the delegates to be weary, ready to approve any provision that mandated land reform and restricted the foreign ownership of land and resources in Mexico.⁷³ However, Molina Enríquez recalled that the debate lasted ten hours with many delegates speaking against the article. Also, according to Molina Enríquez, the first fifteen votes went against approval of Article 27. He even believed the electricity to the Iturbide Theater had been turned off deliberately to stymie approval of Article 27.⁷⁴

Although Molina Enríquez never claimed credit for writing Article 27, his ideas clearly guided the Rouaix committee's hasty revision. In a monograph on the Constitutional Convention at Querétaro, E. V. Niemeyer affirmed the importance of Molina Enríquez's ideas in the final draft of Article 27: "In general its [the First Committee's] draft followed the theme developed by Molina Enríquez in his expository remarks to the Rouaix draft, although the solution to the agrarian problem received greater emphasis than the redefinition of property rights."⁷⁵

Indeed, given that the Rouaix committee had a scant two weeks in which to revise Article 27, only someone like Molina Enríquez, who had developed a systematic land-reform program, could have written the principles guiding the article in so short a period.

ARTICLE 27: MOLINA ENRÍQUEZ AS INTELLECTUAL AUTHOR
OF THE CONSTITUTION'S LAND-REFORM PRINCIPLES

The preface to Article 27 clearly expresses the land-reform ideas Molina Enríquez developed during twenty years of studying the agrarian problem of Mexico prior to publication of *Los grandes problemas*. In addition, Article 27 also contains more specific proposals that Molina Enríquez made in the pre-Revolutionary era.

The first two paragraphs of the preface of Article 27 reflect his early call for state intervention to regulate Mexico's resources on behalf of the public interest. The preface begins by vesting in the federal government the national territory, lands, and waters "originally in the nation," and gives the national government "the right to impose on private property such limitations as the public interest may demand."⁷⁶ As discussed in chapter 2, Molina Enríquez had arrived at the theoretical basis for vesting Mexico's land and resources in the government as early as 1905 when developing a regulatory law for water use in Mexico. His 1905 proposed water law also called for giving the federal government the right to intervene in order to conserve or allocate water on the basis of "public utility." Moreover, in *Los grandes problemas*, Molina Enríquez had argued that the Spanish Crown's ultimate ownership of Mexico's lands and resources passed to the national government at independence, giving the national government the right to regulate private property for the interest of society.⁷⁷ Article 27's delineation of what waters the nation would control was taken directly from Molina Enríquez's 1905 proposed federal water law. Areas of congruence between the water law and Article 27's regulation of water ownership included the following:

1. Giving the nation ownership of all ocean, lakes, and rivers.
2. Concern over regulation of permanent or seasonal water sources.
3. Concern over bodies of waters that formed boundary lines between Mexico and other countries, or between the states of Mexico.
4. Giving to individual landowners the water present on their property.
5. Allowing only concessions to individuals for the use of federal waters.⁷⁸

Allowing individuals to receive only concessions from the government followed colonial precedent, in keeping with Molina Enríquez's call for vesting in the federal government the Spanish Crown's traditional right to all of New Spain's lands and waters.

Article 27's restriction against foreigners acquiring concessions to Mexico's lands, waters, or subsoil resources paralleled the 1905 proposed water law, which mandated that all water developments be considered Mexican — regard-

less of whether foreigners controlled the concessions — and be subject only to the courts of the Republic. Article 27 mandated that all foreigners profess before the Secretary of Foreign Relations that they considered themselves Mexican nationals concerning their concessions in Mexico and that they would not call on their governments to protect their concessions.

Admittedly, the restriction preventing foreign governments from intervening in the affairs of their citizens within Mexico had a long precedent; Molina Enríquez was not the first to form the general principles behind this provision of Article 27. The first *terrenos baldíos* law of 1883 excluded all foreign intervention in the affairs of foreign colonies within Mexico,⁷⁹ creating a precedent for Molina Enríquez's call for subjecting foreign property holders to Mexican law. The inclusion of this principle in Article 27 should be ascribed to both Molina Enríquez's principles and the general sentiments of the radical deputies at the 1917 Constitutional Convention.

Article 27 incorporated most of the important features of Carranza's 6 January 1915 decree calling for the restitution of *ejido* lands in Mexico. Like the 1915 decree, Article 27 mandated the return of village lands alienated under the Ley Lerdo of 1856. In addition, Article 27 extended the 1915 decree's concern with abolishing the monopoly of lands that had arisen under the Díaz regime's *terrenos baldíos* laws. Of course, Molina Enríquez had devoted much of *Los grandes problemas* to explaining the problems that both of these land laws had created in Mexico.

Article 27 moved beyond the 1915 decree in calling for state legislatures to begin establishing laws to divide the haciendas in their respective states;⁸⁰ again, in *Los grandes problemas*, Molina Enríquez had contended that both tax reform and division of haciendas should take place at the state level. Aware of Mexico's great geographical diversity, he believed that any specific laws mandating the maximum sizes of agricultural property would have to take into account the regional conditions of Mexico's twenty-seven states.⁸¹ Thus, Article 27 directed each state and territory to "fix the maximum extension of land that each individual or legally constituted society can own." Unfortunately, Molina Enríquez's bow to federalism would later prove to be a factor inhibiting the division of the hacienda, as state governments tended to shy away from enforcing these provisions of Article 27.⁸²

The preface to Article 27 included a call "to divide the large landed estates" in order "to develop small landed holdings, . . . establish new centers of rural population . . .," and "encourage agriculture."⁸³ These provisions to promote a more equitable distribution of Mexico's wealth embody Molina Enríquez's pre-Revolutionary land-reform goals. He predicated his call for land reform in *Los grandes problemas* on the belief that agriculture was the foundation of any country's existence; thus, division of the unproductive central Mexican hacienda would result in the development of a rural middle class in Mexico, helping to eliminate the traditionally extreme disparities between rich and poor.

The above comparison of Molina Enríquez's pre-Revolutionary land-reform program and goals, coupled with the fact that Molina Enríquez participated in the drafting of Article 27 at Querétaro, conclusively points to Molina Enríquez as the intellectual author of Article 27. Without the previous formulation of Molina Enríquez's systematic land-reform proposals, how else could the Rouaix committee have drafted the comprehensive provisions present in Article 27 in two short weeks? Undoubtedly other committee members made important specific recommendations that were incorporated in Article 27, but the fact remains that of all the committee members, only Molina Enríquez came with twenty years of research behind him on the problem of land reform.

CHAPTER 6

Legislating Land Reform on National and State Levels 1917–1918

Molina Enríquez did not end his activities on behalf of land reform in Mexico with the incorporation of his land-reform program in the 1917 Constitution. Rather, he continued to push for land reform up to his death in 1940. This chapter examines his participation in the early stages of land reform in Revolutionary Mexico, first on the national level as a member of the National Agrarian Commission and then on the state level as general secretary of the state of Mexico.

THE LEGAL DETAILS OF LAND REFORM: THE FIRST PERIOD ON THE NATIONAL AGRARIAN COMMISSION

Molina Enríquez entered the Carranza government's National Agrarian Commission (CNA) in 1916, the commission's first year. Luis Cabrera, as the secretary of finance for Carranza, had intervened on Molina Enríquez's behalf to secure him the position on the CNA executive committee.¹

Molina Enríquez proudly noted that he had been present when the commission approved the restitution of the first ejido given in the Revolution; it was given to the village of Ixtapalapa in the Federal District. He recalled the great turmoil that accompanied the awarding of the first ejidos of the Revolution.² The CNA's own statistics record only one definite award of ejido land in 1916, benefiting a total of 186 persons.³ Given the marginal progress the CNA made in awarding ejido lands during the Carranza administration, the Ixtapalapa

ejido must be seen as more a symbolic precedent than the real start of land reform in Mexico.

The granting of one ejido in 1916 did not signal the beginning of a land-reform revolution in Mexico. In fact, during the Carranza administration, the executive committee of the CNA preoccupied itself more with defining the legal procedures to be followed for the restitution, donation, and amplification of ejidos than in the awarding of ejido lands to landless Mexican peasants. Up to the downfall of the Carranza government in the Agua Prieta rebellion of 1920, only 190 villages made up of 48,000 peasants had received definite presidential grants of ejido lands, and the total area amounted to nearly 170,000 hectares.⁴ However, to be fair to the executive committee of the CNA, Carranza's denial of ejido lands that the CNA had approved was mostly responsible for delaying the award of ejidos during the years of his administration.

The *Monthly Bulletin* of the CNA records provides us with a picture of Molina Enríquez's participation in the legal debates over implementation of land reform by the CNA executive committee in the spring and summer of 1917. The debates focused on the question of how to define which population centers were legally entitled to receive ejido lands. Specific petitions for restitution of ejido lands provided the grist for the committee's legal debates over how to interpret the 6 January 1915 law.

In the middle of March 1917, for example, Molina Enríquez introduced a petition to the executive committee from the pueblo of Los Reyes Matzontla, located in the state of Puebla, for restitution of ejido lands that the pueblo claimed had been unjustly taken by the neighboring pueblo of Zapotitlán. Reportedly the village had had its lands seized before 1856. The committee debated the right of Los Reyes Matzontla to have its lands restored because committee members noted that the 6 January 1915 decree only mandated restitution of lands despoiled after the proclamation of Ley Lerdo on June 25, 1856.⁵

Because the committee had to operate under the provisions of the Constitutionalist 6 January 1915 agrarian decree, it voted against Molina Enríquez's proposal for restitution of Los Reyes Matzontla's lands. The committee's problem lay in the fact that the federal legislature and a majority of state legislatures had not approved the 1917 Constitution. Until a majority did so, the committee could not use Article 27 as the basis for its decisions, and was thus legally bound to follow the 1915 law.⁶

Although the executive committee rejected the petition of Los Reyes Matzontla, it did approve Molina Enríquez's proposal to end the conflict between the two pueblos. Molina Enríquez called on Zapotitlán to cede all the lands claimed by Los Reyes Matzontla. In return, he proposed that the government award Zapotitlán with lands from surrounding haciendas. The committee approved and forwarded this proposal to the secretary of development; in the committee's next session, one of the members mentioned that Carranza had approved the Los Reyes Matzontla resolution.⁷

In April 1917, the executive committee agreed that Molina Enríquez should present his interpretation of the 6 January 1915 law regarding the proper application of the law's ejido restitution clause. The committee noted that it had been nullifying many requests for the restitution of ejidos because the 6 January 1915 law only allowed the restitution of ejidos taken since the 1856 Lerdo Law.⁸

Molina Enríquez explained to the executive committee how hacienda expansion had destroyed many pueblos whose lands had been taken over completely, thereby denying them the legal status required for restitution of their ejido lands. Molina Enríquez said he knew of five or six specific cases of hacienda takeovers of pueblo lands.⁹ In these cases the citizens of the affected pueblos had usually taken refuge in nearby villages, and were now requesting restitution of the ejidos. Yet the language of the 6 January 1915 law prevented the legitimate return of these usurped ejidos.¹⁰ As a way around the problem, Molina Enríquez recommended that the CNA contact state governors and request that they restore these pueblos to legal status; then the CNA could proceed to reconstitute these unfortunate pueblos' ejidos.¹¹

Molina Enríquez argued that "the word pueblo in Article 3 of the law should be taken as referring generically to all population centers."¹² Thus, regardless of their legal status, population centers would have the right to solicit donations of ejido lands. Without this broad interpretation of the law, Molina Enríquez insisted that the object of the 6 January 1915 law—the awarding of land to those in need—would be nullified because 90 percent of rural Mexico's population centers did not have official status as pueblos.¹³

Pastor Rouaix, president of the executive committee of the CNA, objected to Molina Enríquez's recommendation that the CNA ask state governors to grant legal status to pueblos destroyed by hacienda expansion in order to facilitate granting of ejido lands.¹⁴ Although Rouaix did not give a specific reason for opposing the recommendation, it is probable that he wanted to keep the land-reform process under the auspices of the CNA.¹⁵ However, Rouaix did say the CNA could legitimately ask state governments for information on pueblos that had been swallowed up by haciendas to ascertain their actual legal status. Rouaix argued that if state governments confirmed that pueblos had had their legal status eliminated by hacienda expansion, the CNA could proceed with restitution of the pueblos' ejidos without violating the provisions of the 6 January 1915 decree. The committee approved Rouaix's modification of Molina Enríquez's proposal to deal with this aspect of the legal entity question.¹⁶

To circumvent the thorny issue of legal status requirements for pueblos, Molina Enríquez insisted that donation should apply to any population centers having some form of political organization. Earlier the CNA executive committee had approved his resolution to convert all denied restitution solicitations automatically into donation petitions without additional paperwork.¹⁷ In his

subsequent call for universal donation of ejido lands, Molina Enríquez proposed that social groupings requesting ejidos only need have (1) the characteristics of a population center, (2) one hundred or more families, and (3) a location on the lands being requested.¹⁸

Molina Enríquez argued that following the strict legal requirements of the 6 January 1915 law would deny ejidos to the majority of Mexico's rural communities, thus undermining the "spirit of the law" through excessive legal rigidity. Molina Enríquez's work as a rural notary had given him an in-depth understanding of the problems of Mexico's land-title system: most pueblos would be locked out from ejido lands due to lack of legal title.¹⁹ Additionally, Molina Enríquez explained that the names given to rural Mexico's population centers varied according to region; without a broad interpretation of the "spirit" of the 6 January 1915 law, the *riberas* of Chiapas, the *cuadrillas* of Guerrero, the *barrios* of the state of Mexico, and the *villas* of Coahuila — to mention only a few — would all be denied grants of ejido lands.²⁰

The executive committee voted against Molina Enríquez's proposal for a broad interpretation of the 6 January 1915 law. Immediately after the executive committee's rebuff, Molina Enríquez took an extended leave of absence from the committee in order to return to Toluca, the state capital of Mexico, to take a position as secretary general of the state government.²¹ Surely he felt frustrated that the excessively legalistic interpretations of the CNA inhibited the return of lands to Mexico's landless peasantry.

MOLINA ENRÍQUEZ'S TRIUMPHANT RETURN TO TOLUCA

Even before Molina Enríquez accepted the position as secretary general of the state of Mexico, his call for regulating land in the public interest had had an impact on the state's Revolutionary agrarian legislation. After the 1917 Constitution was written, the military governor, Agustín Millán, initiated a new law enabling town councils in the state to rent out unused private lands suitable for cultivation. Millán legitimized this new law by declaring that the cultivation of land in the state was in the public interest. This reasoning followed the pre-Revolutionary idea that Molina Enríquez developed for the regulation of private property and helped to incorporate in Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution.²²

On taking office as secretary general of the state of Mexico in the summer of 1917, Molina Enríquez immediately decreed the expropriation of hoarded corn in the state on the basis of public utility to deal with the problems of food shortages the Revolution had caused. This first decree during his tenure as secretary general reflected his characterization of hacendados in *Los grandes problemas* as speculators who profited from the misery of food shortages. When the summer rains came and the corn harvest was plentiful, hacendados

held their corn off the market, according to Molina Enríquez. He contended that they only placed their corn on the market during lean harvest years, when the prices rose.²³

The decree called for the expropriation of all corn held by one person or family in excess of fifty hectoliters. The government would then sell the corn to needy families, up to a limit of twenty liters per family for no more than twenty centavos a liter. The decree allowed either for the public to denounce corn monopolizers or for government agents with warrants to search out corn hoards.²⁴

Article 9 of the decree mandated that haciendas that had been giving corn rations to their workers had to continue to do so until the last day in November 1917 or face a 10,000 peso fine.²⁵ Ten days after the proclamation, Molina Enríquez amended the decree to prevent haciendas from using the allowance as a loophole to evade the law.²⁶ The amended Article 9 allowed no exemptions for corn hoards on haciendas found outside of the stores used for worker or peon rations.²⁷

Tax-reform legislation in the state during Molina Enríquez's tenure as secretary general also followed prescriptions he had developed in *Los grandes problemas*. In late August 1917, Governor Millán, using extraordinary powers over the state treasury accorded him as a military governor, decreed a substantial tax break for small urban or rural properties with a value under 5,000 pesos. The decree mandated a tax-rate reduction from 35 percent to 10 percent on properties under the 5,000 peso value. Properties over 5,000 pesos continued to be assessed at the 35 percent rate.²⁸

The Millán administration directed that the new 10 percent tax rate on small properties be used to establish "ethnographic schools" in the state to preserve indigenous cultural groups. The ethnographic schools were to aid in incorporating indigenous groups into the state's economy while preserving their customs and original culture.²⁹ Another provision of the Millán administration's "extraordinary" tax reform included a reduction in the tax rate for properties in the Toluca municipality, with the taxes collected under the new rate to be applied to developing roads in the municipality.³⁰

Undoubtedly Molina Enríquez advised Millán in formulating the provisions of the tax-reform decree. Its two provisions, protection of indigenous culture and road development, had been concerns of Molina Enríquez in the pre-Revolutionary era. The August 1917 tax-reform decree represented an amplification of his pre-Revolutionary calls for tax reform—perhaps possible because of the Revolutionary changes that had taken place in Mexico in the eight years since publication of *Los grandes problemas*. Tax reform had been a central concern of the book, and Molina Enríquez had called for tax reform on the state level to prevent hacendados from evading taxes. In his 1911 platform for governor, he had categorized land valued under 5,000 pesos as the ideal size for divided hacienda plots, an obvious link later to the tax-reform

decree.³¹ As an ethnologist, Molina Enríquez took protection of Mexico's indigenous cultures—the goal of the “ethnological schools” mandated in the decree—very seriously. He had included provisions for the protection of the state's indigenous cultures in his 1911 platform for the governorship race.³² As the head professor of ethnology at the National Museum of Anthropology from 1916 into the 1930s, Molina Enríquez had a lifelong interest in preserving Mexico's indigenous cultures. Luis, his grandson, remembers his office at the museum being decorated with indigenous crafts, including masks, pottery, and rugs.³³ Undoubtedly the “ethnological schools” called for in the tax-reform decree were based for the most part on Molina Enríquez's ideas.

The decree's provision for road development also accorded with Molina Enríquez's pre-Revolutionary concerns. Road development had been a concern of his since his years as a notary in Sultepec, Mexico, and the development of a modern transport network for the state of Mexico had figured prominently in his 1911 platform for the governorship.

Molina Enríquez's name as secretary general fittingly appears at the end of the Millán administration's next tax-reform decree of early September 1917, set up to promote the voluntary division of haciendas larger than 1,700 hectares.³⁴ The September 1917 decree attempted to use tax breaks to induce hacendados to divide their property for sale. The decree promised tax reductions of 50 percent on haciendas larger than 1,700 hectares if the owners voluntarily submitted to a government-controlled division into “ranchos, parcels, or lots” of no more than 500 hectares. The decree contained forty articles designed to promote the development of midsized farms and new population centers from hacienda land, and to hinder the creation of new haciendas from the lands the government divided.³⁵

The weak point of the September decree was the assumption that hacendados would voluntarily submit to the division of their haciendas given the incentive of a tax break. Molina Enríquez had argued in *Los grandes problemas* that many hacendados would take advantage of a chance to sell their lands to special banks set up to take care of dividing and selling hacienda lands.³⁶ The September decree followed the same reasoning.

Molina Enríquez took a more forceful position in a notice on 1 October 1917 calling for administrators of all tax-assessment offices of the state to immediately proceed with an assessment of all properties subject to a new maguey tax.³⁷ He had focused on the unfair assessment of pulque taxes in *Los grandes problemas*, and had fumed against the growing of maguey for the production of pulque on lands suitable for grain cultivation.³⁸ His attempt as secretary general of the state to implement a new tax on maguey accorded with his concern to maximize the production of corn in rural Mexico.

The new constitution for the state of Mexico in November 1917 represented the culmination of Molina Enríquez's influence in the state's legislative revolution for land reform. The constitution declared that haciendas larger than 700

hectares “should be” divided among the heirs or beneficiaries of the owner at inheritance,³⁹ following Molina Enríquez’s call in *Los grandes problemas* for this type of hacienda division. As has been discussed, the inheritance of property concerned Molina Enríquez as early as 1895, when he wrote his first pamphlet, *El evangelio de una nueva reforma*, based on the ideas of the German social critic Max Nordau.⁴⁰ And he had called for the division of haciendas at inheritance in *Los grandes problemas*.⁴¹ The new constitution also followed the third, eighth, and eleventh paragraphs of Article 27 of the 1917 federal constitution, which called for the states of the Republic to institute land-reform legislation within one year.⁴²

Following the requirements of Article 27, the state of Mexico’s constitution defined the maximum allowable sizes for rural properties in the state, dependent on the location of the property to population centers. It fixed the maximum size for haciendas more than four kilometers from a population center of 1,000 or more inhabitants at 700 hectares.⁴³ Haciendas within a radius of four kilometers from population centers larger than 1,000 inhabitants were limited to less than 100 hectares.⁴⁴ All rural properties exceeding the limits prescribed were to be divided. Article 205 of the state constitution gave owners whose properties exceeded the set limits one year to begin the division of their lands. If the owners did not comply, the state would begin the forcible division of these lands at the beginning of 1918.⁴⁵

Hacienda sharecroppers and neighbors were to be given the first chance to acquire the lands divided under the 1917 state constitution. If these peasants made known within a month their desire to acquire divided hacienda land, they would be given favorable terms to pay off the land over a five-year period.⁴⁶

Tax initiatives figured prominently in spurring the division of haciendas under the new state constitution. Tax rates were raised on haciendas that exceeded the size limits. The constitution approved “popular action to denounce frauds committed against the public treasury, by the hiding of the true value of rural and urban real estate in tax registers.”⁴⁷ Those found guilty of hiding the true value of their properties to avoid taxes were to make up 50 percent of the tax difference within one year.⁴⁸

In *Los grandes problemas*, Molina Enríquez had called for reforms such as these to end what he believed to be the common practice of underassessing haciendas to avoid taxes. He had noted that the largest haciendas in the state of Mexico were vastly underassessed.⁴⁹ Yet his call for tax reassessments to end tax fraud had been a difficult challenge in 1909, given the influence that hacendados wielded in the state’s political system during the Porfirian era. Apparently the Revolution had curtailed much of the influence that hacendados had wielded in pre-Revolutionary politics.

Finally, the 1917 state constitution, following Article 27 of the 1917 federal constitution, gave the state government the right to expropriate private prop-

erty, rural or urban. The government would compensate the owner of the expropriated property for 110 percent of the assessed tax value of the property. The state constitution gave the owner the right to contest the expropriation before a district judge, whose verdict would be "firm and irrevocable."⁵⁰

Molina Enríquez's key theoretical contribution to Article 27 had been the return to the colonial precedent of giving the state the right to intervene in ownership of private property for the public interest; now his home state of Mexico had instituted the legislation allowing this intervention. Molina Enríquez's return in 1917 as the state's second-in-command had given him the opportunity to push the reforms he had advocated in the 1911 race for governor. He had quit the race after being dismissed by the elite of Toluca as a wide-eyed dreamer, but he had returned to see most of his pre-Revolutionary land-reform program put into the state's legislative books. This certainly marked another personal triumph for Molina Enríquez and represented a political revolution in the state of Mexico.

Of course, Molina Enríquez knew that legislation without implementation does not make a revolution. In fact, from 1915 to 1933, the state of Mexico was number two in the country in the percentage of private rural properties affected by definitive grants of ejidos, with 88 percent of such properties affected.⁵¹ Though the state went further than most in land-reform implementation, thirteen years after the proclamation of the 1917 state constitution, it still had a long way to go. By 1930, ejidos occupied 21.8 percent of all farm property area in the state.⁵² Yet private farms larger than 1,000 hectares — only .4 percent of all private farms — still occupied 50.7 percent of total private farm area; farms smaller than 1,000 hectares — 99.6 percent of total farms — held 49.3 percent of the state's private farmland.⁵³ Thus, although the state of Mexico, and central Mexico in general, had smaller percentages than other states of large landholdings (greater than 1,000 hectares) in private farmland,⁵⁴ the state still had a long way to go to fulfill the constitutional limit of 700 and 100 hectares for rural properties.

MOLINA ENRÍQUEZ'S RETURN AND OUSTER FROM THE CNA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Two months after the proclamation of the Revolutionary 1917 Constitution of the state of Mexico, Molina Enríquez returned to Mexico City to his position as representative of the secretary of finance on the executive committee of the National Agrarian Commission. During his second phase of participation on the committee, it was still preoccupied with defining the specific legal parameters of land reform that the 6 January 1915 decree and Article 27 had mapped out in general terms. The committee's preoccupation with legal matters

inexorably slowed the land-reform process in Mexico. Molina Enríquez's continuing attempts to urge the committee to take a broad interpretation of Article 27 to speed the land-reform process met with little success.

After Molina Enríquez's return to the committee in February 1918, the committee took up the issue of compensation for property owners affected by the donation of ejidos. Molina Enríquez and another member of the committee, Lic. del Valle, saw this as a nonissue because both the 6 January 1915 decree and Article 27 had mandated indemnities for owners affected by land expropriation.⁵⁵ In fact, Molina Enríquez had repeatedly stressed the importance of indemnification for expropriated property in his pre-Revolutionary land-reform program.

CNA President Rouaix took issue with a proposal Molina Enríquez made to deal with the indemnity issue that would have slightly diminished the CNA's power over the land-reform process. Molina Enríquez proposed that owners of expropriated lands had to prove legal title to the lands to the Secretary of Finance office before being paid indemnities. However, President Rouaix opposed the idea, contending that the CNA had jurisdiction in such matters. The committee approved Rouaix's modification of Molina Enríquez's proposal, voting to make land owners demonstrate to the CNA their legal rights to expropriated properties before being paid indemnities.⁵⁶

Rouaix next raised the question of how to assess the proper amount of indemnification for lands affected by the donation of ejido. Rouaix noted that President Carranza had commented on the inconvenience of fixing a price in relation to the tax or fiscal value of the estate in question, given the wide variation between the assessed and real value of estates in Mexico. In the discussion that followed, it was noted that land owners could reap a profit by exaggerating the value of their estates before expropriation.⁵⁷ In the special session Rouaix called to deal with the issue of indemnity assessment, the committee voted to have two experts assess the tax value of the land being expropriated and to use this as the basis of indemnity payments. Molina Enríquez did not vote as he was not present at this session of the committee.⁵⁸

After resolving the indemnity question, the executive committee took up the recurring question of the legal status necessary for communities to receive ejidos, and whether or not cities were entitled to petition for ejido lands. Many of the ejido petitions brought before the executive committee in April 1918 were rejected because the communities that solicited these petitions lacked clearly defined legal status. A donation petition for El Vite in the state of Hidalgo, for example, was rejected because El Vite did not constitute a "political entity" but simply comprised a few broken-down shacks located in a barranca (ravine) of the Hacienda El Vite.⁵⁹ Likewise, a case of restitution of ejido lands for the Rancho de Yunxui, Yucatán, was denied because it lacked legal status as a political entity.⁶⁰

Throughout April, Molina Enríquez questioned the committee's rejection of petitions for ejidos on the basis of a lack of political status; the specific case of the village of Santa María Guadalupe Daghiadí from the state of Mexico gave him the chance to refute what he believed to be the committee's excessive legalistic approach to land reform. He used his knowledge of the local history of the state of Mexico in this case: Daghiadí had lost its political status because the local jefe político had burned the village down, forcing Daghiadí's inhabitants to take refuge in a nearby ranch. Therefore, Molina Enríquez argued, to deny Daghiadí the restitution of ejido lands because it lacked legal political status would be punishing the victims of a crime.⁶¹ He won the argument to reconsider the Daghiadí case on a five-to-three committee vote.⁶²

One committee member reckoned the case could mean that Circular 27 of the CNA might have to be modified to allow the committee more leeway to try individual cases. Circular 27 of the CNA denied population centers on hacienda lands, and any other communities not legally constituted, the right to petition for ejido lands.⁶³ Denying residents of haciendas the chance to petition for ejidos cut out 36.3 percent of the landless peasantry of Mexico in one stroke.⁶⁴ Likewise, the requirement of legal status to petition for ejido lands undoubtedly reduced greatly the number of Mexican peasants eligible to receive lands from the state. Molina Enríquez considered the requirements of Circular 27 as violations of the spirit of Article 27, and consistently fought to have them repealed in the sessions of the CNA executive committee.⁶⁵

As with his minority position regarding the need to take a broad interpretation of Article 27 to speed the land-reform process, Molina Enríquez also found himself at odds with most of the executive committee in his defense of a federalist approach toward land reform. In his final input into the debates of the executive committee, he argued for the right of Mexican states to determine the land-reform process in their territories. He defended the mandate in Article 27 giving the states jurisdiction over the maximum allowable size of agricultural land in their respective territories.

In a case dealing with an ejido petition from Veracruz, Molina Enríquez's defense of federalism even took precedence over his desire to see land returned to landless peasants. Veracruz had set 200 hectares as the maximum allowable size of agricultural lands in the state. When President Rouaix and another member of the executive committee maintained that any property over 50 hectares anywhere in the Republic should be liable for expropriation for ejidos, Molina Enríquez strenuously objected. He insisted that state laws had to be respected, even if it meant some villages would not receive ejidos.⁶⁶

In another case of state jurisdiction over the land-reform process, Molina Enríquez objected to the authorities of his home state of Mexico for making a resolution granting ejido lands that would have affected the neighboring state of Hidalgo. Rather, he held that officials of both states should have arrived

at a decision because it affected the territory of both states. The CNA executive committee rejected his call for a strict respect of state boundaries in the land-reform process.⁶⁷

Molina Enríquez's advocacy of a federalist approach to land reform challenged the federal CNA's control of land reform, causing President Rouaix to take exception to Molina Enríquez's defense of federalism. Rouaix tended to find fault with most of Molina Enríquez's proposals on legalistic grounds. However, Rouaix endorsed many of Molina Enríquez's proposals after a modification that usually ensured the jurisdiction of the CNA over the land-reform process.⁶⁸

In the summer of 1918, the Carranza administration dismissed Molina Enríquez from the CNA, replacing him with Alberto Jiménez, an opponent of land reform. Perhaps Molina Enríquez's disagreements with Rouaix and other members of the executive committee had something to do with his dismissal, but given his replacement's anti-land-reform stance, it appears there were more profound ideological differences at play. Molina Enríquez stopped appearing at CNA executive committee meetings in May of 1918, and the anti-agrarista Jiménez replaced him as representative of the secretary of finance on the CNA in August 1918.⁶⁹

Jiménez immediately set about challenging the legality of Article 27. He contended that Article 14 of the 1917 Constitution preempted Article 27. Article 14 guaranteed that no individual would be deprived of life, liberty, *property*, possessions, or rights without a judgment of a tribunal.⁷⁰ After attempting to refute the legality of Article 27, Jiménez next turned to the 1857 Constitution, arguing against the return of ejido lands to a village whose land title had been nullified by the 1857 Constitution's prohibition of corporate holding of land! The committee voted Jiménez down on this argument eight to one.⁷¹ Restitution of ejido lands alienated under the 1857 Liberal Constitution had, of course, been the primary goal of the CNA's land-reform program.

Molina Enríquez's reputation as a radical agrarista must have grated on the Carranza administration, noted for its hesitancy in implementing land reform. Of all administrations after the armed phase of the Revolution — from Carranza to Lopez Mateos in 1964 — Carranza's administration ranks last in the amount of land distributed.⁷² From Carranza's 6 January 1915 decree to the end of his presidency, around 180,000 hectares of land were distributed to some 48,000 Mexican peasants.⁷³

Accusations have also been made that Carranza preoccupied himself more with returning expropriated haciendas to their former owners than in implementing land reform for Mexico's impoverished rural masses.⁷⁴ Far from enforcing Article 27, the Carranza administration "pulled the teeth out" of the official land-reform program. In 1916 Carranza issued decrees to further centralize the land-reform process, reducing the authority of state agrarian commissions and declaring that only the National Agrarian Commission could

“sanction the distribution of ejidos.”⁷⁵ In 1919 the CNA’s Circular 34 effectively halted the granting of ejido lands by requiring villagers to pay for any lands granted under donation, by then the most important means of returning lands to Mexico’s villages.⁷⁶

Clearly, Molina Enríquez had extreme ideological differences with the Carranza administration regarding the need for land reform in Mexico. Molina Enríquez’s call for a broad interpretation of Article 27 to speed the land-reform process did not coincide with the Carranza administration’s attempts to emasculate official land reform. And Molina Enríquez’s advocacy of a federalist approach to land reform, as mandated in Article 27, threatened the Carranza administration’s power to control the land-reform process. Given these ideological differences, Molina Enríquez’s dismissal from the CNA in August 1918 was to be expected.

Molina Enríquez’s break with the Carranza administration was as fortuitous as the rest of his Revolutionary career, however, as it placed him in a perfect position to reenter the federal government in the early 1920s after Carranza’s downfall. Plutarco Elías Calles would become Molina Enríquez’s patron in the national government after the fall of Carranza, and Molina Enríquez would have his last major impact on the land-reform debate in modern Mexico during the presidency of Calles.

CHAPTER 7

The Agrarian Debate over Individual Property Versus the Collective Ejido 1920–1940

The Carranza administration had eliminated Andrés Molina Enríquez from the official land-reform program in 1918 over differences regarding the interpretation of Article 27 and the pace of land reform. Ironically, Carranza reportedly had been partial to the midsized family farm that Molina Enríquez advocated throughout his career. After President Carranza's overthrow in 1920 in the Agua Prieta Rebellion, Molina Enríquez reentered the political debate over the official land-reform program as an advisor to Plutarco Elías Calles, then secretary of the interior for the Obregón administration.

DEFENSE OF ARTICLE 27: THE MIDDLE WAY BETWEEN PRIVATE MONOPOLY AND SOCIALISM

In 1922, a year of internal and external crisis for Mexico over the “confiscatory provisions” of Article 27,¹ Molina Enríquez defended Article 27 against charges of Bolshevism, invoking both the theory of social evolution and the legal precedence of Mexico's colonial era. He advocated a middle way for Mexico between the extremes of private monopoly and socialism by urging the development of midscale, family-based farms and industry. His advocacy for the midsized family farm as the ultimate goal of land reform rather than the collective ejido suited the temperament of the leaders of the newly emergent Sonoran dynasty that controlled Mexico from 1920 to 1934.²

Molina Enríquez represented the views of the secretary of the interior in

1922 in a speech before the Council of Mexican Industrialists.³ In the speech, he explained the objectives behind the land and labor-reform provisions of the 1917 Constitution. He noted that the press and the latifundistas had created an image of him as a total radical, and that therefore the Council would expect to hear a radical speech. He said that, in fact, he did envision the eventual disappearance of the capitalist system throughout the world due to the workings of social evolution. However, he also rejected socialism on evolutionist grounds, arguing that socialists unnaturally attempted to “diminish the suffering caused by the activities necessary for life.”⁴ Rather than espouse the development of socialism in Mexico, Molina Enríquez urged the creation of family-scale industry as a means to overcome the class contradictions inherent in monopoly capitalism.⁵ Just as he had envisioned the family farm as the middle way between the evils of latifundia and minifundia, he envisioned midscale family industrial firms as a check on the problems of the capitalist system.⁶

Molina Enríquez related in his speech how he had repeatedly advised Secretary of the Interior Calles to press for the fulfillment of the 1917 Constitution’s land- and labor-reform provisions in Mexico. He believed that the secretary of the interior had the obligation to see that state governments followed the principles behind the “organic laws” of the 1917 Constitution when creating regulatory laws to set these principles in motion.⁷

In September of 1922, the Secretariat of the Interior devoted an entire issue of its bulletin to the proper interpretation of Article 27, the bulk of which contained Molina Enríquez’s analysis of Article 27 from 1919 to 1922. The eight studies of Article 27 by Molina Enríquez that were included focused on explaining the origins of Article 27 and defending the right of the nation to regulate Mexico’s resources on the basis of colonial precedent and modern sociology.⁸

Calles apparently believed that Molina Enríquez’s opinions on Article 27 were vital to defending the Mexican government’s right to regulate the nation’s land and resources against the outcries of Mexican hacendados and foreign interests. Molina Enríquez’s denial of any socialist intent behind Article 27 also suited Calles’s nationalist bourgeois vision of Mexico’s future. Although Molina Enríquez did defend in 1922 Mexico’s right to regulate or expropriate foreign properties during the Obregón administration’s crisis with the United States over Article 27, he also insisted on the need for indemnification of any property expropriated under Article 27.

A PROPOSED RESOLUTION FOR THE CRISIS IN U.S. –MEXICAN RELATIONS

Molina Enríquez entered the debate about the deteriorating relationship between the United States and Mexico in the early 1920s. He maintained that the

success of the Mexican land-reform program hinged on resolution of the problems the United States had with the provisions of Article 27 that affected the property of U.S. citizens in Mexico. As he insisted in his pre-Revolutionary land-reform program, Molina Enríquez believed that just indemnities for expropriated properties were crucial to avert a worsening of U.S.–Mexican relations, which could have led to U.S. intervention in Mexico in the 1920s. He had warned in 1909 in *Los grandes problemas* that implementation of reforms in Mexico aimed at creating a mestizo rural middle class would have to guarantee indemnities for foreign properties, especially American properties; if not, Mexico faced U.S. intervention.⁹ However, he argued that in the end, Mexico would have to stand up to the United States in defense of its sovereignty.

In January of 1922, the paper *El Demócrata* reported that “the recognized agrarista” Molina Enríquez had been quoted by anti-agraristas as saying that Mexico’s land-reform program had failed due to a lack of indemnities for expropriated owners.¹⁰ *El Demócrata* believed anti-agraristas had quoted Molina Enríquez, “the writer of Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution,” out of context to attempt to discredit the land-reform program.¹¹

Molina Enríquez clarified his ideas on the necessity for indemnities in a series of articles in *Excelsior* immediately after *El Demócrata*’s public worries over his supposed declaration regarding the failure of land reform. Molina Enríquez linked the payment of indemnities for expropriated agricultural properties to the question of U.S. recognition of the Obregón administration. In fact, the U.S. government did withhold recognition of the Obregón administration primarily over the provisions of Article 27 that affected the property of U.S. nationals in Mexico. The United States was especially keen to prevent the expropriation of American oil and agricultural interests in Mexico.¹² Molina Enríquez believed the linkage of U.S. recognition to U.S. views of the “confiscatory” provisions of Article 27 both helped and hindered Mexico’s land-reform program. On the one hand, he believed the outcry among Mexican and foreign landowners against the expropriation of property caused the Mexican government to hold back the land-reform movement in order to resolve the question of U.S. recognition. On the other hand, Molina Enríquez contended that the congruence between the interests of Mexican hacendados and U.S. parties meant that the Mexican government could not unfold “its program to save the hacendados,” as the Mexican government would then have been seen as selling out to foreign interests.¹³

U.S. oil companies, the strongest Mexican interventionist lobby in Washington in the 1920s, had accused the Mexican government of Bolshevism. This was an attempt to rally U.S. public opinion in support of U.S. intervention in Mexico in order to protect U.S. property from expropriation.¹⁴

To counter charges of Article 27’s “communist” origins in newspaper articles and later before the Mexican Supreme Court, Molina Enríquez first explained how modern social sciences had refuted the notion that the origin of

society resulted from the development of individual property.¹⁵ He explained that this concept had been the norm in western civilization since the Roman empire. However, he asserted that modern social science conceived of private property as a social creation; thus, society had the right to regulate its own invention as it saw fit. Therefore, Article 27 followed the conceptions of modern social sciences, not modern socialism.¹⁶

Likewise, Molina Enríquez defended the right of the Mexican government to expropriate property in the public interest — not with socialist doctrine, but with a return to colonial legal precedence. As early as 1905, Molina Enríquez had justified his proposal for vesting in the federal government control of Mexico's waters by arguing that the rights of the Spanish Crown as owner of all of Mexico's resources passed to the nation at independence.¹⁷ Molina Enríquez incorporated the government's right to control Mexico's land and resources into the preamble to Article 27. Therefore, in February of 1922, Molina Enríquez could refute the charges of U.S. oil companies and Mexican hacendados regarding the communist origins of Article 27 by returning to the legal precedence of the colonial era to justify the right of the federal government to regulate private property.¹⁸

Molina Enríquez ended a series of articles in *Excelsior* with a call for the Mexican government to pay off its foreign debt and guarantee indemnities for expropriated property. He believed this would create the order and stability necessary to continue the land-reform program. Both the payment of the foreign debt and the payment of indemnities for expropriated properties would "level the road of recognition."¹⁹ Molina Enríquez believed that U.S. recognition would take the external pressure off the Obregón administration to hold back the land-reform program, and would also open up new loans for the indemnification of expropriated properties.²⁰

In fact, the Obregón administration's compromise with the U.S. government over the "confiscatory" provisions of Article 27 in the Bucareli Accords of 1923 included a provision for the guaranteed indemnification for expropriated agricultural properties. The Bucareli Accords contained an agreement between the U.S. and Mexican governments that expropriated lands of more than 1,755 hectares would be indemnified by agrarian bonds, and expropriated properties smaller than 1,755 hectares would be paid for immediately upon confiscation.²¹

Interestingly, after the settlement of the indemnity question with the United States, the Obregón administration did speed up its granting of lands to Mexican peasants. Its land grants doubled between 1922 and 1923.²² However, the Obregón administration did not by any means achieve a Revolutionary land-reform program with its granting of 1.1 million hectares, or .7 percent of Mexico's land surface, during its four-year term.²³

Although Molina Enríquez claimed in his articles in *Excelsior* that the Obregón administration had consulted him over the writing of a new indemnification law,²⁴ Molina Enríquez's real link to the administration was in his

relationship with Calles, the secretary of the interior — a link evidenced by his role as the secretary's representative in writing and in speeches.

THE EJIDO VERSUS THE FAMILY FARM

As discussed above, Molina Enríquez disavowed any socialist intent behind Article 27 when defending the article against charges of Bolshevism. Thus, when the debate erupted in 1923 over the goal of Mexican land reform — collective ejido or midscale individual property — Molina Enríquez broke with the ejido-oriented National Agrarian Party (PNA) to help form the National Agrarian Confederation (CNA). The Confederation advocated the midscale individual property as the proper objective of Mexican land reform.²⁵

The PNA had been the first formally organized political organization established after the armed phase of the Revolution to press for land reform in Mexico. Urban Zapatista intellectuals made up most of its leadership, with Antonio Díaz Soto y Gama being the most famous of these intellectuals, and others being Aurelio Manrique and Rafael Ramos Pedrueza.²⁶ José Vasconcelos, who wasn't a Zapatista, also participated in the leadership of the PNA. The PNA contended that the objective of land reform in Mexico should be the collective ejido.²⁷

The PNA gained the Obregón administration's support for the collective ejido in the early 1920s, when the National Agrarian Commission issued Circular 51, which mandated the collectivization of the ejido.²⁸ The PNA leadership used its influence over campesinos to gain political positions in the Obregón administration. In return for political positions, the PNA leadership promised Obregón the support of peasant groups it controlled.²⁹

The CNA was upset over both the PNA's collectivist goals for Mexican land reform and the PNA leadership's manipulation of peasant support to gain high political offices. The CNA leadership included the ex-Zapatista Gildardo Magaña, the San Luis Potosí caudillo, Saturnino Cedillo, and Molina Enríquez.³⁰ The CNA supported Calles for president at its national convention in 1924, and in turn, Calles gave lip service to the CNA program when he became president.³¹

Molina Enríquez's guiding hand can be seen in the CNA's land-reform program, proclaimed in the summer of 1924. The CNA program called for limitation of ejido grants to indigenous or other communities that remained in a communal land-tenure state. According to the CNA, rural Mexicans outside of communal-based villages should have obtained their land through the division of haciendas, not through ejido grants. To achieve this, the CNA called for all Mexican state governments to fix the maximum legal size for rural properties in their various geographical regions. Additionally, the CNA called

on state governments to issue ten-year bonds to enable Mexican peasants to pay off the lands they had received from the division of haciendas over a long period. Fixing the maximum legal size also would prevent the taking of small properties for ejido grants, a common occurrence according to the CNA.³² The CNA, and Molina Enríquez in particular, saw the PNA's policy of concentrating solely on ejido grants as a means to prevent the division of the latifundia system in Mexico. The CNA claimed that the ejido program focused on dividing small properties, not the haciendas. Molina Enríquez asserted that the "true object" of the ejido program was the development of a labor force more finely attuned to the needs of the hacienda.³³ In other words, he believed the ejido program was creating the half-peasant/half-proletariat that would ensure the hacienda a cheaper seasonal labor force.

In May 1925, Molina Enríquez, as president of the CNA, accused the PNA of being an anti-agrarista, careerist, communist-oriented institution bent on destroying the small properties of rural Mexico.³⁴ He asserted that the PNA had unlawfully usurped the role of the National Agrarian Commission in order to gain political office for its leaders. He declared it to be open knowledge that the PNA's goal was the imposition of communism in rural Mexico through the destruction of the so-called small bourgeois property and through its internal control of the collective ejido system it espoused.³⁵

Molina Enríquez and the CNA called for state intervention to encourage the division of Mexico's latifundia system into midscale properties and to grant ejidos to communal-based villages. Beyond this, the CNA repudiated all state involvement in the running of ejidos or small properties.³⁶ According to Molina Enríquez, in order to divide the haciendas, the Mexican states should have followed the example of the state of Mexico, where as general secretary he had helped institute a high tax on uncultivated hacienda lands.³⁷ Molina Enríquez asserted that this tax system helped speed the division of haciendas in the state. However, to enable poor Mexican peasants to buy these divided hacienda lands, he advocated the implementation of the ten-year bond plan that the CNA called for in 1924.³⁸

Molina Enríquez maintained that those who argued against the ejido program on economic grounds did not understand the true object of the program. Rather than attempting to increase agricultural productivity, the ejido program's real purpose was to "provide the indispensable elements of life" for the rural workers who only understood the communal land-tenure system. Thus, arguments against the ejido system based on economic criteria, such as the decrease in agricultural production or undercultivation on ejidos, missed the point.³⁹ As he had proposed in his 1922 speech before the Mexican Industrial Council, Molina Enríquez proposed in 1924 a "middle way" between the land monopoly of the latifundia system and the PNA's collectivist system to increase Mexico's agricultural production. As he had continuously argued since the

publication of *Los grandes problemas*, he contended that only the independent family farm, free of entanglements with government bureaucracy, would ensure the future prosperity of Mexico's agriculture and countryside.⁴⁰

Molina Enríquez foresaw World War II—a “War of the Pacific” between the United States and Japan—as early as the 1920s.⁴¹ He asserted that the “middle way” toward land reform, i.e., the creation of a mestizo rural middle class, would improve Mexico's relationship with the United States and strengthen the defense of the western hemisphere in the coming war. He contended that the United States would need strong allies in Latin America, united in a revamped common Monroe Doctrine to defend the western hemisphere. Molina Enríquez believed land reform in Mexico resulting in creation of a rural mestizo middle class would ensure that the majority of Mexicans would have ideological affinities with the United States, “the land of liberty and ideals of equality.”⁴² To pave the way toward this era of friendship and common defense between the United States and Mexico, Molina Enríquez called on the Calles administration to end the communist-oriented ejido system and look toward the development of a rural middle class through the division of the hacienda.⁴³

WINNING THE IDEOLOGICAL BATTLE, LOSING THE IMPLEMENTATION WAR

Molina Enríquez won the ideological battle with the PNA: the Calles administration replaced the PNA-influenced Circular 51 of the National Agrarian Commission, which called for establishment of collective ejidos, with a CNA-influenced Regulatory Law Concerning the Division of Ejido Lands in 1925. The Regulatory Law, as the title suggests, mandated the division of ejido agricultural lands into individual family plots. The Calles administration shared Molina Enríquez's views that Circular 51 was communist-inspired and “that the ultimate goal of the reform was private property—private property more justly distributed, private property controlled in the interest of the public, but private property nonetheless.”⁴⁴

During the Calles years, Molina Enríquez won another ideological battle that he had engaged in as a member of the National Agrarian Commission: the interpretation of Article 27. The Calles administration reformed the basic law of restitution and donation of ejido lands to allow any populated place that lacked or had insufficient lands and waters to receive these legally regardless of legal political status.⁴⁵ As related in the preceding chapter, Molina Enríquez had continuously argued on the National Agrarian Commission for a broad interpretation of the word “pueblo” in Article 27, allowing for the donation of ejido lands to all rural communities in need of them, regardless of political status or legal name.

Calles agreed with Molina Enríquez's conception of the ejido program as a bridge to midscale private property.⁴⁶ In *Los grandes problemas* Molina Enríquez had seen the ejido as a necessary institution for those indigenous groups in Mexico that lacked any notions of private land tenure owing to their "backward evolutionary" advancement.⁴⁷ Although presidential approval of his land-reform program constituted a personal triumph for Molina Enríquez, Calles's public and legislative concordance with Molina Enríquez's land-reform ideology was not fulfilled in practice. Although the Calles administration made significant advances over the Carranza and Obregón administrations' land-reform programs in the amount of land granted, it only distributed 1.5 percent of Mexico's land surface in land grants.⁴⁸ Furthermore, the Calles administration granted an average of only 10.6 hectares per recipient.⁴⁹ This small average meant that the recipients of Calles's land-reform program would never turn into the rural middle class that Molina Enríquez hoped to see develop in post-Revolutionary Mexico.⁵⁰

How could Molina Enríquez have won the ideological battle over land reform in the 1920s only to lose the war of implementation? His ideological perspective fit into Calles's basic bourgeois perspective,⁵¹ hence the lip service paid by Calles to the development of a rural middle class through land reform. However, President Calles ("el Jefe Maximo") had much to lose by following Molina Enríquez's and the CNA's land-reform proposals. Their proposals for implementation of land reform would have drastically reduced the federal government's role in the process. Molina Enríquez conceived of self-regulating ejido communities and independent midscale farmers, free of all government tutelage, as the proper end to Mexican land reform.⁵² However, one of the salient features of the land-reform program has been the federal government's manipulation of peasant support through the granting of land.⁵³

The Calles administration also faced internal and external political pressure that would have intensified had it begun a thorough assault on the hacienda to institute midscale property ownership in Mexico. Internally, from 1926 to 1929 Calles faced the conservative, Catholic uprising known as the Cristero rebellion. The forced division of haciendas would only have created more conservative enemies for the Calles administration. Externally, the United States government was again at odds with Mexico over the implementation of Article 27, and its effects on the property of U.S. nationals in Mexico. A threat of U.S. intervention already hung over the Calles administration in 1927.⁵⁴ A move toward the radical division of Mexico's haciendas might have pushed things over the edge despite Molina Enríquez's long-term vision of how U.S. – Mexican relations should improve with the development of a Mexican rural middle class. In short, politically the Calles administration could not have afforded to implement Molina Enríquez's land-reform program, even if it had wanted to.

While the years of the Calles administration saw a significant increase in the amount of ejido lands granted, in the later years of the “Maximato” (the Calles era) the granting of ejido lands declined to the levels of the Obregón years.⁵⁵ In fact, by 1930 Calles declared the ejido program a failure, and called for an end to the program over a transition period.⁵⁶ Yet, in 1933 Calles was advocating the division of the haciendas into midsize farms.⁵⁷ Molina Enríquez’s land-reform ideology again appeared on the verge of triumph in Mexico.

THE CÁRDENAS YEARS 1934–1940

Lázaro Cárdenas’s presidency in 1934 marked the end of the Maximato. The Cárdenas presidency also marked a radical shift in the land-reform policy of the federal government, as it focused on the development of the collective ejido as the proper end for Mexican land reform. Cárdenas did more than any other president since the beginning of the Mexican Revolution in implementing land reform. Cárdenas distributed a little short of eighteen million hectares, representing 9.1 percent of Mexico’s land surface, during his six years in office. More than eight hundred thousand Mexicans, representing 41.6 percent of the agriculturally employed population, received land during Cárdenas’s term.⁵⁸ And importantly, Cárdenas distributed good-quality agricultural land to peasants, in contrast to most administrations in twentieth-century Mexico.⁵⁹

Molina Enríquez supported the land-reform program of the Cárdenas administration in spite of his ideological differences with the administration over the objective of land reform in Mexico. Molina Enríquez contacted the newly established Cárdenas administration to profess his support and to urge Cárdenas to implement reforms for the benefit of the “popular classes.”⁶⁰ He also resurrected his paper, *El Reformador*, and used it in an attempt to influence the direction of the Cárdenas administration’s land-reform agenda.⁶¹

In Molina Enríquez’s first letter to Cárdenas, he said that the “agrarian question” did not consist solely of the awarding of ejidos. Molina Enríquez did not call on Cárdenas to work on behalf of the mid-sized family farm, nor did he use the word communism to refer to the collective ejido. Rather, he worded his missive to Cárdenas obliquely to alter the direction of the Agrarian Department toward the “universal system” (i.e., communist system), “that in all the world is an anachronism, and among us exists not for scientific motives, but for political motives, contrary to the interests of the Revolution.”⁶²

Through *El Reformador*, Molina Enríquez fought the “communist” collective ejido as the ultimate end of land reform in Mexico, seeing in the ejido program a means to circumvent a “true” land reform. He believed that hacendados had manipulated the ejido program to curtail any meaningful land reform, that ejido-oriented land reform “had sacrificed the small properties to save the large hacienda.”⁶³

Molina Enríquez contended that his old friend, Luis Cabrera, had originated the emphasis on the ejido solution to land reform as a means to curtail a thorough land-reform program. While the first National Agrarian Commission of Mexico during the Madero administration had arrived at the ejido solution during its investigation into the agrarian problem in Mexico, Molina Enríquez believed that Cabrera's 1912 speech in the Chamber of Deputies calling for the restitution of the ejidos fixed the direction of Mexico's agrarian politics during the Revolution. In Molina Enríquez's opinion, Cabrera had thus served as the representative of the hacendado class who embraced his call "to reestablish the forgotten ejido system."⁶⁴

Molina Enríquez believed the Mexican communists of the 1930s aided the continued existence of the hacienda through their rejection of the "bourgeois" family farm. The communists were naively following a policy the hacendados had developed to curtail true land reform. In Molina Enríquez's opinion, the communal ejido program would arouse alarm in foreign countries, especially in the United States, over the institution of communism in Mexico. This foreign alarm would aid the hacendados in their goal of ending the land-reform program. Additionally, he asserted that the lack of individual property rights for ejido holders would result in the takeover of ejido lands by those with influence. The ultimate result would be the transformation of the ejido lands into a new latifundia system.⁶⁵

For Molina Enríquez, the members of collective ejidos, with no individual rights to their lands, were no better than the serfs of medieval Europe.⁶⁶ He believed the collective ejidos were governed in an autocratic manner, demoralizing peasants who had to receive yearly permission to cultivate ejido land. Peasants only accepted the collective ejido for lack of other options to live.⁶⁷

Molina Enríquez ascribed the failure of land reform in Mexico to the misapplied ejido program. For Molina Enríquez, the creoles of Mexico, following their traditional technique to subvert Mexico's revolutions, had proposed the ejido solution to distract the Revolutionaries from the true purpose of the Revolution: the division of the haciendas. He pointed out that the statistical evidence demonstrated the hacienda system had grown overall during the Revolution, leaving Mexico as the number-one country of latifundia in the world.⁶⁸

Molina Enríquez asked: "Does this fact correspond with the first propositions of the Revolution?"⁶⁹

CÁRDENAS'S YUCATÁN CAMPAIGN

The Cárdenas administration invited Molina Enríquez to accompany the president on his famous trip to Mérida in August of 1937 to decree the expropriation of the henequen plantations in Yucatán. Due to poor health, Molina Enríquez could not make the trip. However, he wished Cárdenas "complete success" in

implementing land reform in the Yucatán.⁷⁰ While Molina Enríquez rejected the collective ejido program of the Cárdenas administration, he enthusiastically supported Cárdenas's expropriation of the henequen plantations on the Yucatán peninsula.

In one year, Cárdenas effectively eliminated the infamous plantation system of the Yucatán. He delivered some 80,000 hectares of the Yucatán's henequen lands over to ejidos in 1937, giving ejidos control of 61 percent of all henequen lands. Expropriated owners were entitled to keep 150 hectares of henequen lands.⁷¹

Luis Cabrera wrote an article entitled "The Crusade of Mayab" denouncing Cárdenas's actions in the Yucatán. Cabrera contended that the Ejido Bank had become the hacendado for members of the collective ejidos, reducing them to another form of servitude. Cabrera believed that the collective ejido harmed Mexican agriculture, retarded the education of the peasant, endangered the sovereignty of Mexico's states, was unconstitutional, and was an enemy of the family farm.⁷² Cabrera's criticism of the collective ejido program of the Cárdenas administration closely parallels the arguments that Molina Enríquez also made against the collective ejido. Yet Molina Enríquez rejected Cabrera's views against Cárdenas's program in the Yucatán.

Molina Enríquez supported Cárdenas's action in a pamphlet entitled *The Glorious Crusade of Mayab*, which refuted Luis Cabrera's attack.

Unlike his friend Cabrera, Molina Enríquez embraced Cárdenas's ejido program for the Yucatán because of its sweeping elimination of the henequen latifundia system. The problem with the ejido program had been its "compromising character, according to Molina Enríquez. Rather than sweeping away the hacienda in most of Mexico, the ejido program had created a two-tiered land-tenure system resulting in continual confrontation and violence between the hacienda and the ejido."⁷³

Molina Enríquez also supported Cárdenas's ejido program in Yucatán because of the evil legacy of the area's henequen plantations, and because the peninsula's indigenous population was most suited to a communal land-tenure system according to Molina Enríquez's theoretical conceptions. In his writings on the pre-Revolutionary henequen plantations of Yucatán, he portrayed them as hellholes where people were consumed for the profits of an export economy.⁷⁴ He believed that the henequen plantation owners had no legal right to protect their interests because their past mistreatment of the Mayas made them "not men but brutes" that the Cárdenas's "glorious crusade" had rightfully castigated.⁷⁵ As for the communal ejido Cárdenas set up in the Yucatán, Molina Enríquez considered the ejido necessary for Mexico's indigenous groups, given their "oriental" understanding of land tenure.⁷⁶

In embracing Cárdenas's collective ejido program in the Yucatán, Molina Enríquez did not refute his ideological belief in the midsize family farm as the proper ultimate end to Mexican land reform. Rather, his support of the Yucatán

campaign logically followed from his historical and theoretical conceptions on how land reform should take into account the needs of Mexico's differing population groups. Molina Enríquez made detailed distinctions on the proper application of land reform in Mexico's various regions. If the collective ejido was right for the Yucatán, the midsize family farm would still be more proper for the mestizos of central Mexico.

THE DENIAL OF MOLINA ENRÍQUEZ'S PENSION

Molina Enríquez had an ambivalent relationship with the Cárdenas administration. Although the administration had invited Molina Enríquez to the Yucatán in 1937, it denied him the pension he requested in the following year.

In February 1938, Molina Enríquez requested a modest pension from the Cárdenas administration in accordance with pensions normally awarded to retired professors. Molina Enríquez contended that he deserved a ten-peso-a-day pension, equal to his salary as the head professor of ethnology at the National Museum, owing to his services to the nation.⁷⁷ He emphasized his career as an agrarista when listing the merits that entitled him to a pension. Molina Enríquez mentioned how Dr. Priestly, a history professor at the University of California at Berkeley, had commended *Los grandes problemas*, as the "best book written about Mexico, by a Mexican." And Molina Enríquez noted the year he had "suffered" in prison for attempting to instigate land reform in the failed Texcoco revolt of 1911. He also claimed to have "inspired" Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution. In short, Molina Enríquez portrayed himself to the Cárdenas administration as one of the originators of the agrarian movement in Mexico, and therefore entitled to a government pension in order to avoid living out his old age in poverty.⁷⁸

The Union of Revolutionary Agraristas of the South and Vicente Lombardo Toledano, general secretary of the powerful Confederation of Mexican Labor, sent letters of support for Molina Enríquez's pension to the Cárdenas administration. General Jenaro Amezcua of the Union of Revolutionary Agraristas of the South urged Cárdenas "to concede a maximum pension to Lic. Andrés Molina Enríquez."⁷⁹ And Lombardo Toledano asked Cárdenas to approve Molina Enríquez's pension to reward his labor for the "development of the culture of our people."⁸⁰ As head of the Cárdenas's Confederation of Mexican Labor, Lombardo Toledano had strong influence in the Cárdenas administration; yet despite Toledano's support for Molina Enríquez's pension, the administration never acted to grant it. Letters of support from well-credentialed revolutionaries to the Cárdenas administration did not have their desired effect. Molina Enríquez never saw a "centavo" from the Cárdenas administration, and died in modest circumstances.⁸¹ Given Molina Enríquez's service to his country, the denial of a mere ten-peso-a-day pension was an injustice.

The reasons that the Cárdenas administration did not act on the pension request were likely either bureaucratic or ideological. Molina Enríquez's grandson, Luis, a lawyer in Mexico City who knows the labyrinth of the Mexican bureaucracy, thinks Molina Enríquez's pension request likely got lost in the bureaucratic shuffle of the Cárdenas administration, and the president likely never even saw it.⁸² However, Molina Enríquez's campaign against the ejido program as the end-all of Mexican land reform in *El Reformador* might have tainted his Revolutionary credentials within the Cárdenas administration. In fact, in a 1936 editorial in *El Reformador*, the paper refuted any connection with the political cause of Calles or the fascist movement.⁸³ Obviously Molina Enríquez wrote this disavowal to counter charges against him and *El Reformador*, lending credence to the idea that the Cárdenas administration denied his pension on ideological grounds.

The irony of the Cárdenas administration's lack of action on Molina Enríquez's pension request lies in the fact that Molina Enríquez's land-reform ideology provided the foundation for the administration's notable implementation of land reform and the nationalization of the oil industry in 1938. In fact, Molina Enríquez supported Cárdenas's expropriation of the oil industry in a personal letter sent to Cárdenas, and publicly in *El Reformador*.⁸⁴ Molina Enríquez only lamented the fact that Cárdenas had not also moved to nationalize the haciendas of Mexico in order to convert them into villages.⁸⁵

Molina Enríquez's ideology provided a bridge between the classical liberalism of the nineteenth century and the "socialism" of the Cárdenas administration in the twentieth century. Molina Enríquez's decisive contribution to the 1917 Mexican Constitution was in vesting the federal government with Mexico's land and resources. This represented a dramatic break from the individualism of the 1857 Mexican Constitution and provided the legal foundation for Mexican land reform. Without the break that Molina Enríquez made with nineteenth-century liberalism and helped codify in the 1917 Constitution, the Cárdenas administration would likely have been unable to implement its sweeping land-reform program given the strong opposition it faced, even with the legal sanction of Article 27.⁸⁶

Molina Enríquez's ideological difference with the Cárdenas administration was that while Molina Enríquez rejected Liberal "means," he embraced Liberal "ends." Essentially, Molina Enríquez's long-term goal was a return to the pure capitalism of Adam Smith.⁸⁷ However, "leveling the playing field" in Mexico was complicated owing to the diverse social and racial groups the nation contained. Therefore, Molina Enríquez could agree with Cárdenas' ejido program in the Yucatán as the right program for the indigenous peoples of that region, while still holding to the old Liberal dream of a yeoman-based, prosperous, rural Mexico.

CHAPTER 8

Mexican Land Reform Since the Revolution 1940–1990

From the death of Andrés Molina Enríquez in 1940 until the 1980s, the official party continued using land reform as a means of incorporating its power in Mexico. The goals of land reform shifted from collectivization to privatization during these four decades; and now the land-reform mandate has been removed from the constitution. Due to failures within the agrarian-reform program as well as changes in Mexican society and the world economy, land reform has ended in Mexico.

Most analysts of the 1910 Revolution have focused on the Revolutionary era from 1910 to 1917 or 1940 when assessing the impact of land reform. By moving beyond a focus on the Revolutionary era and the creation of the communal ejido, Mexican land reform can be conceived as a cyclical phenomenon beginning with the Liberal land legislation of the nineteenth century.

James W. Wilkie and Michael W. Hammond have developed a set of time-series statistics in order to demonstrate that three phases of Mexican land reform have taken place from 1853 until 1992. The first phase begins in 1853 with Santa Anna's attempt to nationalize all untitled lands, and continued until 1909, with the fall of Díaz. Liberal land reform under Benito Juárez focused on the breaking up of Church and ejido lands with the goal of establishing a yeoman peasantry. Porfirio Díaz reversed the original Liberal goal of creating midsized family farms and emphasized the development of large-scale export agriculture. State-controlled land reform under Díaz witnessed a massive transfer of land from peasant ownership to hacienda ownership. Wilkie and Hammond estimated that Díaz oversaw the redistribution of 26 percent of

Mexico's land surface. Revolutionary land reform from 1910 to 1992 marks the second phase of Mexican land reform, now ended due to the constitutional reform of late 1991 that marks the end of state involvement in land redistribution. The present and third phase of Mexican land reform seeks to establish privately owned commercial farms geared to food production for Mexico's urban areas and export production to enhance Mexico's balance of trade.¹

To understand Mexico's 1910 Revolution, a longer historical view of decades or even centuries allows an analysis of the Revolution as a series of conflicts and adjustments regarding the proper role of the state in economy and society. This conflict has a long history in Mexico dating back to the late colonial era of Bourbon reforms and continuing after independence in the conflicts between Liberals and Conservatives. In essence, the Revolution carried the state interventionism of the Reform and Porfiriato in a different direction, a direction that Molina Enríquez helped to define.

James W. Wilkie recently analyzed the adjustments that Mexico's one-party system has made since 1910 in his article, "The Six Ideological Phases of Mexico's 'Permanent Revolution' Since 1910."² Wilkie divided Mexico's twentieth-century revolution into six phases:

- I. Political Revolution, 1910–30
 - A. Violence, 1910–19
 - B. Reconstruction, 1920–30
- II. Social Revolution, 1930–40
- III. Economic Revolution, 1940–60
- IV. Balanced Revolution, 1960–70
- V. Statist Revolution, 1960–70
 - A. Political, 1970–76
 - B. Economic, 1976–82
- VI. Restructured Revolution, 1983–
 - A. Economic, 1982–88
 - B. Political, 1988–

Using this interpretive framework, Wilkie analyzed the various phases of Mexico's "Permanent Revolution" through the use of statistical time series. By employing Wilkie's longer-term framework, the debate over the nature of the Revolution among the revisionists and the neo-populists becomes somewhat moot. Rather than attempting to define the Revolution as the victory of any one social class, Wilkie delineated the methods that Mexico's one-party system used to include all social sectors in the Revolutionary process. Wilkie emphasized the complexities of the Revolution by analyzing the techniques that Mexico's one-party system has used to build and hold political power through its responses to unavoidable crises.

In Wilkie's scheme, the Revolution becomes a series of state adjustments to crises within Mexican politics, economy, and society. For instance, during the

period of Social Revolution, President Cárdenas — reacting to the Depression of the 1930s, the political challenge of Calles, and the needs of the Mexican people — built a mass base for Mexico's one-party system through the creation of a corporate system. Cárdenas gained peasant support through a massive land-reform program and worker support through the *Confederación de Trabajadores de México* under Vicente Lombardo Toledano. After Cárdenas, conditions changed and the state focused on the capitalist development of Mexico in the period of Economic Revolution, without an abandonment of land reform until the 1980s. Thus, land reform should be conceived as only one aspect of a revolution that also created programs for the working class, middle class, and even upper class.

Contrary to revisionist views, Wilkie's statistics demonstrated general improvement in the lives of average Mexicans during the "Permanent Revolution." In fact, Wilkie argued that "the stereotype of a socially timeless Mexico" was belied by his Poverty Index for Mexico and by Stephen Haber's Social Modernization index. Both indexes demonstrated that Mexico experienced "a shift from a non-modern condition of society everywhere to a modern condition."³

Likewise contrary to revisionist views on land reform, Wilkie's statistics demonstrated a massive transfer of land extending from the 1920s to the 1970s,⁴ as evidenced in the following statistical tables.

President Díaz Ordaz (1964–70), portrayed now as a rightist because of the 1968 crackdown on student protesters at the Plaza of the Three Cultures, distributed more land than any other previous president, excluding Cárdenas. The rapid pace of land reform continued through the 1970s under Luis Echeverría Alvarez.

From 1940 until 1982, succeeding presidential administrations in Mexico did not abandon land reform but alternated the objectives of the official land-reform program between the collective ejido and the individually plotted ejido and/or the development of the individually owned small property. President Alemán, who came to power in 1946, shifted the land-reform program back to a focus on developing the midsized individual property. This policy basically held until the advent of the Echeverría administration, which took the land-reform program back to the left and attempted to redevelop the collective ejido system of the Cárdenas years.

Since 1982, facing a general economic crisis precipitated by the fall in world oil prices, the Mexican government began a shift away from land reform. Facing a drastic fall in government revenues with the crash in oil prices, President de la Madrid distributed less land than any president since Rodríguez in the early 1930s, and took steps to provide more land-tenure security to commercial farmers and ranchers.⁵ Under President Salinas, the ejido system has been privatized as the shift away from statism continues in the era of Restructured Revolution.

Table 8.1
Land Reform in Mexico, 1916-88
Part I. Hectares²

Date Term Ends ³	President	Approx. Months in Office	Resolutions Published ⁴			Definitive Actions ⁵		
			Number	Hectares ⁷	Hectare/ Month	Number	Hectares ⁷	Hectare/ Month
May 21, 1920	Venustiano Carranza	48.4	326	224,393	4,636	188	134,239	2,774
Nov. 30, 1920	Adolfo de la Huerta ⁶	6.1		157,533	25,825		33,696	5,524
Nov. 30, 1924	Alvaro Obregón	48.0	748	1,730,686	36,056	628	1,133,813	23,621
Nov. 29, 1928	Plutarco Elías Calles	48.0	1,622	3,186,294	66,381	1,573	2,972,876	61,935
Feb. 4, 1930	Emilio Portes Gil	14.1	1,350	2,438,511	172,944	1,156	1,707,757	121,118
Sept. 3, 1932	Pascual Ortiz Rubio	30.8	540	1,225,752	39,797	852	944,538	30,669
Nov. 29, 1934	Abelardo L. Rodríguez	27.0	1,581	2,060,228	76,304	596	790,694	29,285
Nov. 29, 1940	Lázaro Cárdenas	72.0	11,334	20,145,910	279,804	10,744	17,906,430	248,700
Nov. 30, 1946	Manuel Avila Camacho	72.0	3,074	5,970,398	82,922	3,485	5,944,450	82,562
Nov. 30, 1952	Miguel Alemán Valdez	72.0	2,245	5,429,528	75,410	2,385	4,844,123	67,279
Nov. 30, 1958	Aldolfo Ruiz Cortines	72.0	1,745	5,771,721	80,163	1,864	4,936,665	68,565
Nov. 30, 1964	Aldolfo López Mateos	72.0	2,375	9,308,149	129,280	2,887	11,361,270	157,795
Nov. 30, 1970	Gustavo Díaz Ordaz	72.0	3,912	23,055,619	320,217	2,769	14,139,560	196,383
Nov. 30, 1976	Luis Echeverría Alvarez	72.0	2,208	12,243,317	170,046	2,202	13,328,852	185,123
Nov. 30, 1982	José López Portillo	72.0	3,415	6,347,425	88,159	1,975 ^a	6,728,797 ^a	93,456
Nov. 30, 1988	Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado	72.0	2,103	4,448,754	61,788	1,298	2,981,519	41,410
	Total	870.4	38,578	103,744,209 ^b	119,191	34,602	89,889,279	103,274

SOURCE: Secretaría de Reforma Agraria (SRA). *Avance en Materia Agraria, 1983-1987* (México, D.F.: Dirección General de Programación y Evaluación, n.d.); James W. Wilkie, *The Mexican Revolution: Federal Expenditure and Social Change Since 1910* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 188; and SRA chart "Resoluciones Presidenciales Publicadas, Ejecutadas y Pendientes de Ejecutar por Periodo Presidencial, 1915-1980," photocopied in José Luis Mateos, "Diagnóstico del Sector Agropecuario y Forestal: Estructura Social: La Reforma Agraria en México, 1915-1980; Un Nuevo Enfoque Analítico," manuscript, n.d., except all De la Huerta dates are from Departamento Agrario, *Memoria del Laborex, 1945-1946* (statistical section), figures subtracted from total for Carranza in source above. JPL data for resolutions are from SRA, Dirección General de Documentación e Información Agraria, "Resoluciones Presidenciales Publicadas en el Periodo de José López Portillo," computer printout October 1988, supplied by Alfonso Casillas Romahn; for JPL

definitive data, see note a, below. MMH data are from SRA. "Resoluciones y Ejecuciones en el Período de Miguel de Madrid Hurtado," computer printout August 1988, supplied by Casillas Romahn.

¹Revises most data given in Mexico's presidential reports (which tend to be unreliable when compared to detailed data given by the land reform agency); Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática, *Estadísticas Históricas de México*, I, p. 277; and data for presidents Díaz Ordaz and Echeverría given in James W. Wilkie, *La Revolución Mexicana (1910–1970): Gasto Federal y Cambio Social* (Mexico, D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1978), p. 323.

²Land-reform rights distributed as grants to, restitutions to, and enlargements of collective and individual ejidos; grants for new ejidal population centers; and confirmation of existing communal land rights (which recognizes de jure rights of ejidatarios historically holding de facto rights with unregistered legal papers).

³Because presidential reports to congress customarily take place September 1 and presidents leave office December 1, data for the final three months in office for any president may be credited to the following president.

⁴Presidential resolutions become preliminary actions when published in the Mexican government's *Diario Oficial*; resolutions are subject to appeal by persons affected and do not become effective until presidential definitive actions are signed. Resolutions here exclude those signed by one president but not published until one or more succeeding presidents have also taken into account political considerations, technical details, and bureaucratic delays.

⁵Definitive actions finalize previously published presidential resolutions; they are also known as "resoluciones ejecutadas," or "resoluciones definitivamente entregadas." Definitive actions take into account appeals, technical adjustments, and changing circumstances to often modify the resolutions. Definitive actions may be based on resolutions signed by earlier presidents. Pending definitive actions are here excluded.

⁶Data for De la Huerta are separated here from data for Carranza.

⁷One hectare equals 2.47 acres.

⁸These definitive data are from Secretaría de Reforma Agraria (SRA), *Avance en Materia Agraria*, cited in Source, above. These figures should be used with caution because the López Portillo government did not leave records fully documenting definitive actions, according to Alfonso Casillas Romahn, MMH's head of the SRA Dirección General de Documentación e Información Agraria, interviews August and October 1988. De la Madrid's *Quinto Informe Económico; Apéndice Estadístico*, 1987, p. 412, gives the following erroneous figures for the JLP period: 3,321 definitive actions distributing 13,994,924 hectares.

⁹Excludes 65,023,310 hectares resolved for distribution by one president but published under another (1920–80), according to Casillas.

¹⁰The only figure available is from De la Madrid's *Quinto Informe*, cited in note a, above. Although this figure seems logical in relation to the historical series, it should be used with caution because of the erroneous data given in the *Quinto Informe* for the number of hectares distributed to these persons.

¹¹Excludes 1,346,759 beneficiaries resolved under one president but published under another (1920–80), according to Casillas.

Part II. Beneficiaries¹

Date Term Ends ³	President	Approx. Months in Office	Resolutions Published		Definitive Actions	
			Persons	Persons/ Month	Persons	Persons/ Month
May 21, 1920	Venustiano Carranza	48.4	59,848	1,237	40,068	828
Nov. 30, 1920	Adolfo de la Huerta ⁶	6.1	17,355	2,845	6,330	1,038
Nov. 30, 1924	Alvaro Obregón	48.0	164,128	3,419	134,798	2,808
Nov. 29, 1928	Plutarco Elías Calles	48.0	302,539	6,303	297,428	6,196
Feb. 4, 1930	Emilio Portes Gil	14.1	187,269	13,281	171,577	12,169
Sept. 3, 1932	Pascual Ortiz Rubio	30.8	57,994	1,883	64,556	2,096
Nov. 29, 1934	Abelardo L. Rodríguez	27.0	158,393	5,866	68,556	2,539
Nov. 29, 1940	Lázaro Cárdenas	72.0	764,888	10,623	811,157	11,266
Nov. 30, 1946	Manuel Avila Camacho	72.0	122,941	1,708	157,836	2,192
Nov. 30, 1952	Miguel Alemán Valdéz	72.0	108,625	1,509	97,391	1,353
Nov. 30, 1958	Aldolfo Ruiz Cortines	72.0	226,292	3,143	231,888	3,221
Nov. 30, 1964	Aldolfo López Mateos	72.0	289,356	4,019	304,498	4,229
Nov. 30, 1970	Gustavo Díaz Ordáz	72.0	374,520	5,202	240,695	3,343
Nov. 30, 1976	Luis Echeverría Álvarez	72.0	223,250	3,101	206,452	2,867
Nov. 30, 1982	José López Portillo	72.0	245,488	3,410	264,532 ^c	3,674
Nov. 30, 1988	Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado	72.0	184,213	2,559	105,920	1,471
	Total	870.4	3,487,099 ^d	4,006	3,203,682	3,681

SOURCE: Resolutions, SRA chart, "Resoluciones Presidenciales Publicadas, Ejecutadas y Pendientes de Ejecutar por Período Presidencial, 1915-1980," given in Mares, slightly revising data in Nacional Financiera, *La Economía Mexicana en Cifras, 1977*, p. 45; except data for De la Huerta from Departamento Agraria, *Memoria del Labores, 1945-1946* (statistical section), subtracted here from data for Carranza. JPL data are from SRA, Dirección General de Documentación e Información Agraria, "Resoluciones Presidenciales Publicadas en el Período de José López Portillo," computer printout October 1988, supplied by Alfonso Casillas Romahn (see note a, above). MMH data are from SRA, "Resoluciones y Ejecuciones en el Período de Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado," computer printout August 1988, supplied by Casillas Romahn.

Definitive actions, SRA chart for 1915-80 (as for resolutions, above), slightly revising Wilkie, *The Mexican Revolution: Federal Expenditure and Social Change Since 1910*, p. 194; except JPL data for definitive actions are from MMH, *Quinto Informe de Gobierno: Apéndice Estadístico, 1987*, p. 412. MMH data are from SRA, "Resoluciones y Ejecuciones en el Período de Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado," computer printout August 1988, supplied by Casillas Romahn.

¹For notes, see Part I, above.

Part III. Certificates of Inaffectability Granted to Protect Agricultural and Ranging Lands from Land Reform,¹ 1934–88^a
(Number)

Period	President	Agricultural		Ranching ⁵	
		Issued	Pending	Issued	Pending
1934–40	Lázaro Cárdenas	865	0	69	0
1940–46	Manuel Avila Camacho	13,350	0	126	0
1946–52	Miguel Alemán Valdez	73,694	0	575	0
1952–58	Aldolfo Ruiz Cortines	82,366	0	445	0
1958–64	Aldolfo López Mateos	8,627	0	54	0
1964–70	Gustavo Díaz Ordaz	2,055	0	749	0
1970–76	Luis Echeverría Alvarez	1,496	0	361	0
1976–82	José López Portillo	7,715	0	481	0
	Subtotal	<u>190,235</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2,862</u>	<u>0</u>
1982–88	Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado	<u>222,816</u>	<u>1,257</u>	<u>31,572</u>	<u>451</u>
	Total	413,051	1,257	34,434	451

SOURCE: SRA, Dirección General de Documentación e Información Agraria, "Inaffectabilidad: Concentrado de Certificados por Período Presidencial," computer printout August 1988, supplied by director general Alfonso Casillas Romahn.

¹For farm lands, certificates are permanent; for ranching, some certificates are permanent and some are for 25 years. Data include certificates issued as renewal of protection granted earlier.

^aBetween 1901 and 1933, 67 certificates were issued for agricultural lands, 2 for ranching lands.

Part IV. Agricultural Lands Protected by Certificates of Inaffectability, 1934–88^a
(Hectares)

Period	President	Type of Land ¹		Total ¹
		Irrigated	Rainfed	
1934–40	Lázaro Cárdenas	12,040	41,555	53,595
1940–46	Manuel Avila Camacho	115,474	292,712	408,186
1946–52	Miguel Alemán Valdez	387,397	455,416	842,813
1952–58	Aldolfo Ruiz Cortines	94,197	1,229,526	1,323,723
1958–64	Aldolfo López Mateos	150,340	34,704	185,044
1964–70	Gustavo Díaz Ordaz	60,796	52,413	113,209
1970–76	Luis Echeverría Alvarez	14,892	15,089	29,981
1976–82	José López Portillo	48,392	37,654	80,046
1982–88	Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado	<u>343,906</u>	<u>1,476,657</u>	<u>1,820,563</u>
	Total	1,227,447	3,635,736	4,863,183

SOURCE: SRA, Dirección General de Documentación e Información Agraria, "Inaffectabilidad: Superficie Amparada por Certificados Agrícolas Emitidos," computer printout August 1988, supplied by director general Alfonso Casillas Romahn.

¹May include some renewal of certificates granted early in the program.

^aBetween 1901 and 1933, 23 hectares were protected, 13 irrigated and 10 rainfed land.

Part V. Ranching Lands Protected by Certificates
of Inaffectability, 1934–88^a
(Hectares)

Period	President	Total
1934–40	Lázaro Cárdenas	114,369
1940–46	Manuel Avila Camacho	736,148
1946–52	Miguel Alemán Valdez	2,326,743
1952–58	Aldolfo Ruiz Cortines	945,577
1958–64	Aldolfo López Mateos	71,944
1964–70	Gustavo Díaz Ordaz	2,262,575
1970–76	Luis Echeverría Alvarez	262,024
1976–82	José López Portillo	70,387
1982–88	Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado	9,311,582
	Total	16,091,890

SOURCE: SRA, Dirección General de Documentación e Información Agraria, "Inaffectabilidad: Superficie Amparada por Certificados Ganaderos Emitidos," computer printout August 1988, supplied by director general Alfonso Casillas Romahn.

^aIncludes renewal of certificates.

^bBetween 1901 and 1933, 54 hectares were protected, 472 of low quality and 69 of medium quality.

In December 1991, the Salinas administration oversaw the revision of Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution to eliminate the land-reform mandate. This constitutional reform effectively allowed the government to halt the distribution of land, privatize the ejido system, and develop an agro-business, high-tech farming sector from the resulting reforms. In fact, the Land Reform Agency has been dismantled and placed in the Department of Agriculture as a subministry. As the economist, Antonio Junez, of the Colegio de México states, "Other presidents have tried restructuring but this is the most profound, most radical vision yet." At least one Mexican official maintains that population growth means "there is no more land to give."⁶

In legalizing the privatization of the ejido, the Salinas administration simply gave de jure recognition to a de facto situation. The ejido system was riddled with problems from the start. Lack of credit, corruption in the program, and rising population all spelled the eventual doom of the ejido. As Mexico became an urbanized country in the last fifty years, food production and commercial agriculture became more important than land distribution.⁷ With population growth in the countryside, ejidos became mere subsistence units — and eventually could not even provide these needs. Because ejidos had been communally owned, they faced a credit crunch. Ejidos could not provide the collateral that commercial banks required for loans, and state banks never had enough funds to supply adequate credit to ejidos. State banks also faced serious difficulties collecting payments from ejidatarios. As a result, ejidata-

rios began renting their lands to commercial farmers and many began working as farm laborers. The Salinas administration has legalized this solution to the ejidos' problems.

Molina Enríquez foresaw some of the long-term problems the ejido would experience. He called the ejido the "second serfdom" for the Mexican peasantry. He warned that corrupt, autocratic state administrators would become the new hacendados of the collective ejidos, and contended the program spelled the eventual doom of land reform. While he did not foresee the problems in lack of credit and the changes in Mexico due to urbanization, Molina Enríquez did foresee renewed land monopoly growing out of the failures of the collective ejido program.⁸

Given the alternation between the collectivist and privatist land-reform goals that Mexico has experienced since the Revolution and throughout Mexican history, where does this work on the Revolutionary career of Andrés Molina Enríquez fit into the current debate on the role of land reform in the Mexican Revolution? On one hand, the revisionists interpret the official land reform as a means for post-Revolutionary regimes to subvert regional caudillos by cultivating peasant support.⁹ On the other hand, the neo-populists interpret land reform as an index of peasant strength rather than of middle-class manipulation.

This study of Molina Enríquez's ideological and political involvement in the Revolution does not contradict the new revisionist orthodoxy regarding the manipulation of land reform. In fact, as it became fashioned, the official land-reform program—placed in the power of the Mexican executive branch—aided the consolidation of the Sonoran dynasty in the 1920s, and continued through the 1970s to legitimize Mexican presidential administrations. Once in power, Obregón used land reform to quell peasant unrest in Zapatista-controlled regions and employed peasant leagues in defense of his regime during the 1923 De la Huerta rebellion.¹⁰ Calles paid lip service to land reform during his presidency, yet ultimately called for an end to the program.

However, the revisionists have overlooked the ideological roots behind this successful program of peasant co-optation. Molina Enríquez's land-reform ideology united the social stability of the old colonial order with the economic dynamism of Liberal nineteenth-century Mexico. This provided Mexico with a means to embark on its phenomenal twentieth-century economic growth without the social disruptions that much of the rest of Latin America has experienced in this century.

Molina Enríquez warned in the years prior to the Revolution that the needs and desires of Mexico's peasant masses could only be ignored at great peril. In his own assessment of Mexico's agrarian revolution, Molina Enríquez linked the rise and fall of the various Revolutionary chiefs to the land-reform issue. In this respect the middle-class leadership of the Sonoran dynasty had to offer land reform to the peasantry to survive in a new era of mass-based politics. Thus the revisionists' claims of manipulation can be turned around and inter-

preted as an index of peasant strength. Indeed, John Tutino, in his study of peasant rebellion from independence to the 1910 Revolution, concluded: "Agrarian insurgents did not make modern Mexican history alone; but they made certain that elites would not make it without them."

"They used every opportunity available to mount insurrections, never winning, but insuring that no elites would endure as rulers without addressing agrarian grievances."¹¹

Such an interpretation would see the official land-reform program as a means for the new middle-class leadership of post-Revolutionary Mexico to survive in office rather than as a co-optation of the peasantry.

If land reform became a crucial means to power in post-Revolutionary Mexico, why did the program not gain momentum until the second half of the 1930s? This study details the debates over land reform in Mexico from 1920 to 1934. Molina Enríquez repeatedly cited the opposition of the United States when explaining the lack of decisive land-reform action in the 1920s.

A definitive answer to the complicated question of how U.S. opposition influenced Mexican land reform is beyond the scope of this study. However, as the crisis in Mexican-U.S. relations unfolded in the 1920s, Molina Enríquez's pre-Revolutionary warning on the danger of U.S. opposition to social reform in Mexico appeared to be vindicated.

Despite the importance that Molina Enríquez placed on U.S. opposition, the debate within Mexico on the ultimate goal for land reform in the 1920s also figured prominently in inhibiting a comprehensive land-reform program. Had the agrarista intellectuals of the 1920s been united, Calles would have been under much greater pressure to make a true move toward land reform.

Having played a prominent role in defining modern Mexican land reform, can Molina Enríquez be considered the "father of agrarian reform," "the sociologist of the Mexican Revolution," or the "Rousseau of the Mexican Revolution," as Mexican panegyrists have asserted?¹² As to being the "father of agrarian reform," the answer must be qualified. Molina Enríquez was the intellectual "father" of land reform in twentieth-century Mexico in the sense that he formulated the framework of Article 27 that created the legal mandate for land reform in Mexico. However, the actual implementation of land reform in Mexico has depended on the objectives of differing presidential administrations, so no one man can be named the "father" of agrarian reform.

Was Molina Enríquez "the sociologist" or "the Rousseau" of the Mexican Revolution? He did work out a systematic land-reform ideology in pre-Revolutionary Mexico based on late nineteenth-century sociology. And his land-reform ideology entered the Revolution in 1915 in a modified version with Luis Cabrera's writing of the decree of 6 January 1915. More importantly, the basic principles of Article 27 do follow Molina Enríquez's pre-Revolutionary land-reform ideology. However, Molina Enríquez's land-reform ideology did little to

foment armed agrarian revolution; objective conditions in the Mexican countryside caused the peasant uprisings in the years of the Mexican Revolution.

If we can designate Molina Enríquez as the sociologist or the Rousseau of the Mexican Revolution, then D. A. Brading's assertion about Molina Enríquez's unwitting contribution to forming the "dictatorial, interventionist state" of post-1910 Mexico is valid. He broke with traditional Liberalism in advocating state intervention to limit the rights of private property in Mexico. This indeed forms the basis upon which the modern Mexican state has intervened to regulate Mexico's economy and society. However, Molina Enríquez intended the state to intervene only to "level the playing field," then to retire from the "game," allowing the free development of a rural-middle-class-based economic and social system. Of course, the Mexican state did not "wither away," but developed instead into the Institutional Revolutionary Party, the one-party system that has governed Mexico for the last half century.

An objective analysis of Molina Enríquez's participation in the development of the ideology of land reform in Revolutionary Mexico demonstrates why he should be considered an important intellectual of the Revolutionary era, deserving of national recognition in Mexico. He formed the legal basis for Article 27 in the pre-Revolutionary era and can therefore be considered the intellectual author of that key article. He also advocated land reform—often at great personal sacrifice—before it became a fashionable and manipulated program of the Revolution.

Although it is clear from this study that the agrarian ideology of Molina Enríquez had little direct impact on mass mobilization, as witnessed in the failed Plan de Texcoco revolt, in fact, his land-reform program aided the Mexican State in forging a stable, neo-colonial social order. This post-Revolutionary new order provided the social foundation for the recentralization of power and the unfolding of capitalist economics that both revisionists and neo-populists agree were the political and economic results of the Revolution.

The official land reform of the Mexican state from 1920 to 1970 reconstituted the colonial era's symbiosis of the village and hacienda, which had been disrupted in the nineteenth century under the land policies of the Liberals. Land reform from the 1940s to the 1980s involved the hoped-for symbiosis of the factory and ejido.¹³ Since 1982, the state has stressed the need to develop a modernized, commercially oriented agrarian system and has allowed privatization of the ejido. Since 1991, the elimination of the land-reform mandate from the constitution has signed the "death warrant" of the ejido system. Given the ability of the state to manipulate land reform, we can conclude that while Mexico did experience a massive land-reform program from the 1920s to the 1970s, it was a reform directed by middle-class leaders and ideologues, such as Molina Enríquez, rather than driven by the pressure of peasant masses upon whose mobilization the Revolution initially rode.

APPENDIX

The Plan de Texcoco

PROPOSITIONS OF THE MOVEMENT

1. The plan repudiates the federal government presided over by Licenciado Señor don Francisco L. de la Barra: the plan likewise repudiates the governments of the states, Federal District, and territories that are now functioning; and the plan suspends constitutional order throughout the Republic, only in the functioning of the legislative powers, the federal executive, and the local powers of the states, until the complete dominion of the Revolutionary forces can make a real and effective peace throughout the Republic, and can ensure, without danger of any confusion, the functioning of all the reforms contained in the Revolutionary laws that form the integral part of this plan.
2. The rebel leader will assume the functions of the legislative and executive powers, which remain suspended until constitutional order is reestablished in the country.
3. The rebel leader will assume the functions that are ended until a special tribunal is formed by the following persons: Licenciado don Emilio Vázquez Gómez, Ing. don Manuel Bonilla, General don Pascual Orozco, General don Emiliano Zapata, General don Camerino Mendoza, General don Rafael Tapia, and Señor don Paulino Martínez; the first three mentioned, who form the aforementioned tribunal, will control the governing of the nation until it is possible to return to constitutional order.

MILITARY GOVERNMENTS IN THE STATES

4. In case the rebel leader dies, the first chief with superior command will take leadership of the movement, who likewise will proclaim the revolution. If the tribunal is already established, and if some of its members die, the two remaining members will freely elect a third. If all the members die, the revolutionaries that faithfully follow this plan will elect a person to assume the leadership.
5. In accordance with this plan, the military commanders of the states, Federal District, and territories will be the leaders of the liberating army who have the superior command and adhere to the plan; in each entity, likewise, if the indicated superior chief

(From *El Imparcial*, August 25, 1911; author's translation.)

does not take command, the secondary, or subsecondary leaders, by their respective grades, will become the military commanders, and likewise, it will successively fall to some person that will assume command without vacillation.

6. The military commanders will immediately dissolve the legislative and executive powers of the entities under their command, but will not exercise the legislative function as all the legislative initiatives of the Republic are reserved for the rebel leader and the tribunal of the country as long as this plan is in force.

7. The military commanders of the estates will proceed immediately with the implementation of the laws that form the integral part of this Revolutionary plan.

8. The rebel leader assumes responsibility for all the acts of the nation toward foreign nations. The present Revolution will care for the lives and interests of the foreigners within the nation and will exercise the functions of military justice to punish all acts of depredation committed against foreigners.

9. All the general and local laws expended until today are declared in force, with the exception that those laws that have constituted the personnel of the legislative and executive powers of the Federation and the states remain invalid, likewise those laws that have convoked elections for the renovation of the referred-to powers remain invalid.

10. In virtue of this plan, the complete, essential dispositions for the constitution of the tribunal will be dictated, and the same tribunal will be provided with the necessities to govern the Republic.

Given in Texcoco on the day August 23, 1911

Andrés Molina Enríquez

BREAKING UP THE PROPERTIES

[Together with the cited Plan of Texcoco, the licenciado Molina Enríquez expended various decrees that are presented in a condensed form.]

Decree over the breaking up of the large properties.

It is declared that on the basis of public utility, from the date of this decree, the partial expropriation of all the rural real estate with a surface area that exceeds two thousand hectares.

Popular action may denounce the real estate that should be expropriated in keeping with this law. The denouncer has a right to choose the best part of the land suitable for expropriation.

Decree over the freedom of importing and exporting foreign cereals.

From the date of this decree, the entrance or exit of corn or wheat from the territory of the Republic is declared definitely free of the duties of importation and of exportation; all the laws and dispositions that oppose the implementation of this decree remain suspended.

Decree over hamlets, villages, and tribes.

This decree will consider the following as corporations or institutions that harass the social and political interests of the nation: the hamlets, villages, and the tribes. The present decree will consider as hamlets the communities that exist in collective possession of land that was private property, and that have formed because of the interruption of the individual titles, due to the multiplicity of successive owners of these titles that make it impossible to define the rights of each one of the successive owners. The present decree will consider as villages the communities that were created or were recognized as such by original title that gave them the territory that they possess and in which they were established. The present decree will consider as tribes all those groups of families that live in a community without having any title to the land that they possess, occupy, or simply surround. The hamlets will be dissolved and eliminated in five years, the villages will be dissolved and eliminated in ten years, and the tribes will be dissolved in twenty years.

POLITICAL BOSSES AND DAILY WAGES

Decree over the abolishment of the political bosses.

Throughout the Republic the bosses, prefects, and political directors will be removed, which as agents of the executives of the states and Federal District had as their duties the administrative direction of the districts, administrative area, or cantons of the territories, that each of these entities are divided into conforming to their local constitution or conforming to the general constitution and other relative laws.

Decree over salaried or daily labor.

This decree contains diverse articles about the limited time that a contract of labor must have; the payment of advances of wages, etc.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. See James W. Wilkie, *Measuring Land Reform* (Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center, 1974), I, n. 1, for references to more detailed discussions involving the distinctions between land reform and agrarian reform.

2. Luis Cabrera, "Andrés Molina Enríquez, in memoria," *La Prensa*, 7 August 1940, p. 1. José María Luis Mora was the most important Liberal intellectual in Mexico in the first half of the nineteenth century. Mora's Liberal ideology helped pave the way for the Liberal revolution of 1857, known in Mexico as the Reforma.

3. Lic. Román Badillo, "El padre de la reforma agraria," *El Nacional*, 3 August 1958.

4. *Andrés Molina Enríquez*, Colección testimonios del Estado de México (Toluca: Estado de México, 1979), pp. 42, 36-37, by the government of the state of Mexico contains a series of articles lauding Molina Enríquez as a hero of the Revolution.

5. Lic. Antonio Huitrón Huitrón, as the official historian of Jilotepec and a former federal deputy, has done the most to promote the honoring of Molina Enríquez in the state of Mexico. I met repeatedly with Señor Huitrón in 1988 during my year of research in Mexico for this work.

6. Frank Tannenbaum, *Peace by Revolution: An Interpretation of Mexico* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1933), pp. 115, 118.

7. Henry C. Schmit, *The Roots of Lo Mexicano* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1978), pp. 45, 66, 67.

8. Arnaldo Córdova, "El pensamiento social y político de Andrés Molina Enríquez," prologue in Andrés Molina Enríquez, *Los grandes problemas nacionales* (Mexico City: Ediciones Era, 1978), pp. 11-68.

9. James L. Hamon and Stephen R. Niblo, "El programa de reforma agraria y la filosofía de unidad nacional de Andrés Molina Enríquez," in *Precursores de la revolución agraria en México: Las obras de Wistano Luis Orozco y Andrés Molina Enríquez* (Mexico City: Secretaría de Educación Pública, 1975), pp. 67-127.

10. D. A. Brading, "Social Darwinism and Romantic Idealism: Andrés Molina Enríquez and José Vasconcelos in the Mexican Revolution," in *Prophecy and Myth in Mexican History* (Cambridge, England: Centre of Latin American Studies, 1984), p. 71.

11. Personal interviews during 1988 between author and Lic. Antonio Huitrón, a "Molinista," or partisan of Molina Enríquez, and a former federal deputy.

12. See Michael C. Meyer, *Huerta: A Political Portrait* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1971).
13. J. N. Macías, "Quien fué el autor del artículo 27 constitucional," *El Universal*, 20 September 1937, pp. 1, 10.
14. Pastor Rouaix, *Génesis de los artículos 27 y 123 de la constitución política de 1917* (Mexico City: Biblioteca del Instituto Nacional de Estudios Históricos de la Revolución Mexicana, 1959), p. 148.
15. Eyler N. Simpson, *The Ejido: Mexico's Way Out* (Durham: North Carolina Press, 1937), pp. 11–14. Simpson traces the ejido from the colonial era back to the old Aztec altepetlalli, or clan-based lands.
16. David A. Brading, ed., *Caudillo and Peasant in the Mexican Revolution* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1980). Mexican scholars pioneered the revisionist views of the Revolution and influenced Anglo-phone Mexicanists (Mexican experts of the English-speaking world). See Pablo González Cassanova, *Democracy in Mexico* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970); Arnaldo Córdova, *La ideología de la revolución mexicana: La formación del nuevo régimen* (Mexico City: Ediciones Era, 1973); and Aldo Gilly, *The Mexican Revolution* (London: Verso Books, 1983).
17. Ramón Eduardo Ruíz, *The Great Rebellion: Mexico 1905–1924* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1980), p. 7.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 96. The Zapatista episode refers to the most famous peasant rebellion of the Revolution led by Emiliano Zapata and carried forward with the slogan, "land and liberty"; see John Womack, *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution* (New York: Vintage Books, 1968). For a revisionist view of Zapatismo, see Sam Brunk, "Zapata: Revolution and Betrayal in Mexico" (Ph.D. diss., University of New Mexico, 1992).
19. Ruíz, *The Great Rebellion*, pp. 384, 400.
20. Alan Knight, *The Mexican Revolution*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1986), p. ix.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 217.
22. John Tutino, *From Insurrection to Revolution in Mexico: Social Bases of Agrarian Violence, 1750–1940* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 37.
23. John Mason Hart, *Revolutionary Mexico: The Coming and Process of the Mexican Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), p. x.
24. Friedrich Katz, "Mexico: Restored Republic and Porfiriato, 1887–1910," in Leslie Bethell, ed., *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, vol. 5, c. 1870 to 1930 (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1986).
25. John Womack, "The Mexican Revolution, 1910–1920," in Leslie Bethell, ed., *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, vol. 5, c. 1870 to 1930 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 82.
26. Jean Meyer, "Mexico: Revolution and Reconstruction in the 1920s," in Leslie Bethell, ed., *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, vol. 5, c. 1870 to 1930 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 193.

CHAPTER 1

1. Arnaldo Córdova, "El pensamiento social y político de Andrés Molina Enríquez," in Andrés Molina Enríquez, *Los grandes problemas nacionales* (1909, reprint; Mexico City: Ediciones Era, 1978), p. 55 (my translation).

2. Lic. Luis Molina Enríquez (grandson of Andrés), interviewed by author 21 October 1988 in Mexico City. I met with Luis Molina Enríquez three times in 1988 to talk about his grandfather. Luis lived with his grandfather for a time as a boy during the separation of his parents, and had a wealth of family history to share. I accompanied Luis and his family, including his cousin Alvaro Molina Enríquez, to Jilotepec where we visited the Catholic Church Archive and the old family hacienda, now an ejido outside of Jilotepec.

3. Raúl Gustavo de Santiago Gómez, “Teórico del nacionalismo Mexicano: Molina Enríquez,” *El Sol del Centro*, Aguascalientes, Mexico, 23 March 1986, p. 7.

4. José Vicente Villada, *Memoria de la Administración Pública del Estado de México presentada a la XV Legislatura por el Gobernador Constitucional, General Vicente Villada durante el cuatrienio de 1886 a 1893*, (Toluca: Imprenta, Litografía y encuadernación de la Escuela de Artes y Oficios, 1894), p. 636.

5. Luis Molina Enríquez claimed that this strain of Jewish blood might explain Andrés’s originality of thought as a family trait. Because of their Jewish origins, the Enríquezes were less tied to Catholic doctrine in their thinking, according to Luis.

6. Jalapa de Enríquez honors the memory of Juan de la luz Enríquez, who was mayor of Jalapa and governor of the state of Veracruz and who helped Benito Juárez fight the French intervention of Mexico in the 1860s.

7. Because the Mexican Inquisition remained informal until the 1570s, Juan Ignacio Enríquez could have easily escaped detection as a Jew in Jilotepec.

8. Villada, *Memoria* (1894), p. 45.

9. Gustavo de Santiago, “Molina Enríquez,” p. 7.

10. Luis Molina Enríquez interview, 1988.

11. For an excellent survey of the complicated transition between the encomienda and hacienda, see James Lockhart, “Encomienda and Hacienda: The Evolution of the Great Estate in the Spanish Indies,” *Historical Review* 59 (August 1969).

12. The Crown granted land for the Indian pueblos of Jilotepec, San Pablo Huan-tepec, and Santiago Oxtoc in the Jilotepec region during the sixteenth century. See Antonio Huitrón Huitrón, *Monografía municipal: Jilotepec* (Toluca, México: Estado de México Monografías Municipales, no date), p. 59.

13. Margarita García Luna O., *Haciendas Porfiristas en el Estado de México* (Toluca: Universidad Autónoma del Estado de México, 1981), pp. 54–58. Professor García Luna O. uses the 1894 *Memoria* of Governor Villada to work out a series of statistical tables on the agrarian structure of the state of Mexico during the Porfiriato. She states that the 1894 *Memoria* contains the only detailed information on the agrarian structure of the state of Mexico from 1824 to 1910. I had the good fortune of being able to locate and copy the portion of the *Memoria* that lists agrarian properties, thanks to the help of the librarians at the Central Public Library of the state of Mexico in the Centro Cultural Mexiquense in Toluca, Mexico.

14. Villada, *Memoria* (1894), pp. 686–88.

15. Production levels for the two Jilotepec haciendas also compare unfavorably to more productive haciendas in the Toluca district, where the small hacienda San Juan de la Cruz, all of 570 hectares, produced 300,000 kilograms of corn in 1893. García Luna O., *Haciendas*, pp. 73, 75.

16. The 1879 census records 70 percent of the population of the Jilotepec district as living in pueblos and rancherías, midsized and small rural communities. Juan N.

Mirafuentes, *Memoria* (Toluca: Imprenta, Litografía, y encuadernación de la Escuela de Artes y Oficios, 1879), pp. cccclxx–cccclxxi.

17. Villada, *Memoria* (1902), Anexo Núm. 127. “Principales producciones agrícolas habidas en el Estado, en el año de 1900,” pp. div–dx.

18. *Ibid.*, p. CCCXCVI. There were twenty-two pulque breweries and fifty-six pulque bars recorded in the Toluca District in 1902, with twenty-two general stores next on the list of businesses.

19. *Ibid.*, Anexo Núm. 129, “Noticia que manifiesta el valor fiscal de la propiedad raíz en el Estado, durante el año fiscal de 1 de Julio de 1899 a 30 de Junio de 1900,” p. dxvi.

20. Margarita García Luna O., *El Instituto Literario de Toluca: una aproximación historical* (Toluca: Universidad Autónoma del Estado de México, 1986), p. 87.

21. Andrés Molina Enríquez, *La propiedad agraria en México*, ed. Antonio Huitrón Huitrón (Toluca: Ediciones del Gobierno del Estado de México, 1987), Documentos Facsimilares, p. 365 (my translation).

22. García Luna O., *Instituto*, p. 74; a list of professors at the Instituto in 1878 in García Luna’s book lists Silviano Enríquez as a professor of chemistry. Jesus Lalanne, *Memoria presentada a la XI Legislatura del Estado de México por el Gobierno Constitucional del mismo C. General Jesús Lalanne* (Mexico City: Imprenta de Ignacio Escalante, 1886), Documento Núm. 7. Lalanne’s *Memoria* says that Silviano Enríquez taught chemistry at the Instituto at the salary of 900 pesos a year.

23. Luis Molina Enríquez interview, 1988.

24. García Luna O., *Instituto*, p. 10.

25. Córdova, “El pensamiento,” p. 21.

26. Zoraida Vázquez, “Los primeros tropiezos,” p. 761; Miguel Fernández Mejía, *Política agraria en México en el siglo XIX* (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1979), pp. 126–128.

27. Andrés Molina Enríquez, *Esbozo de la historia de los primeros diez años de la revolución agraria de México* (Mexico City: Talleres Gráficos del Museo Nacional de Arqueología, Historia y Etnografía, 1933), vol. 3, p. 103.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 98.

29. *Ibid.*, pp. 98–108, for Molina Enríquez’s discussion of the contrasting land-reform programs of Mora and Zavala.

30. García Luna, *Instituto*, pp. 23–29.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 57. For an analysis of Gabino Barreda’s “Plan of Education for Mexico,” see Leopoldo Zea, *Positivism in Mexico* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1974), chapter 3.

32. *Ibid.*, pp. 78, 79.

33. “Acta relativa del exámen que para obtener el título de Escribano presentó el ciudadano Andrés Molina Enríquez en el Tribunal Superior de Justicia del Estado siendo aprobado por unanimidad, de fecha 3 de abril de 1891,” en Andrés Molina Enríquez, *La propiedad agraria en México*, Documentos Facsimilares, Documento Núm. 5.

34. Margarita García Luna, *Toluca en el Porfiriato* (Toluca: Ediciones del Gobierno del Estado de México, 1985), pp. 7–14.

35. *Ibid.*, pp. 46–49.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 77.

37. Ibid., p. 59.
38. Mirafuentes, *Memoria* (1879), pp. CCCCLXX-CCCCLXXI.
39. Andrés Molina Enríquez, "Expedición de estudio: Sultepec," in *Anales del Museo Nacional de Antropología, Historia, y Etnología* (Mexico City: Museo Nacional de Antropología, Historia, y Etnología, 1931), p. 83. Molina Enríquez used his trip back to Sultepec in 1930 to contrast the growth and development of the region after the Revolution with the stagnation he had witnessed in the 1890s.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid. The hacienda in the area around Texcaltitlán was known as Gavia Chica in the records, to differentiate it from the massive Hacienda Gavia, the biggest in the state of Mexico.
42. Ibid.
43. María del Carmen Reyes, "Detalles de la vida y obra de Andrés Molina Enríquez," *Boletín del Archivo General del Estado de México* 9 (September-December 1981): 65.
44. Ibid.
45. Molina Enríquez, *Los grandes problemas*, pp. 175–176.
46. Ibid., p. 317.
47. García Luna O., *Haciendas Porfiristas*, pp. 55, 58. García Luna O. marks the minimum size of a Porfirian hacienda at one thousand hectares. See also Frank Schenk, "Jornaleros y hacendados. La distribución de la propiedad de la tierra en el suroeste del Estado de México hacia 1900," in Manuel Miño Grijalva, ed., *Haciendas, pueblos y comunidades: Los valles de México y Toluca entre 1530 y 1916*, (Mexico City: Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes, 1991), pp. 230–269. Frank Schenk uses his research in the archives of the Sultepec district to point out the error that early historians of the Revolution made regarding the extent of hacienda land monopoly by relying on national and state statistics regarding land tenure. Schenk also found minimal hacienda landholding in the Sultepec district and notes the importance of small landholdings in the district. Schenk goes on to conclude that small landholdings were not exceptional on the eve of the Revolution, though these holdings tended to cluster in regions isolated from commercial markets. Schenk's revisionist views of land-tenure patterns in pre-Revolutionary Mexico coincides with Jean Meyer's findings for Michoacán. See Jean Meyer, "Haciendas y ranchos, peones y campesinos en el Porfiriato. Algunas falacias estadísticas," *Historia Mexicana* 35 (1986): 477–510.
48. Villada, *Memoria* (1902), pp. dxvi–dxvii.
49. Ibid., p. div.
50. This average is based on twenty-eight land transactions that Molina Enríquez notarized from 1884 to 1898 in the municipios of Sultepec, Amatepec, and Tlatlaya found in the Archivo Municipal de Sultepec. In 1895, the district adopted the metric system to record the size of rural properties.
51. Archivo Municipal de Sultepec, "Tierras," C-3, Exp. III, Núm. 1.
52. Schenk arrives at the same conclusions regarding the effects of Liberal land legislation in the Sultepec district. Contrary to traditional interpretations of the effects of Liberal land legislation in the Sultepec district, the legislation achieved the goal of widening land ownership, not land monopoly. Schenk, "Jornaleros y Hacendados," pp. 253–264.
53. Archivo Municipal de Sultepec, "Tierras," Caja 3, Exp. III.

54. Molina Enríquez, *Los grandes problemas*, p. 187.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 168. Note: These are Molina Enríquez's own figures.
56. *Ibid.*
57. *Ibid.*, p. 169.
58. *Ibid.*, pp. 168–169.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 213.
60. *Ibid.*, pp. 213–214.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 201.
62. *Ibid.*, pp. 201–202.
63. *Ibid.*, pp. 216–218.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 220.
65. *Ibid.*
66. Wistano Luis Orozco's book *Legislación y jurisprudencia sobre terrenos baldíos* (1895; reprint, Mexico City: Ediciones El Caballito, 1974) greatly influenced Molina Enríquez's argument against the terrenos baldíos law; Molina Enríquez also took up Orozco's condemnation of "feudal ruralism" in his Liberal critique of the hacienda.
67. Molina Enríquez, *Los grandes problemas*, p. 210.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 206.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 207.
70. As traditionally portrayed in the literature, the *terrenos baldíos* law, implemented in 1885, resulted in the takeover of one-fifth of Mexico's land surface by foreign companies, individuals, and rich Mexicans; see Simpson, *The Ejido: Mexico's Way Out*, p. 28. Charles Cumberland found that the law caused forty million acres of Mexican land to end up in the hands of land companies and private individuals; see Charles Cumberland, *Mexico: The Struggle for Modernity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 198–99. And Frank Tannenbaum gives a figure of sixty million acres "granted to a few land owners under the terrenos baldíos legislation"; see Tannenbaum, *Peace by Revolution*, p. 143. More recently, regional historians of the Porfiriato have begun to take issue with these statistics of land-grabbing so crucial to the populist interpretation of the Revolution; see especially Meyer, "Haciendas y ranchos."

CHAPTER 2

1. Molina Enríquez, *Los grandes problemas*, p. 416.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 73.
3. To provide a "scientific" justification for his view on the primacy of agriculture in human development, Molina Enríquez turned to the carbon theory of life developed by Ernst Haeckel, the German professor at the University of Jena who became the foremost propagandist for Darwin's theory of evolution on the European continent. See Ernst Haeckel, *The History of Creation: Or the Development of the Earth and its Inhabitants by the Action of Natural Causes* (New York: D. Appleton, 1876).
4. Molina Enríquez, *Los grandes problemas*, pp. 77–78, 81. Molina Enríquez begins *Los grandes problemas* with an introduction to Mexico's geography in which he first explains the importance he ascribes to the "fundamental zone of cereals" of central Mexico.

5. Ibid., p. 174.
6. Ibid., p. 292.
7. Ibid., p. 177.
8. Ibid., p. 151.
9. Ibid., p. 92, 151.
10. Ibid., p. 412.
11. For an analysis of Jovellanos's agrarian concerns, see John H. R. Polt, *Jaspar Melchor de Jovellanos* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1971).
12. Richard Herr, *Modern Spain* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 57–60.
13. Molina Enríquez, *Los grandes problemas*, p. 156.
14. Charles Hale, *Mexican Liberalism in the Age of Mora, 1821–1853*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 177, 181.
15. Ibid., pp. 181–182.
16. Ibid., p. 157.
17. Ibid., p. 162.
18. Ibid., p. 167.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., p. 152.
21. Ibid., p. 153.
22. Ibid., pp. 165–166.
23. Ibid., p. 158.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., p. 162.
26. Andrés Molina Enríquez, *La cuestión del día, la agricultura nacional* (Mexico City: Imprenta “La Española,” 1902). The Mexican Society of Geography and Statistics published Molina Enríquez's speech, which was given on his entry into the society as an honorary associate.
27. Molina Enríquez, “El aprovechamiento de las aguas y la agricultura,” *El Tiempo*, 5 November 1905, p. 1.
28. Ibid.
29. Michael C. Meyer, *Water in the Hispanic Southwest: A Social and Legal History, 1550–1850* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1984), pp. 107–108.
30. Molina Enríquez, “El aprovechamiento,” *El Tiempo*, 31 October 1905, p. 4.
31. Meyer, *Water*, pp. 117, 119.
32. Molina Enríquez, “El aprovechamiento,” *El Tiempo*, 15 November 1905, p. 4.
33. Molina Enríquez, *Los grandes problemas*, p. 226.
34. Molina Enríquez, “El aprovechamiento,” *El Tiempo*, 29 October 1905, p. 4.
35. Molina Enríquez, *Los grandes problemas*, p. 180.
36. Andrés Molina Enríquez, *La Reforma y Juárez, estudio histórico-sociológico* (Mexico City: Tipografía de la Viuda de Francisco Díaz de León, 1906).
37. Charles A. Weeks, *The Juárez Myth in Mexico* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1987), p. 49. Weeks describes how Liberals saw the Juárez era in a positive light, as it represented a break with the Church, affirmed Mexico's independence, and began a more practical application of the 1857 Constitution.
38. Molina Enríquez, *La Reforma y Juárez*, p. 1.
39. Ibid., p. 54.

40. *Ibid.*, pp. 17–18.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 32; quotation by Molina Enríquez.
42. Whether or not Juárez's nationalization of Church land was the decisive factor in the Guerra de Tres Años would be hard to prove. However, the Liberal forces did go on to final victory over the Conservatives shortly after Juárez's declaration.
43. Molina Enríquez, *La Reforma y Juárez*, pp. 87–89.
44. See T. G. Powell, "Priest and Peasants in Central Mexico: Social Conflict During "La Reforma," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 57 (May 1977): 296–313. Powell noted the general lack of support the Church found among Indians of central Mexico in the War of the Reform as being due to the abuse of office by village priests in the nineteenth century. Perhaps, as Molina Enríquez noted, Juárez's suspension of the Liberal assault on village communal lands also played a part in preventing a Conservative/Indian villager alliance against the Liberals.
45. Molina Enríquez, *La Reforma y Juárez*, p. 30.
46. Moisés González Navarro, "El Porfiriato, La Vida Social," in Daniel Cosío Villegas, *Historia Moderna de México*, vol. 4 (Mexico City: Editorial Hermes, 1957), p. 273.
47. Molina Enríquez, *La Reforma y Juárez*, p. 25.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
49. *Ibid.*, pp. 45–46.
50. Alfred Kelly, *The Descent of Darwin: The Popularization of Darwinism in Germany, 1860–1914* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), p. 78.
51. P. M. Baldwin, "Liberalism, Nationalism, and Degeneration: The Case of Max Nordau," *Central European History* 13 (June 1980): 99.
52. Andrés Molina Enríquez, *Esbozo de la historia de los primeros diez años de la revolución agraria de México* (Mexico City: Talleres Gráficos del Museo Nacional de Arqueología, Historia y Etnografía, 1933), vol. 4, p. 53.
53. Kelly, *The Descent of Darwin*, pp. 78, 105, 110. Kelly mentions how Darwin himself maintained that "positive traits like cooperation and altruism" had been selected for in nature.
54. *Ibid.*, pp. 100–101.
55. Max Nordau, *The Conventional Lies of Our Civilization* (London: William Heinemann, 1895), pp. 25, 81.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 187.
57. Andrés Molina Enríquez, *El evangelio de una nueva reforma* (Toluca: Biblioteca de México, 1895), p. 29.
58. Frank Tannenbaum, *Peace by Revolution: Mexico after 1910* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1933), p. 116. More recent studies concur with Tannenbaum's assessment of the prevalence of racist thinking within the Porfirian elite. See Alan Knight, *The Mexican Revolution*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 8.
59. "Instrucciones dadas a las empresas particulares de colonización obligados a traer colonos extranjeros," *Boletín de la Dirección de Agricultura* 1 (May 1911): 78–79.
60. See Manuel Fabila, *Cinco Siglos de legislación agraria en México (1493–1940)*, vol. 1 (Mexico City: 1943), pp. 184–85. The 1883 "Decreto sobre colonización y compañías deslindadoras" included tax breaks, financial incentives, free rail travel, and freedom from military service for foreign immigrants.

61. Moisés González Navarro, “El Porfiriato, La Vida Social,” in Daniel Cosío Villegas, *Historia Moderna de México*, vol. 4 (Mexico City: Editorial Hermes, 1957), p. 134. González Navarro outlines the development of the myth of Mexico’s fabulous potentials beginning with Humboldt.

62. Roberto Moreno, “Mexico,” in Thomas F. Glick, ed., *The Comparative Reception of Darwinism* (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1972), p. 373.

63. R. R. Palmer and Joel Colton, *A History of the Modern World* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), pp. 593–596.

64. Moreno, “Mexico,” p. 373.

65. D. A. Brading, “Social Darwinism and Romantic Idealism: Andrés Molina Enríquez and José Vasconcelos in the Mexican Revolution,” p. 67.

66. Kelly, *The Descent of Darwin*, p. 117; and Brading, “Social Darwinism and Romantic Idealism,” p. 67.

67. Cited by Brading, “Social Darwinism and Romantic Idealism,” p. 67.

68. Molina Enríquez, *Los grandes problemas*, p. 343. Molina Enríquez later applied this division of natural selection into a wider division of the world into two cultures, the eastern and the western, using evolutionist theory. See *La revolución agraria*, vol. 1, ch. 1.

69. Molina Enríquez, *Los grandes problemas*, p. 344.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 345.

71. *Ibid.*, pp. 349–350.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 356.

73. T. G. Powell, “Mexican Intellectuals and the Indian Question,” p. 20.

74. Molina Enríquez, *Los grandes problemas*, p. 306.

75. *Ibid.*, pp. 305–312.

76. *Ibid.*, p. 305.

77. *Ibid.*, p. 425.

78. *Ibid.*, p. 306.

79. *Ibid.*, p. 433.

80. *Ibid.*, p. 199.

CHAPTER 3

1. Jan Bazant, *A Concise History of Mexico from Hidalgo to Cárdenas, 1805–1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 122.

2. Given the advanced age of Díaz, his choice of vice-president became a crucial issue in Mexican politics in 1909. The two factions that emerged were the Reyistas, or partisans of Bernardo Reyes, and the Corralistas, or partisans of Ramón Corral, Díaz’s choice for the vice presidency. For more on the political atmosphere of 1909 and the Reyista movement see Alan Knight, *The Mexican Revolution*, pp. 48–54.

3. Josefina G. de Arellano, *Bernardo Reyes y el movimiento Reyista en México* (Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Antropología y Historia, Colección Científica, 1982), ch. 1, Bernardo Reyes. Datos biográficos.

4. Anthony Templeton Bryan, “Mexican Politics in Transition, 1900–1913: The Role of General Bernardo Reyes,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Nebraska, 1969), pp. 110, 116–118.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 134–149.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 153.
7. Knight, *The Mexican Revolution*, vol. 1, pp. 49–50.
8. Bryan, “Mexican Politics in Transition,” pp. 221–225.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 235.
10. Archivo General Bernardo Reyes, 188891, 333. CONDUMEX.
11. Bryan, *Mexican Politics in Transition*, p. 235.
12. Raúl Gustavo de Santiago Gómez, “Teórico del nacionalismo Mexicano: Molina Enríquez,” *El Sol del Centro*, 13 April 1986, p. 4.
13. Molina Enríquez, *La revolución agraria*, p. 46.
14. Carlos Basave, “Los Libros de la Revolución” (1939), Colección de Carlos Basave, Archivo Histórico de UNAM, no page numbers.
15. *Ibid.*
16. Molina Enríquez, *Los grandes problemas*, p. 435.
17. Bryan, *Mexican Politics in Transition*, p. 223.
18. Andrés Molina Enríquez, “Lo que significa reyismo,” en *México Nueva*, 21 September 1909, p. 1.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
20. Molina Enríquez’s 1909 political program can be found in Andrés Molina Enríquez, *La propiedad agraria en México*, ed. Antonio Huitrón Huitrón (Toluca: Ediciones del Gobierno del Estado de México, 1987), pp. 298–332.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 314, 316, 328.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 312 & 313.
23. Knight, *The Mexican Revolution*, vol. 1, p. 53.
24. R. A. Esteva Ruíz, “El progreso del retroceso,” *La Reelección*, 2 October 1909, pp. 5–6.
25. Andrés Molina Enríquez, “La formula de solución momentanez del conflicto político actual,” *México Nueva*, 20 November 1909, p. 1.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
27. *Ibid.*, pp. 9–11.
28. Bryan, “Mexican Politics in Transition,” pp. 239–249.
29. For an interpretation of Reyes’s abandonment of the vice-presidential campaign, which he never publicly endorsed, see Knight, *The Mexican Revolution*, vol. 1, pp. 54–55.
30. Bryan, “Mexican Politics in Transition,” p. 256.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 269.
32. Brading, “Social Darwinism and Romantic Idealism,” p. 70.
33. Molina Enríquez, *La revolución agraria*, vol. 4, p. 161
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 45–49.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 143.
36. A. N. Molina Enríquez, *El agrarismo de la revolución: exegesis, critica y reencauzamiento* (Mexico City: Biblioteca Nacional, 1953), pp. 42–43.
37. *Ibid.*
38. Charles C. Cumberland, *Mexican Revolution: Genesis Under Madero* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1952), pp. 36–37. Cumberland noted the importance Madero attached to the approval of his grandfather, father, and uncle Ernesto. Cumberland also emphasizes Madero’s “dependence on his family after he came to the presidency.”

39. Molina Enríquez, *La revolución agraria*, vol. 4, pp. 141–147.
40. Molina Enríquez, *La revolución agraria*, vol. 5, p. 65.
41. José Angel Aguilar, *La revolución en el estado de México* (Toluca: Ediciones del Gobierno del Estado de México, 1987), p. 95; Villada, *Memoria* (1902), p. cccccxxiv.
42. Rodolfo Alanís Boyzo, *El Estado de México durante la Revolución Mexicana, (1910–1914)* (Toluca: El Gobierno del Estado de México, 1985), pp. 89–96.
43. *Ibid.*, pp. 126–130.
44. Andrés Molina Enríquez, “Programa Definitiva del Señor Lic. D. Andrés Molina Enríquez para el Gobierno del Estado Libre y Soberano de México,” Archivo Histórico “German Estrada,” Secretaría Relaciones Exteriores. The Secretary of the state of Mexico sent Molina Enríquez’s political platform to the Department of Foreign Relations in the summer of 1911.
45. García Luna O., *Haciendas Porfiristas en el estado de México*, Cuadro 14, “Haciendas del Estado de México con alta productividad agrícola año de 1893,” p. 73.
46. Luis Molina Enríquez interview, 1988.
47. Andrés Molina Enríquez, “Dos de las leyes del pueblo que expedira el Sr. Lic. Don Andrés Molina Enríquez, si es electo gobernador del Estado de México,” UNAM, Archivo Carlos Basave, Biblioteca Nacional.
48. Please refer to chapter 1 of this work for an examination of Molina Enríquez’s portrayal of what he considered to be the ubiquitous practice of tax evasion by Mexican hacendados in *Los grandes problemas*.
49. Rodolfo Alanís Boyzo, *El Estado de México durante la Revolución Mexicana, 1910–1914*, (Toluca: Ediciones del Gobierno del Estado de México, 1985), p. 127.
50. *El Democrático*, Toluca de Lerdo, 31 August 1911, p. 3.
51. Alanís Boyzo, *El Estado de México*, p. 129.

CHAPTER 4

1. “Otro revolución, *El Imparcial*, 25 August 1911, p. 2. The Mexico City newspaper, *El Imparcial*, printed Molina Enríquez’s Plan de Texcoco two days after its proclamation. For my English translation of the Plan de Texcoco, see the appendix of this work.
2. Knight, *The Mexican Revolution*, vol. 1, p. 229.
3. “Otra revolución,” *El Imparcial*, 25 August 1911, p. 2.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 1–2; and “La Revolución fraguada por el Lic. Molina Enríquez,” *El Imparcial*, 26 August 1911, p. 8.
5. “La Revolución fraguada,” p. 8.
6. *Ibid.*
7. Knight, *The Mexican Revolution*, vol. 1., p. 269; and Thomas B. Hohler, 27 July 1911, British F.O. 371/1150.
8. Silvano Barba González, *La lucha por la tierra*, vol. 3, (Mexico City: Editorial Magisterio, 1963), p. 88; and David G. LaFrance, *The Mexican Revolution in Puebla, 1908–1913* (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1989), pp. 116–117.
9. Archivo Francisco L. de la Barra, 101, CONDUMEX.
10. Hohler, 27 July 1911, British F.O. 371/1150.

11. Knight, *The Mexican Revolution*, vol. 1, p. 248.
12. In vol. 5 of *La revolución agraria*, Molina Enríquez inserts a study he made for Plutarco Elías Calles, as minister of the interior, proving the legality of the Zapatista movement through Revolutionary logic, pp. 69–71. And on pp. 74–75, Molina Enríquez characterizes the De la Barra administration as a counter-Revolutionary government.
13. Madero to León de la Barra, Archivo Francisco L. de la Barra, 101, CONDUMEX.
14. Molina Enríquez, *La revolución agraria*, vol. 5, p. 89.
15. “El Lic. Molina Enríquez hace apreciaciones acerca del Señor Madero,” *El Tiempo*, 4 September 1911, p. 5. *El Tiempo* condensed a long article by Molina Enríquez published earlier in the summer in *El Imparcial*.
16. Berta Ulloa, “La Lucha Armada (1911–1920)” in Daniel Cosío Villegas, *Historia General de México* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1976), pp. 1086–1087.
17. Molina Enríquez, *La revolución agraria*, vol. 5, p. 65.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 66–67.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 79.
20. Hohler, 3 August 1911, British F.O. 371/1150. Whether or not Emilio Vázquez Gómez truly represented the radical wing of the Maderista movement has been questioned; see Knight, *The Mexican Revolution*, vol. 1, p. 249. However, it is beyond doubt that the issue of Emilio Vázquez Gómez’s dismissal from the De la Barra cabinet did rally the dissident elements within the Maderista movement.
21. Hohler, 3 August 1911, British F.O., 371/1150.
22. Hohler, 13 August 1911, British F.O. 371/1150.
23. Knight, *The Mexican Revolution*, vol. 1, p. 249.
24. Hohler, 13 August 1911, British F.O., 371/1150.
25. A. N. Molina Enríquez, *El agrarismo de la revolución*, pp. 43–44.
26. Luis Molina Enríquez interview, 1988.
27. Molina Enríquez, *La revolución agraria*, vol. 5, p. 86.
28. Archivo Francisco L. de la Barra, 101, CONDUMEX.
29. Archivo De la Barra, 103, CONDUMEX.
30. *Ibid.*
31. Molina Enríquez, *La revolución agraria*, vol. 5, p. 80.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 79.
33. Molina Enríquez marked the De la Barra administration’s campaign of extermination against the Zapatistas as beginning with the appointment of García Granados as minister of the interior, *La revolución agraria*, vol. 5, p. 80. Alan Knight explains the De la Barra administration’s go-ahead to General Huerta to crush the Zapatistas in August 1911 in *The Mexican Revolution*, vol. 1, p. 263. John Womack also points out the crucial change the replacement of Emilio Vázquez with Granados marked for the Zapatista struggle in Morelos. According to Womack, Granados relished the chance to forcibly disarm the Zapatistas. See John Womack, *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution*, pp. 106–107.
34. “Madero Chosen Candidate by Progressives,” *Mexican Herald*, 31 August 1911, p. 1.
35. *Ibid.*
36. Gabriella de Beer, “La revolución en peligro: Madero y De la Barra,” *Luis*

Cabrera: Un intelectual en la Revolución Mexicana (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1984), pp. 64, 70.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 70.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 63.

39. Silvano Barba González, “Andrés Molina Enríquez,” *La lucha por la tierra*, ch. 3, (Mexico City: Editorial Magisterio, 1963), p. 89. All of the brief biographies on Molina Enríquez in Mexico mention the year he spent in prison after the failure of the Plan de Texcoco. Accounts of Carlos Basave, a contemporary of Molina Enríquez, on meeting him in prison adds confirmation to these accounts. Unfortunately, I was unable to find the records of the trial and sentencing of Molina Enríquez.

40. “La revolución fraguada,” p. 8.

41. *Ibid.*; and “Mexico in Throes of Novel Revolt,” *The Mexican Herald*, 26 August 1911, p. 1.

42. “Mexico in Throes.”

43. “La revolución fraguada,” p. 8.

44. “Mexico in Throes.”

45. *Ibid.*

46. *Ibid.*

47. *El Imparcial*, 25 August 1911, p. 1.

48. “El Lic. Molina Enríquez se metió á revolucionario,” *El Tiempo*, 25 August 1911, p. 2.

49. *El Imparcial*, 25 August 1911, p. 1.

50. Ramo Revolución, 91.2, vol. 19, Exp. 12, Archivo Estado de México. While not knowing how to decipher the coded message, I assume it deals with the Texcoco revolt and indicates the concern that state officials had regarding the potential disorder the revolt could have caused.

51. Molina Enríquez, *La revolución agraria*, vol. 5, p. 87.

52. “La revolución fraguada,” *El Imparcial*, 26 August 1911, p. 1.

53. “Nota Editorial: La revolución en la prensa,” *El Tiempo*, 25 August 1911, p. 1; and Sección Editorial: “El Plan de Texcoco y la ‘Revolución es la Revolución,’” *El Imparcial*, 30 August 1911, p. 3.

54. “Nota Editorial: La revolución en la prensa,” *El Tiempo*, 25 August 1911, p. 1.

55. *Ibid.*

56. Sección Editorial: “El Plan de Texcoco y la ‘Revolución es la Revolución,’” *El Imparcial*, 30 August 1911, p. 3.

57. *Ibid.*

58. Molina Enríquez, *La revolución agraria*, vol. 5, p. 92.

59. Molina Enríquez, “Filosofía de mis ideas sobre reformas agrarias,” p. 454.

60. Gabriel Ferrer Mendiola, “El agrarista Molina Enríquez,” *El Nacional*, 4 August 1953.

61. *Ibid.* Ferrer Mendiola claims that Madero pardoned Molina Enríquez shortly before the Huerta coup against the Madero administration in February 1913. However, I was unable to find any evidence of this pardon in the Ramo Revolución at the Archivo General de la Nación in Mexico City.

62. Molina Enríquez, *La revolución agraria*, vol. 4, p. 92.

63. Andrés Molina Enríquez, “Filosofía de mis ideas sobre reformas agrarias,” in *Los grandes problemas*.

64. In July 1912, General Huerta had arrested Villa for insubordination and almost had him shot during the campaign against the Orozquista uprising against Madero's government in northern Mexico. President Madero's stay of execution rescued Villa from the firing squad at the last minute. Villa was then sent to the federal penitentiary in Mexico City. It was during this period that Molina Enríquez encountered Villa in prison. Cumberland, *Mexican Revolution: Genesis under Madero*, p. 199; and Martín Luis Guzmán, *Memoirs of Pancho Villa* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1966), pp. 72–79.

65. Carlos Basave, "Los libros de la Revolución" (1930), Colección de Carlos Basave, Archivo Histórico de UNAM.

66. John Womack, Jr., *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution* (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p. 145.

67. Molina Enríquez, *La revolución agraria*, vol. 5, pp. 94–95.

68. *Ibid.*, pp. 93–95.

69. Ramo Revolución, Drawer 16, Exp. 156, AGN.

70. *Ibid.*

71. Orozco, "La cuestión agraria," in Jesús Silva Herzog, ed., *La cuestión de la tierra*, vol. 1 (Mexico City: Instituto Mexicano de Investigaciones Económicas, 1960), pp. 223–224.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 223.

73. Molina Enríquez, "Filosofía de mis ideas," pp. 453, 455.

74. *Ibid.*, pp. 459–463.

CHAPTER 5

1. Editorial Nacional, "El quebrantamiento de la gran propiedad," *El Reformador*, no. 3, vol. 1, 17 January 1913. In this editorial Molina Enríquez argued that large landowners were organizing to overthrow Madero, and that the return of Felix Díaz to Mexico boded ill for the Madero administration.

2. "Fragmento de la Memoria que nuestro Director presentó al Gobierno del Sr. Madero sobre las reformas agrarias," *El Reformador*, no. 1, vol. 1, 10 January 1913, p. 4.

3. "Lo que significa para el país: La vuelta del jefe del partido Científico," *El Reformador*, no. 3, vol. 1, 17 January 1913. Molina Enríquez, of course, participated in the factionalization of the revolutionaries with his Plan de Texcoco rebellion against the De la Barra interim government.

4. "El gobierno debe ser Revolucionario," *El Reformador*, no. 1, vol. 1, 17 January 1913.

5. "El gobierno vencerá paso a la revolución de 1910. Nuestra opinion acerca del resultado final de la contienda," *El Reformador*, no. 10, vol. 1, 15 February 1913.

6. "La verdadera naturaleza del movimiento rebela," *El Reformador*, no. 10, vol. 1, 15 February 1913.

7. "Ahora o nunca Sr. Madero," *El Reformador*, no. 10, vol. 1, 18 February 1913.

8. "El Gobierno debe ser Revolucionario," *El Reformador*, no. 1, vol. 1, 17 January 1913.

9. "Un consejo al gobierno," *El Reformador*, no. 10, vol. 1, 15 February 1913.

10. Raúl Gustavo de Santiago Gómez, "Teórico del nacionalismo Mexicano: Molina Enríquez," *El Sol del Centro*, 8 June 1986.

11. Discussion with Lic. Antonio Huitrón Huitrón in 1988. Lic. Huitrón served in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies and participated in attempts to honor Molina Enríquez's contribution toward the social reforms that made the Revolution a revolution.

12. Michael C. Meyer, "Revolution or Counterrevolution?" in *Huerta: A Political Portrait* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1971), p. 177. Alan Knight has questioned Meyer's revisionist approach to the Huerta regime in "Revolution? Counterrevolution? What revolution?" in *The Mexican Revolution*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 94–103.

13. Meyer, *Huerta*, p. 165.

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 166–167.

15. Andrés Molina Enríquez, "El deslance de la ciudadela," *El Imparcial*, 24 June 1913, p. 5.

16. "Sobre el problema agrario," *El Independiente*, 1 October 1913, p. 4.

17. *Ibid.*

18. Meyer, *Huerta*, p. 151.

19. "Manifiesto que los señores Gral. Ing. David de la Fuente y Lic. Andrés Molina Enríquez, Candidatos del GRAN PARTIDO LIBERAL REPUBLICANO para la Presidencia y Vicepresidencia de la República, Respectivamente, Dirigen á sus Conciudadanos, Exponiendo su Programa en Demanda de Votos en las Próximas Elecciones," Archivo Carlos Basave, UNAM.

20. *Ibid.*

21. *Ibid.*

22. *Ibid.*

23. *Ibid.*

24. Michael C. Meyer (*Huerta*) categorizes the 1913 presidential elections as "Huerta's electoral farce," and notes how the election served as a plot to "divide the opposition, to confuse the voters, and at the same time to maintain the sham of trying to meet all legal technicalities" (p. 76).

25. Molina Enríquez, *La revolución agraria*, vol. 5, p. 137.

26. Telegrama, Chihuahua, 29 October 1914, Silvestre Terrazas Collection, 166, Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley.

27. *Ibid.*

28. *Ibid.*

29. Friedrich Katz, "Agrarian Changes in Northern Mexico in the Period of Villista Rule, 1912–1915," in James W. Wilkie, Michael C. Meyer, and Edna Monzón Wilkie, eds., *Contemporary Mexico: Papers of the Fourth International Congress of Mexican History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 261–262.

30. Andrés Molina Enríquez, "Si la Revolución es la Revolución, la paz es la paz," *La Convención*, 20 April 1915, p. 7.

31. John Hart, *Revolutionary Mexico* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), p. 303.

32. "Medidas distadas para resolver el problema agrario en Chihuahua," *La Convención*, 18 December 1914, p. 8.

33. B. Mallan, "Adquisición de buenos agricultores, hay que poblar el estado," *La Convención*, 25 December 1914, p. 8; and General Julian Mazo Juvera, "La cuestión

agraria en México, algunos consideraciones respecto de un proyecto de Ley, sobre fraccionamiento de tierras,” *La Convención*, 25 December 1914, p. 2.

34. “La Convención será la generadora de las nuevas Instituciones,” *La Convención*, 30 December 1914, p. 8.

35. Molina Enríquez, “Si la Revolución es la Revolución, la paz es la paz,” p. 7.

36. *Ibid.*

37. *Ibid.*

38. *Ibid.*

39. Katz, “Agrarian Changes in Northern Mexico,” pp. 268, 272–273; and Friedrich Katz, *The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, the United States and the Mexican Revolution* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 280–287, for a discussion of Villa and the agrarian question.

40. Venustiano Carranza, “Program of the Revolution,” *Plan de Guadalupe: Decretos y Acuerdos, 1913–1917* (Mexico City: Secretaria de Gobernación, 1981), p. 41.

41. *Ibid.*

42. See chapter 6 of this work for an examination of the activities of Carranza’s National Agrarian Commission in the post-Revolutionary period.

43. Carranza, *Plan de Guadalupe*, p. 40.

44. Bazant, *A Concise History of Mexico*, p. 145.

45. Luis Cabrera, “Proyecto de Ley Agraria y el discurso del Dip. Lic. Luis Cabrera,” in Manuel Fabila, *Cinco siglos de legislación agraria en México*, p. 222.

46. Carranza, *Plan de Guadalupe*, p. 43.

47. Molina Enríquez, *Los grandes problemas*, pp. 230–231.

48. Carranza, *Plan de Guadalupe*, pp. 42–44. Carranza’s 6 January 1915 agrarian law specifically focused on undoing the ill effects of the Lerdo Law of the Liberal era and the terrenos baldíos laws of the Porfiriato.

49. See Alan Knight’s discussion of this problem in *The Mexican Revolution*, vol. 2, pp. 313–314.

50. Charles Cumberland, *Mexican Revolution: The Constitutionalist Years* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1972), pp. 321, 326–328.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 328.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 341.

53. Molina Enríquez, *La revolución agraria*, vol. 5, p. 162.

54. Santiago Gómez, “Teórico del nacionalismo Mexicano,” *El Sol del Centro*, 8 June 1986, p. 5.

55. Molina Enríquez, *La revolución agraria*, vol. 5, p. 171.

56. *Ibid.*

57. *Ibid.*

58. *Ibid.*, p. 172.

59. Daniel Moreno, *Los hombres de la Revolución, 40 estudios biográficos* (Mexico City: Ibero Mexicano Editores, 1960), pp. 254–256.

60. *Ibid.*, pp. 172–174.

61. Emilio Portes Gil, “Prólogo,” in Andrés Molina Enríquez, *La revolución agraria en México* (Mexico City: Comisión Federal de Electricidad Instituto Nacional de Estudios Históricos de la Revolución Mexicana, 1985), p. 24.

62. Villa had reverted to guerrilla tactics after the defeat at Celaya and raided with “armies of five thousand or more men” through the state of Chihuahua in 1916. In

Charles Cumberland's words, "Before the end of 1916 Villa had captured, and subsequently evacuated, every major city in the state [of Chihuahua] except Ciudad Juárez, and he ended the year by capturing and looting Torreón." Cumberland, *Mexican Revolution: The Constitutionalist Years*, p. 234.

63. Molina Enríquez, *La revolución agraria*, vol. 5, pp. 172–176.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 177.

65. E. V. Niemeyer, *Revolution at Querétaro: The Mexican Constitutional Convention of 1916–1917* (Austin: The Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Texas, 1974) p. 137.

66. Molina Enríquez, *La revolución agraria*, vol. 5, p. 176.

67. E. V. Niemeyer, *Revolution at Querétaro*, p. 137.

68. Molina Enríquez, *La revolución agraria*, vol. 5, p. 177.

69. *Ibid.*

70. Pastor Rouaix, "Apuntes sobre la génesis del Artículo 27 Constitucional," in Felix F. Palavicini, *Historia de la Constitución de 1917*, vol. 1, p. 608.

71. Niemeyer, *Revolution at Querétaro*, p. 143.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 136 & p. 164.

73. Cumberland, *Mexican Revolution*, p. 352.

74. Molina Enríquez, *La revolución agraria*, vol. 5, pp. 178–179.

75. Niemeyer, *Revolution at Querétaro*, p. 141.

76. "Artículo 27 de la Constitución de 1917," in Manuel Fabila, *Cinco siglos de legislación agraria*. English translations of Article 27 can be found in Frank Tannenbaum, *The Mexican Agrarian Revolution* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1933) pp. 518–527, Appendix D, Article 27 (includes preface), and Niemeyer, *Revolution at Querétaro*, pp. 250–262, Appendix E, Article 27 Compared to Draft Proposal.

77. Please see chapter 2 for a discussion of Molina Enríquez's 1905 proposed federal water law that contains the theoretical foundations for Article 27 and how Molina Enríquez uses colonial legal precedence in *Los grandes problemas* to argue for the right of the federal government to regulate private property.

78. For a summary of Molina Enríquez's 1905 proposed federal water law, see chapter 2 of this work. For Article 27, see references in footnote 68 of this chapter.

79. "Decreto sobre colonización y compañías deslindadoras," en Fabila, *Cinco siglos de legislación agraria en México*, Art. 14, p. 185.

80. Niemeyer, "Article 27 Compared with Draft Proposal, Clause 11," *Revolution at Querétaro*, appendix E, pp. 260–261.

81. See chapter 2 of this work.

82. Eyley N. Simpson, "The Mexican Agrarian Reform: Problems and Progress" (Mexico City: Institute of Current World Affairs, 1933), Agricultural Studies, Series 1, No. 9, unpublished manuscript, p. 78.

83. Tannenbaum, *The Mexican Agrarian Revolution*, appendix D, Article 27, pp. 518–520.

CHAPTER 6

1. Molina Enríquez, *La revolución agraria*, vol. 5, p. 162.

2. *Ibid.*

3. Simpson, "Mexican Agrarian Reform," Table 7: Definitive Distribution of Land by Years and Type of Grant, 1915–1931, p. 73.
4. Simpson, "Mexican Agrarian Reform," p. 73; and Wilkie, *The Mexican Revolution: Federal Expenditure and Social Change since 1910* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), Table 8-4, Execution of Definitive Presidential Resolutions Distributing Land Since 1915, p. 188.
5. "Acta de la sesión celebrada el día 15 de Marzo de 1917," in *Boletín Mensual de la Comisión Nacional Agraria*, year 1, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 85–89.
6. "Sesión, 29 de Marzo de 1917," *Boletín Mensual de la Comisión Nacional Agraria*, year 1, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 93–94. In fact the Constitution did not become the "fundamental law" of Mexico until 1 May 1917. Between February and May of 1917, the Carranza government was busy organizing national and state elections. These elections in the spring of 1917 would put into place the politicians and leaders who would be responsible for governing under the provisions of the 1917 Constitution. This would include making changes at the state level to "conform to the new national charter." Cumberland, *Mexican Revolution: Constitutional Years*, pp. 381, 364.
7. "Sesión, 29 de Marzo de 1917," *Boletín Mensual de la Comisión Nacional Agraria*, year 1, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 93.
8. "Sesión, 7 April 1917," *Boletín Mensual de la Comisión Nacional Agraria*, year 1, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 95–96.
9. "Sesión, 23 April 1917," *Boletín Mensual de la Comisión Nacional Agraria*, year 1, vol. 1, no. 3, p. 141.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 142.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 141–142.
12. "Sesión, 12 April 1917," *Boletín Mensual de la Comisión Nacional Agraria*, year 1, vol. 1, no. 1, p. 137.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 137–138.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 142.
15. Earlier sections of this chapter discuss Rouaix's opposition to another of Molina Enríquez's proposals that would have diminished the authority of the CNA in the land-reform program.
16. "Sesión, 23 April 1917," *Boletín Mensual de la Comisión Nacional Agraria*, year 1, vol. 1, no. 3, p. 142.
17. "Sesión, June 1917," *Boletín Mensual de la Comisión Nacional Agraria*, year 1, vol. 1, no. 4, p. 201.
18. "Sesión, 7 July 1917," *Boletín Mensual de la Comisión Nacional Agraria*, year 1, vol. 1, no. 5, p. 224.
19. See chapter 1 for an examination of Molina Enríquez's notary work in Sultepec, Mexico from 1894 to 1898.
20. "Sesión, 7 July 1917," *Boletín Mensual de la Comisión Nacional Agraria*, year 1, vol. 1, no. 5, pp. 224–225.
21. Molina Enríquez was not present at the monthly meetings of the executive committee of the CNA from August 1917 to February 1918.
22. "Ley agraria para aprovechamiento de tierras ociosas," Legislatura Constitucional, Decreto No. 45, 11 January 1911, *Archivo Cámara de Deputado, Estado de México*.
23. Molina Enríquez, *Los grandes problemas*, p. 174.

24. "Decreto No. 10," 20 August 1917, *Periódico Oficial del Gobierno del Estado de México*, 22 August 1917.
25. Ibid.
26. "Decreto," 5 September 1917, *Periódico Oficial del Gobierno del Estado de México*, 5 September 1917.
27. Ibid.
28. "Decreto," 29 August 1917, *Periódico Oficial del Gobierno del Estado de México*, 29 August 1917.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. See chapter 3 of this work for an analysis of Molina Enríquez's platform as gubernatorial candidate in the state of Mexico in the summer of 1911.
32. See chapter 3.
33. Luis Molina Enríquez interview, 1988.
34. "Decreto," 15 September 1917, *Periódico Oficial del Gobierno del Estado de México*.
35. Ibid.
36. Molina Enríquez, *Los grandes problemas*, p. 182.
37. "Acuerdo," 1 October 1917, *Periódico Oficial del Gobierno del Estado de México*.
38. See chapters 1 and 2 of this work for Molina Enríquez's pre-Revolutionary concerns over pulque cultivation in central Mexico.
39. "Constitución Política del Estado Libre y Soberano de México," *Periódico Oficial del Gobierno del Estado de México*, 17 November 1917.
40. See chapter 2 of this work for an analysis of the influence of Nordau's ideas on Molina Enríquez's first social-reformist tract.
41. Molina Enríquez, *Los grandes problemas*, p. 182.
42. "Constitución Política del Estado México," 17 November 1917; and Niemeyer, *Revolution at Querétaro*, Appendix E, Article 27, paragraph 3, p. 256, paragraph 8, p. 259, and paragraph 11, pp. 260–261.
43. In a 1909 tract for the Reyista movement, Molina Enríquez had set the maximum allowable sizes of haciendas at 100 to 1,000 hectares.
44. "Constitución Política del Estado de México," 17 November 1917.
45. Artículo 205, "Constitución del Estado de México."
46. Artículos 206 and 207, "Constitución del Estado de México."
47. Artículo 208, "Constitución del Estado de México."
48. Ibid.
49. See chapter 1 of this work, which outlines the tax assessment problem as taken up in *Los grandes problemas*.
50. Artículos 209–216, "Constitución del Estado de México."
51. Eyler Simpson, *The Ejido: Mexico's Way Out* (Raleigh: The University of North Carolina Press, 1937), Table 23, p. 616.
52. Ibid., pp. 626–627.
53. Ibid., pp. 644–645.
54. Ibid., p. 203.
55. "Sesión, 22 February 1918," *Boletín Mensual de la Comisión Nacional Agraria*, year 2, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 175–180.

56. Ibid., p. 176.
57. Ibid., pp. 176–177.
58. “Sesión Extraordinaria, 25 February 1918,” *Boletín Mensual de la Comisión Nacional Agraria*, pp. 178–180.
59. “Sesión, 5 April 1918,” *Boletín Mensual de la Comisión Nacional Agraria*, year 2, vol. 2, nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, p. 294.
60. “Sesión Extraordinaria, 16 April 1918,” *Boletín Mensual de la Comisión Nacional Agraria*, year 2, vol. 2, nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, p. 299.
61. “Sesión, 19 April 1918,” *Boletín Mensual de la Comisión Nacional Agraria*, year 2, vol. 2, nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, p. 300.
62. Ibid.
63. “Circular Número 27,” in Fabila, *Cinco siglos de legislación agraria en México*, pp. 327–328.
64. Tannenbaum, *The Mexican Agrarian Revolution*, Census of 1921 — Rural Population, p. 40.
65. Molina Enríquez included the right of indigenous communities in the state of Mexico to legal status in his 1911 populist platform for the gubernatorial race in the state of Mexico. See chapter 3.
66. “Sesión, 12 April 1918,” *Boletín Mensual de la Comisión Nacional Agraria*, year 2, vol. 2, nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, pp. 295–297.
67. Ibid., p. 300.
68. Earlier sections of this chapter outline how Rouaix modified Molina Enríquez’s recommendation that the CNA ask state governors to grant legal status to pueblos destroyed by hacienda expansion, and how Rouaix modified Molina Enríquez’s proposals to ensure the CNA retained jurisdiction over the land reform process.
69. “Sesión, 30 August 1918,” *Boletín Mensual de la Comisión Nacional Agraria*, year 2, vol. 2, nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, p. 431.
70. “Sesión, 6 September 1918,” *Boletín Mensual de la Comisión Nacional Agraria*, year 2, vol. 2, nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, pp. 431–432.
71. “Sesión, 20 September 1918,” *Boletín Mensual de la Comisión Nacional Agraria*, year 2, vol. 2, nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, p. 434.
72. James W. Wilkie, *The Mexican Revolution*, Table 8-4: Execution of Definitive Presidential Resolutions Distributing Land since 1915, p. 188.
73. Simpson, *The Ejido*, p. 79.
74. Ramón Eduardo Ruíz, *The Great Rebellion: Mexico, 1905–1924* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1980), p. 308; and Katz, *The Secret War in Mexico*, p. 536.
75. Simpson, *The Ejido*, p. 78.
76. Ibid.

CHAPTER 7

1. Mexican hacendados fought the implementation of Article 27 with court injunctions. Meanwhile, the United States government, concerned with Article 27’s provisions that mandated that the nation held ultimate right to all subsoil resources in Mexico, applied external pressure on behalf of U.S. oil companies in the 1920s. See Frank Tannenbaum, *Peace by Revolution*, pp. 204–205, for a discussion of how Mexican

hacendados were able to use court injunctions to drastically slow down the land-reform process. For the question of U.S. pressure to curtail the nationalization features of Article 27, see Lorenzo Meyer, *México y los Estados Unidos en el conflicto petrolero, 1917–1942* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1968).

2. Many revisionist commentators on the Mexican Revolution note how the Sonoran dynasty's ascendancy to power represented the coming to power of the national bourgeoisie in Mexico. Naturally, for the bourgeoisie, the midsize family farms that Molina Enríquez advocated were greatly preferable to the collective farms of the ejido program. For examples of this revisionist argument, see Hector Aguilar Camín, "The Relevant Tradition: Sonoran Leaders in the Revolution," in D. A. Brading, *Caudillo and Peasant in the Mexican Revolution* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1980) and John Womack, "The Mexican Revolution, 1910 to 1920," in Leslie Bethell, ed., *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, vol. 5, c. 1870–1930, (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1986).

3. "Conferencia del Lic. Molina Enríquez, *La Raza*, 24 May 1922, and *Boletín de la Secretaría de Gobernación*, vol. 1, no. 4, (Mexico City: Imprenta de la Secretaría de Gobernación) September 1922.

4. "Conferencia del Lic. Molina Enríquez, *La Raza*, 24 de Mayo de 1922, p. 2.

5. While Molina Enríquez's disavowal of socialism might seem to be inconsistent with his ideological orientation before and during the Revolution, in fact, from the first he had taken an anti-socialist stance and had never advocated the abandonment of capitalism.

6. "Conferencia del Lic. Molina Enríquez," *La Raza*, p. 5.

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Boletín de la Secretaría de Gobernación*, vol. 1, no. 4, September 1922. Most of Molina Enríquez's articles in the *Boletín* can be seen in Andrés Molina Enríquez, *Los grandes problemas*, Arnaldo Córdova, ed. (Mexico City: Ediciones Era, 1978), Anexos.

9. See chapter 2 of this work for an examination of Molina Enríquez's warnings regarding the possibilities of U.S. intervention to protect the property interests of its citizens given a social revolution in Mexico.

10. *El Demócrata* had been a pro-Axis paper during World War I, according to Stanley Ross. However, this orientation did not inhibit the paper from taking a proagrarian reform stance in the debates of the 1920s. For a brief history of the Mexican press, see Stanley R. Ross, "El historiador y el periodismo mexicano," in *Historia Mexicana* 55, vol. 14, no. 3, January-March 1965, pp. 347–382.

11. "Por que ha fracasado la Reforma Agraria—Lo que debe hacerse para realizarla," *El Demócrata*, 25 January 1922, p. 3.

12. Lorenzo Meyer, "El primer tramo del camino," in *Historia General de México*, vol. 2 (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1976), pp. 1219–1220.

13. "Como Interpreta el Sr. Lic. Molina el Artículo 27," *Excelsior*, 30 January 1922, p. 1.

14. Alan Knight, *U.S.–Mexican Relations, 1910–1940: An Interpretation* (San Diego: Center for U.S.–Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1987), p. 128.

15. For Molina Enríquez's defense of Article 27 before the Mexican Supreme Court, see Andrés Molina Enríquez, *Los grandes problemas*, Arnaldo Córdova, ed. (Mexico City: Ediciones Era, 1978), Anexos, pp. 481–523.

16. Andrés Molina Enríquez, "Cuando deben pagarse las indemnizaciones," in *Boletín de la Secretaría de Gobernación*, vol. 1, no. 4 (Mexico City: Imprenta de la Secretaría de Gobernación, 1922), p. 85, and "Como Interpreta el Sr. Lic. Molina el Artículo 27, *Excelsior*, 30 January 1922, p. 2.
17. See chapter 2, pp. 64–65, of this work.
18. Molina Enríquez, "Como Interpreta . . . Artículo 27," p. 8.
19. Andrés Molina Enríquez, "El pago efectivo de las tierras, *Excelsior*, 2 January 1922, p. 4.
20. *Ibid.*
21. Meyer, "El primer tramo del camino," p. 1222.
22. Simpson, *The Ejido*, Table 17, Definitive Distribution of Land by Years and Type of Grant, 1915–1933, p. 609.
23. Wilkie, *The Mexican Revolution*, Table 8–4, Execution of Definitive Presidential Resolutions Distributing Land Since 1915, p. 188.
24. Molina Enríquez, "Como Interpreta . . . Artículo 27," p. 8.
25. Lorenzo Meyer, "El primer tramo del camino," p. 1209.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 1207.
27. Moisés Gonzalez Navarro, *La Confederación Nacional Campesina, una grupo de presión en la Reforma Agraria Mexicana* (Mexico City: B. Costa-Amic. Editorial, 1968), p. 128.
28. Simpson, *The Ejido*, p. 321.
29. Berta Ulloa, "La lucha armada (1911–20)," in *Historia General de México*, vol. 4 (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1976), p. 135.
30. Lorenzo Meyer, "El primer tramo del camino," p. 1209.
31. *Ibid.*
32. Letter, Confederación Nacional Agraria, August 1924, Archivo Carlos Basave, Biblioteca Nacional, 707.
33. Andrés Molina Enríquez, "El verdadero objeto de los ejidos," Confederación Nacional Agraria, Archivo Carlos Basave, Biblioteca Nacional, p. 720.
34. Andrés Molina Enríquez, "El Partido Nacional Agrarista ha hecho al Agrarismo más daño que los mismos Latifundistas," *El Demócrata*, 26 May 1925, p. 3.
35. *Ibid.*
36. Andrés Molina Enríquez, "Puntos de vista sobre el problema agrario," *El Demócrata* 29 May 1925, p. 3.
37. Chapter 6 of this work contains an examination of how the 1917 Constitution of the state of Mexico incorporated Molina Enríquez's tax-reform proposals as a means to push the division of the state's haciendas.
38. Andrés Molina Enríquez, "La mejor forma de los contratos," Confederación Nacional Agraria, Carlos Basave Archive, Biblioteca Nacional, 717.
39. Molina Enríquez, "El verdadero objeto de los ejidos."
40. Molina Enríquez, "Puntos de vista sobre el problema agrario," p. 3.
41. See Andrés Molina Enríquez, *La Guerra del Pacífico* (Mexico City: Publicaciones del Museo Nacional de México, 1937). This monograph is a reprint of a newspaper series Molina Enríquez wrote in 1928 predicting World War II.
42. Andrés Molina Enríquez, "El tratado con el Japón y la bandera agraria de la disolución de las haciendas," *El Demócrata*, 10 July 1925, p. 3.
43. *Ibid.*
44. Simpson, *The Ejido*, p. 333.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 92.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
47. Molina Enríquez, *Los grandes problemas*, pp. 151–152.
48. Wilkie, *The Mexican Revolution*, Table 8.4, Execution of Definitive Presidential Resolutions Distributing Land Since 1915, p. 188. The nearly three million hectares that the Calles administration distributed from 1924 to 1928 almost tripled the amount that the Obregón administration had distributed from 1920 to 1924.
49. Wilkie, *The Mexican Revolution*, Table 8.7, Recipients of Land by Presidential Term Since 1915, p. 194.
50. This would be especially true in arid northern Mexico where several hundred hectares are necessary to have a viable ranch or farm. Yet even in central Mexico, ten hectares would not constitute enough land to make a comfortable living. See Wilkie, *The Mexican Revolution*, p. 195.
51. Ideologically, Calles fits the revisionist characterization of the Sonoran dynasty as being representative of the bourgeoisie that took power in Mexico after the coup against Carranza in 1920. See note 2 of this chapter.
52. Molina Enríquez, “Puntos de vista sobre el problema agrario,” p. 3.
53. Francois Chevalier, “The Ejido and Political Stability in Mexico,” in Claudio Veliz, ed., *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 187.
54. Knight, *U.S.–Mexican Relations*, pp. 130–137.
55. Simpson, *The Ejido*, Table 17, p. 609.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 114.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 441.
58. Wilkie, *The Mexican Revolution*, p. 188 & p. 194.
59. Susan R. Walsh Sanderson, *Land Reform in Mexico: 1910–1980* (New York: Academic Press, 1984), pp. 91–95.
60. Andrés Molina Enríquez to President Cárdenas, 23 November 1934, Fondo Cárdenas, 444.1/1, AGN.
61. In 1935, Molina Enríquez revived his paper *El Reformador*, which he first published in 1913, in order to aid the national government in representing the interests of the “Indians and Indian-mestizos” of Mexico. *El Reformador*, year 1, no. 3, Mexico, D.F., 2 June 1937.
62. Andrés Molina Enríquez to President Cárdenas, 23 November 1934, Fondo Cárdenas, 444.1/1, AGN.
63. “La Obra de la Revolución,” interview with Andrés Molina Enríquez, *El Reformador*, 15 July 1936, p. 5.
64. Andrés Molina Enríquez, *La Gloriosa Cruzada del Mayab*, September 1937, unpublished monograph. Biblioteca Daniel Cosío Villegas, Colegio de México, México, D.F., pp. 3–5.
65. “A los Comunistas,” *El Reformador*, 15 December 1935, pp. 1, 7.
66. “El conflicto de los derechos de propiedad en nuestro País,” *El Reformador*, 2 June 1937, p. 3.
67. “Lo que significan las invasiones de las Haciendas,” *El Reformador*, 1 April 1936, p. 8.
68. Andrés Molina Enríquez, “La reforma agraria—Enorme diferencia entre lo que la Revolución prometió hacer y lo que ha hecho,” *El Reformador*, 1 November 1935, p. 8. In the article Molina Enríquez claims that Señor Lic. Don Gilberto Leyo.

“our intelligent demographer,” had compiled the statistics demonstrating that the hacienda had actually grown from 1917 to 1935.

69. *Ibid.*, pp. 1, 2, 8.

70. Andrés Molina Enríquez to President Cárdenas, Fondo Cárdenas, 135.23/56, Ramo Presidente, AGN.

71. Jeffery Brannon and Eric N. Baklanoff, *Agrarian Reform and Public Enterprise in Mexico: The Political Economy of Yucatán's Henequen Industry* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1987), p. 52.

72. Gabriella de Beer, *Luis Cabrera*, pp. 101–103.

73. Molina Enríquez, *La gloriosa cruzada*, pp. 8–9.

74. Molina Enríquez, *La revolución agraria*, vol. 4, p. 116. For confirmation of Molina Enríquez's assessment of pre-Revolutionary Yucatán, see John Kenneth Turner, “The Slaves of the Yucatán,” in *Barbarous Mexico* (San Antonio: University of Texas Press, 1969) pp. 3–26.

75. Molina Enríquez, *La gloriosa cruzada*, p. 10.

76. Molina Enríquez, *La gloriosa cruzada*, p. 9. In the first volume of his five-volume history of the Mexican agrarian revolution, Molina Enríquez divided the world into two great cultures, the oriental and the occidental, divided by their concepts of property. He placed Mexico's indigenous peoples into the oriental culture, which had never developed the idea of private property but rather held land communally. *La revolución agraria*, vol. 1, pp. 23–24.

77. Telegram, Molina Enríquez to President Cárdenas, Fondo Cárdenas, 201.5/793, Ramo Presidente, AGN.

78. *Ibid.*

79. General Jenaro Amezcuca to President Cárdenas, 2 November 1938, Fondo Cárdenas 201.5/793, Ramo Presidente, AGN.

80. Confederación de Trabajadores de México (CTM) to President Cárdenas, 9 March 1938, Fondo Cárdenas 201.5/793, Ramo Presidente, AGN.

81. Raúl Gustavo de Santiago Gómez notes how the “Mexico City establishment” abandoned Molina Enríquez. According to Santiago Gómez, Molina Enríquez's prime interest in obtaining a pension was to secure the future for his small daughter from a second marriage. Santiago Gómez, “Teórico del Nacionalismo Mexicano: Molina Enríquez,” *El Sol del Centro*, 6 August 1986, p. 5.

Luis Molina Enríquez explained that his grandfather had never focused on making money, and as a second- or third-level bureaucrat at the National Museum, had earned a modest income. In fact, instead of retiring, Molina Enríquez returned to Toluca in the late 1930s and worked as a judge in the Tribunal Superior de Justicia del Estado de México until his death in 1940. Luis Molina Enríquez interview, 1988.

Molina Enríquez's financially modest means in old age contrasts sharply with that of other politicians of the Calles era who enriched themselves by rising to positions of responsibility during the Revolution. For this, see Frank Tannenbaum, *Mexico: The Struggle for Peace and Bread* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), pp. 69–70.

82. Luis Molina Enríquez interview, 1988.

83. “La política del gobierno,” *El Reformador*, 1 February 1936.

84. Andrés Molina Enríquez to President Cárdenas, 7 April 1938, Fondo Cárdenas, Ramo Presidente, AGN.

85. Editorial, *El Reformador*, 2 April 1938, p. 1.

86. Luis González notes that Mexican city dwellers generally opposed Cárdenas's land-reform program along the lines of Luis Cabrera's argument against the collective ejido. Luis González, *Los días del presidente Cárdenas*, vol. 15, *Historia de la Revolución Mexicana* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1981), p. 155.

87. By this I mean the pure competition that Adam Smith envisioned as the great regulator of the economy. In fact, Smith was strongly anti-monopoly, especially in regard to landlords. For Smith, landlords were monopolists, and like all monopolists, loved "to reap where they never sowed." See Eli Gizberg, "An Economy Formed by Men," in Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr., ed., *Adam Smith and Modern Political Economy: Bicentennial Essays on the Wealth of Nations* (Ames: The Iowa State University Press, 1979), p. 40–41.

CHAPTER 8

1. James W. Wilkie and Michael W. Hammond, "La primera 'reforma agraria' en México, 1853–1909, visto por la estadística oficial," in Sergio de la Peña and James W. Wilkie, *La estadística económica en México: Los orígenes* (Mexico City: Siglo Veinte Uno and Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana–Azcapotzalco, forthcoming).

2. James W. Wilkie, "The Six Ideological Phases of Mexico's 'Permanent Revolution' since 1910," in James W. Wilkie, ed., *Society and Economy in Mexico*, (Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center Publications, 1990), pp. 1–69.

3. Wilkie, "The Six Ideological Phases," Figure 6: Mexico Social Modernization Index, 1930–70, p. 40. Haber's Social Modernization Index, expanding on Wilkie's Poverty Index, uses seven factors in determining poverty. In total, the seven factors define a poor Mexican as a barefoot or sandal-wearing rural dweller who cannot read, speaks Indian and Spanish, and eats tortillas rather than wheat bread. Using these criteria, poverty in Mexico has declined by half from 1930 to 1970.

4. Wilkie, "Six Ideological Phases," Table 2 Land Reform in Mexico, 1916–88, Part I. Hectares, p. 7.

5. Wilkie, "Six Ideological Phases," pp. 41–42.

6. David Clark Scott, "Mexican Agricultural Reforms Set Stage for a New Revolution," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 21 November 1991. Marjorie Miller and Juanita Darling, "Mexico Seeks Land Reform, Bigger Farms." *Los Angeles Times*, 8 November 1991.

7. Tim Golden, "The Dream of Land Dies Hard in Mexico," *New York Times*, November 27, 1991. Golden mentions that the Mexican government has subsidized peasant production of corn and beans at double the world price in recent years, yet has still had to import corn and beans to feed the urban population.

8. Numerous studies of the ejido have been made beginning with Eyler N. Simpson, *The Ejido: Mexico's Way Out* (Raleigh: North Carolina Press, 1937). See also Clarence Senior, *Land Reform and Democracy* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1958), a study of the collectivization of the La Laguna cotton-growing region of northern Mexico; Raymond Wilkie, *San Miguel: A Mexican Collective Ejido* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971); David Ronfeldt, *Atencingo: The Politics of Agrarian Struggle in a Mexican Ejido* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); Arturo Warman, *We Come to Object: The Peasants of Morelos and the National State* (Baltimore:

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9. In sum, the essays in D. A. Brading's 1980 book *Caudillo and Peasant* present official agrarian revolution as a means to mobilize the peasantry for ends harmful to their long-term interests: the creation of a capitalist economy directed by a centralized, authoritarian state. Land reform became a means by which the federal government attempted to undermine peasant support for regional strongmen who presented a challenge to the evolving one-party system.

10. Wilkie, "Mexico's 'Permanent Revolution' since 1910," p. 6.

11. Tutino, *From Insurrection to Revolution*, p. 371.

12. See the introduction of this work for notes on the Mexican writers who have honored Molina Enríquez with such titles.

13. See Francois Chevalier, "The Ejido and Political Stability in Mexico," in Claudio Veliz, ed., *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Stanley F. Shadle is an assistant professor of history at College Misericordia in Dallas, Pennsylvania. He received his Ph.D. in 1990 in Latin American history from the University of California, Santa Barbara, with co-direction of his dissertation at UCLA. Shadle was awarded a master's degree in Latin American Studies from the University of Cambridge in 1985. He lived in Mexico City in 1988 while conducting the research for this book, and in 1992 was a speaker for the 75th anniversary of the state of Mexico's 1917 Constitution.

